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Preface
This book is a long-overdue sequel to Regulating Paradise, published in 
1984, which is both out of print and out of date. It reflects more of an 
emphasis on land use and development law at the expense of environ-
mental law for two reasons. First, there has been a great deal of activity, 
both legislatively (statutes and ordinances) and judicially (Hawai‘i state 
and relevant federal cases), particularly in the areas of land develop-
ment conditions, creation of state agencies with land management or 
development functions (OHA, ATDC, for example), coastal zone man-
agement, and environmental impact assessment. Second, I no longer 
teach, research, or write in environmental law, and my colleague, Denise 
Antolini, who does, is writing her own book on Hawai‘i environmental 
law. Therefore, while there is some overlap (we both give coastal zone 
management full chapter treatment, and I have a catch-all environmen-
tal law chapter as it specifically affects land use), in-depth treatment of 
such subjects as clean air, clean water, endangered species, and environ-
mental impact assessment I gladly leave to Professor Antolini.
 This book could not possibly have been written without the gener-
ous support of several groups and the dedicated research and drafting 
provided by a cadre of patient research assistants over the past three 
years. In the first category, my thanks to the Pacific Legal Foundation for 
its annual support for several years and additional contributions from 
Title Guaranty Escrow Services, the McNaughton Group, the Maryl 
Group, Castle & Cooke Hawai‘i, Hawai‘i Leeward Planning Conference, 
Outrigger Enterprises, the Lyle Anderson Group, and the Bill Mills 
Development Company, all through the Hawai‘i Property Law Project. 
In the second category, my thanks for the splendid research contribu-
tions not only in the tedious tasks of checking sources and notes, but also 
in providing research memoranda and draft chapter additions: to my 
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present research assistants Stephen Fischer, Mark Kaetsu, Kekoa Keiley, 
and Emily Klatt; and for past research contributions, Adrienne Saurez, 
Christopher Goodin, Jennifer Benck, Tina Wakayama, Glenn Sonoda, 
Marissa Lum, Rafael Renteria, Joe Dane, Madeline Reed, Sara String-
fellow, and Anna Fernandez. Also, my thanks to Princess Soares, my 
faculty-support staff specialist for her consistent help and unfailing 
good humor as we moved the book from draft (eight, at last count) to 
completion over the past eighteen months, and to my past staff specialist, 
Josephine Ah Ching. For reviewing early drafts of chapters, my thanks to 
Professors Denise Antolini and Kem Lowry; and for reviewing the entire 
manuscript on behalf of the University of Hawai‘i Press, Dan Davidson 
and Professor Dan Tarlock. Drafts of many chapters were sent to and 
for the most part reviewed by the relevant government agencies, many 
of which made detailed and helpful suggestions. However, since many 
of the individual government reviewers asked to remain anonymous, all 
references to present and past public sector reviewers are omitted here, 
except where referenced in footnotes. My thanks to Lorenzo Trinidad 
for the Corky Trinidad editorial cartoons from the Honolulu Star-Bulletin 
that appear in this book. I’ve also been blessed again with superb edito-
rial support from Ann Ludeman, managing editor at the University of 
Hawai‘i Press, and the careful editing and suggestions of copy editor 
Lee S. Motteler. Finally, my eternal thanks for the years of support and 
encouragement of William H. Hamilton, director of the University of 
Hawai‘i Press. I couldn’t have done it without you, Bill. 
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Note on Style
In the text, diacritical marks in Hawaiian words and names follow mod-
ern usage (e.g., ‘āina, Hawai‘i, Lāna‘i, etc.). However, note that in state 
and county government agencies and offices, use of the marks is often 
considered optional. Also, to facilitate searching, the marks are omit-
ted in court cases and Web site URLs throughout this volume. Titles of 
publications (articles, books, Web pages, etc.), where possible, follow 
the original.

1Introduction
A “Baker’s Dozen” Land Policy Agenda
for the Fiftieth State
Ua mau ke ea o ka ‘āina i ka pono—The life of the land is 
perpetuated in righteousness.
 —Hawai‘i state motto
Land use in Hawai‘i continues to be the most regulated of all the fifty 
states. According to many sources, going from raw land to the comple-
tion of a project may well average ten years, given that such raw land is 
almost certainly classified by the State Land Use Commission initially as 
either Conservation or Agriculture (still, between them, comprising 95 
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percent of the land area of the state). The costs associated with holding 
and developing land for so long are considerable, and this drives up the 
price of virtually anything connected with land development. It is no 
wonder that our housing prices, for example, are among the highest 
in the United States. Couple this regulatory scheme with increasingly 
large numbers of so-called public interest groups that lay claim both 
to stakeholder status in the land use process and a veto power over the 
ultimate decision, and we have an unhealthy brew that threatens the 
economic future of the Fiftieth State. Commenced in order to bring 
order and sense to the use and development of that most precious of 
Island commodities—land—the regulation of land use has become an 
enormously complex process, often equally frustrating to the public 
and private sectors alike.
Context: The Evolution of Land Use Controls in Hawai‘i
The preoccupation with land management in Hawai‘i goes well back in 
history, arguably dating from the semifeudal relationship of certain of 
Hawai‘i’s monarchs with their chief nobles (ali‘i) to whom they parceled 
out land in ahupua‘a, which usually extended from the uplands to the 
sea.1 Thus, the roots of the statewide regulatory system are historical, 
which does much to explain the relatively easy acceptance of a strong 
regulatory regime without significant legal challenge: Management 
and disposal policies existed before a modern system of public land 
policy evolved. Indeed, this public land policy began to emerge shortly 
after what has been described as the chaotic conditions following the 
virtual destruction of ancient Hawaiian social and economic patterns 
in the middle of the nineteenth century.2 This culminated—officially at 
least—in the division (mahele) of 1848, also known as the Great Mahele 
(or simply Mahele). Between 240 and 250 owners (konohiki) met with 
King Kamehameha to divide their lands formally into two groups: those 
belonging to the king and those belonging to the chiefs. The division 
was recorded in a Mahele Book between January 27 and March 7, 
1848. By this process, the king obtained rights to about half the land 
in Hawai‘i, which he immediately separated further into crown lands 
(his own)3 and land for the government (the chiefs and the people) to 
be controlled by the legislature. The chiefs obtained title to land that 
the Mahele set aside for them by filing an appropriate claim with a land 
commission. Therefore, at the conclusion of the Mahele, land in Hawai‘i 
was assigned to—but not necessarily owned by—three groups: the royal 
 Introduction 3
family (crown lands), the government, and the chiefs. In theory, each 
group’s land was divided subject to the rights of those common people 
who were tenants thereon. However, unfamiliarity with European con-
cepts of landownership, lack of concern and lack of understanding 
resulted in the loss of many of these rights in just a few years.4
 In order to establish a more equitable pattern of landholding, 
there were several attempts to encourage “homesteading” acts both 
before and after Hawai‘i became a territory of the United States in 1898. 
Although a few hundred people did acquire family farm-sized tracts, 
the increasingly entrenched position of the large landholders remained 
largely unchanged, thereby perpetuating the centralized character of 
land management but with different “managers.”5 In sum, the fact that 
land management (though not necessarily ownership) had passed to 
a “foreign” oligarchy from a native one in the space of a few decades 
may be significant, but it is not when viewed from the perspective of a 
land use management framework.6 The centralizing influence remains, 
reinforced by the fact that government has also been highly centralized 
throughout much of Hawai‘i’s history.7
 In theory, it was possible for this pattern to have been broken 
by federal land policies once Hawai‘i became a territory, if the early 
attempts at “homesteading” had been continued by the federal govern-
ment. They were not. Nearly 2 million acres, Hawai‘i’s public lands, 
were ceded to the U.S. government, some of it quickly set aside for mili-
tary purposes.8 This simply increased the tendency toward centraliza-
tion of land management, despite sporadic attempts by both the federal 
government and a succession of governors in the first quarter of the 
twentieth century to resuscitate homesteading.9 The result was a climate 
that heavily favored centralized land use management and control at 
the public sector level, which is just what occurred in the middle decade 
of the twentieth century.
 In the years preceding 1961, when the State of Hawai‘i passed its 
Land Use Law, the interests of the private landholding oligarchy and 
the centralized state government converged out of concern for the 
threat to agricultural land, the mainstay of the major private inter-
ests and the single most important factor in the Hawaiian economy.10 
Hawai‘i’s economic boom was beginning, along with land speculation 
and development. Presumably the state’s four counties were unequal to 
the task of dealing with the problems generated by this rapid economic 
growth, having comparatively little planning expertise and few land use 
controls.11 The stage was thus set for the passage of Hawai‘i’s landmark 
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land use law, which resulted in the zoning of Hawai‘i by a state agency 
in order to contain sprawl and preserve agricultural land. It is this law 
and its progeny upon which most commentators have chosen to dwell. 
This is but the tip of the iceberg, however. Hawai‘i now labors under a 
plethora of local as well as additional state regulations that affect the 
use of land, public and private. Both traditional and unique zoning and 
subdivision schemes with multiple permits and conditions, all tied to 
tiers of local plans, vie for prominence with a host of regulations and 
standards issued pursuant to federal statutes that, directly or indirectly, 
further restrict the use of land.
 Not nearly so widely publicized are the steadily increasing power 
and authority of Hawai‘i’s counties—in particular Honolulu and spe-
cialized state development corporations—over land use planning and 
control. The result is a comprehensive and detailed set of land use 
controls. Indeed, as the counties and their planning and zoning depart-
ments have grown in experience, skill, and size and as their plans and 
ordinances have become more sophisticated, the role of the state in 
land use decision making not clearly involving a statewide interest is 
steadily diminishing. Land use decisions are thus beginning to more 
nearly resemble the regional regulatory patterns of developed states 
on the mainland. The Islandwide jurisdiction of each of Hawai‘i’s four 
counties, together with the absence of any smaller units of local gov-
ernment, effectively prevents local decision making from becoming too 
parochial.
 Nevertheless, Hawai‘i’s statewide land use law and the state plans 
that guide its implementation set the basic land use patterns for both 
private and public land in Hawai‘i. They also provide the context for 
county land use regulation, since only in one of the state’s four land 
use classifications may the counties exercise traditional local zoning 
and subdivision powers. All four counties have local land use powers 
and vigorously exercise them, not only through traditional zoning dis-
tricts but also through a host of special and mixed uses and districts, 
some of which “overlay” traditional districts for historic, conservation, 
or aesthetic purposes. How these affect traditional private develop-
ment “rights” is an increasingly important issue. So is the relation-
ship of proliferating county plans to traditional local land control 
ordinances.
 As the problems of land management in a developing state grow in 
complexity, so does the relationship of traditional land use controls with 
other related or special-purpose laws. Hawai‘i has its share of specific 
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state and local laws to protect historic sites and the natural environ-
ment. In addition to local responses to federal programs with the same 
goals, Hawai‘i has its own set of historic preservation and environmental 
impact assessment laws directed at the review—but not always preser-
vation—of historic and natural areas threatened with development. 
Special laws and state development corporations are also directed at 
special issues such as elimination of blight, redevelopment of commer-
cial areas, and provision of reasonably priced housing.
 The effect of land use laws on environmental laws is evident from 
the many land use implications of Hawai‘i’s response to the environmen-
tally sensitive federal programs of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Of major 
importance to an island state are the federal coastal zone and flood 
hazard protection programs and the way they have been integrated into 
state and local land use controls. Following closely in importance are 
the plans and regulations required by federal endangered species habi-
tat protection, clean air, and clean water laws and their effects on the 
siting of commercial, industrial, and large residential developments.
 Finally, in states such as Hawai‘i, both the state and the federal gov-
ernments make their presence felt through land use and disposal poli-
cies. The unique historic posture of Hawai‘i’s “ceded lands” continues 
to affect how, when, and to whom the federal government “disposes” 
of certain of its holdings. Ceded lands and other sizable tracts also are 
largely exempt from local and state land use regulation unless there are 
significant spillover consequences on adjacent land.
 A partial listing of major permits required for residential and resort 
development alone contains literally hundreds of entries. Government 
applies these regulations at both the county and state level, often with 
substantial federal encouragement. They apply to every aspect of the 
land use and development process, on virtually every square foot of 
beach, mountain, plateau, and valley, whether public or private, whether 
resort or residential, agricultural or urban. Thirteen particular issues—a 
baker’s dozen—confront our island state, fifty years since Hawai‘i voted 
overwhelmingly to join the Federal Union.
Land Development Conditions and the Use 
of Development Agreements
Coupled with the land development permit process as it presently 
exists, government imposes onerous conditions—often illegally—at the 
land reclassification stage that lack either nexus or proportionality to a 
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particular development. It is fair to require the land development com-
munity to bear a proportionate share of the costs of public facilities 
such as public schools and parks and infrastructure such as streets and 
water and sewer systems generated by a new development. It is, however, 
neither fair nor legal to foist “catch-up” infrastructure or social costs 
upon a particular project that has virtually no effect upon such costs. A 
prime example is the current litigation in Maui County over a 50 per-
cent workforce/affordable housing set-aside, imposed at the land clas-
sification stage on every form of development, including single-family 
detached. There is neither nexus nor proportionality. Every court that 
has rendered an opinion on such housing requirements has required 
such a connection, particularly and (for Hawai‘i) most relevantly, the 
State of California and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.12
 However, by negotiating a development agreement between land-
owner and local government, as provided for by statute in Hawai‘i (and 
California, among twelve other states that provide for such agreements), 
Hawai‘i’s counties could dispense with the twin requirements of nexus 
and proportionality, bargaining for substantial infrastructure and afford-
able/workforce housing from a developing landowner in exchange for 
“freezing” existing land development regulations and plans for a fixed 
period of years. Hundreds of such agreements have been negotiated in 
California under a similar statutory scheme and upheld by California 
courts on a regular basis. Indeed, such an agreement was the basis for a 
$50 million bypass highway and a 180-acre shoreline park, provided by 
a developer of resort-residential projects under a development agree-
ment negotiated with the County of Hawai‘i, in exchange for county 
guarantees that the landowner could take up to twenty years to com-
plete the project as originally approved.
 This is the second substantial advantage to the use of such agree-
ments: the vesting of rights in the land developer to proceed with a proj-
ect for whatever period of time he or she may negotiate in exchange 
for providing such “extra” public infrastructure/facilities. Multiphase 
developments in particular are at risk in the event of a change in county 
administration from an approving to a disapproving county council. 
The common law of vested rights (including estoppel for the most 
part) in Hawai‘i requires that a developer acquire a “last discretionary 
permit” and then spend substantial sums of money or otherwise dem-
onstrate good faith reliance on that permit before acquiring a right to 
continue with the development in the face of a law, plan, or policy that 
renders it illegal. Negotiating a development agreement freezes—but 
 Introduction 7
does not change in any way—existing plans, regulations, ordinances, or 
policies that permit such a development and renders laws to the con-
trary “void.”
Affordable Housing: Barriers, Workforce Housing,  
and Inclusionary Zoning
The resolution of Hawai‘i’s affordable housing crisis is a critical issue for 
statewide concern. Mandatory set-asides of so-called workforce housing 
units—even if constitutional, which they probably are not (see preced-
ing section on land development conditions)—cannot realistically pro-
vide so much as a partial solution, dependent as they are on a robust 
development economy: no development, no set-asides. Moreover, except 
when levied at an almost certainly unconstitutionally high level, such set-
asides provide very little housing. Thus, for example, a recent study of 
low-income housing production in Massachusetts finds that of fourteen 
thousand such units provided over a decade, less than 10 percent—a 
mere fourteen hundred—came from set-asides. A far more productive 
solution is a combination of government subsidy—either construction of 
such houses or providing fully infrastructured land to the private sector 
for such construction—coupled with the lowering of regulatory barriers 
(both administrative and substantive) to such housing, as advocated by 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and our State 
Task Force on Regulating Barriers to Affordable Housing. Among the 
solutions proposed decades ago in states such as New Jersey are using 
expedited permits and the increased use of manufactured housing 
(including so-called mobile homes), much of which is virtually indistin-
guishable today from traditionally constructed housing on-site.
Right to Exclude
There is a growing—and deeply flawed—sense of entitlement to cross 
private land to reach beaches, trailheads, and other public resources 
that is shared by many members of the public and various levels of gov-
ernment. Let’s be clear: With few exceptions, this is common-law tres-
passing. The right to exclude others from one’s land is a fundamental 
attribute of the fee simple ownership of land, and it has three times in 
the past twenty-five years been held by the U.S. Supreme Court to be a 
fundamental U.S. Constitutional right. It is on this ground that own-
ers of land fronting undeniably public beaches have every right to gate 
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private access ways to the beach and private residential communities 
have every right to gate the entrance to their private streets. Nor may 
government require such an access as a condition of land development, 
as at least three state supreme courts have clearly held. There are only 
two exceptions: (1) those who have successfully trespassed for enough 
years that they have acquired what the law calls an easement by prescrip-
tion, and (2) Native Hawaiians who can demonstrate that such access is 
a traditional and customary right.
 If that access is so important to the public at large, then govern-
ment can easily and relatively inexpensively condemn an easement 
for the public across any land it chooses. As the iconic justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr. of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote in a landmark 
opinion nearly a century ago, “We are in danger of forgetting that a 
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to 
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way 
of paying for the change.”13
Eminent Domain after Kelo v. New London
Following Hawai‘i’s famous Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff decision 
rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1984,14 there is virtually nothing 
left of the Fifth Amendment requirement that government condemn 
land only for a public use. So long as the announced public purpose 
(no longer only use by the public) was conceivable and possible, even if 
it never came to pass, a unanimous Court agreed it was constitutional. 
Thus it came as no surprise that, based largely on that decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the condemnation of two private houses by a 
city redevelopment agency in order to make way for “economic revital-
ization” in a depressed city on the Atlantic coast.15 While the Court left 
it open to the states to tighten public use standards and raise the bar for 
public use determinations (and dozens did so, either by constitutional 
or statutory amendment following the Kelo decision),16 Hawai‘i is so far 
not among them.
 Thus, it is worth loudly applauding the increasing use of pub-
lic purchase—either through bargain and sale or through eminent 
domain (compulsory purchase)—of private lands deemed important to 
preserve for public benefit and use. Prime examples are the community 
coalitions brought together to purchase large tracts of land in Pūpūkea 
and Waimea Falls Park and the use of the state’s Legacy Lands funds 
to contribute a public portion of the purchase price. Also potentially 
 Introduction 9
important—with reservations—is the increased activity of the Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) in the acquisition of large acreages ostensibly 
to preserve the Hawaiian values for which OHA was created.
 The U.S. Supreme Court did, however, leave one small sliver of a 
remedy for private landowners who can successfully show that the use 
of eminent domain by government is actually to benefit another private 
party and that the stated public purpose is a sham: pretextuality. If, for 
example, government were to condemn one discount store in a shop-
ping center at the request of another discount store for the purpose of 
eliminating competition, a claim of future blight elimination would not 
meet the public use/public purpose test. The Hawai‘i Supreme Court 
decided that county condemnation of land for a public bypass road that 
a developer agreed to construct in order to relieve congestion on an 
existing public highway could be characterized as pretextual and sent 
the case back to the trial court to hear more evidence.17 While one may 
applaud the concept, its execution in the context of these facts has been 
mystifying condemnation attorneys all over the country.
Open Space: Use of Rural and Agricultural Lands 
and Definition of Farm Dwellings
Our famous Land Use Law provides little concrete guidance about what 
constitutes sufficient agricultural use and farm dwellings to qualify as 
permitted uses in the State Agricultural Classification. Moreover, all 
four of Hawai‘i’s counties have for two decades permitted so-called 
fake farms—large-lot residential developments with some associated 
agricultural uses either on or off such large lots—and they have done 
so with no significant objection either from the Land Use Commission 
or the State Legislature. It should therefore have surprised no one that 
the much maligned Hōkūli‘a resort residential development on the Big 
Island sought and successfully obtained county permits to commence 
such development on state agriculturally classified land. Nor did the 
settlement of the ensuing litigation before the State Supreme Court 
could render a decision contribute to any certainty. The Hōkūli‘a devel-
oper simply followed the practice in the industry as the Court has previ-
ously held it was entitled to do, all in accordance with a well-drafted and 
executed development agreement. The attempt to change the rules in 
the middle of the game (as was duly noted and reported in the Wall 
Street Journal) sent a most unfortunate message to developers both in 
and out of the state about the security of land entitlements in Hawai‘i.
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 In addition, there is the matter of open space preservation. The 
current Important Agricultural Lands statute has the capacity to do 
much to ease the necessary conversion of poor agricultural land (recall 
that our State Land Use Law specifically permits so classifying land even 
if it is lava covered or so thinly soiled that it is demonstrably useless for 
agricultural purposes) to some kind of economically beneficial use (as 
required by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as interpreted 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council) in 
exchange for virtual permanent classification of important—translate 
“useable for agricultural purposes”—agricultural land in agricultural 
districts. However, the notion persists that agricultural land can con-
tinue to be regulated for open space preservation under the guise of 
protecting conservation and agricultural values even when neither is 
transparently possible.
 So it is also with the state’s conservation zone. An example stems 
from the application of the U.S. Endangered Species Act to that zone. 
The act is designed to protect plant and animal species listed by the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service as endangered. Despite propaganda by various 
environmental activist groups, the listing goes well beyond cute-looking 
wolf or fox cubs, lovely wildflowers, or stands of stately redwoods. The list 
in Hawai‘i also includes tiny blind cave spiders and cephalopods. It is to 
protect the latter that nearly one-quarter of the island of Kaua‘i was origi-
nally designated as “critical habitat” by the Fish and Wildlife Service in the 
1990s. While the federal statute by its terms prohibits only certain federal 
activity in such designated habitat, our State Land Use Law requires the 
State Land Use Commission to designate land in the restrictive Conserva-
tion District for the protection of endangered species and then requires 
the State Department of Land and Natural Resources, through its gov-
erning Land Board, to place such land in the most restrictive of its four 
subdistricts. The result is almost certainly to prevent all economically 
beneficial use of such land. This is not only just plain wrong, but it is also 
almost certainly unconstitutional as a regulatory taking of private land 
without compensation, as more fully described below.
Regulatory Takings after Lingle v. Chevron
While the 2005 Lingle v. Chevron case was about gas stations and gas 
prices, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court took the occasion to deliver 
a tutorial on takings jurisprudence, both regulatory and physical. In 
particular, the Court reiterated two key standards applicable to land 
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development regulations, whether at the state or county level, based on 
previous holdings:
 (1) If a regulation deprives a landowner of “all economically 
beneficial use,” then the Court will treat it as if government 
condemned the property. There is no defense of necessity or 
harm prevention available. Only if government is codifying 
common law nuisance or basing its law on some “background 
principle of a state’s law of property” such as custom or public 
trust can government escape the requirement to pay the 
landowner for that deprivation.18
 (2) If a regulation only partially deprives a landowner of 
economically beneficial use, then the court must examine the 
character of the governmental regulation and its economic 
effect on the landowner, and in particular whether the law 
frustrates the distinct or reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions of the regulated landowner.19
An example under Honolulu’s Land Use Ordinance occurs with respect 
to development in that ordinance’s Preservation 2 (P-2) zoning cate-
gory. As noted above, it is not constitutional for a regulation to deprive 
a landowner of all economically beneficial use of his or her land. How-
ever, the only permitted uses in this P-2 zone are vacation cabins and 
golf courses. But a small tract of P-2 cannot support the latter, and the 
former are permitted only as accessory uses to outdoor recreational 
principle uses. Indeed, the use of a ridge parcel so classified for vacation 
cottages has been denied by the director of the Department of Permit-
ting and Planning on just such grounds: They appear to be a principal 
use rather than an accessory use, and the parcel is too small to support 
a golf course. The situation raises total regulatory takings problems, 
as a matter of constitutional law. The same is almost certainly true for 
the state conservation zone (over 40 percent of the state land area), in 
which virtually no economically beneficial uses are permitted.
The Nature and Practice of Redevelopment at 
HCDA, ATDC, HFDC, and HHL
While Hawai‘i has no local governments or special municipal districts 
besides our four counties, the state does have several special-purpose 
redevelopment agencies provided for by state statute. Each has a partic-
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ular purpose as defined in the statute creating it. Each has considerable 
freedom from county—and in some instances state—land use controls. 
Each is charged with developing land. None has fully realized its goals.
Hawaiian Home Lands (HHL) is perhaps the oldest of the four. Its pur-
pose is to redevelop and develop land for the housing of Native Hawai-
ians. Until recently, there was very little substantive progress partly due 
to lack of infrastructure on its assigned land. HHL now appears to be 
moving briskly—for Hawai‘i—toward producing housing. However, a 
major issue is the extent to which it may ignore state and local land use 
controls. A recent State Supreme Court case found that an environ-
mental impact statement review is applicable to HHL projects because 
it does not significantly affect the land. Apparently, police power regula-
tions apply to HHL only if they do not significantly affect the land. Pre-
sumably, therefore, State Land Use Commission, Department of Land 
and Natural Resources, and county zoning regulations are inapplicable, 
rendering HHL free to develop land any way it chooses.
 Perhaps the state development corporation with the greatest 
promise and effect is the Hawai‘i Community Development Authority 
(HCDA). Its statutory purpose is not solely to develop land, such as the 
Kaka‘ako waterfront, but also to provide for affordable housing. Also 
statutorily free of county land use controls, HCDA is required to regu-
late the use of land within its jurisdiction by means of detailed devel-
opment plans and regulations conforming to such plans. After nearly 
thirty years, much of Kaka‘ako remains underdeveloped and precious 
little affordable housing has been created, perhaps not surprising given 
the prime nature of the real estate in that area. Interference by the State 
Legislature has not helped. Thus, a carefully planned and fully com-
plying mixed-use project with significant environmental cleanup and 
Native Hawaiian performing arts facilities was pulled from HCDA and 
canceled by the State Legislature after years of hearings, planning, and 
effort largely due to the efforts of a small but focused band of surfers, 
environmentalists, and residents. The development community, both 
locally and out of state, thereby learned (or relearned) once again two 
lessons about development or redevelopment in Hawai‘i: (1) Entitle-
ments are worth very little in the face of minority opposition, even after 
full compliance with our myriad land plans and laws, and (2) Hawai‘i 
has so many “stakeholders” wielding a veto over development that the 
process takes years, with no certainty about outcomes.
 The Aloha Tower Development Corporation (ATDC), on the other 
hand, has only one legislative purpose in life: to redevelop unused and 
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derelict piers on either side of the Aloha Tower Marketplace. In this it 
has been an abysmal failure. The sole response to its request for propos-
als to develop about a third of the piers and land under its jurisdiction 
came to naught when ATDC radically changed the rules in the middle 
of preconstruction implementation, effectively terminating its best 
opportunity for such redevelopment since the marginally successful 
Aloha Tower Marketplace. An arbitrator awarded the developer nearly 
$2 million in damages, finding that ATDC bargained in bad faith. So far, 
the state has simply refused to pay the award.
14 Regulating Paradise
Cultural Sensitivity, Burials, and Land Development
There is a sense among certain participants in the Hawaiian Renaissance 
that, like many groups in the environmental community with whom they 
are often allied, stakeholding is a given, and it means the power to veto. 
Contrast the long delay in the Honolulu complex that was to house the 
“first” Whole Foods Market in Hawai‘i with the “backup” smaller store, 
commenced about a year later, now thriving in Kahala Mall, resulting 
from the discovery of human—and likely Native Hawaiian—remains. 
Note also the difficulties a well-off landowner presently faces in build-
ing a single-family home on a single lot on Kaua‘i. No one suggests 
that human remains, regardless of ancestry, be treated in the cavalier 
fashion allegedly displayed by some contractors for the Hōkūli‘a proj-
ect on the Big Island following the discovery of bones in broken lava 
tubes (and for which Hōkūli‘a has paid dearly, even after putting a kiawe 
wood gated perimeter around each such “find” at considerable cost, 
both in terms of land and construction costs, in addition to providing 
access, the necessity for which the formerly hidden nature of the buri-
als belies). However, one suspects the perversion of the flawed process 
for dealing with burials under applicable statutes—which were rushed 
onto the books with little critical examination—for other motives and 
on other bases, such as in order simply to delay or stop the process of 
land development.
 Further, there is the brouhaha over telescopes and other such uses 
largely under the auspices of the University of Hawai‘i atop Mauna Kea. 
One of the two or three best sites in the world for astronomical obser-
vations (witness the tens of millions of dollars foreigners are not only 
willing to invest in equipment, but also the millions to share a few pre-
cious nights of already-leased “viewing time” with existing lessees), it is 
in danger of losing its status as some Native Hawaiian groups insist the 
site be treated as “sacred.”20
What Triggers an Environmental Assessment under HEIS
In common with many states, Hawai‘i has an environmental assessment 
statute requiring an initial evaluation of the environmental impacts of 
certain proposed developments, leading to a formal environmental 
impact statement if the assessment demonstrates such a need. The 
requirements are procedural: Regardless of the results of such an envi-
ronmental review, the applicable statute does not prohibit the project’s 
 Introduction 15
going forward. To paraphrase a federal court describing the result 
under the federal environmental policy act upon which our state statute 
is based, the law does not prohibit an environmental blunder; it simply 
renders that blunder knowledgeable.
 It is thus little short of amazing that our State Supreme Court has 
applied this lengthy, expensive, and time-consuming requirement to 
sweep within its terms entire projects on hundreds of acres when the 
sole “trigger”—use or sale of state land—amounts to a culvert under a 
state highway. The court seems unable either to reasonably apply a de 
minimis standard or to refrain from legislating from the bench. There is 
nothing in either the Hawai‘i Environmental Impact Statement (HEIS) 
law or its legislative history to demonstrate any legislative intent to sweep 
with such a large broom. The HEIS law desperately needs amending by 
the Legislature.
The “Third Rail”: OHA, Ceded Lands, Crown Lands, 
and T&C Rights
Claims of Native Hawaiians to certain lands ceded by the government 
that succeeded Queen Lili‘uokalani to the United States upon annexa-
tion of Hawai‘i as a territory of the United States at the end of the nine-
teenth century have roiled the state for at least the past two decades. 
The nub of the issue is whether the United States had sufficient title to 
such lands to return them legally to the State of Hawai‘i shortly after 
statehood, and if so, whether the state was the proper returnee. Many 
Native Hawaiians maintain that the queen’s government was illegally 
overthrown, the transfer of ceded lands to the United States was also 
illegal, and therefore the transfer back to the state is legally ineffective 
as well. The State of Hawai‘i takes issue with at least the last two asser-
tions and maintains that in any event the vote for statehood cured past 
legal problems, if any. The state has been negotiating, largely with a 
state entity, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), on the matter of title 
to and income from ceded lands for the past ten years. OHA rejected 
most settlement offers and appeared determined to maintain an all-or-
nothing position. The matter came to something of a head following 
a decision by the State Supreme Court, largely if not exclusively based 
upon the Apology Resolution passed by Congress during the Clinton 
administration, forbidding the state to deal in ceded lands until Native 
Hawaiian claims are resolved, which could be years or decades. Given 
that the Apology Resolution is supposed by many to have no legal effect—
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indeed, at least one member of our senatorial delegation so stated on 
the floor of the Senate—and the resolution also so states, it is hardly 
surprising that the state and many of its citizens strongly disagreed with 
both the decision and its basis, resulting in a successful petition for a 
hearing before the U.S. Supreme Court. Early in 2009 the Court ruled, 
in a relatively brief but surprisingly unanimous opinion, that the Apol-
ogy Resolution is just that: an apology, without so much as a scintilla of 
legal effect on the rights of Native Hawaiians. Acknowledging that there 
may well be moral obligations resulting from the manner in which the 
territorial government was established following the precipitous ending 
of the Hawaiian monarchy, the Court disposed of any notion that the 
resolution conferred any rights against the federal or the state govern-
ment. The Court also strongly hinted that the conferring of statehood, 
after a popular vote overwhelmingly favoring it, might well dispose of 
many claims as a matter of law. While there is some sentiment for find-
ing independent state grounds to prevent the sale of ceded lands until 
the resolution of Native Hawaiian claims, and while there are presently 
bills in the State Legislature that may, with certain exceptions, so pro-
vide, these are by no means free from legal issues; legal challenges are 
a virtual certainty, likely on Fourteenth Amendment due process and 
equal protection grounds. There is also the small matter of the state/
federal admission legislation, which places the ceded lands in trust for 
five purposes: education, agriculture, public improvements, public use, 
and Native Hawaiians. In an unpublished memorandum (and presum-
ably unanimous) opinion fifteen years ago, the State Supreme Court 
handily disposed of the notion that any of the five purposes takes pre-
cedence over all of the other four and specifically held that the state 
could dispose of ceded lands so long as the proceeds were traceable 
and accounted for among the said five purposes or beneficiaries. It is 
difficult to see what, on the legal landscape, has changed, except for the 
Apology Resolution, now legally a very dead letter.
Covenanted Communities: Local Government  
by Contract in Hawai‘i
The problems and opportunities created by covenanted communities 
and their explosive growth in Hawai‘i are staggering. On the one hand, 
the absence of units of local government prevalent in virtually all of the 
other fifty states—cities, villages, towns, and school and park districts—
removes local government activity effectively from all but the regional 
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level. Our local government consists solely of our four counties with 
islandwide (multiple islands in the case of Kaua‘i and Maui Counties) 
regional rather than local interests. O‘ahu’s toothless neighborhood 
boards have proven to be pale shadows of government entities with little 
power beyond holding hearings on proposed developments and mak-
ing (usually ignored) recommendations to the county governments, 
which actually make decisions.
 Enter the covenanted community. An outgrowth of private land 
development restrictions placed on the residential subdivision approval 
process and created by means of the basic CCRs—covenants, conditions, 
and restrictions—which attach to most residential land developments 
beyond a handful of lots, the covenanted community has virtually sup-
planted local government in such areas as design control, land develop-
ment control, public safety, and recreational facilities. Gates, guards, 
and patrols substitute for police protection. Detailed design, siting, 
landscaping, and height restrictions supplant local zoning—even to the 
point of deciding who may live in such communities based on age and 
whether pets will be allowed or cars parked in driveways. Private pools, 
parks, and playgrounds cater to the closed and often gated membership 
owners. “Taxes” are levied in the form of annual assessments to pay for 
the above. The result is a microcosm of a community (though some on 
the U.S. mainland sprawl over dozens of square miles, complete with 
restaurants and shopping centers) catering to the needs of its members, 
just as villages and towns do on the U.S. mainland.
 All such obligations are “voluntarily” assumed, and the commu-
nities and their governing boards are private, so there is virtually no 
required due process, either substantive or procedural, to guard against 
neighborhood board excess. Indeed, even an elected board is no cer-
tainty until the particular development is “built out,” often leaving criti-
cal decisions about community design and exceptions in the applica-
tion thereof to a single developer representative. Courts usually apply 
a “business judgment” rule in the event of a challenge to the authority 
of such boards or individuals, meaning that in the absence of demon-
strated and egregious bad faith, such decisions are legally unassailable.
The Endangered State of Comprehensive Plans and Planning
Hawai‘i is—or was—a land planning state. There is a statutory state 
plan, functional plans, county comprehensive general and develop-
ment plans, and neighborhood plans, all calling for certain uses of land 
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and all theoretically with the force of law. Indeed, the Hawai‘i Supreme 
Court so held in two 1989 decisions.21 It is not so today.
 First, the State Legislature confounded its own agency, the Hawai‘i 
Community Development Authority (HCDA), by reversing the approval 
of a carefully designed land development project replete with Native 
Hawaiian cultural performance venue and massive privately funded 
environmental cleanup of the site, all in accordance with a carefully 
drafted plan and after months of hearings on both plan and project. It 
then stripped the same HCDA of its authority to undertake or approve 
most development in that part of its jurisdiction—Kaka‘ako—closest to 
Ala Moana Boulevard, also as set out in the aforesaid plan.
 Second, our State Water Commission and Supreme Court unac-
countably dispensed with the mandatory language in both a state water 
plan and applicable county general and development plans to radically 
alter the assignment of water rights from the Windward side of O‘ahu 
to the Leeward side. In so ignoring the plans, the Court favored Native 
Hawaiian and water conservation uses over economic uses—an inver-
sion of the applicable statutory hierarchy as set out in the state Water 
Code.22
 Most recently, a coalition of groups has attacked a multiphase resi-
dential project in the ‘Ewa District, even though the City and County 
of Honolulu plans for such a project have been in place for some time. 
So far, the State Land Use Commission has rejected the landowner’s 
petition for the necessary boundary amendments from agriculture to 
urban use classification, on the plausible ground that the application 
fails adequately to address with precision the timing of the development 
phases. While the project is proposed on useful—and presently used 
for—agricultural land, five former Honolulu planning directors have 
publicly written in a daily newspaper to point out that the apparent 
conflict between housing and agriculture was thoughtfully and care-
fully considered and resolved in official plans and planning. Whither 
do planning plans and planning go in today’s Hawai‘i?
“McMansions” and the Zoning Envelope
There are in addition several issues that cry out for resolution or atten-
tion connected with zoning ordinances in Hawai‘i, particularly in Hono-
lulu. Perhaps the most intractable (and unforeseeable) is connected 
with the national trend (until recently) toward demolishing perfectly 
good but older houses in order to build much larger ones, generally to 
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take advantage of a perceived good location that would support more 
expensive housing. Some of the dwellings—dubbed “McMansions”—
are erected in formerly pleasant (from an aesthetic perspective, at 
least) neighborhoods and are considerably out of scale with nearby 
residences and the neighborhood generally. Kahala is a prime example. 
Less obvious but equally tragic is the demolition of the typical bungalow 
of 1,000–1,500 square feet in Kaimuki and its replacement with blocky 
two- and three-story multigeneration houses containing upwards of 
3,000 square feet. Both are perfectly legal, since the front and side yard 
requirements in both neighborhoods can legally support vastly larger 
structures within the bulk regulation-bounded “zoning envelope.” And 
the aesthetic (or lack thereof) nature of the new houses is not governed 
by zoning regulations because there is no special design overlay district 
to add aesthetic architectural feature requirements. Nor are there pri-
vate restrictive design covenants such as one might find in newer, upper-
end housing developments such as Hawai‘i Loa Ridge and Wai‘alae Iki 
4 and 5. Some out-of-state jurisdictions have begun to save such housing 
stock and neighborhoods by means of maximum house size ordinances, 
and at least one has been upheld on the U.S. mainland.23
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Chapter 1
State Land Use Controls
Hawai‘i is unique among the fifty states in its comprehensive statewide 
land use controls. The State Land Use Commission (LUC) manages 
a system of land district classification distinct from but overlaying the 
county zoning schemes. Actions by state agencies—which are required 
for the approval of the multitude of permits required for virtually any 
large land use project—must also theoretically meet the requirements 
of the statutory state comprehensive plan.
Hawai‘i’s Land Districts
Land in Hawai‘i is divided into four use districts: urban, rural, agricul-
tural, and conservation.1 The LUC is responsible for grouping contigu-
ous parcels of land into these districts according to the present and 
foreseeable use and character of the land. The urban district includes 
lands that are in urban use and will be for the foreseeable future.2 The 
rural district is designed for land with small farms and low-density resi-
dential lots.3 The agricultural district consists of land theoretically used 
for farming and ranching,4 and after recent amendments it includes 
a new, statutorily defined subdistrict: “Important Agricultural Lands” 
(IAL). The LUC, Hawai‘i’s four counties, and private landowners are 
currently identifying and classifying IALs. Finally, the conservation dis-
trict includes land in areas formerly classified as forest and water reserve 
zones, open spaces, water sources, wilderness, and scenic and historic 
areas.5 Land within the conservation district is further divided into five 
subzones: protected, limited, resource, general, and special.6
 Presently, about 48 percent of Hawai‘i’s land area is designated con-
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servation, 47 percent agricultural, 5 percent urban, and less than half 
a percent rural.7 This last classification is expanding—largely from the 
agricultural districts—to accommodate rural residential development in 
the wake of the lengthy litigation over large-lot resort-residential devel-
opment on agricultural-zoned land on the island of Hawai‘i between 
1995 and 2005.8 Given the steady demand for residential, commercial, 
and resort/residential real estate in Hawai‘i, coupled with the compara-
tively tiny percentage of land classified urban or rural (approximately 5 
percent), landowners expend much time and energy seeking to reclas-
sify agricultural (and occasionally conservation) land into one or the 
other development-oriented districts.
 This district classification system is akin to a zoning scheme, 
although, as described in chapter 2, Hawai‘i’s four counties retain most 
of the regulatory authority to further classify land in the urban district 
for typical urban uses. As described below, only low-density residential 
use is permitted (jointly by the LUC and the counties) in the rural and 
agricultural districts, and virtually no economically beneficial uses at 
all are permitted in the conservation district, much of which is publicly 
owned. In sum, the counties control uses within the urban district, the 
counties and the state jointly control uses in the agricultural and rural 
districts, and the state controls uses in the conservation district.
 Permitted uses in agricultural districts include the cultivation of 
crops, orchards, and forests; animal husbandry, fish farming, wind farms, 
solar energy facilities (in land designated to have limited farming poten-
tial), scientific monitoring stations not equipped for use as a residence, 
agricultural tourism on working farms, and open-area recreational facil-
ities.9 Employee housing, mills, storage facilities, and other buildings 
related to farming are permitted for “[b]ona fide” agricultural uses.10 
Land currently or previously used by a sugar or pineapple plantation 
may contain housing for employees or former employees.11 Construc-
tion of single-family homes is also permitted on lots in the agriculture 
district subdivided before June 4, 1976.12 The subdivision of agricultural 
land, especially prime agricultural land with high-quality class A or B 
soil, is subject to special requirements, such as that the use of the land 
be primarily agricultural.13 Aside from specified exceptions, residential 
uses beyond “farm dwellings” are theoretically prohibited. In practice, 
however, all four of Hawai‘i’s counties have for decades permitted 
large-lot residential subdivisions so long as there is some demonstrable 
agricultural use on a lot or on common open space, largely because of 
inadequate statutory and common law definitions of “farm buildings” 
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and agricultural use.14 Golf courses and golf driving ranges are not 
permitted “open space recreational” uses unless approved by a county 
before July 1, 2005.15 An LUC survey of land parcels in the agricultural 
division of Hawai‘i County revealed that 78 percent are smaller than 
5 acres, each averaging 1.24 acres in size and altogether totaling only 
89,095 acres.16 By statute, the agricultural district specifically includes 
lands “not suited for agriculture,” such as lava flow land and desert, 
lending credence to the suspicion in some quarters that, particularly 
with the demise of plantation agriculture, the district has become a de 
facto open space district.17
 The rural districts may contain low-density residential uses, agri-
cultural uses, golf courses and related facilities, and public utilities.18 
The density of dwellings in rural districts generally must not exceed 
one per half acre, though variances may be granted for “good cause.”19 
Although only a tiny fraction of state land is now classified as rural, 
this is changing as landowners take advantage of 2008 amendments 
to the Land Use Law and seek to reclassify agricultural land to rural 
for large-lot residential development projects. There is increasing state 
and county resistance to all but truly agricultural uses in the large agri-
cultural district, following several long and costly lawsuits challenging 
residential use on land classified agricultural.20
 Once so classified by the LUC, urban districts are wholly controlled 
by the counties; all uses permitted by county ordinances or zoning rules 
are permitted in urban districts.21
 Conservation districts are specially protected by the state and are 
governed by the State Department of Land and Natural Resources 
(DLNR). The state seeks to “conserve, protect, and preserve the impor-
tant natural resources of [Hawai‘i] through appropriate management 
and use to promote their long-term sustainability and the public health, 
safety and welfare.”22 Consequently, virtually no structural development 
is permitted in the conservation district (except an occasional single-
family house, as noted below), a change from the practice of the LUC 
in the 1960s and 1970s, when both a golf course and a college campus 
were developed on conservation district land.23
 DLNR further divides the conservation district into subzones that 
permit different uses: (1) Protective; (2) Limited; (3) Resource; (4) 
General; or (5) Special.24 The Protective subzone is intended to protect 
valuable watersheds, historic sites, and the ecosystems of native spe-
cies.25 A few activities, such as removing dead nonnative or small trees, 
do not require a permit (removing a hazardous tree, on the other hand, 
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requires submitting documentation). Most uses, however, will require 
documentation of the need and/or a permit. Permitted uses include 
nature reserves and scenic areas; restoring fishponds; agriculture and 
a single-family residence when such a use was “historically, customarily, 
and actually found on the property”; public facilities such as transporta-
tion systems, water systems, and recreational facilities; and the mainte-
nance, replacement, operation, and renovation of existing structures. 
Subdivision (not to be confused with residential development) may be 
approved when it “serves a public purpose and is consistent with the 
objectives of the [Protective] subzone.”26
 The Limited subzone is intended to prevent uses where “natural 
conditions suggest constraints on human activities” to prevent erosion, 
floods, or buildup in areas vulnerable to natural disasters.27 It includes 
all the permitted land uses in the Protective category. Additional per-
mitted land uses are a small amount (less than one acre) of agriculture 
with a permit, or a larger amount with both a permit and a manage-
ment plan; botanical gardens, erosion control devices, landscaping, and 
single-family residences in floodplains or coastal high-hazard areas that 
conform to flood control regulations.28
 The Resource subzone consists mainly of parkland, land suitable 
for lumber, and land suitable for recreational outdoor activities such as 
hiking and fishing, offshore islands, and sandy beach areas.29 Permitted 
uses are astronomy facilities, commercial forestry, artificial reefs, min-
ing, and single-family homes, in addition to the uses permitted in the 
Protective and Limited subzone.
 The General subzone is dedicated to open space where no conser-
vation uses are defined yet urban use is not desirable.30 The subzone 
thus accommodates open space (but no golf courses) and other land 
uses “which are consistent with the objectives of the general subzone.”31 
Finally, the Special subzone is for areas “possessing unique developmen-
tal qualities” complementary to natural resources in the surrounding 
area.32 This classification allows a unique use on a specific site. Examples 
include Koko Head’s Sea Life Park for recreational, education, and 
commercial purposes; Kāne‘ohe’s Haka site for cemetery purposes; 
and Honolulu’s Kapakahi Ridge for nursing or convalescent home 
purposes.33
 In agricultural and rural districts, a landowner who wishes to make 
use of the land for “certain unusual and reasonable uses” in a manner 
not enumerated by statute may petition for a special permit from the 
relevant county planning commission (for land under fifteen acres) or 
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from both the county planning commission and the LUC (for land over 
fifteen acres).34 Although the counties and the state share jurisdiction 
over land use in the rural and agricultural districts, it is each county’s 
responsibility to enforce the State Land Use Law in both.35 Alternatively, 
a conservation district landowner wishing to make any use of his or her 
land must submit a Conservation District Use Application (CDUA) to 
the Department of Land and Natural Resources.36 The special permit 
and CDUA processes are described below. Besides permits, a landowner 
also has the option of requesting that his or her land be reclassified from 
one district to another (a so-called boundary amendment) or, within 
the conservation district, from one subzone to another, to allow for his 
or her proposed use. The Hawai‘i Legislature has also enacted new leg-
islation that fast-tracks and streamlines reclassification of agricultural 
land to the other districts in exchange for designating other land IAL. 
Finally, a landowner may petition the LUC for a “declaratory order” 
interpreting its rules regarding the permissible uses of the landowner’s 
land. These processes are also described below.
The Special Use Permit Process
Within agricultural and rural districts, Hawai‘i’s Land Use Law specifi-
cally permits a landowner to seek a “special permit” for uses otherwise 
not permitted. The county planning commissions have jurisdiction over 
such special use permits—for “certain unusual and reasonable uses”—
within these districts for parcels less than fifteen acres in size.37 For par-
cels more than fifteen acres, or land designated IAL, special permits 
are subject to the approval of both the relevant county planning com-
mission and the LUC.38 Criteria for determining that a use is “unusual 
and reasonable” are the following: (1) The use is not contrary to the 
objectives of the LUC statute and administrative rules (which are not 
explicitly stated in the statute); (2) the use would not “adversely affect” 
surrounding property; (3) the use would not “unreasonably burden 
public agencies” to provide infrastructure such as roads and sewage sys-
tems; (4) whether “unusual conditions, trends, and needs have arisen 
since district boundaries and rules were established”; and (5) whether 
the land in question is “unsuited for the uses permitted within the dis-
trict.”39 The state attorney general has also opined that the purpose of a 
special use permit is to “provide a landowner relief in exceptional situ-
ations that would not change the essential character of the district nor 
be inconsistent therewith, and is basically analogous to a variance.”40 
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The fifth factor is illustrated by much land covered by lava flows being 
classified within the “agricultural” district, a classification theoretically 
designated for land with a “high capacity” for cultivation. In the agri-
cultural district, special permits may be issued for land uses supporting 
ecotourism related to the preservation of threatened or endangered 
species. Moreover, although the counties generally prescribe uses in the 
rural district, there is one circumstance under which the LUC has juris-
diction: A landowner seeking a variance from the statutory minimum lot 
size requirement must also apply for a special permit from the LUC.41
 To approve a special use permit, the relevant county planning com-
mission must determine, by majority vote, that the use would promote 
the effectiveness and objectives of the land use statute.42 The commis-
sion may impose conditions upon issuance of the special use permit—
including, for example, time limits.43 Overuse is discouraged, and the 
Hawai‘i Supreme Court has specifically held that such permits may not 
be used to circumvent the need for a boundary amendment, particu-
larly for large and intrusive projects.44 However, the same Court per-
mitted a golf course by special permit, even though the Land Use Law 
specifically forbade them in the agricultural district where the applicant 
planned to develop it.45
 Several cases have further defined what is permitted under the Land 
Use Law. In Curtis v. Board of Appeals, a cellular phone tower was not con-
sidered a “communications equipment building” or a “utility line,” both 
of which would be permitted uses of right in an agricultural district.46 
Noting that such an expansionary reading of the term “utility line” would 
frustrate the State Land Use Law’s goals of protection and rational devel-
opment, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court found telecommunications tow-
ers and antennas “novel and unique use[s]” requiring a special permit 
absent enumeration in the statute.47 Later, in T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. County 
of Hawaii Planning Commission, the Court allowed a “stealth antenna” con-
cealed completely within a false chimney and with all related equipment 
kept in a garage.48 In distinguishing from Curtis, the Court pointed out 
that the entire structure would be concealed in a chimney and garage—
both structures being permitted uses—and that the concealed antenna 
would not undermine the State Land Use Law’s objectives.49
The Conservation District Use Application Process
The DLNR controls uses within the conservation district, and in order 
for landowners to make use of their conservation land, they must go 
 State Land Use Controls 27
through the DLNR Conservation District Use Application (CDUA) per-
mitting process. First, however, the owner must go through the county 
Special Management Area (SMA) review process (described more fully 
in chapter 8). The county must either determine (1) that the proposed 
land use is outside the SMA or (2) that the proposed land use is exempt. 
Otherwise, the landowner must include the SMA permit in the CDUA 
application. Next, the landowner must include basic information about 
himself, a description of the land, and plans for the proposed use, 
including maintenance and management plans, a filing fee, and a draft 
environmental assessment (briefly described in chapter 9) of the pro-
posed use.
 Finally, landowners must indicate for which of the following per-
mits they are applying: (1) a departmental permit, (2) a board permit, 
(3) an emergency permit, (4) a temporary variance, (5) a nonconform-
ing use, (6) a site plan approval, or (7) a management plan.50 The type 
of permit required is determined by the subzone in which the land is 
located and the use proposed.51 For example, a landowner with land in 
the protective subzone who wishes to post signs should apply for a site 
plan approval, while a landowner with land in the limited subzone who 
wishes to create botanical gardens must have a management plan in 
place and obtain a board permit.
 A public hearing is required for any application involving land uses 
for commercial purposes, changes in identified uses, uses in the protec-
tive subzone, and proposed land uses affecting the public interest.52 The 
applicant for a CDUA has the burden of demonstrating that the pro-
posed land use will be “consistent with the purpose of the conservation 
district” and subzone in which the use will occur, that it will comply with 
Coastal Zone Management statutes and rules, will not cause “substantial 
adverse impact to existing natural resources” within the region or com-
munity but that it will at the very least preserve “natural beauty and 
open space characteristics” of the land, and that it will fulfill the general 
catch-all requirement that the proposed use not materially harm “pub-
lic health, safety, and welfare.”53 Subdivision of land is not allowed to 
increase the “intensity” of land uses in the conservation district.54
Conservation District Subzone Reclassification
If the use to which a landowner wishes to put conservation land would 
otherwise be prohibited within the relevant subzone, the landowner may 
request to have the land reclassified to a subzone that permits the use.55 
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The conservation district subzone reclassification process requires the 
landowner to propose an administrative rule change, which is processed 
as an amendment to the DLNR’s regulations.56 To consider a reclassifi-
cation request, the DLNR requires information on the landowner and 
property, including geographic, climatic, hydrological, and biological 
characteristics, as well as historic properties located in the area, scenic 
or visual resources, infrastructure evaluations, and a review of the prop-
erty’s characteristics in relation to subzone objectives.57
District Boundary Amendment
A landowner denied a use within a designated district may petition 
the LUC to reclassify the land into a more intensive use district—for 
example, from conservation or agriculture to urban—through a District 
Boundary Amendment (DBA). The LUC processes all DBAs for conser-
vation land as well as for parcels larger than fifteen acres in urban, rural, 
and agricultural districts. The relevant county planning commission 
processes applications for DBAs of parcels less than fifteen acres in the 
rural, urban, and agricultural districts. After proper notice and the fil-
ing of the petition and fees, the LUC holds a “contested case” hearing.58 
Thus, DBAs are generally considered to be nonlegislative acts, though 
whether such a conclusion would or should be applied to DBAs result-
ing from five-year reviews of state boundary classifications is dubious, as 
this would reflect a policy determination of a more general nature than 
a DBA petition.59
 The LUC uses the following criteria in determining whether to 
reclassify the subject land: whether reclassification is in accordance with 
the goals, objectives, and policies of the Hawai‘i State Plan (discussed 
infra); district standards; impact upon habitat and historical, natural, 
or cultural resources, particularly the cultural resources of the Native 
Hawaiians;60 consequences for natural resources relevant to Hawai‘i’s 
economy; whether there is a commitment of state funds; employment 
opportunities and economic development; housing opportunities for 
all income levels; the county general plan and all community or com-
munity development plans relating to the land subject to the reclas-
sification petition; and the representations and commitments made by 
the petitioner.61 The LUC must also closely scrutinize reclassifications 
of intensively cultivated agricultural lands under the recently enacted 
Important Agricultural Lands statute.62 The LUC may approve the reclas-
sification if it will not impair nearby agricultural production or is neces-
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sary for urban growth. The overall standard for approving DBAs is, by a 
clear preponderance of the evidence, whether the DBA is reasonable, 
does not violate the statute that governs land districts, and is consistent 
with the Hawai‘i State Plan.63 Six affirmative votes from the nine-mem-
ber LUC are necessary to approve a DBA, and the LUC may choose to 
impose conditions that run with the land. The LUC may impose sanc-
tions for failing to observe conditions, including downzoning land to 
“uphold . . . the intent and spirit” of the statute and “assure substantial 
compliance with representations made by the petitioner.”64 Thus, for 
example, the LUC has threatened to return land classified urban to its 
former agricultural classification for failure of the landowner-developer 
to commence development in a timely manner.65 Whether it may legally 
do so depends largely upon how one views the nature of the boundary 
amendments. Cases and commentators are by and large critical of such 
“rezonings” merely for failure to proceed with a particular project.66
 The LUC approves most petitions for DBAs.67 Every five years, the 
Office of Planning (OP) is required to review all DBAs in the state,68 an 
obligation which it has rarely met, particularly in the past fifteen years; 
OP last undertook such a review in 1991. This lack of overall bound-
ary review has probably contributed to the LUC’s tendency to focus on 
individual parcels to the detriment of a statewide overview.
 Several Hawai‘i cases further interpret and elaborate upon the 
LUC’s obligation under the Land Use Law. First, under Kilauea Neigh-
borhood Ass’n v. Land Use Commission, the LUC must make specific find-
ings with regard to each criterion for reclassifying district boundaries 
when approving a District Boundary Amendment.69 Second, according 
to Ka Paakai o ka Aina v. Land Use Commission, in approving a DBA, the 
LUC must take into account the impact of reclassification on Native 
Hawaiian rights.70 Specifically, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court held that the 
LUC may not delegate to a landowner its constitutional and statutory 
obligation to protect Native Hawaiian customary rights and must make 
specific findings and conclusions regarding the following:
 (1) the identity and scope of valued cultural, historical, or 
natural resources in the petition area, including the extent to 
which traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights are 
exercised;
 (2) the extent to which those resources, including traditional 
and customary native Hawaiian rights, will be affected or 
impaired by the proposed action; and
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 (3) the feasible action, if any, to be taken by the [LUC] to 
reasonably protect native Hawaiian rights if they are found to 
exist.71
The Ka Paakai o ka Aina decision has been criticized for misunderstand-
ing the responsibility of the LUC in the DBA process. A DBA provides 
a landowner with considerable discretion in future uses of the land, 
making it often impossible to so much as speculate about the effects of 
a DBA on Native Hawaiian—or any other—rights or resources, given 
the variety of possible uses of land that may result from such a DBA. 
Moreover, many such uses are impossible without county concurrence 
or approval.
Declaratory Orders
Any interested person may also petition the LUC to issue a declaratory 
order.72 A declaratory order indicates how the LUC would interpret 
its own rules with regard to a particular parcel and use within it. After 
receiving a petition for a declaratory order, the LUC may deny the peti-
tion, issue a declaratory order, or set a hearing, which may or may not 
be of the contested case variety required for DBAs.73 The LUC will not 
issue declaratory orders for questions that are speculative or hypotheti-
cal, for petitions in which the petitioner would not have standing in a 
judicial action, for questions affecting the interests of the LUC in pend-
ing litigation, or questions beyond the LUC’s jurisdiction.74
Important Agricultural Lands
The State Legislature created a major new land subclassification, IAL, 
via amendments to the Land Use Law in 2005. Recognizing a “substan-
tial interest” in the survival of the agricultural industry in Hawai‘i, these 
amendments sought to provide incentives to landowners to preserve 
lands capable of producing high yields for agricultural purposes, even if 
the lands were not currently put to such use.75 The designation is thus a 
carrot to landowners to preserve large blocks of contiguous fertile land 
from creeping urbanization and fragmentation. Among other stated 
aims, the law seeks to “ensure that uses on important agricultural lands 
are actually agricultural uses” 76 and attempts to avoid their development 
as large-lot residences with little actual agricultural use, as illustrated 
by the so-called fake farm phenomenon that brought luxury homes to 
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lands designated for agriculture. The first IAL designation by the LUC 
occurred in March of 2009, when approximately 3,770 acres on Kaua‘i 
owned by a subsidiary of Alexander & Baldwin were reclassified.
 IAL designation criteria include whether the land is already used 
for farming, the quality of the soil, the sufficiency of water and infrastruc-
ture (including convenience of transportation of agricultural goods), 
and whether the land is associated with traditional Native Hawaiian 
agriculture, such as taro farming.77 The designation is fairly flexible: An 
IAL candidate need not meet every criterion.78 Indeed, a parcel meet-
ing any of the criteria must receive “initial consideration.”79 The LUC 
also requires a certification issued by the Department of Agriculture as 
to the quality of the land to be designated IAL; at a minimum, the land 
must have “sufficient quantities of water to support viable agricultural 
production” and “contribute . . . to maintain[ing] a critical land mass 
important to agricultural productivity.”80
 The classification process begins with either (1) a petition from 
a landowner or (2) county action. A two-thirds majority of the LUC is 
required to designate lands IAL at the request of a landowner.81 In the 
second category, the county must make designations based on maps 
and in consultation with landowners and various interest groups. The 
county departments must include the position of the owners of the land 
to be designated in their final recommendation, along with comments 
from other interest groups, the viability of existing agribusinesses, and 
its conformity with the criteria. The county council ultimately makes the 
decision, which is reviewed by the LUC.82 Lands designated as IALs are 
eligible for incentive programs, including grant assistance, tax offsets, 
enhanced access to water, and agricultural training.83
 IALs are subject to extra considerations and requirements for spe-
cial use permits, rezoning, and district boundary amendments. Like 
land areas greater than fifteen acres, such actions pertaining to IALs 
require processing by both the LUC and the relevant county.84 The state 
must find that the public benefit from the proposed action is justified by 
a need for additional land for nonagricultural purposes, that the action 
will not harm existing agricultural enterprises, and that the proposed 
action has “no significant impact upon the viability” of neighboring agri-
cultural operations that may share marketing or infrastructure costs.85 
Absent a landowner request, the IAL designation may also be removed 
if, through no fault of the landowner, there is no longer a sufficient sup-
ply of water to allow profitable farming.86 IAL maps must be reviewed at 
least once a decade, but not more often than once every five years.
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 In 2008, incentives to classify land as IAL commenced in earnest 
with the adoption of additional statutory amendments. The amend-
ments enact the incentives noted above, expanding on the promised 
tax credits, providing for the state to guarantee loans by commercial 
lenders to agricultural producers, and mandating priority processing 
for agricultural permits. Moreover, the amendments allow the building 
of farm dwellings, but only if used exclusively by employees who actively 
work on the land and immediate family members. Such dwellings can-
not occupy more than 5 percent of the total IAL or fifty acres, whichever 
is less. No residential subdivisions are permitted, but farmers may clus-
ter dwellings together to preserve agricultural space. These portions of 
the 2008 amendments are uncontroversial.
 Of greater importance to land use is a reclassification land swap: In 
exchange for landowner designation of large tracts of contiguous arable 
land, the LUC will by a declaratory order facilitate the reclassification 
of a smaller amount of agriculture district land to urban, conservation, 
rural, or a combination thereof. The land to be so reclassified need not 
be contiguous with the proposed IAL, though it must be in the same 
county. This reclassification may apply to up to 15 percent of the land; 
thus at least 85 percent of the land must be designated IAL. If landown-
ers seek less than 15 percent of the land to be reclassified rural, urban, 
or conservation, they earn a “credit” for the difference. The credit is 
valid for ten years but may not be transferred to another person.87
 Procedurally, a landowner petitioning to reclassify land IAL may, 
within that petition, seek the above-described land swap reclassifica-
tion. The LUC will review the suitability of the reclassification to urban, 
rural, or conservation and may include “reasonable conditions” in the 
declaratory order.88 If it fails to approve either reclassification—the 
IAL designation or the land swap designation—the petition is denied 
entirely.89 Additionally, land swap reclassifications to the urban district 
must be consistent with the relevant county general development plan.
What distinguishes the land swap from a more conventional DBA—
besides a presumably greater propensity on the part of the LUC for 
approval—is that the new law contains no provision for a contested 
case hearing. This accelerates the reclassification process by avoiding 
the delays associated with the public review process otherwise required 
under the ordinary system for DBAs. Land swap reclassification approval 
is conditioned only upon meeting the suitability requirements and a 
two-thirds vote by the LUC.90 The LUC possesses “the sole authority 
to interpret the adopted map boundaries delineating the [IAL].”91 Of 
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course, land so reclassified is still subject to permitting requirements 
associated with the reclassified district, county plans, and county zoning 
restrictions.
 Land use is restricted by more than just district boundaries, however. 
State agencies making land use decisions must conform their rulings to 
the overall theme, goals, objectives, and policies of the comprehensive 
State Plan, enacted as a statute.
Act 100: The State Plan as Law
Hawai‘i is unique among the fifty states in having converted its State 
General Plan into a statute—Act 100—which made it the first state to 
enact a comprehensive state plan. The writing of the plan into the statu-
tory code transformed what is in most states a policy document into a 
set of preeminent legal requirements.92 Its passage by the Ninth State 
Legislature in 1978 represented not only a milestone for the state—
indeed, the governor ranked it second only to the State Constitution in 
importance—but also for the nation.93 Moreover, a State Land Use Law 
amendment to LUC standards for deciding boundary amendments—
providing no such boundary amendment can be adopted unless it is in 
conformance with the State Plan—adds considerably to the State Plan’s 
legal significance in Hawai‘i.94
The State Plan
The culmination of efforts having begun in 1975, the State Plan is the 
product of three years of intense work by the Department of Planning 
and Economic Development (now the Department of Business, Eco-
nomic Development & Tourism (DBEDT)) that included an inventory 
of goals, objectives, and policies; a statewide household survey; technical 
studies; issue papers; public workshops and hearings; the creation of a 
policy council; and intense lobbying in the legislature. Its major areas of 
concentration were the following: population; the economy (tourism, 
defense and other federal spending, the sugar and pineapple industries, 
diversified agriculture, and potential new areas such as motion picture 
production); the physical environment; facility systems (water supply, 
transportation, energy, public utility facilities, solid and liquid waste 
disposal); and sociocultural advancement (housing, health, education, 
social services, leisure activities, public safety, and cultural heritage).
 The Hawai‘i State Plan is divided into three major parts: overall 
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theme, goals, objectives, and policies; planning coordination and 
implementation; and priority guidelines.95 The Findings and Purposes 
statement of the act sets out the rationale for the plan:96
The legislature finds that there is need to improve the plan-
ning process in this State, to increase the effectiveness of gov-
ernment and private actions, to improve coordination among 
different agencies and levels of government, to provide for wise 
use of Hawai‘i’s resources and to guide the future development 
of the State.97
The purpose of this chapter is to set forth the Hawai‘i state 
plan that shall serve as a guide for the future long-range devel-
opment of the State; identify the goals, objectives, policies and 
priorities for the State; provide a basis for determining priorities 
and allocating limited resources, such as public funds, services, 
human resources, land, energy, water, and other resources; 
improve coordination of federal, state, and county plans, 
policies, programs, projects, and regulatory activities; and to 
establish a system for plan formulation and program coordina-
tion to provide for an integration of all major state, and county 
activities.98
 The all-important implementation strategy is accomplished 
through several mechanisms. To begin, a policy council of state, county, 
and public representatives was established to advise the legislature and 
reconcile conflicts between the agencies and plans described below. 
DBEDT provides technical assistance to the policy council, particularly 
by performing statewide policy analysis and reviewing recommenda-
tions on all State Plan matters. Twelve state functional plans99 define, 
implement, and conform to the overall theme, goals, objectives, poli-
cies, and priority guidelines of the State Plan.100 County general plans 
(general and development) must indicate desired population and 
physical development patterns for each county and regions within the 
county and further define the overall theme, goals, objectives, policies, 
and priority guidelines of the State Plan.101 State programs must con-
form to both the State Plan (and apply its priority guidelines) and to 
approved state functional plans.102 Therefore, while the county general 
plans must take into account state functional plans and vice versa, both 
functional plans and county general plans must conform to the State 
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Plan.103 Finally, priority guidelines address areas of statewide concern.104 
For example,
Protect and enhance Hawai‘i’s shoreline open spaces and 
scenic resources.105
Utilize Hawai‘i’s limited land resources wisely, providing 
adequate land to accommodate projected population and 
economic growth needs while insuring the protection of the 
environment and the availability of the shoreline, conservation 
lands and other limited resources for future generations.106
Encourage urban growth primarily to existing urban areas 
where adequate public facilities are already available or can 
be provided with reasonable public expenditures, and away 
from areas where other important benefits are present, such 
as protection of important agricultural land or preservation of 
lifestyles.107
 That part of the State Plan dealing with implementation—and 
especially conformance—is the most significant for the purpose of 
land use control. This is so because the State Plan in theory requires 
“conformance” to its policies, goals, objectives, and priority guidelines 
across virtually the whole spectrum of state land use actions. How-
ever, in 1984 the legislature defined “conformance” as a weighing of 
the overall theme, goals, objectives, and policies and a determination 
that an action, decision, rule, or state program is both consistent with 
the overall theme and fulfills one or more of the goals, objectives, or 
policies.108 Under this new definition, conformance becomes relatively 
easy to accomplish—and nearly impossible to contest. This is particu-
larly true now that the term “guidelines” has replaced “directions” in 
“statutory directions.” “Guidelines” now means merely a “stated course 
of action which is desirable and should be followed unless a determina-
tion is made that it is not the most desirable in a particular case; thus a 
guideline may be deviated from without penalty or sanction.”109
State Activities
Nevertheless, the State Plan requires that all state programs be in confor-
mance with its theme, goals, objectives, policies, and priority guidelines 
as well as with its twelve functional plans: “The formulation, administra-
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tion, and implementation of state programs shall be in conformance 
with the overall theme, goals, objectives, and policies and shall utilize as 
guidelines the priority guidelines contained within this chapter, and the 
state functional plans approved pursuant to this chapter.”110 These state 
programs include but are not limited to those programs involving coor-
dination and review; research and support; design, construction, and 
maintenance; services; and regulatory powers.111 State programs that 
exercise coordination and review functions include but are not limited 
to the state clearinghouse process, the capital improvements program, 
and the Coastal Zone Management program. State programs that exer-
cise regulatory powers in resource allocation include but are not limited 
to the land use and management programs administered by the Land 
Use Commission and Board of Land and Natural Resources.112 State 
programs “shall further define, implement, and be in conformance 
with the overall theme, goals, objectives, and policies, and shall utilize 
as guidelines both the priority guidelines contained within this chapter, 
and the state functional plans approved pursuant to [the statute].”113
 Certain programs relating to budget review and land use control 
are particularly singled out as “implementation mechanisms” for confor-
mance with the overall theme, State Plan goals, objectives, and policies. 
These are program appropriations, capital improvement project (CIP) 
appropriation, budgetary review and allocation, “land use decision-
making processes of state agencies” (such as the LUC and the Board of 
DLNR) and “all other regulatory and administrative decision-making 
processes of state agencies.”114 Thus, the state’s major land use decision-
making body—the LUC—is to some extent bound by the State Plan and 
its subordinate functional plans in land reclassification (e.g., DBA) deci-
sions. The State Land Use Law provides decision-making criteria—such 
as the “extent to which the proposed reclassification conforms” to the 
State Plan—that the LUC must consider in making DBA decisions.115 A 
more detailed look at these statutory guidelines is discussed supra in the 
section on the DBA process. 
The Functional Plans
While broad policies are sketched in the State Plan, it is the functional 
plans to which state and county agencies were originally to look for guid-
ance. The State Plan provides for the preparation of twelve such plans 
addressing different policy areas: education, employment, health, hous-
ing, human services, agriculture, conservation lands, energy, historic 
preservation, recreation, tourism, and transportation.116 Ten plans were 
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adopted in 1984 by concurrent resolution.117 Five plans were revised in 
1989,118 and seven plans were revised in 1991.119 The functional plans 
must define, implement, and conform to the overall theme, goals, objec-
tives, policies, and priority guidelines contained within the statute.120 
In the same paragraph, Act 100 directs that “county general plans and 
development plans shall be taken into consideration in the formulation 
of state functional plans.”121 The State Plan also sets out basic require-
ments for the functional plans: “The functional plan shall identify prior-
ity issues in the functional area and shall contain objectives, policies, 
and implementing actions to address those priority issues.”122
 Originally, the responsibility for preparing each functional plan 
was assigned to named state agencies such as the DLNR and the former 
DPED, but the duty of maintaining and creating guidelines for the revi-
sions of the functional plans was transferred back to the Hawai‘i Office 
of Planning from the Department of Budget and Finance in 2001.123 The 
State Functional Plans have “languished” since they were last updated in 
1991.124
 All the State Functional Plans have the same framework. Each plan 
has three chapters. Chapter I, the first five or so pages of each plan, is 
an introduction and is largely the same in each State Functional Plan. 
It follows a basic introduction with the purpose, role, theme, advisory 
committee, and review, revision, and coordination processes of the State 
Functional Plans. Chapter II addresses the approach to the specific 
functional plan’s issues. It consists of a long-term philosophy statement, 
an overview of the specific functional plan, the objectives and scope of 
the functional plan, the coordination of the specific functional plan 
with other State Functional Plans, and the issue areas addressed in the 
functional plan.125
 For example, in the State Conservation Lands Functional Plan 
(SCLFP),126 Chapter II articulates the overall theme and goals of the 
Hawai‘i State Plan, describes how further growth in the population and 
economy of Hawai‘i is inevitable but must be balanced with Hawai‘i’s 
need to minimize the negative effects on the natural environment, and 
states what must be done to meet these statewide concerns. The brief 
overview indicates that the plan addresses issues concerning the aqua-
culture industry and continued efforts to broaden public use of natural 
resources and lands, while protecting and preserving land from over-
use. The objective of the SCLFP is to provide for a management pro-
gram balancing the use and protection of the state’s natural resources. 
The majority of the responsibility lies with the state, although federal, 
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private, and county assistance will also play roles. The SCLFP is closely 
related to other State Functional Plans that are concerned with the use 
of natural resources and/or environmental protection, including the 
Energy, Health, Historic Preservation, and Recreation Plans. These 
plans include many complementary as well as competing interests. The 
plan is then divided into three issue areas directly related to planning 
and management: (I) inventories of resources and background infor-
mation and basic research; (II) management; and (III) education and 
public information.
 Chapter III is the bulk of each functional plan. This chapter is 
particularly significant, as it declares the objectives, policies, and imple-
menting actions of the functional plan. Each issue area listed in Chapter 
III has several main objectives. Each objective has multiple related poli-
cies, and each policy has one or more corresponding implementation 
actions. For instance, in Chapter III of the State Conservation Lands 
Functional Plan, Issue Area I is first stated. Then the first of two objec-
tives of Issue Area I is listed: establishment of databases for inventories 
of existing lands and resources. It is followed by the first of five poli-
cies within the section: Develop and maintain a centralized statewide 
database of conservation areas and natural resources. A correspond-
ing implementation action is then stated: Develop a centralized land 
inventory and natural resource database in conjunction with the State 
Geographic Information System. A lead organization, assisting organi-
zations, a start date, a total budget estimate, a target location, and com-
ments are set forth with each implementing action.
County Plans
Finally, county general plans and development plans are integrated 
with State Functional Plans. These plans “shall further define the over-
all theme, goals, objectives, policies, and priority guidelines” of the 
State Plan,127 and the formulation, amendment, and implementation of 
such plans “shall take into consideration statewide objectives, polices, and 
programs stipulated in state functional plans.”128 This directive is par-
ticularly critical to the county land use regulatory scheme, since most 
county land use control schemes are tied so directly to their general or 
development plans that land use changes made contrary to those plans 
are invalid. Thus, for example, in the City and County of Honolulu City 
Charter, a provision requires all local zoning and subdivision ordinances 
to conform to local development plans.129
 All of these detailed development plan elements must further 
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define the provisions of the State Plan and take into consideration state-
wide objectives, policies, and programs stipulated in State Functional 
Plans approved in consonance with this chapter. County general plans 
and the more detailed development plans are to (1) be formulated with 
input from the state and county agencies as well as the general public, 
(2) take into consideration the State Functional Plans, and (3) be for-
mulated on the basis of sound rationale, data, analyses, and input from 
the state and county agencies and the general public.130 This would be, 
for example, where a county council’s findings stated that studies were 
made, public hearings were held, field investigations were conducted, 
public testimony was considered, and findings were made that the 
amendment to the development plan was consistent with policies and 
objectives of the development and general plans, and that the ordinance 
did not violate the State Planning Act requirement that county develop-
ment plans be formulated with input from state and county agencies 
and the general public and on the basis of sound rationale, data, and 
analyses.131 However, Act 100 also makes its own specific requirements 
with respect to both the manner of formulation and the contents of 
county general and development plans, providing that any amendment 
to the county general plan of each county shall not be contrary to the 
county charter.132
 While there have been no substantive amendments to the state plan-
ning system or its plans since the 1990s, a Hawai‘i 2050 task force was 
established to review the State Plan and other fundamental components 
of community planning and to develop recommendations on creating 
the Hawai‘i 2050 sustainability plan for future long-term development 
of the state.133 The Hawai‘i 2050 Sustainability Plan was submitted for 
review in early 2008.134 Paralleling the studies that went into the process 
to develop the State Plan, the goals are divided into the economy, the 
physical environment, and physical, social, and economic well-being.135 
 The Sustainability Plan is advisory only, but it contains a number of 
specific goals and proposals. It proposes an implementing entity, “the 
Sustainability Council,” a nonregulatory body that would “promote 
sustainability, determine intermediate and long-term benchmarks, 
measure success, coordinate cross-sector efforts and dialogue, and 
report to government and private sector leaders on progress.”136 The 
plan purports to provide “over-arching State goals” to guide the coun-
ties in developing sustainable practices. Of the nine “priority actions” 
for which the plan suggested benchmarks, two have major implications 
for land use: (1) increasing affordable housing; the plan estimates that 
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between 2007 and 2011, there is a need for 23,000 affordable hous-
ing units; and (2) increasing production of local foods and products.137 
The state’s use of incentive programs and regulations to encourage 
agriculture will likely continue to have land use implications for the 
foreseeable future.
 Hawai‘i’s land use system and complicated interlocking planning 
schemes are still evolving. The release of the Hawai‘i 2050 Sustainability 
Plan, though it speaks mainly in generalities, is the first return to com-
prehensive state planning since the early 1980s. The Sustainability Plan 
may mark the beginning of a revival of state comprehensive planning. 
Recent legislation reveals a renewed interest in land use issues by the 
State Legislature and a willingness to try new ideas. The agricultural 
land swap scheme promises new opportunities for rational development 
of Hawai‘i’s islands.
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Chapter 2
Local Planning and Zoning
Zoning reached puberty in company with the Stutz Bearcat 
and the speakeasy. F. Scott Fitzgerald and the Lindy Hop 
were products of the same generation. Of all these phe-
nomena of the twenties, only zoning has remained viable a 
generation later.
 —Babcock, The Zoning Game1
Although the legal and planning literature of the 1970s was filled 
with gleeful requiems for local zoning, the “ancien régime” of land use 
controls is not only alive but increasingly robust even after decades of 
neglect.2 Local zoning never really declined except in the perception 
of commentators on the land use scene. Cities—where the vast major-
ity of people live and work and where, therefore, land use decisions 
most directly affect the public’s way of life—never abandoned zoning.3 
While states and federal agencies may have promoted, often success-
fully, regional and statewide land use management and control systems 
as an added—sometimes even superseding—layer of control upon local 
governments, these were in addition to rather than a substitute for local 
zoning. In a sense, then, the ancien régime was not overthrown but 
circumscribed—applied to urban areas, addressing primarily local con-
cerns—with the exception of Hawai‘i, which chose to zone the entire 
state in 1961 through its Land Use Law.
 The history of zoning nationally is adequately treated in a number 
of articles, books, and treatises,4 appearing to have sprung from the 
need to uniformly control nuisance and, whether or not concomitantly, 
to protect property values.5 It first appeared in recognizable form dur-
ing the latter part of the nineteenth century and in the early part of 
the twentieth, although its antecedents precede the beginnings of the 
United States. Its efficacy could have been blunted by an unexpected 
linkage between regulation and taking in the 1922 case of Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a regula-
tion, if it went too far, could result in a “taking” under the Fifth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution, for which compensation would have to 
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be paid.6 “Taking” in this context means the regulation of land so heavily 
that the owner is left with virtually no permissible uses; this “regulatory 
taking” issue continues to bedevil land use regulation.7 However, a few 
years later, in the landmark Euclid case, the U.S. Supreme Court ulti-
mately held that the dividing of a city or village into use zones and the 
permitting or prohibiting of various uses and classes of uses therein were 
constitutional,8 though such zoning as applied in a given case might be 
found unconstitutional.9 Thereafter, zoning swept the country, spread-
ing to every major city in the United States.10 By 1930, forty-seven states 
had adopted zoning enabling legislation in accordance with the federal 
Standard Zoning Enabling Act, and 981 municipalities, representing 67 
percent (or 46 million) of our urban population, had adopted the zon-
ing ordinance as the latest and most useful technique to control the use 
of land.11
The Basics of Zoning
As the Euclid case made abundantly clear, while the so-called fact basis of 
zoning may well have as its aim the abatement of nuisance and protec-
tion of property, zoning is firmly rooted in police power—the power to 
regulate for the protection of the health, safety, morals, and welfare of 
the people.12 In most jurisdictions, including Hawai‘i, that power is del-
egated from the state—the repository of police power—to units of local 
government through a zoning enabling act. The act is usually based on 
the Standard Zoning Enabling Act produced by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce in 1926. Such acts permit but do not require local gov-
ernments to divide the land area in their jurisdictions into districts (or 
zones) and to list permitted uses, permitted height and density (known 
as bulk regulations), and conditional uses for each. The map upon 
which the districts are drawn is called the “zoning map,” a copy of which 
must usually be kept in the offices of the local government unit, to be 
marked with each change in district boundaries and each exception or 
variance granted.
 The lists of uses, bulk regulations, definitions, administrative pro-
cedures, and so forth are collectively called the “text.” The map and text 
are used in tandem; each zoning district on the map has a corresponding 
list of permitted uses within the text. The list of permitted uses, includ-
ing permitted accessory, temporary, and special or conditional uses, is 
exhaustive. An accessory use might be a garage, while a temporary use 
may refer to a fruit stand or construction shed. A special or conditional 
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use is one permitted in a district but only subject to certain articulated 
conditions. For example, a neighborhood grocery may be permitted in 
a residential area provided it is screened, has no electric signs, and is 
open only at certain hours. The point of imposing such conditions is to 
preserve the character of the area, minimizing the negative side effects 
of otherwise necessary or desirable uses. Each district also has a set of 
bulk regulations limiting, for example, the size of the lot per unit, the 
permitted height of principal and accessory structures, minimum yard 
requirements, and off-street parking and loading requirements.
 There are essentially three broad categories of uses—residential, 
commercial, and industrial—though “mixed use” and “overlay” districts 
are increasingly common as well. Except for such mixed use areas, dis-
tricts are generally categorically exclusive: Homes are not permitted in 
commercial or industrial districts, factories are not permitted in resi-
dential or commercial districts, and so forth. The districts theoretically 
follow a use-intensity pattern, so that low-density residential uses do not 
abut industrial or even intensive commercial uses. Thus, a ring of garden 
or medium-rise apartment buildings in a high-density residential zone 
might appropriately separate single-family homes in a low-density resi-
dential zone from a shopping center, as they do in Honolulu’s Mānoa 
Valley around the Mānoa Marketplace.
 There is also a section in the text treating uses that were permit-
ted as of some past date but fail to conform to the existing land use 
regulations for the district, called collectively “nonconformities.” Most 
courts have held that it is an unconstitutional confiscation of property to 
require the immediate termination of what had previously been a lawful 
use of property after a zoning change renders that use prohibited in 
that district. Some jurisdictions, including Hawai‘i, use “amortization”—
the termination of a nonconforming use after the end of an arbitrarily 
determined useful life.13 Local governments employ this technique most 
often in eliminating low-investment nonconforming uses, such as signs 
and billboards, or to terminate what they consider particularly noxious 
uses, such as junkyards.
 Finally, there are administrative regulations setting out how the zon-
ing ordinance restrictions on a particular parcel of land may be changed. 
The principal agencies for administration of a local zoning ordinance are 
(1) a zoning officer or administrator, (2) the zoning board of appeals, 
(3) the local legislative body, and (4) the planning commission.
 The zoning administrator is generally responsible for seeing that 
the provisions of the zoning ordinance are carried out. He receives 
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complaints of violations and issues zoning certificates if so required 
by ordinance. He also grants or denies certain special use requests. In 
Honolulu, that officer is the director of the Department of Planning 
and Permitting (DPP). The zoning administrator’s decisions may be 
appealed to a board of appeals, alternatively known as a zoning board 
of adjustment. Generally, this board also hears all requests for variances 
or exceptions from the terms of the zoning ordinance (except in Hono-
lulu, where, by charter amendment, the DPP director hears and decides 
all variances). The local legislative body is responsible for enacting the 
zoning ordinance in its original form (usually upon recommendation 
of a zoning commission appointed for the purpose) and for adopting 
amendments. Amendments, usually reviewed first by a recommending 
body such as the planning commission, take two forms: textual and map. 
The latter, in which land is reclassified (“rezoned”) from one district to 
another, is by far the most common. Finally, a planning commission, 
an appointed body, is constituted for the purpose of advising on the 
planning aspects of land use changes. The commission usually reviews 
requests for amendments and special uses, reviews (and in some cases 
approves) subdivision plats, holds public hearings, and occasionally 
provides planning recommendations on variance and special or condi-
tional use requests.
The Place of Planning in Land Use Controls
In theory at least, land use regulations should follow comprehensive 
planning. Indeed, such was the original philosophy behind zoning in 
the United States. In 1928, the U.S. Department of Commerce promul-
gated the Standard City Planning Enabling Act, which contemplated the 
establishment of a planning commission for each adopting city, whose 
duty it was to produce a “master plan”—a comprehensive scheme of 
development—for the physical development of the city. However, the 
plan was to be advisory to the governing body of the city.14 The statutes 
of many states permit the formulation of such a plan by a planning 
board or commission. Many of these same states then require its adop-
tion by local legislative bodies. A few (e.g., Hawai‘i, California, Oregon, 
Florida) require conformance to these plans once they are adopted.
 However, not many court decisions have advanced the cause of 
mandatory planning before zoning. While observing that good planning 
is important as a requisite or even a prerequisite to effective land use 
controls, the judiciary has often interpreted planning requirements so 
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broadly as to make them nearly meaningless. The following New Jersey 
court’s characterization of the plan-zoning ordinance link is typical: “No 
doubt good housekeeping would be served if a zoning ordinance followed 
and implemented a master plan . . . but the history of the subject dictated 
another course. . . . A plan may be readily revealed in an end-product—
here the zoning ordinance—and no more is required by statute.”15 Given 
such interpretations, comprehensive planning is often advisory.
The Enabling Act
The state enabling legislation grants to Hawai‘i’s four counties the power 
to zone, primarily as a tool to implement “a long-range comprehensive 
general plan prepared or being prepared to guide the overall future 
development of the county.”16 The manner and method of administra-
tion and enforcement is left wholly to the discretion of the counties, 
except that nonconforming uses may be terminated only through amor-
tization and then only in commercial, industrial, apartment, and resort 
districts.17 As noted above, amortization of nonconformities has been 
upheld in several states, provided the period after which the use must 
end is reasonable. Reasonableness is generally a function of the owner’s 
investment in the structure or use and the structure’s age in relation to its 
predetermined useful life. Additionally, the enabling legislation permits 
(but does not require) minor rezonings—“non-significant changes”—by 
administrative bodies (such as zoning boards or planning commissions) 
or officers (such as the director of Planning and Permitting in Hono-
lulu), even though courts regard even minor rezonings as legislative acts 
requiring the passage of an ordinance by a county council.18
 Finally, Hawai‘i is one of the first states in the nation to require 
local governments to permit two dwelling units per lot in all residence 
zones.19 Called “ohana zoning,” the law was passed in 198120 princi-
pally to help alleviate Hawai‘i’s acute housing shortage and to permit 
extended families to live on the same lot, even if the lot was zoned for 
single-family residences. A county may forbid such second dwellings 
only if public facilities (water, sewer) are inadequate or bulk require-
ments (yard, setback, height) are potentially infringed.
County Charter Provisions
The charters of Hawai‘i’s four counties all provide for zoning, yet they 
do so in different ways and with different implications, particularly in 
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terms of the legal effect of plans on the zoning ordinance. Those por-
tions of the counties’ zoning powers that are enshrined in the charters 
may not be altered by the county councils, either by ordinance or reso-
lution. The State Constitution provides that charters may be amended 
only by general law of the legislature or by vote of the people of the 
county.21 County charter provisions also deal with the relationship of 
planning to zoning. This issue is best analyzed on a county-by-county 
basis.
Honolulu
The charter of the City and County of Honolulu ties zoning to plan-
ning very closely. Indeed, zoning (and subdivision) must conform to 
so-called regional (sub-island) development plans in order to be valid 
at all.22 These development plans were adopted in 1982 and “amended” 
(replaced, actually) between 1999 and 2004,23 eliminating both the 
original detailed maps and site-specific text that allegedly too much 
resembled zoning maps and ordinances.24 The Honolulu City Council 
passed (by resolution) a general plan in 1977 and amended it in 1997, 
but it is largely advisory under the present charter. It is, however, a guide 
that certain state agencies are required by statute to consider or con-
form to, as described in chapter 1.25 Designed to cover a wide range 
of objectives, the Honolulu General Plan is largely aspirational and 
strives to “set forth the city’s objectives and broad policies for the long-
range development of the city,” addressing general social, economic, 
environmental, and design needs.26 It includes within its purview policy 
and development objectives “to be achieved for the general welfare and 
prosperity of the people and the most desirable population distribution 
and regional development pattern.”27 The development plans indicate 
geographically where future development is planned and where it is 
not;28 they are supposed to implement the general plan’s goals. There 
has been considerable debate in Honolulu over what the county’s eight 
development plans should contain. However, the charter is quite clear as 
to what they are and what they must contain: “‘Development plans’ shall 
consist of conceptual schemes for implementing and accomplishing the 
development objectives and policies of the general plan within the city. 
A development plan shall include a map, statements of standards and 
principles with respect to land uses, statements of urban design prin-
ciples and controls, and priorities as necessary to facilitate coordination 
of major development activities.”29
 The development plans and maps (which “shall not” be detailed in 
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the manner of zoning maps) must describe the desired urban character 
and the significant natural, scenic, and cultural resources for the several 
parts of the city to a degree that is sufficient to serve as a policy guide 
for more detailed zoning maps and regulations and public and private 
sector investment decisions.30 For example, the Primary Urban Center 
Plan contains chapters on downtown’s current role in O‘ahu’s develop-
ment pattern, on the plan for future development of the area, including 
plans to protect and enhance “natural, cultural and scenic resources,” 
on transportation, on infrastructure, and on public facilities.31 All O‘ahu 
Regional Development Plans are available on the Department of Plan-
ning and Permitting Web site.32
 Based on this language, some commentators have suggested that all 
existing zoning must also conform to any new development plans that 
are adopted. Moreover, in a series of cases, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court 
has held that (1) zoning must conform to plans;33 (2) in case of contra-
diction between plans and zoning designation, the more restrictive of 
the two controls present land use;34 and (3) both plan map and zoning 
map amendments are legislative acts.35 While it is not clear whether the 
Honolulu City Council is required to rezone all land to accord with 
the development plans, in 1966 the Court also held that zoning ordi-
nances passed or amended after such plans are passed but contrary to 
their provisions are void.36 Under the current revised charter, a land-
owner may seek a development plan amendment and a zoning map 
amendment concurrently. The Honolulu City Council presently hears 
and decides all such amendment requests at one “annual review,” so 
as to adequately consider their cumulative effect on the development 
plans.
Maui
Like Honolulu, Maui County’s plans are binding. Although Section 
8-8.5 of the Maui County Charter—the general and community plan-
ning provision—says nothing about land use changes and develop-
ment proposals having to conform to either the general plan or the 
area-specific community plans,37 Section 2.80B.030.B of the Maui 
County Codes states, “All agencies shall comply with the general plan. 
Notwithstanding any other provision, all community plans, zoning ordi-
nances, subdivision ordinances, and administrative actions by agencies 
shall conform to the general plan. Preparation of County budgets and 
capital improvement programs shall implement the general plan to the 
extent practicable. The community plans authorized in this chapter 
 Local Planning and Zoning 53
are and shall be part of the general plan of the County, as provided by 
section 8-8.5 of the charter.”38 Thus, while the ordinance continues to 
emphasize the general plan as a guide, it nevertheless requires that local 
zoning and subdivision regulations conform to that guide.39 There is 
nothing prospective about this language. The Maui ordinance provides 
that both past and present zoning and subdivision ordinances have to 
conform to its plans, which requires therefore that all existing ordi-
nances be changed as well.40 However, as this language is contained in 
an ordinance, not a charter, it can easily be amended.
 The Maui General Plan is primarily a statement of policies. It con-
sists of two parts: (1) a set of objectives expressing the common wishes 
and aspirations of the county residents and (2) policies that will have to 
be carried out in order to attain each objective.41 Together, the objec-
tives and policies of this plan provide a framework for the specific deci-
sions that the county will be required to make in the future.42 They are 
carried out through an implementation program.43
 The detailed community plans are required to be far more spe-
cific. The community plans created and revised by the citizen advisory 
committees must set forth, in detail, land uses within the community 
planning regions of the county. The objectives of each community plan 
must implement the policies of the general plan. Each community plan 
must include implementing actions that clearly identify priorities, time-
lines, estimated costs, and the county department accountable for the 
completion of the implementing actions.44
 Moreover, once adopted into the county code (by ordinance), the 
community plans are incorporated into and made a part of the general 
plan, so that they are supposed to be as binding as the general plan with 
respect to local zoning and subdivision ordinances: “The community 
plans authorized in this chapter are and shall be part of the general plan 
of the County, as provided by section 8-8.5 of the charter.”45 Further-
more, Section 8-8.5 of the Maui County Charter states, “The community 
plans generated through the citizen advisory councils and accepted by 
the planning commission, council, and mayor are part of the general 
plan.”46 Thus, the charter also specifically ties the community plans to 
the general plan.
Kaua‘i
The relationship of planning to zoning on Kaua‘i is relatively straight-
forward. The Kaua‘i Charter requires the County Council to adopt a 
general plan setting forth in graphic and textual form policies to govern 
54 Regulating Paradise
the future physical development of the county: “Such plan may cover 
the entire county and all of its functions and services or may consist 
of a combination of plans covering specific functions and services or 
specific geographic areas which together cover the entire county and 
all of its functions and services. The general plan shall serve as a guide 
to all future council action concerning land use and development 
regulations, urban renewal programs and expenditures for capital 
improvements.”47
 Based upon this language in the Kaua‘i Charter, it is unlikely that 
local zoning and subdivision regulations could be required to conform 
to the Kaua‘i General Plan. Because the charter further provides that 
relatively detailed development plans merely implement the guidelike 
general plan (a provision that the Maui Charter lacks), it is also unlikely 
that development plans would be construed to supersede past or future 
zoning and subdivision regulations, even though the charter requires 
both the general and development plans to be adopted by ordinance 
and not by resolution.48
Hawai‘i
Hawai‘i County, on the other hand, clearly means for its zoning and 
subdivision codes to conform to its planning schemes—in this case, its 
general plan—at least prospectively:
 (a) The council shall enact zoning, subdivision, and such 
other ordinances which shall contain the necessary provisions 
to carry out the purpose of the general plan.
 (b) No public improvement or project, or subdivision or 
zoning ordinance, shall be initiated or adopted unless the same 
conforms to and implements the general plan.49
The requirements for the Hawai‘i general plan are specifically spelled 
out in the county code, making it possible for its contents to be rela-
tively detailed. These include a “statement of development objectives, 
standards and principles with respect to the most desirable use of land” 
in the county and identifying those uses as “residential, recreational, 
agricultural, commercial, industrial and other purposes,” which are to 
be “consistent with the proper conservation of natural resources and 
the preservation of . . . natural beauty and historical sites.”50 Details for 
the use of land are to address such issues as the most desirable popula-
tion density; a system of roads and public access to shorelines and other 
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open spaces; locations and improvements of public buildings; location 
and the extent of public utilities and terminals; the extent and location 
of public housing projects; adequate drainage facilities and control; and 
air pollution.51 Anything not covered in detail is provided for in a more 
general statement recognizing that the County Council may address 
“such other matters as may . . . be beneficial to the social, economic, and 
governmental conditions and trends . . . of the county . . . to promote 
the general welfare and prosperity of its people.”52 The Hawai‘i County 
Plan, like those of Honolulu, Maui, and Kaua‘i, is adopted into its code 
by ordinance.53
County Zoning in Hawai‘i
County zoning in the State of Hawai‘i may be said to be a mixture of 
innovation and “Euclidian” zoning. Euclidean zoning (after the land-
mark Euclid case) is a convenient nickname for traditional as-of-right 
or self-executing zoning (that is, no special permissions are needed) 
in which district regulations are explicit; residential, commercial, and 
industrial uses are segregated; districts within categories such as “resi-
dential” are cumulative (“higher” uses such as single-family residences 
are permitted in “lower” use zones, such as those for apartments); and 
bulk and height controls are imposed.54 It also results in the least guid-
ance for landowners because of its many required reviews and often 
imprecise standards, particularly in its “overlay” zones.
Honolulu County: The Demise of Euclidean Zoning?
The City and County of Honolulu’s Land Use Ordinance (LUO) con-
tains many—but not all—of the zoning requirements of the city and 
county. The rest are found in the charter. While clearly retaining many 
standard Euclidean zoning features, both contain many elements, such 
as special permit zones and overlays, that make Honolulu’s zoning 
requirements the most technical and thorough of the four counties.
 The Zoning Districts
 The LUO divides the land area of O‘ahu into twenty-four districts, 
each with its own set of permitted uses, restrictions, and standards. 
These are in turn grouped into eleven broad categories: preservation, 
agricultural, country, residential, apartment, apartment mixed use, 
resort, business, business mixed use, industrial, and industrial-commer-
cial mixed use as follows:55
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Preservation
 Restricted P-1
 General P-2
 Military and Federal F-1
Agricultural
 Restricted AG-1
 General AG-2
Country C
Residential  R-20, R-10, R-7.5, R-5,  
  R-3.5
Apartment
 Low-density A-1
 Medium-density A-2
 High-density A-3
Apartment Mixed Use
 Low-density AMX-1
 Medium-density AMX-2
 High-density AMX-3
Resort  Resort
Business
 Neighborhood B-1
 Community B-2
Business Mixed Use
 Community BMX-3
 Central BMX-4
Industrial
 Limited I-1
 Intensive I-2
 Waterfront I-3
Industrial-Commercial Mixed Use IMX-1
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 Each district carries with it certain typical standards relating to 
permitted uses, bulk of structures, required yards, and the like, all theo-
retically designed to protect the health, safety, welfare, and morals of its 
inhabitants. While certain regulations apply generally to all districts, the 
LUO is so organized that, once a landowner locates a parcel of property 
on the zoning map of O‘ahu, a general idea of what is permitted in the 
zoning “envelope” surrounding that parcel is easily found by looking up 
that district in the text of the LUO. The zoning map, prepared by the 
director of the Department of Planning and Permitting, is available for 
public inspection—and purchase—at the Office of the City Clerk; it is 
also available online.56 In the event of conflict between the map and the 
text of any ordinance, the text prevails.57
 An example of how the LUO works is the A-1 apartment district.58 
First, the following principal uses permitted in that district are listed in 
Table 21-3 (the Master Use Table), most of which are generally permit-
ted, with additions, in the rest of the apartment districts as well (an 
example of cumulative zoning):59
Boarding facilities
Consulates
Duplex units
Detached one-family dwellings
Detached two-family dwellings
Multifamily dwellings
Public uses and structures
Type A utility installations
 The Master Use Table also lists special accessory uses. An accessory 
use is, inter alia, “clearly incidental to and customarily found in connec-
tion with the principal use.”60 Accessory uses include home occupations 
and receive-only antennas.61
 Also listed are uses and structures that are permitted only upon 
the fulfillment of certain conditions (these conditions and permits for 
use are discussed later in the section on zoning administration). One 
such category of conditional uses includes group living facilities, spe-
cial needs housing for the elderly, use of historic structures, neighbor-
hood grocery stores, day care facilities, meeting facilities, elementary, 
intermediate, and high schools, joint use of parking facilities, off-site 
parking facilities, Type B utility installations, and joint developments.62 
Special uses are also permitted only upon certain conditions but differ 
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in that they are less permanent or less obtrusive than conditional uses. 
An example of special uses includes language schools.63
 Second, the area, yard, and bulk regulations set out size limitations 
on principal structures and indicate where accessory structures may or 
may not be located in relation to required front, side, and rear yards.64 
A separate table in this section contains the intensity-of-use ratio known 
as the “floor area ratio” or FAR. Briefly, FAR refers to the ratio of floor 
area to land area permitted, expressed as a percent or decimal.65 Thus, a 
floor area ratio of .5 would mean that on a ten thousand square-foot lot, 
the maximum floor space permitted would be five thousand square feet. 
Additional height and yard limits would also apply, but usually applica-
tion of the FAR results in a structure smaller than would otherwise be 
permitted within such height and yard limitations. The consideration of 
such regulations creates what is commonly called the “zoning envelope” 
within which a permitted building must fit.
 The Special Districts
 That zoning in large cities is substantially changed from the heyday 
of Euclidean zoning is clear.66 The most obvious change is the trend 
toward permitting: Instead of the traditional zoning district listing 
ranges of permitted uses on a parcel so zoned, a special zone is set out 
in the zoning ordinance and a permit to develop a particular project is 
issued in accordance with certain standards and goals; little is permitted 
automatically. The Honolulu LUO contains a classic example of this 
trend, particularly in its planned unit development regulations and spe-
cial design district regulations.
 Special Design Districts
 An increasingly common approach to the regulation of develop-
ment through zoning is to require that development of any kind be 
allowed only by special permit in certain areas. While a few communi-
ties appear to require practically all development to go through such 
a permitting process (for example, Irvine, California), the Honolulu 
LUO requires it only by means of its special design district (SDD) des-
ignation. There are now seven special design districts in the City and 
County of Honolulu: the Hawai‘i Capitol Special District, the Diamond 
Head Special District, the Punchbowl Special District, the Chinatown 
Special District, the Thomas Square/Honolulu Academy of Arts Special 
District, the Waikīkī Special District, and the Hale‘iwa Special District.67 
All but the Waikīkī District are “overlay” districts: The regulations appli-
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cable in such districts are in addition to—or “overlay”—the standards 
and requirements in the traditionally mapped zoning district upon 
which they are superimposed.
 The establishment of a special design district is a multistep pro-
cess.68 First, the department discusses the proposal with the applicant 
and may assign a project manager to review the proposal.69 Additionally, 
the applicant must present the project to the relevant neighborhood 
board.70 Once these steps have been completed, the proposal is submit-
ted to the director of DPP, pertinent governmental agencies, and the 
Design Advisory Committee for review and comment.71 The director 
of DPP must then either deny the application or submit a report and 
proposed ordinance to the planning commission.72 Within forty-five 
days of receiving the proposal, the planning commission must hold a 
public hearing; within thirty days of the public hearing, the planning 
commission must forward the director’s report and proposed ordi-
nance to the Honolulu City Council. The council then holds a public 
hearing and may approve, conditionally approve, or deny the proposed 
ordinance.73
 If the district is established, the DPP director creates a design con-
trol system for all development in the district, promulgating “regula-
tions which provide guidance for the design of new development and 
the renovation of existing development.”74 All development in an SDD is 
classified as major, minor, or exempt. Major and minor projects require 
special district permits in order to proceed.75
 Changing Districts and Uses
 The name of the game in zoning is change.76 Change is accom-
plished through amendments, special and conditional uses, and vari-
ances, with procedures within the City and County of Honolulu con-
tained in both the LUO and the Honolulu Charter. Key actors in these 
processes are the Honolulu City Council, Planning Commission, Zoning 
Board of Appeals (ZBA), and the director of the DPP.
 Administration and Administrative Appeals
 The formulation of general and development plans, as well as the 
administration of the zoning and subdivision ordinances of the City 
and County of Honolulu, are both largely in the hands of the direc-
tor of DPP.77 Thus, the DPP director receives nearly all applications for 
land use changes and the initial interpretive and information requests. 
Appeals from the final decisions of the director and in the general 
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administration of the ordinance go to the ZBA. The ZBA will sustain an 
appeal only in the event of an erroneous finding of fact by the director 
or upon a finding that the director acted in an “arbitrary or capricious 
manner or had manifestly abused his discretion.”78
 Amendments and Public Hearings
 There are three classes of amendments set out in the LUO: changes 
in zoning (so-called map amendments or rezonings) or amendments to 
the LUO (so-called text amendments); establishment of special design 
districts; and the creation of planned unit developments. All require 
the adoption of an ordinance by the Honolulu City Council.79 In all 
categories, it is critical to follow the procedural timetable. A missed 
deadline can result in a procedural defect that may require starting all 
over again.
 Whether map or textual, a landowner requesting an amend-
ment must first present the request before the neighborhood board 
of the project’s district.80 After presentation, the applicant submits 
the request for an amendment to the DPP director, in whom the city 
charter vests the power to prepare zoning amendments.81 The director 
then requests written comments and recommendations on the rezon-
ing from pertinent governmental agencies, community organizations, 
and other interested parties during a forty-five-day comment period.82 
If the director chooses to proceed with a rezoning request, he submits 
a report and proposed ordinance to the Planning Commission for fur-
ther review83 within ninety days of acceptance of the initial completed 
request.84
 The Planning Commission is specifically provided for by the char-
ter.85 Consisting of nine members, it not only advises the mayor, council, 
and the director of DPP and reviews local plans, but it is also vested by the 
charter with the authority to review subdivision and zoning ordinances 
and amendments.86 Upon receiving the report of the DPP director in 
regard to a proposed amendment, the commission must hold a public 
hearing within forty-five days and transmit the proposed amendment 
(with its recommendations and those of the DPP director) “through 
the mayor to the Council for its consideration and action” within thirty 
days of the close of the public hearing.87 The council must then hold 
another public hearing and either approve, approve with modifications, 
or reject the proposed amendment within ninety days after receiving 
the proposal from the commission. If the council fails to act, such inac-
tion signifies rejection.88
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 Throughout the proceedings, it is clear that the council has the 
“last word,” and therefore it is reasonable to assume that the process up 
to the point of the council hearing and consideration is advisory only. 
Indeed, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has so held, rejecting contentions 
that formal administrative procedures apply to either the DPP or the 
planning commission’s processes.89
 One of the thorniest issues in the council hearing process is how 
much the amendment can be changed by the council after the hear-
ing without triggering the need for a new hearing. While presumably it 
could not substitute another amendment entirely, it is surely not neces-
sary to rehear an amendment proposal after the insertion of every new 
comma. Indeed, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has held that the raising of 
a height limit in the special Hawai‘i Capitol District by sixty feet (from 
250 to 310 feet) after public hearing was not sufficiently significant to 
require a new hearing.90 While agreeing that the council could not 
adopt a proposal different from the one “noticed” for public hearing 
merely because the changes were “advocated or discussed at a public 
hearing,” the Court declared that it would have to be “fundamentally 
different from that proposed [so] as to amount to a new proposal” in 
order to require a re-notice and rehearing.91 How the Court would 
decide a more complex matter, such as changes to development plans 
after council hearing, remains to be seen.
 A final point on the amendment process is that some courts have 
held that map amendments involving relatively small land parcels 
should be treated as judgelike or quasijudicial determinations, even 
when made—as in Honolulu—by a legislative body such as the City 
Council.92 With largely local effects and often with contestants argu-
ing for and against, the proceeding does more closely resemble the 
judicial process rather than the public-policy and general-applicability 
character of legislation and the legislative process. The results of such 
a determination would be significant in the judicial process: Issues in 
appeals from legislative determinations are tried in court de novo (all 
over again), while administrative appeals are reviewed based solely on 
the record already made before administrative bodies or legislative bod-
ies acting in nonlegislative capacities (as in the granting of shoreline 
management permits in Honolulu). The Hawai‘i Supreme Court has 
expressly held that rezoning is a legislative act.93 While legislative deci-
sions are, in accordance with appropriately drafted enabling provisions, 
traditionally subject to referenda, quasijudicial decisions traditionally 
are not.94 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, recently decided that 
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both legislative and administrative acts are subject to the referendum 
process in City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation.95 
Although it remains unlikely that zoning by initiative and referendum 
in Hawai‘i will be revived (because of the Nukolii and Hawaii Kai deci-
sions discussed above), the federal Buckeye decision throws this area of 
the law into confusion.
 Conditional Zoning: Reclassification/Development
 Conditions on rezoning and conditions on development proceed 
from different bases in law and policy. The purpose of placing condi-
tions on the land reclassification or rezoning process at common law 
is to prevent the use of land in a fashion inconsistent with the overall 
zoning scheme or development plan for the area. Honolulu specifically 
provides for conditions on rezoning in its LUO:96 Before the enactment 
of a zoning change, the City Council may impose conditions on the 
applicant’s use of property. The stated rationale is to protect the public 
from “potentially deleterious effects” of the proposed use and to fulfill 
the need for “public service demands created by the proposed use.”97 
The LUO further provides that the required conditions be formally 
recorded in a so-called unilateral agreement.98 Some observers argue 
that is a fundamentally flawed process for at least two reasons. First, there 
is no reason why the two purposes set out in the LUO cannot be accom-
plished by other more traditional and defensible means: Providing for 
infrastructure and public facilities is usually accomplished through the 
development or subdivision exaction or impact fee, discussed in chapter 
3. Protecting the public from deleterious effects of a use is usually accom-
plished either by removing the use from the zoning district or by making 
it a special or conditional use, approved according to strict standards and 
by permit only by a zoning administrative officer after a hearing—but 
without a zone change. Second, critics also suggest that the method of 
memorializing the conditions—the unilateral agreement—is both illegal 
and a contradiction in terms. Under basic contract law theory, there is 
no such thing as an enforceable “unilateral” agreement: An agreement 
presumes at least two parties and, to be enforceable, “consideration”—a 
bargained-for benefit—must flow both ways. A “unilateral” agreement is 
thus lacking the required reciprocity element, as the applicant is making 
a one-sided promise and receiving nothing in exchange.
 There are also more general problems with Honolulu’s conditional 
zoning. Related to or often treated the same as contract zoning, the 
practice comes dangerously close to bargaining away the police power 
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of local government. In most jurisdictions, this kind of conditional 
zoning is considered illegal, unless (as with development agreements 
discussed in chapter 3) there is a statutory basis for the practice.99 More-
over, it is difficult to know what is or is not permitted in a mapped zone 
classification if zoning approvals are regularly hedged with conditions 
on approval, such as the common limiting of existing uses to fewer than 
those permitted in the new zone classification under the local zoning 
ordinances.100 Such limitations rarely have anything to do with the 
appropriateness of the use in the district. Rather, community and/or 
government opposition—either to most of the uses permitted in the 
zoning ordinance in that district or to the particular use, without condi-
tions governing how the use is to be carried out—is among the salient 
reasons for conditioning the rezoning. If the concerns are legitimate, 
then perhaps the controversial other uses should be removed from the 
zoning classification as uses “of right” and permitted only upon certain 
articulated conditions, thereby leveling the playing field for all par-
ticipants in the zoning game. Otherwise, the zoning ordinance itself 
becomes something of a shibai (pretense).
 Special and Conditional Uses
 The city may impose conditions on land use changes without resort 
to conditional zoning, however, as it can now process special and condi-
tional uses. Provisions in the LUO specifically address such conditional 
permissions, each of which could, by the process of text amendment dis-
cussed above, be expanded to cover any situation to which conditional 
zoning might be applied. The difference is that the City Council is not 
involved in the special or conditional use process, except to the extent 
that it originally—or in the future (by way of text amendment)—lists 
in each zoning district classification the special or conditional uses that 
might be approved, according to the process described below.
 The conditional use permit is the broader of the two categories. 
Like the approval of planned developments and major projects in coun-
cil-established SDDs, conditional use permit applications are issued by 
the director of the DPP.101 In deciding such applications, the director is 
guided by the standards set out for such conditional uses generally—
and by specific uses in particular—as set out in the LUO in Article V and 
the list, if any, of conditional uses appended to or contained in the LUO 
sections applicable to particular zone district classifications. The direc-
tor may also vary the application of dimensional and bulk standards 
(yard, lot dimension, height) in permitting such uses.102
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 Special use permits can be granted for uses of a less permanent 
or intrusive nature. Reflecting that lower level of potential impact, no 
hearing is required; application to the DPP director is sufficient.103 As 
with conditional uses, the special use permit is restricted to those special 
uses set out as permitted in the various zoning district classifications. 
While some of the uses permitted in this category are both permanent 
and consequential (such as private vacation cabins), most are tempo-
rary in nature, such as produce stands and construction trailers.104
 Variances
 The DPP director has the authority to soften the application of the 
precise zoning ordinance requirements under extraordinary circum-
stances by “varying” applicable building and use requirements. Accord-
ing to the charter, an applicant’s success in obtaining such variances is 
based upon convincing the director of “unnecessary hardship”:
 (1) the applicant would be deprived of the reasonable use of 
such land or building if the provisions of the zoning code were 
strictly applicable;
 (2) the request of the applicant is due to unique circum-
stances and not the general conditions in the neighborhood, 
so that the reasonableness of the neighborhood zoning is not 
drawn into question; and
 (3) the request, if approved, will not alter the essential 
character of the neighborhood nor be contrary to the intent 
and purpose of the zoning ordinance.105
 Variances have become increasingly difficult to obtain. If the direc-
tor denies the variance, the landowner may appeal to the ZBA, which 
holds another hearing on the variance and determines whether or not 
the action of the director was clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, 
or an abuse of discretion.106 Because legal standards are applied, an appli-
cant’s success is largely dependent on legal research and supplying past 
cases in which variances were granted under similar circumstances.
 Nonconformities
 Nonconformities violate either present structural or present 
use requirements. Counties may not pass zoning ordinances that 
eliminate single-family or duplex residential and agricultural uses as 
nonconforming.107
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 Somewhat different rules apply to nonconforming structures. In 
Honolulu, while nonconformities may not be expanded, moved, or 
structurally altered, the nonconforming use of part of the structure may 
be expanded under certain circumstances. Moreover, the use of the 
structure may change to other nonconforming uses “of the same nature 
and general impact,”108 and the structure itself may be repaired so long 
as the work is limited to an enumerated list of “ordinary repairs”109 (up to 
10 percent of its value in any twelve-month period), thereby extending 
its life indefinitely. The repairs permitted are unlimited if they are for the 
purpose of “strengthening or restoring to a safe condition” a structure 
declared to be unsafe by an appropriate official. The structures must 
cease to be used in a nonconforming fashion if use is discontinued for 
twelve consecutive months or for any eighteen months in three years.110 
If the nonconforming structure is damaged or destroyed beyond 50 per-
cent of its replacement cost, then it must be reconstructed in a conform-
ing fashion only.111 Under the Honolulu LUO, nonconforming uses of 
land (as opposed to structures) may neither be enlarged, moved about, 
nor expanded, and nonuse for six consecutive months or for a total of 
twelve months in any three-year period will result in termination.112
Mau‘i County: Unrefined Euclidian
With the exception of its historic preservation provision, Maui’s zoning 
scheme is traditionally Euclidian.113 Like the County of Hawai‘i, Maui 
appears to have some virtually unclassified (“interim zone”) areas.114 
The districts set out in the ordinance are for the most part both less 
complicated and less finely tuned than those in Honolulu, reflecting 
Maui County’s less-developed and more rural character.
 The Zoning Districts
 Maui is divided into twenty-six zoning districts:115
A. Residential districts:
 1. R-1 6,000 square feet,
 2. R-2 7,500 square feet,
 3. R-3 10,000 square feet;
B. Multiple-family districts:
 1. Two-family district (duplex district),
 2. Apartment districts;
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C. Hotel districts;
D. Business districts:
 1. B-1 neighborhood business district,
 2. B-2 community business district,
 3. B-3 central business district,
 4. B-R resort commercial district,
 5. B-CT business country town district;
E. Industrial districts:
 1. M-1 light industrial district,
 2. M-2 heavy industrial district;
F. Airport district;
G. Agricultural district;
H. Off-street parking and loading;
I. Planned development;
J. Civic improvement district;
K. Park districts:
 1. PK-1 neighborhood park district,
 2. PK-2 community park district,
 3. PK-3 regional park district,
 4. PK-4 golf course park district;
L. Rural districts:
 1. RU-0.5 rural district,
 2. RU-1 rural district;
M. Open space districts:
 1. OS-1 passive open space district,
 2. OS-2 active open space district.
 One or two points are worth elaborating. First, the planned devel-
opment “district” is not a traditional zoning district at all but an overlay 
district.116 Thus, densities permitted therein depend upon which of the 
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five residential district regulations apply to the Planned Unit Develop-
ment (PUD).117 Moreover, the PUD regulations specifically provide 
that “[a]ll other regulations shall be the same as those for the particu-
lar district in which the planned development is located.”118 On the 
other hand, a planned development may be located in just about any 
district—residential, duplex, apartment, hotel, business, and industrial. 
Such districts and the regulation of uses therein are the responsibility 
of the County Planning Commission, not the County Council.119 Maui 
uses a three-step approval process for PUDs: approval, sketch plan, and 
unified site and building program.120 The incentive for undertaking 
planned development on Maui is a series of density and related bonuses 
designed to reduce development costs.121
 Of particular interest in Maui County is the “projects district” estab-
lished in 1974.122 Its purpose is “to provide for a flexible and creative 
planning approach rather than specific land use designations, for qual-
ity developments.”123 A design proposal for the project area is required 
prior to development.124 In return, the owner/developer retains a degree 
of flexibility much like that for planned development.125 Unlike general 
PUDs, however, such districts are specifically identified on the Wailuku-
Kahului General Plan.126 As with planned development zones, both the 
zoning ordinance and the subdivision requirements remain applicable 
to developments within the project district, except to the extent that 
their provisions are modified by or inconsistent with the project district 
provisions. As with PUDs, the Planning Commission approves creation 
of these districts.127
 Maui has also established civic improvement districts for the 
purpose of “encouraging, securing and maintaining the orderly and 
harmonious appearance, attractiveness and aesthetic development of 
structures and developments in such districts in order that the most 
appropriate use and value thereof be determined and protected and that 
the public health, safety and general welfare be preserved.”128 A “precise 
plan” for any such district must be adopted by the County Council upon 
Planning Commission recommendation. The plan describes the area 
included, together with applicable standards of design.129 From there 
on, an advisory committee, appointed by the mayor (with approval of 
the council), regulates development by reviewing developer/applicant 
plans and approving, modifying, or rejecting in accordance with the 
standards contained in the plans.130 For example, the Nāpili Bay Civic 
Improvement District on West Maui’s Gold Coast was established in 1971 
through the use of this procedure.131 Among the design and land use 
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standards described in its precise plan were prohibitions on building 
height and total floor area, directives about the construction and style 
of buildings, restrictions on signs and advertisements, and instructions 
about the availability of off-street parking.132
 Finally, the interim zoning district as it operates in Maui County is 
worth noting.133 When the permanent zoning ordinance was enacted 
in 1971, there were portions of the county that were left unclassified. 
To regulate land use in such areas (Makawao, Lahaina, Hāna, Lāna‘i, 
and Moloka‘i), the county enacted an interim zoning ordinance.134 
Many parts of Moloka‘i and the Kula district on Maui remain in such 
an “interim zone,” in which only residential uses are permitted. Land 
newly classified as urban by the State Land Use Commission is also often 
temporarily placed in this zone.135
 Administration
 As in Honolulu, administration of the zoning ordinance in Maui 
County is largely the responsibility of the Maui County Council, Plan-
ning Commission, Board of Variances and Appeals, and an administra-
tive officer, the planning director. Zoning changes are ultimately the 
responsibility of the council, whether or not they initiate the process.136 
In addition to granting variances,137 the board acts on all appeals per-
taining to the zoning ordinance and the decisions of the planning 
director.138 The Maui Charter provides for the planning director to 
prepare and revise the general plan and proposed zoning ordinances 
and maps.139 The charter also provides for the Planning Commission 
to review, hold hearings upon, and make findings on the general plan 
and zoning ordinances.140 The Maui zoning ordinance allows review of 
subdivision plans by the director of public works.141 However, the zoning 
ordinance delegates to the Planning Commission, however, the respon-
sibility to prepare a master plan or plans of the urban areas.142 But the 
commission is left out of the community development plan formulation 
process; it is responsible only for reviewing and making findings and 
recommendations on revisions to enacted community development 
plans proposed by the planning director or by the council.143
 Conditional Zoning
 In 1980, Maui enacted a comprehensive conditional zoning amend-
ment whereby a property owner may substantially improve the chances 
of obtaining an otherwise “iffy” rezoning if the applicant agrees in 
advance to certain conditions calculated to mitigate public service bur-
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dens and protect the public against deleterious uses that might result.144 
Formal, written agreement to such conditions as the county imposes 
might precede consideration of the rezoning request itself, but even 
the execution of a separate and unilateral agreement by a landowner to 
abide by such conditions will not bind the county to pass the requisite 
rezoning amendment. Similar to Honolulu’s scheme, the conditions 
are then enumerated in a “unilateral agreement” running in favor of 
the council, to be recorded with the Bureau of Conveyances, assuring 
that any subsequent purchaser of the land has notice of them. The legal 
terminology applied to such conditions or declarations of covenants is 
that they “run with the land,” though whether they will be subsequently 
enforceable is an unsettled question in Hawai‘i. It may depend more on 
the nature of the covenants and who seeks enforcement, rather than on 
anything the County of Maui may have in mind.
Kaua‘i County: A Non-Euclidian Approach
Kaua‘i appears to be the only one of Hawai‘i’s four counties in which a 
comprehensive plan preceded zoning. Consequently, Kaua‘i’s General 
Plan—and in particular its first goal, to maintain the concept of Kaua‘i 
as the Garden Isle—has probably had a greater influence on the later-
adopted Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance (the Kaua‘i CZO) than the 
plans of the other three counties. As a result, the Kaua‘i CZO varies 
from the standard Euclidean ordinance of the other counties. It is pri-
marily a density-based rather than lot/use-based ordinance.
 Districts, Uses, and Automatic Rezonings
 The Kaua‘i CZO is organized into six major-use categories with 
fourteen districts and two overlay categories with nine districts, all of 
which are drawn on zoning maps depicting the seven planning areas 
into which the county has been divided: Kapa‘a-Līhu‘e, Kōloa-Po‘ipū, 
Hanapēpē, Waimea, Hanalei, Kīlauea, and Kaua‘i-Ni‘ihau.145 These dis-
tricts are as follows:146
Residential  R: R-1, R-2, R-4, R-6, R-10, R-20
Resort  RR: RR-10, RR-20
Commercial  C
Neighborhood Commercial  CN
General Commercial  CG
Industrial  I
Limited Industrial  IL
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General Industrial  IG
Agricultural  A
Open  O
Special Treatment  ST
Public Facilities  ST-P
Cultural/Historic  ST-C
Scenic/Ecological  ST-R
Constraint  S
Drainage  S-DR
Flood  S-FL
Shore  S-SH
Slope  S-SL
Soils  S-SO
Tsunami  S-TS
The special treatment and constraint categories are overlay districts. 
Thus, underlying mapped district classifications govern use therein 
except as modified by whatever special treatment and constraint zone 
conditions are applied by “overlaying” the special zones on top of the 
mapped zones.147
 Kaua‘i also uses conditional zoning extensively.148 Aside from pro-
viding for the imposition of conditions on any zone change for both 
health/safety and public improvement/heritage protection, the Kaua‘i 
CZO also lists the kinds of conditions that may be imposed.149 It further 
provides for “automatic” zone changes whenever specified conditions 
occur.150
 The practice of automatic zone changes may seem a bit dubious, 
because zoning in Hawai‘i is a legislative act and so, therefore, is rezon-
ing. Rezoning arguably automatically deprives a property owner of the 
usual due process involved in rezoning a parcel of land, and some states 
therefore forbid the practice altogether. Others, however, permit auto-
matic rezoning under very limited circumstances, comparing it to a spe-
cial use with conditions.151 The breach of a condition of such a special 
use permit causes the permit to automatically expire, leaving the owner 
with the underlying zoning. This special use procedure is superior both 
administratively and legally.
 Kaua‘i requires a zoning permit for residential,152 commercial,153 
industrial,154 resort,155 agricultural,156 open space157 development, and 
conditional use.158 It thus utilizes permit zoning as opposed to the stan-
dard zoning envelope model where many uses are permitted as “of right” 
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in each district. There are usually four classes of zoning permits available 
for each development type.159 This zoning permit system is closely tied 
to (1) the size of the project and (2) its location in or out of one of the 
two classes of overlay districts: constraint and special treatment.160 An 
applicant for a zoning permit files an application with the county plan-
ning department, showing, among other things, existing and proposed 
structures.161 Whether the planning director or the Planning Commis-
sion issues the permit depends upon which of the four classes of permit 
is required; this in turn depends upon the size of the development and 
its location in or out of an overlay or constraint zone.162
 Use permits are required for a variety of uses. For example, fifteen 
individual uses require a use permit in commercial districts, from ani-
mal hospitals and automobile sales to warehouses and schools.163 Such 
permits are granted only if the proposed use is compatible within the 
district and not detrimental to the health, safety, peace, morals, com-
fort, and general welfare of the community, will cause no substantial 
harmful environmental consequences, and will be consistent with the 
general plan.164 The commission or the director may impose a variety of 
conditions on the permit pertaining to such a location, amount, type, 
and time of construction, amount and type of traffic, appearance of the 
building, and landscaping.165
 Permitting in a special treatment or constraint district depends 
upon the nature and location of a proposed development. In these 
overlay districts, the underlying standard zoning district requirements—
residential, commercial, agricultural, open space, industrial—apply, 
except as their special requirements impose further restrictions.166 
There are three special treatment districts: Public Facilities (ST-P), 
Cultural/Historic (ST-C), and Scenic/Ecologic Resources (ST-R).167 
In addition to zoning permit requirements, use permits are required 
for nearly all “uses, structures or development” in a special treatment 
district.168
 Constraint districts, which are more traditional overlay districts, 
contain restrictions directed at alleviating specific physical site develop-
ment problems—or preventing development where such problems are 
too severe.169 There are six such districts, designed to deal with drain-
age, flood, tsunami, steep slope, shoreland protection, and unsuitable 
soil problems.170 The flood, shore, and tsunami district regulations track 
various state and federal requirements, which are discussed in chapter 6 
on coastal zone management and chapter 7 on flood hazards.
 Kaua‘i’s permit system is particularly strong in its approach to 
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preserving agriculture and open space. In the agriculture district, no 
structures other than agricultural buildings and single-family residences 
are permitted without a use permit.171 Moreover, a use permit allows 
only the applicant an animal hospital, a church, a school, commercial 
recreation, or similar structure as determined by the planning direc-
tor.172 Even if a use permit is issued, subdivision is limited (in order to 
“limit, retard, and control such subdivision of agricultural land that will 
destroy agricultural stability and potential”173 and to “avoid dissipation 
of agricultural land”174) according to a sliding scale that ties the number 
and size of the subdivided lots to the size of the original parcel.175 Thus, 
a parcel of ten acres or less can be divided into one-acre parcels,176 but 
a parcel between thirty and fifty acres may be divided into only five-acre 
parcels.177 However, while at least one dwelling unit may be constructed 
on each parcel of one acre or larger, three additional acres per parcel 
are needed for each additional dwelling unit on the same parcel, up to a 
maximum of only five dwelling units per parcel, regardless of its size.178
The open space district is designed principally for the preservation 
of environmentally critical land or water areas and the regulation of 
development in hazard zones.179 As in the agriculture zone, the gener-
ally permitted uses are structurally limited to agricultural buildings and 
single-family residences.180 Land coverage is limited to 10 percent of 
a lot or parcel.181 Density is limited according to the underlying State 
Land Use Commission classification.182 Thus, the limit is one dwelling 
unit per acre on land classified urban (provided the slope is no greater 
than 10 percent), one dwelling unit per three acres if it is designated 
rural (or if the slope exceeds 10 percent in urban), and one dwelling 
unit per five acres on agricultural land.183
 Both districts may be subject to Kaua‘i’s “agricultural park” ordi-
nance passed in 1974, whereby an area of at least 350 acres in either 
the agricultural or open space zone may become a sort of agricultural, 
development-free horizontal condominium.184 The purpose of the ordi-
nance was apparently to prevent development of agricultural land and 
to keep it available to small farmers.185
 Administration
 The permit/performance nature of the Kaua‘i CZO obviates much 
“normal” zoning administration. A few points of difference from stan-
dard practice in Hawai‘i in the variance and amendment process are 
worth noting, however.
 The variance on Kaua‘i has two extraordinary features. First, the 
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zoning ordinance not only fails to recite the usual hardship require-
ment, it also expressly rejects financial hardship as a “permissible basis 
for the granting of a variance.” This rejection is preceded by an unusu-
ally articulate list of factors and restrictions on the granting of vari-
ances.186 Second, the variance request is processed, heard, and decided 
not by a zoning board of appeals but by the Planning Commission.187 
This is most unusual, as the hearing of variances is generally regarded 
as a quasijudicial proceeding for which an appeals board is usually 
uniquely qualified. On the other hand, as Kaua‘i has tended toward a 
permit-oriented performance land use control scheme, and as the Plan-
ning Commission has a substantial administrative, quasijudicial role by 
hearing permit requests under the scheme, it is less illogical that it, as 
another appointed body, be entrusted with responsibility for variances 
as well.
 The amendment process also contains some novel facets. The 
Planning Commission not only receives and processes amendment 
applications,188 but it also holds the sole hearing on such applications.189 
This is a laudable piece of economy. The practice (as in Honolulu) of 
holding another hearing before the council is unnecessary. However, 
the CZO also provides that should the commission disapprove of a pro-
posed amendment, its decision is final, except that its decision may be 
appealed to the council, which must then hold a hearing before decid-
ing the fate of the amendment.190 It is not altogether clear why the Plan-
ning Commission is given authority to make final decisions on generally 
legislative matters. The providing of an appeal to the council does not 
really save this process. Identical procedures for both negative and posi-
tive decisions of the Planning Commission on proposed amendments 
would be more consistent, even if it is the intent that the commission 
have more than the usual advisory role to the council on amendment 
matters.
Hawai‘i County: A Traditional Approach
The County of Hawai‘i zoning ordinance is more traditional than those 
of the other three counties. With the exception of two overlay districts, 
the zones are textbook-typical. There is a host of permitted uses in each 
district, permitted automatically and without the need for, say, the use 
permit usually required in Kaua‘i or the potential restrictions of a spe-
cial design or historic, scenic, and cultural districts in Honolulu. There 
is, however, a rigorous and comprehensive planning review process 
applicable to many of the districts.
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 The Zoning Districts
 Hawai‘i County divides land into seventeen districts:191
RS, single-family residential districts
RD, double-family residential districts
RM, multiple-family residential districts
RCX, residential-commercial mixed use districts
RA, residential and agricultural districts
FA, family agricultural district
A, agricultural districts
IA, intensive agricultural districts
V, resort-hotel districts
CN, neighborhood commercial districts
CG, general commercial districts
CV, village commercial districts
MCX, industrial-commercial mixed use districts
ML, limited industrial districts
MG, general industrial districts
O, open districts
Special districts
 Each district lists uses permitted of right, followed by standard bulk 
limitations on these uses (yard, height, and so forth), density of cover-
age, and the like.
 Plan approval may also be required for any variance or conditional 
use permit.192 No hotel or condominium may obtain plan approval unless 
it is approved in accordance with project procedures.193 A detailed site 
plan must be filed with the director of planning (who heads the Depart-
ment of Planning), who must deny, approve, or defer it subject to condi-
tions, according to detailed site planning criteria.194 The director’s deci-
sions are appealable only to the Hawai‘i County Board of Appeals.195
 The director is also authorized to continually review any multiphase 
project, raising the potential of a stop-order in the event of violations.196 
Thus, while the uses permitted are determined by the district regula-
tions, the manner in which the uses are developed is controlled by the 
director and Board of Appeals in most zoning classifications.
 Aside from a relatively straightforward agricultural district, there is 
also an intensive agricultural district for the preservation of agricultural 
lands that have “high yields of crops.”197 There is also an open district 
“to protect investments which have been or shall be made in reliance 
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upon the retention of such open use.”198 Growing plants (if it does not 
impair a view), golf courses, historical sites, private recreation, and pub-
lic parks are the principal permitted uses.199
 Planned Development and Other Special Approvals
 The most refreshing aspect of the County of Hawai‘i’s planned 
development regulations is that they appear to permit commercial and 
industrial as well as residential developments.200 Moreover, planned 
developments are permitted as special use rather than as a new district 
classification,201 thereby avoiding any potential problems of automatic 
“reverting” to the former zone classification in the event that the planned 
development permit is violated. However, no planned development is 
permitted in any district unless the uses proposed are permitted either 
of right or conditionally in the zoning district where the property is 
situated.202 Thus a rezoning will often be required before a planned unit 
development is approved.203 This two-step process provides additional 
guarantees to property owners who have relied on existing zoning to 
develop their property, but it is nevertheless cumbersome for planned 
developments.
 Hawai‘i’s charter shifts the power to hear and decide variances 
from the Planning Commission to the director, but only “as provided 
by law.”204 It is therefore not altogether clear that the director is autho-
rized to hear variance requests until “conforming” legislation has been 
passed by the council. The charter further provides that the decision of 
the director may be appealed to the Board of Appeals.205 The zoning 
code presently provides that “a variance shall not allow the introduction 
of a use not otherwise permitted within the district.”206 This language 
would appear to foreclose the granting of the notorious use variance.
Conclusion
Local zoning among the counties in Hawai‘i is both similar and diverse. 
Some of the most innovative and procedurally direct land use procedures 
in the country—as well as some of the most traditional—are written into 
the four county codes. If the name of the zoning game is change, then 
Hawai‘i is playing the game, with major code revisions about to begin 
or already commenced in all four counties. In particular, major revi-
sions or additions to the all-important detailed plans (which often take 
precedence over subsequent zoning amendments) are proceeding in 
the two most heavily developed of the four counties—Honolulu and 
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Maui. While nationally known for its state land use schemes, Hawai‘i is 
also a laboratory for innovative and complex local land use controls. As 
a result of recent decisions by Hawai‘i’s Supreme Court,207 such controls 
will be strictly enforceable as well.
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Chapter 3
Subdivisions, Land Development 
Conditions, and Development 
Agreements
I. SUBDIVISIONS
The subdivision approval process represents one of the most relevant of 
land use control techniques. It is exercised at the county level, enabled 
through legislation at the state level, and is a prerequisite for virtually 
all single-family residential development as well as a significant portion 
of new multifamily, commercial, and industrial development whenever 
a landowner-developer divides land into more parcels. Generally char-
acterized by preliminary and then final plan or plat approval, it is at 
this stage in the land development process that county government 
often requires a series of land development conditions (exactions, dedi-
cations, impact fees) precedent to permission to develop.1 Such land 
development conditions trigger analysis of case law relating to when 
government can legally impose such conditions. Hawai‘i has no substan-
tive case law on such conditions (in this, it is virtually alone among states 
with significant development).2 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
set down tests requiring nexus and proportionality in order for such 
land development conditions to pass constitutional muster, as discussed 
in the following sections in this chapter. Of course, to the extent a county 
and a landowner negotiate and execute a development agreement, as 
permitted by state statute in Hawai‘i, the nexus and proportionality tests 
are inapplicable.3 This chapter therefore also discusses development 
agreements, even though such agreements can and should be negoti-
ated, if at all, far earlier in the land development process than at the 
point of subdivision regulation and control. This chapter also discusses 
the applicability of the concept of vested rights, given that the vesting 
of rights to complete a land development project is what often attracts a 
landowner-developer to the development agreement process.
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Hawai‘i: Of Mandatory Dedications and Open Space
The State of Hawai‘i has required subdivision exactions for decades. It 
does so by statute, directing each county to require and set standards 
for the dedication of land for parks and playgrounds in their respective 
subdivision ordinances. The county may take money in lieu of land, or it 
may take a combination of land and money. Credit against the required 
dedication or money must be given both for privately owned parks and 
for lands previously dedicated.4 The counties have responded in various 
ways to this park/playground dedication scheme.
Honolulu
While the subdivision ordinance is ultimately passed by the City Coun-
cil (which also considers any amendments), it is initially prepared by 
the director of the Department of Planning and Permitting (DPP) and 
reviewed (public hearing, findings, and recommendations) by the Plan-
ning Commission. However, review of subdivisions themselves, as well 
as the promulgation of rules and regulations governing such approach, 
is up to the DPP director. The rules prohibit the subdividing of land, 
the selling or advertising of any interest in land located in a subdivision 
(that is, a lot), or the recording of a plat or subdivision unless a final 
plan has been approved by the director. Moreover, no roadway may be 
opened or building occupied until the director approves the public 
improvements required by the rules and regulations.5 Appeals from the 
director’s decisions are heard by the Zoning Board of Appeals.6
 Honolulu follows a traditional two-step process in the review of sub-
divisions. An applicant files twenty copies of the preliminary map with 
the DPP’s Subdivision Branch, which reviews the application for confor-
mance with the Subdivision Rules and Regulations.7 Requirements for 
the preliminary map include detailed location and dimensions of each 
lot; location and dimension of existing and proposed streets; slope and 
contour lines; location of landmarks and flood/inundation zones; pro-
posed use (residence, park, public building, etc.) of each lot; and exist-
ing and proposed infrastructure (sewer, water, landscaping).8 Copies of 
the map are distributed to other county and state agencies for review 
and comment while the DPP conducts its own review.9 The Subdivision 
Branch will ultimately accept or reject the application in its entirety. 
If accepted, it is next reviewed by the Subdivision Committee, which 
meets weekly. The committee looks for any issues that stand out on the 
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application beyond mere conformance issues and makes a recommen-
dation to the DPP director.
 Next, the DPP director makes a preliminary map decision on the 
basis of the committee’s recommendation.10 The director has very little 
discretion in preliminary map approval, which signifies that the pre-
liminary map conforms to the rules and regulations promulgated.11 The 
director’s approval is generally accompanied by requirements or condi-
tions, such as the dedication of land for streets and parks (roads, streets, 
drainage, sewers, water, landscaping) or the construction or guaranteed 
construction (by performance bond) of certain improvements. These 
required improvements are coordinated through the relevant DPP 
branch or other agency, which will upon improvement completion sub-
mit a letter of work certification to the DPP director. After preliminary 
map approval, a developer may be able to obtain permits for model 
homes; however, no interest may be sold with mere preliminary map 
approval.
 Finally, after all such improvements have been completed and 
within one year of the date of preliminary map approval (unless 
extended), the applicant must submit fifteen copies of the final map. 
The DPP director has forty-five days to act on the final map, which deci-
sion is purely ministerial in nature. The sole question is whether or not 
the final map conforms to the previously approved preliminary map, 
and thus whether the required improvements have been completed.12
 Honolulu has responded to the state’s dedication of land for parks 
and playgrounds requirements by including detailed provisions in its 
subdivision code that extend beyond subdivisions to multifamily build-
ings: “Every subdivider as a condition precedent to (1) the approval of 
a subdivision by the director, or (2) issuance of a building permit for 
multiple family development by the Building Department, shall provide 
land in perpetuity or dedicate land for park and playground purposes, 
for the joint use by the occupants of lots or units in subdivisions as well 
as by the public.”13 In single-family and duplex zoning districts, 350 
square feet per unit must be dedicated.14 In multifamily districts, the 
requirement is 110 square feet per dwelling unit or 10 percent of the 
maximum permitted floor area, whichever is less.15
 Since the state statute permits money payment in lieu of the land 
dedication requirement, the Honolulu subdivision code so provides.16 
If the city receives cash instead of land, the money goes into a revolving 
fund for parks and playgrounds, to be paid out within five years either 
for the purchase of land for new or expanded parks/playgrounds, the 
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purchase of park/playground equipment, or the improvement of exist-
ing facilities. Regulations set out standards for the minimum size of a 
parcel acceptable for dedication (two and a half acres in a residential 
district, ten thousand square feet in apartment districts).17 Priority is first 
given to establishing or expanding parks and playgrounds within one-
half mile, one mile, and then two miles of the project site.18 Honolulu 
permits credits against the aforementioned requirements primarily for 
private parks and playgrounds. These private facilities must be owned 
and maintained by the owner and occupants of the subdivision.19
Kaua‘i
Kaua‘i’s ordinance is similar both in form and content to the one 
described above for Honolulu, with a few exceptions. Kaua‘i also uses 
a two-step review process in which copies of a preliminary subdivision 
map are distributed to various county and state agencies before being 
reviewed by the Planning Commission for tentative approval. Twelve cop-
ies of the map must be filed with the Planning Department and should 
include the tax map key, subdivision name, the names and locations of 
adjoining subdivisions, streets, and sewers, the proposed lot and street 
layout of the subdivisions, the number and size of lots, the location of 
flood or tsunami hazards, and so forth.20 The various government agen-
cies have thirty days to review the preliminary subdivision map before 
they must submit their review to the planning director. The planning 
director then prepares a subdivision report for the Planning Commis-
sion. At this time, the Planning Commission must approve, approve 
with conditions, or disapprove the preliminary subdivision map.21 After 
tentative approval is granted, the subdivider must then submit six cop-
ies of grading plans, construction plans, and specifications showing 
details and road construction, drainage structures, sewers, water mains, 
and all other utilities proposed to be constructed in the subdivision.22 
The Department of Public Works and Department of Water approve 
the construction plan and submit their recommendations of approval 
to the Planning Commission,23 which is then responsible for the subdi-
vision map’s final approval.24 In granting final approval, the Planning 
Commission must determine whether the final subdivision map substan-
tially conforms to the terms, conditions, and format of the preliminary 
subdivision map, the construction plans, and whether the applicant 
has satisfied all other requirements imposed by law. The commission 
has forty-five days to act, or the map is deemed to be approved.25 The 
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Planning Commission also has the power to grant modifications to the 
subdivision code in particular cases, similar to variances in practice.26
 One of the requirements for subdivision is parks and playgrounds.27 
However, unlike Honolulu, Kaua‘i uses a population density standard to 
compute the amount of land to be dedicated for park and playground 
purposes: one and three-quarter acres per thousand “or fraction 
thereof.”28 As population is difficult to predict until after the develop-
ment is completed, Kaua‘i’s subdivision code provides the following 
estimates: 3.5 persons per single-family or duplex unit and 2.1 persons 
per multifamily dwelling unit.29
 The manner in which a developer may pay money in lieu of dedi-
cating land is also different. The value of the land to be developed is 
used as a basis to calculate the amount of money to be paid: the “raw” 
land plus 50 percent of the difference between that raw land value 
and the prospective fair market value as improved for development 
purposes.30 While the money must be used for park and recreational 
facilities within the district where the subdivision will be developed, it is 
up to the county engineer to decide precisely how it is spent within that 
district.31 Finally, while credit for private parks is permitted (as the state 
statute requires), there is a limit of 50 percent on such credit. Thus all 
subdivisions will have contributed to or developed truly public park and 
recreational facilities.32
Maui
The Maui subdivision provisions, like those of Kaua‘i, are found prin-
cipally in a separate subdivision code. That ordinance appears to be 
administered solely by the planning director, who approves both pre-
liminary and final subdivision plans. An applicant may appeal the direc-
tor’s decision to the Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals, which 
may also vary the subdivision ordinance’s provisions.33
 An applicant must first submit nine copies (or more if requested) 
of the preliminary map to the Department of Planning.34 Within five 
days of submission, the planning director must distribute copies for 
review and comment to the director of water supply, the director of 
public works, the sanitary engineer, and—if the proposed subdivision is 
near a current or proposed state highway—the district engineer.35 Other 
agencies, including the Department of Environmental Management, 
Department of Fire and Public Safety, and the Maui Electric Company 
may be consulted at the director’s discretion.36 The director’s review 
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period follows, with a decision on the preliminary map required within 
forty-five days, or if the project is to be processed as an affordable hous-
ing project, thirty days.37
 The final map must be complete within one year of the preliminary 
map’s approval; a missed deadline results in the preliminary map being 
deemed null and void.38 However, a developer may request an extension 
in writing, which may be granted for good cause, so long as the request 
is made more than fifteen days before the one-year deadline.39 When 
the final map is ultimately submitted, ten copies must be provided, 
which are again distributed to various interested agencies40 for examina-
tion of whether the final map is “substantially similar to the approved 
preliminary plat, that the plat is technically correct, as well as to verify 
the information on the final plat by entering upon the respective subdi-
vision.”41 A provision in the ordinance requires the director to notify the 
developer as to any errors or omissions within twenty days of submission, 
to afford the developer an opportunity to correct the final map.42
 As in Honolulu and Kaua‘i (and pursuant to state statutory require-
ments), Maui requires dedication of land for parks and playgrounds (or 
money in lieu thereof) as a condition for subdivision plat approval.43 
The amount of land required is tied to the number of lots in the subdivi-
sion: 500 square feet per lot, in excess of three, resulting from the subdi-
vision; or 250 square feet per lot for residential workforce housing.44 In 
the event the director chooses to permit the contribution of money in 
lieu of land, the director may require (1) payment, as calculated accord-
ing to a formula in the ordinance,45 (2) a combination of payment and 
land to be dedicated,46 or (3) improvement to parks and playgrounds in 
the community plan area where the subdivision is located.47
Hawai‘i
The Hawai‘i subdivision ordinance also follows the two-part plan 
approval process characteristic of the other counties. As on Maui, it is 
the director of the Department of Planning who approves preliminary 
and final plats of subdivision. The subdivider must submit eight copies 
of a written application for subdivision, a preliminary plat, and other 
supplementary material required to describe the nature and objectives 
of the proposed subdivision.48 Copies are then distributed to county 
and state agencies (the manager of the Department of Water Supply, 
the director of public works, the State Department of Health, and—if 
the proposed subdivision is near a state highway—the district engineer) 
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for their review49 and then sent back to the Planning Department for 
tentative approval within forty-five days of the applicant’s initial submis-
sion.50 After the director and the relevant officers have reviewed the 
plat, the director may defer action pending further review, give tentative 
approval of the preliminary plat as submitted or modified, or disapprove 
the preliminary plat, stating the reasons in writing.51 If conditions are 
attached, the subdivider has three years to complete them. The director 
may grant an extension of no more than two years.52 If the conditions 
are not fulfilled by the end of the three-year period, the approval of the 
preliminary plat expires; however, approval may be renewed provided 
that the preliminary map is still in conformance with current code and 
rule requirements.53
 One year after tentative approval of the preliminary plat, the sub-
divider must prepare and complete the final plat.54 Within thirty days of 
receipt, the director must again distribute copies to the relevant agen-
cies.55 Ultimately, final approval is a ministerial function; the director 
must simply determine if the subdivider has complied with all the condi-
tions for approval. If the director disapproves the plat, the grounds for 
disapproval must be filed in the records of the Planning Department. 
However, no plat can be disapproved by the director without giving 
the subdivider an opportunity to correct errors on the plat map.56 Like 
Kaua‘i, Hawai‘i County allows for subdividers to apply for variances from 
the provisions of the Subdivision Code.57
 Like the other counties, Hawai‘i requires the dedication of park-
land by subdividers.58 Subdividers are required to dedicate land, pay a 
fee, or a combination of both.59 The amount of land to be dedicated is 
at least five acres for every one thousand people in the district.60 Fees in 
lieu of land dedication are determined by fair market value at the time 
of filing.61 The Hawai‘i Subdivision Code also includes requirements for 
subdivisions in Safety Flood Hazard Districts,62 plantation community 
subdivisions (subdivision on lands formerly owned by sugar plantations 
and developed into housing and community buildings for employees of 
the plantation),63 farm subdivisions (subdivision of agricultural lands, 
provided that structures for residential occupancy or habitation are pro-
hibited, in order to encourage landowners to provide agricultural lands 
for farm leasing),64 standards for determining preexisting lots,65 and 
regulations regarding the review by Hawai‘i County for condominium 
property regimes.66
 In sum, the four counties are largely responsible for the imple-
mentation of subdivision control in Hawai‘i. The four subdivision 
90 Regulating Paradise
ordinances are similar in structure and control; however, all respond 
to the mandatory park and recreation land dedication requirement 
imposed by statute in substantially different ways. Only one county—
Kaua‘i—ensures that a percentage of truly public area will be provided 
by the erstwhile subdivider. None of the counties address the phasing 
and timing of development and infrastructure improvements through 
their subdivision codes in the manner of, say, Ramapo, New York, as set 
forth in the landmark Golden v. Town of Ramapo.67 This “sequencing” is 
addressed—briefly—in the various county development plans68 as well 
as in the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu.69 It is an important element 
in the public management and control of land. Without the provision 
of public improvements and the sequencing or timing of development 
to coincide with those improvements, the planning for both public and 
private development becomes increasingly divorced from practice.
II. LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS
For decades, local government has charged land developers for a part 
of the cost of public facilities, at least with respect to those facilities 
intrinsic to the development, in the form of subdivision dedications 
and fees. Initially “charged” as the price of drawing and recording the 
simpler and cheaper subdivision plat in place of the lengthy, tedious, 
and easily flawed metes and bounds description for land development, 
these fees and dedications soon became part of the regulatory land 
use process, exercised by local government under police power for the 
health, safety, and welfare of the people, often as a method to control 
or manage growth.70 Hawai‘i has so “charged” developers at both the 
state and county land use regulatory levels, both at the filing of land 
use reclassification and at the time of development approval, in both 
the subdivision process described in the preceding section and at the 
coastal zone special or shoreline management permit stage of develop-
ment. As appears below, both are theoretically governed by the state 
impact fee statute. This is not so, in fact.
 By justifying land development dedications and fees as police 
power regulations rather than “voluntary” costs of using the subdivision 
process, local governments invite judicial scrutiny under the takings 
clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which permits 
the taking of private property for public use only upon payment of just 
compensation. While early cases by and large upheld such intrinsic 
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dedications and fees, the more recent charges of “impact fees” for the 
shared construction by several land developments of large and expen-
sive public facilities (such as municipal wastewater treatment plants and 
sanitary landfills) outside or extrinsic to the development upon which 
the fee is levied have led knowledgeable courts to scrutinize the connec-
tion between these fees and the need generated by the charged devel-
opment for the particular facility in question.71 It is generally agreed 
that the law applicable to impact fees, exactions, and in lieu fees, as well 
as to compulsory dedications, is the same, given that they all represent 
land development conditions levied at some point in the land develop-
ment process, such as subdivision plat approval, shoreline management 
permit, building permit, occupancy permit, or utility connection.72 
Therefore, except where the text specifically makes such distinctions, 
the terms are used here interchangeably.
 The major legal issue with respect to fees, dedications, and exac-
tions is the connection or “nexus” to the land development. Without 
this nexus, such land development regulations are generally unconstitu-
tional takings of property without compensation, particularly after the 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission73 
and Dolan v. City of Tigard.74
 As the history and cases make abundantly clear, such land develop-
ment conditions are development driven; that is, to be valid they must 
be collected (and exactions and dedications required) for, and only for, 
public facilities and infrastructure for which land development causes a 
need.75 Courts uniformly strike down—usually as an unauthorized tax—
land development conditions that are not so connected. Generally, this 
includes attempts to remedy existing infrastructure deficiencies76 or to 
provide for operation and maintenance of facilities.77 Of course, if pay-
ment for a public facility or its construction or dedication is in part ful-
fillment of a landowner’s contractual obligations under a development 
agreement between landowner and local government, then the legal 
issues and analysis are entirely different and the need for nexus and 
proportionality, at least as a matter of constitutional law, disappears.78 
Parts of this chapter discuss this issue in more detail.
Nexus, Proportionality, and Takings: The Federal 
Constitutional Standard
While much of the recent case law dealing with such conditions and 
exactions has developed from challenges to the impact fee, the lan-
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guage is applicable to all three. To be enforceable and valid, an impact 
fee must be levied upon a development to pay for public facilities, the 
need for which is generated, at least in part, by that development.79 This 
is the so-called rational nexus test developed by the courts in Florida 
and other jurisdictions that have considered such fees and exactions.80 
First proposed in 1964,81 it became the national standard by the end of 
the 1970s.82
 The test essentially has two parts. First, the particular development 
must generate a need to which the amount of the exaction bears some 
rough proportionate relationship. Second, the local government must 
demonstrate that the fees levied will actually be used for the purpose col-
lected.83 This test was confirmed and made applicable to all land devel-
opment conditions by a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987. 
Decided on the last day of the Court’s 1987 term, Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission84 deals ostensibly with beach access. Property owners 
sought a coastal development permit from the California Coastal Com-
mission to tear down a beach house and build a bigger one. The com-
mission granted the permit only upon condition that the owner give the 
general public the right to walk across the owner’s backyard beach area, 
an easement over one-third of the lot’s total area. The purpose, the 
commission said, was to preserve visual access to the water, which was 
impaired by the much bigger beach house. The Court, however, held 
that—assuming the commission’s purpose to overcome the psychologi-
cal barrier to the beach created by overdevelopment was a valid one—it 
could not accept that there was any nexus between these interests and 
the public lateral access or easement condition attached to the permit.85 
It would be an altogether different matter if there were an “essential 
nexus” between the condition and what the landowner proposes to do 
with the property.86
 The Nollan Court did not discuss the required degree of connec-
tion between the exaction imposed and the projected impacts of the 
proposed development. This issue was left open until the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1994 decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard.87 Florence Dolan owned 
a plumbing business and electrical supply store located in the business 
district of Tigard, Oregon, along Fanno Creek, which flowed through 
the southwestern corner of the lot and along its western boundary. 
Dolan applied to the city for a building permit to double the size of the 
store and pave the thirty-nine-space parking lot. To mitigate the impact 
of increased runoff from her property that would result from her expan-
sion plans, the commission required that Dolan dedicate to the city the 
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portion of her property lying within the hundred-year flood plain along 
Fanno Creek for a public greenway. To mitigate the impact of increased 
traffic and congestion caused by an increase in visitors to her store, the 
commission also required that Dolan dedicate an additional fifteen-foot 
strip of land adjacent to the floodplain as a public pedestrian/bicycle 
pathway.
 In Dolan, the Supreme Court added a second test beyond nexus: 
whether the degree or amount of the exactions demanded by the city’s 
permit conditions were sufficiently related to the projected impact of 
the development proposed. The Court coined the term “rough propor-
tionality” to describe the required relationship between the exactions 
and the projected impact of the proposed development.88 Although 
“no precise mathematical calculation is required, the city must make 
some sort of individualized determination that the required dedica-
tion is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed 
development.”89 The Court reviewed the exactions (the two required 
dedications, of the public greenway and the pedestrian/bicycle path-
way) and found that the city had not met its burden of demonstrating 
the required proportionality.
 In sum, Nollan and Dolan require that to pass constitutional muster, 
land development conditions imposed by government
 1. Must seek to promote a legitimate state interest;
 2. Must be related to the land development project upon 
which they are being levied by means of a rational or essential 
nexus;
 3. Must be proportional to the need or problem that the 
land development project is expected to cause, and the project 
must accordingly benefit from the condition imposed.
 Under the first standard, legitimate state interest, government may 
require a landowner to dedicate land (or interests in land) or contrib-
ute money for public projects and purposes, such as public facilities 
and, in most jurisdictions, public housing. Under the second standard, 
essential nexus, government must find a close connection between the 
need or problem generated by the proposed development and the land 
or other exaction or fee required from the landowner/developer. Thus, 
for example, a residential development will in all probability generate 
a need for public schools and parks. A shopping center or hotel in all 
probability will not. Both will generate additional traffic and therefore 
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generate a need for more streets and roads. Under the third standard, 
proportionality, a residential development of, say, three hundred dwell-
ing units may well generate a need for additional classroom space but 
almost certainly not a new school or school site. On the other hand, 
such a residential development of several thousand units would, when 
constructed, likely generate a need for a new school and school site, 
depending upon the demographics of the new residents.
 Ignoring the foregoing raises a presumption, as a matter of both 
law and policy, that the impact fee is nothing more than a revenue-
raising device, either for a facility that has nothing to do with the land 
development upon which the fee is raised or for undetermined fiscal 
purposes generally. In either case, the “fee” is then presumed to be a 
tax. This characterization as a tax is almost always fatal to an impact fee, 
since most local governments have very little specific authority from the 
state to tax beyond the property tax and, occasionally, a sales or income 
tax. Since an impact fee is none of the above, and since all local govern-
ment taxes must be supported by specific statutory authority, such a fee 
is almost always declared illegal.90
Applicability of Nollan and Dolan to Land 
Development Conditions Generally
A number of courts have struck down land development conditions for 
failure to comply with Nollan’s and Dolan’s three-part test. An excellent 
example is the Eighth Circuit Court decision in Christopher Lake Develop-
ment Co. v. St. Louis County,91 in which the court applied Dolan to strike 
down a county drainage system requirement.92 The county granted the 
owner of forty-two acres preliminary development approval for two resi-
dential communities on the condition that the owner provide a drain-
age system for an entire watershed. Citing Nollan for the nexus test, the 
court held that although “the County’s objective to prevent flooding 
may be rational, it may not be rational to single out the Partnership 
to provide the entire drainage system.”93 The court then found such 
a requirement disproportionate to the drainage problems resulting 
from the proposed development: “[F]rom our review of the record, the 
County has forced the Partnership to bear a burden that should fairly 
have been allocated throughout the entire watershed area. A strong 
public desire to improve the public condition will not warrant achieving 
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the 
change.”94 As for a remedy, the court said, “We believe that the Partner-
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ship is entitled to recoup the portion of its expenditures in excess of its 
pro rata share and remand to the district court to determine the details 
and amounts.”95
 What if a city or other local agency requires payment of an impact 
fee or imposes some other sort of development condition not requiring 
the dedication of land? Does the Nollan/Dolan nexus test apply? The 
California Supreme Court said yes in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City.96 The 
Ehrlich court held that there was no ascertainable difference between a 
fee and a dedication. Other courts have also applied Nollan/Dolan beyond 
dedications to monetary exactions. Thus, the Ninth Circuit, in Garneau 
v. City of Seattle,97 specifically applied the doctrine of those cases to other 
than physical dedications, even though it found them inapplicable for 
other reasons, as discussed below.98 While noting that the case before it 
was not appropriate for setting out precise rules, nevertheless an Oregon 
appellate court held in Clark v. City of Albany99 that “[t]he fact that Dolan 
itself involved conditions that required a dedication of property interests 
does not mean that it applies only to conditions of that kind.”100
Legislative Decisions
Many courts have ruled that the heightened scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan 
is inapplicable to legislated impact fees and exactions. The Ehrlich case 
discussed above is one of those cases. There, the court held that if a city 
bases a development or impact fee on an ordinance or rule of general 
applicability, the fee will be within the city’s police power and will not 
be subject to the heightened constitutional scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan 
nexus test, though there must be some connection between the fee and 
the proposed project. Also, in Home Builders Ass’n v. City of Scottsdale,101 
the Arizona Supreme Court specifically refused to apply heightened 
scrutiny to Scottsdale’s water resource development fee, deciding that 
Nollan/Dolan was inapplicable to generally legislative fees of this type.102 
The Fifth Circuit also declined to apply such scrutiny to a challenge to 
a general zoning ordinance prohibiting trailer coaches on any lot in 
the city except trailer parks, in Texas Manufactured Housing Ass’n v. City 
of Nederland.103
 However, some courts share the puzzlement of Justice Thomas in 
his dissent from a denial of a petition for certiorari in Parking Ass’n of 
Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta:104
It is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the 
type of governmental entity responsible for the taking. A city 
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council can take property just as well as a planning commis-
sion can. Moreover, the general applicability of the ordinance 
should not be relevant in a takings analysis. . . . The distinction 
between sweeping legislative takings and particularized admin-
istrative takings appears to be a distinction without a constitu-
tional difference.105
Citing Justice Thomas’ certiorari petition dissent in Parking Ass’n of Geor-
gia, an Illinois appellate court disagreed that a municipality could “skirt 
its obligation to pay compensation . . . merely by having the Village 
Board of trustees pass an ‘ordinance’ rather than having a planning 
commission issue a permit.”106 Oregon appellate courts have also con-
sistently applied Nollan/Dolan to legislative and quasijudicial exactions 
alike, whether required by a zoning ordinance or not.
 Critical as the takings/nexus issue is, there are other legal require-
ments for attaching conditions to the development of land. Among 
these are the need for authority to levy such dedications, fees, and other 
exactions in the form of enabling legislation and local ordinances to 
avoid the charge that they are “ad hoc”; and the need to expend the fee, 
whether “in lieu” of a dedication requirement or an impact fee, within 
a reasonable period of time after collection. These issues are discussed 
below in the context of impact fees in Hawai‘i.
Impact Fees in Hawai‘i
Hawai‘i has its own impact fee statute.107 Recall that impact fees are not 
taxes; consequently, in order to justify payment the government must 
show a direct connection between the fee and a service or benefit to 
the area being developed.108 Moreover, there must be proportionality 
between the amount of the fee and the benefit conferred to the devel-
opment.109 This is reflected in the statute’s definition of “impact fees,” 
which limits the fee’s use to “all or a portion of the public facility capital 
improvement costs required by the development from which it was col-
lected,” restricting the funds to that particular development.110
 The statute lays out a clear methodology for determining impact 
fees.111 The county must first approve a needs assessment study to iden-
tify the public facilities to be benefited by the impact fees.112 The study 
must be conducted by an “engineer, architect, or other qualified pro-
fessional” and must include the “data sources and methodology” upon 
which the study is based.113 The needs can be assessed for either future 
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or existing improvements.114 Second, the cost must be proportional to 
the improvement; additionally, the developer should only pay his pro 
rata share.115 The final step is ensuring that the impact fee is “fair and 
reasonable.”116 This step is primarily concerned with ensuring that the 
developer only pays a fee that is “substantially related to the needs aris-
ing from the development,” as well as proportionate to the burden the 
newly developed property will create.117 In determining whether a fee is 
a “proportional share” of the improvement costs, the statute lists seven 
factors.118 Consideration of these factors is necessary to ensure that the 
new development pays only for its own relative increase in the burden 
on the community.119
 Under the Hawai‘i statute, in order to impose an impact fee 
the local government must demonstrate that the fee will benefit the 
development being charged.120 “Collection and expenditure of impact 
fees assessed, imposed, levied, and collected for development shall be 
reasonably related to the benefits accruing to the development.”121 To 
ensure that the fees are reasonably related, the statute sets out several 
requirements. First, impact fees must be deposited in a separate account 
or fund;122 this allows for better oversight of impact fee expenditures.123 
Second, the collection and expenditure of the impact fee must be 
“localized”; that is, there must be geographically limited benefit zones 
to ensure that the fees being spent are used to construct facilities from 
which the paying development can benefit (however, “benefit zones” 
are not required if the development can still enjoy a reasonable benefit 
without such boundaries).124 Third, collection of the fee is predicated 
upon the creation of a plan that identifies the planned improvements to 
the development, based on the needs or anticipated needs of the devel-
opment.125 This is essentially a capital improvement plan within a needs 
assessment study, the purpose being to identify necessary improvements 
and list anticipated funding sources (of which impact fees would be 
one).126 The fourth requirement requires that the fees be spent on the 
kind of public facilities for which the fees were originally collected.127 
Last, the collecting county must spend or encumber the impact fee 
within six years of its collection.128 Those fees that are not spent within 
six years of their collection are refunded to the developer (or his succes-
sor) with any accrued interest.129 Similarly, if an improvement project is 
terminated, the fee must be refunded to the developer as well130 (since 
there is no longer any reasonable benefit being conferred upon the 
development).131
 Hawai‘i also has a statutory impact fee that applies only to schools. 
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In 2007, the State Legislature adopted a provision whereby any “new 
residential developments within designated school impact districts shall 
provide land for schools or pay a fee in lieu of land proportionate to the 
impacts . . . on existing school facilities.”132 Act 245 requires that no new 
residential development in a designated school impact district “shall be 
issued a residential building permit or condominium property regime 
building permit until the department of education provides written 
confirmation that the permit applicant has fulfilled its school impact 
fee requirements.”133
 The State School Board must first designate a school impact dis-
trict for impact fee purposes. In order to designate such a district, the 
department must prepare a written analysis that contains a map delin-
eating the boundaries of the impact areas as well as analysis to support 
the need for new or expanded school facilities construction within the 
next twenty-five years based on growth, density, demographics, and 
other criteria. After a school impact district is so designated, it then 
must prepare an impact fee analysis, taking into account factors such as 
“student generation rates” and enrollment capacity, and then based on 
such factors determine the appropriate impact fee to assess.134
 From the developer’s standpoint, any residential development 
within a school impact district that requires a county subdivision 
approval, a building permit, or a condominium property regime 
approval “shall be required to fulfill the land requirement and verti-
cal construction requirement of the department.”135 However, certain 
developments are exempt: All nonresidential development, those that 
will pay the transient accommodation tax, or “any form of housing per-
manently excluding school-aged children, with the necessary covenants 
or declarations of restrictions recorded on the property” are not subject 
to this section.136 Whether land is dedicated or a fee in lieu is paid largely 
depends on the size of the development. For example, in fulfilling the 
land requirement, contemplated developments of greater than or equal 
to fifty units entail either payment, land dedication, or a combination, 
whereas units less than fifty require only the fee in lieu.137
 While HRS § 46-141-48 lays out a state policy regarding impact 
fees, many of Hawai‘i’s counties already have such ordinances in place, 
pursuant to their authority under the counties’ state-delegated police 
powers.138 Consequently, Hawai‘i’s Impact Fee Law merely provides a 
guideline to the counties as to the applicability, calculation, and admin-
istration of impact fees.139 So far, however, none of the counties has 
modified its local impact fee ordinances to follow the state statute. The 
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primary binding requirement the Impact Fee Law imposes over the 
counties is that county ordinances cannot require a development “to 
pay or otherwise contribute more than a proportionate share of public 
facility capital improvements.”140
 Of particular concern in Hawai‘i is the increasing governmen-
tal tendency to attach mandatory affordable or workforce housing 
requirements to land use approvals. However, unless local government 
can demonstrate a clear rational and proportional nexus between 
market price and the imposition of below-market cost housing set-
asides, it may not require them at any stage in the land development 
process. What scant precedent exists for imposing such exactions on 
residential developments does so only when the local government 
requiring such exactions provides a series of meaningful bonuses to 
help offset the cost of the mandatory affordable housing set-asides. 
As to the imposition of such costs on nonresidential development, 
local government must demonstrate that it generates a need for such 
housing, generally of the workforce variety, and that the amount to be 
set aside is proportionate to that need. As one commentator recently 
noted in the commercial housing set-aside context, “A number of cit-
ies have adopted exaction programs that require downtown office and 
commercial developers to provide housing for lower-income groups 
or to a municipal fund for the construction of such housing. [Such] 
programs satisfy the nexus test only if the municipality can show that 
downtown development contributes to the housing problem the linkage exac-
tion is intended to remedy.”141
 As noted in a standard treatise on land use, “There is some author-
ity for the use of set-asides and other housing exactions and fees to pro-
vide needed low income housing, but whether this is a sufficient basis 
for nexus, let alone proportionality, to stave off a constitutional chal-
lenge, is not clear.”142 Indeed, as another treatise observes, “When the 
provision of lower-income housing is not linked to housing subsidies, 
zoning incentives may be necessary to absorb losses incurred by the developer on 
the lower-income units. Density bonuses are a possibility, and the ordinance can 
also relax sited development requirements.”143
 Before addressing the constitutional issues of nexus and propor-
tionality, there is the initial question of authority for housing set-asides 
or exactions. Thus, for example, Hawai‘i’s impact fee statute, does not 
apply to housing linkage fees, and, indeed, expressly excludes such fees 
from the authority granted to Hawai‘i’s four counties to levy impact fees 
for public facilities.144 The relevant statute states that “impact fees may 
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be imposed only for those types of public facility capital improvements 
specifically identified in a county comprehensive plan or a facility needs 
assessment study.”145 However, it defines “impact fees” as “the charges 
imposed upon a developer by a county or board to fund all or a portion 
of the public facility capital improvement costs required by the development 
from which it is collected, or to recoup the cost of existing public facility 
capital improvements made in anticipation of the needs of a develop-
ment.”146 That same section also defines “public facility capital improve-
ment costs” and explains that such costs “do not include expenditures 
for required affordable housing.”147 Moreover, Section 46-143(c) imposes 
nexus and proportionality requirements, providing that “[a]n impact 
fee shall be substantially related to the needs arising from the develop-
ment and shall not exceed a proportionate share of the costs incurred 
or to be incurred in accommodating the development.”148 It is therefore 
not at all clear that Hawai‘i’s counties have the power or authority to 
require workforce (affordable) housing as a condition of land develop-
ment approval.
 While Hawai‘i courts have not ruled on this issue, a Virginia court 
has done so. In Kansas-Lincoln, L.C. v. Arlington County Board149 the court 
found that the county did not have the authority to include a require-
ment that a developer provide affordable housing as part of the land 
development process at the zoning stage, nor did it have the authority 
to require an affordable housing contribution as part of the site plan 
approval process:150
There is no authority for the County Board to require site plan 
applicants to make affordable housing contributions to the 
County Housing Reserve Fund or provide affordable hous-
ing units as part of the County’s site plan approval process. 
Moreover, the County is not authorized to require site plan 
applicants who seek to provide affordable housing through 
the bonus density program to also make a contribution to the 
affordable housing fund as that requirement is specifically 
prohibited by Va. Code § 15.2-2304.151
The court found that the requirement was outside the legislative author-
ity granted to Arlington County by the Virginia General Assembly and 
was, therefore, illegal and invalid.
 As to the constitutional issues (nexus and proportionality), Nollan’s 
nexus test, or its close equivalent, applies to linkage fees. For example, 
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in Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. Sacramento,152 the Ninth Circuit held 
that an ordinance that imposed a linkage “fee in connection with the 
issuance of permits for nonresidential development of the type that 
will generate jobs,”153 (in other words, a workforce-affordable housing 
requirement) was constitutional under Nollan.154 Plaintiffs challenged 
the ordinance directly on Nollan grounds: lack of nexus or connection 
between the development and the affordable housing condition. First, 
the court addressed the holding of Nollan: “Nollan holds that where 
there is no evidence of a nexus between the development and the 
problem that the exaction seeks to address, the exaction cannot be 
upheld.”155
 The court then explained that “the [o]rdinance was implemented 
only after a detailed study revealed a substantial connection between 
development and the problem to be addressed.”156 The court related at 
some length what the City of Sacramento did to establish the “substan-
tial connection between the development and the problem” of afford-
able housing. First, it commissioned a study of the need for low-income 
housing, the effect of nonresidential development on the demand for 
such housing, and the appropriateness of exacting fees in conjunction 
with such developments to pay for housing. The study:
Estimat[ed] the percentage of new workers in the develop-
ments that would qualify as low income workers and would 
require housing. [The study] also calculated fees for develop-
ment. . . . Also as instructed, however, in the interest of erring 
on the side of conservatism in exacting the fees, it reduced 
the final calculation by about one-half. Based upon this study, 
the City of Sacramento enacted the Housing Trust Fund 
Ordinance [which] . . . included the finding that nonresidential 
development is ‘a major factor in attracting new employees 
to the region’ and that the influx of new employees ‘creates a 
need for additional housing in the City.’ Pursuant to these findings, 
the Ordinance imposes a fee in connection with the issuance of 
permits for nonresidential development of the type that will generate 
jobs.157
 Consequently, the court found “that the nexus between the fee 
provision here at issue, designed to further the city’s legitimate interest 
in housing, and the burdens caused by commercial development is suf-
ficient to pass constitutional muster.”158
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 Even courts that decline to apply heightened scrutiny to legisla-
tively imposed fees nonetheless apply some form of Nollan’s essential 
nexus test. For instance, in San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San 
Francisco,159 although the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that leg-
islatively imposed, ministerial impact fees are not subject to the tests in 
Nollan or Dolan,160 it nonetheless required that there “be a ‘reasonable 
relationship’ between the fee and the deleterious impacts for the miti-
gation of which the fee is collected.”161
 In sum, there are virtually no instances of courts countenancing 
naked linkage or affordable housing set-aside requirements on resi-
dential developments without substantial bonuses, usually consisting of 
significant density increases. Indeed, a recent report from a nonprofit 
coalition on housing in California concludes that most California local 
governments with inclusionary affordable housing programs provide a 
range of substantial density bonuses and other advantages to develop-
ers required to provide affordable housing, and the average percentage 
of such housing requirements is closer to 10 percent, with 20 percent 
being at the high end of the spectrum. This experience is replicated in 
other surveys of other jurisdictions.
 As to workforce housing exactions or set-asides on commercial 
development, the principal—indeed virtually the only—federal case 
approving such set-asides did so only after the local government requir-
ing such set-asides engaged in thorough and detailed studies of the 
workforce jobs required and generated by the proposed commercial 
development, which requirements were then cut in half. If govern-
ment wishes to enact such an ordinance mandating affordable housing 
set-asides or fees on commercial development (not zoning, but actual 
development), then it should consider the basis upon which the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld such an ordinance passed by the City 
of Sacramento, and it should also:
 1. Undertake a detailed study of the precise need for 
workforce housing;
 2. Work on a project-by-project basis;
 3. Calculate the precise fee or set-aside each project 
requires;
 4. Cut that fee in half before applying it to a given project;
 5. Provide meaningful density bonuses, expedited permit-
ting, and grants.
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III. DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS
As noted in the previous section on land development conditions, none 
of the legal issues are relevant if the landowner and local government 
execute a development agreement requiring certain contributions, 
dedications, and so forth from a landowner-developer. While there 
are additional legal issues associated with development agreements, 
they have been broadly upheld in those states that provide for them by 
statute (particularly in California, where more than a thousand have 
been negotiated and executed) and in another state (Nebraska) where 
there is no such specific statutory authorization. However, as with land 
development conditions, Hawai‘i has no reported cases dealing with 
development agreements, even though its authorizing statute has been 
in effect since 1985. Therefore, the summary below cites only two cases 
from other jurisdictions.
 Developers and local governments face two difficult problems in 
the land development approval process. Local governments are unable 
to exact dedications of land or fees of the “impact” or “in-lieu” variety 
without establishing a clear connection or nexus between the proposed 
development and the dedication or fee.162 The developer is usually 
unable to “vest” or guarantee a right to proceed with a project until that 
project is commenced.163 The situation in Hawai‘i is particularly com-
plex. Vested rights—or the point at which a development may proceed 
in the face of a newly enacted land use regulation that would, if applied, 
hinder or halt the project completely—are a commonly litigated issue 
across the country and in Hawai‘i. Two decades ago, Honolulu’s use of 
an interim development control (in essence, a moratorium on devel-
opment during which time the land was reclassified as what was then 
called a historic, cultural, scenic district [HCSD]) prompted precedent-
setting litigation on the issue of vested rights. In two cases, decided in 
1979 and 1980, both involving the nonprofit environmental group Life 
of the Land and the Honolulu City Council, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court 
attempted to deal with the issue of a developer’s right to proceed with 
a multistory condominium project despite the passage of an HCSD 
ordinance forbidding its construction.164 In Life of the Land I, the Court 
hearkened back to two earlier opinions in which it had required devel-
opers to show that they had been given assurances by appropriate local 
government officials that they could proceed because the development 
met applicable zoning regulations and that they had a right to rely on 
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such assurances.165 Good-faith expectancy that a permit to build would 
be used would not be enough. Moreover, the Court held that money 
damages would be an inappropriate remedy even if rights had vested. 
It reasoned that development rights were acquired when the property 
was purchased and, furthermore, that money expended in reliance on 
these rights—for architectural drawings and site planning—vested those 
rights to proceed. In Life of the Land II, however, the Court backtracked 
somewhat by deciding vested rights were not even implicated. It held 
that the city was simply prevented from enforcing the HCSD ordinance 
because the pattern of meetings and assurances given the developer 
caused him to justly rely on the city’s representatives; thus, the city was 
“equitably estopped” from enforcing the ordinance. The city arguably 
never meant to apply the new HCSD ordinance to his development 
anyway.166
 A year later came the row on the island of Kaua‘i over a resort 
development known as Nukoli‘i at Hanamā‘ulu. There, despite consid-
erable public opposition in the form of a petition drive to place before 
Kaua‘i’s voters a rescission of the zoning permitting Nukoli‘i’s condo-
miniums and hotel, the development partnership began construction 
of the condominiums based upon an apparently validly granted zoning 
classification permitting such development. The developer proceeded 
even though the petition had been certified (approved for voting) and 
the proposition to rescind was placed on the ballot. To no one’s surprise, 
the proposition passed. Still the partnership continued to build, com-
mencing hotel construction. After the zoning was ultimately rescinded, 
the partnership claimed that the right to finish construction had vested, 
taking advantage of the part of Kaua‘i’s charter initiative provision that 
expressly forbids such votes to affect vested rights. While the circuit court 
upheld the developer, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court reversed the decision 
and ordered the cancellation of building permits and the halting of all 
construction activities.167 The Court held that once the referendum was 
certified, the holding of the referendum itself was the last step (before 
building permits could issue) in the development permit process, which 
the developer needed to obtain vested rights.168 It also decided that, 
unless no economic uses were left, a landowner’s property could not be 
“taken” by regulation.
 The decision was initially predicted to increase the popularity of 
initiative and referendum in Hawai‘i. However, six years later, the State 
Supreme Court held in another landmark case that zoning by initiative 
is not allowed in Hawai‘i. In Kaiser Hawaii Kai Development Co. v. City & 
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County of Honolulu,169 the Hawai‘i Supreme Court held that “[z]oning 
by initiative is inconsistent with the goal of long-range comprehen-
sive planning”170 and invalidated an initiative downzoning a parcel of 
land. It is likely that the Hawai‘i Supreme Court would also invalidate 
zoning by referendum if it were ever presented with the question of 
whether such zoning is also inconsistent with the goal of long-range 
comprehensive planning.171 Thus, despite the Nukolii decision, zoning 
by initiative and referendum is unlikely to play a role in the future in 
Hawai‘i.
 The development agreement offers a solution to both landowner-
developer and local government. Usually authorized by statute, a well-
structured agreement can be drafted to deal with a variety of common 
issues that arise in the land development process between landowner 
and local government.172
 A major issue for government under the “vested rights” problem is 
whether the local government has bargained away its police power by 
entering into an agreement under which it promises not to change its 
land use regulations during the life of the agreement. Specific statutory 
authorization is helpful so as to make clear that these agreements effec-
tuate public purposes recognized by the state. Thirteen states have so 
far adopted legislation enabling local governments to enter into devel-
opment agreements with landowner-developers.173 The dominant view 
is that development agreements, drafted to reserve some governmental 
control over the agreement, do not contract away police power but rather 
constitute a valid present exercise of that power. Thus, a recent Califor-
nia appeals court upheld a development agreement that was challenged 
directly on “surrender of police power” grounds, holding that a “zoning 
freeze in the Agreement is not . . . a surrender or abnegation [of the 
police power].”174 In Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis 
Obispo County Bd. of Supervisors, an area residents’ association contended 
that because San Luis Obispo County had entered into a development 
agreement for a project before the project was ready for construction, 
freezing zoning for a five-year period, the county improperly contracted 
away its zoning authority.175 In holding for the county, the court noted 
that land use regulation is an established function of local government, 
providing the authority for a local government to enter into contracts to 
carry out the function. The county’s development agreement required 
that the project be developed in accordance with the county’s gen-
eral plan, did not permit construction until the county had approved 
detailed building plans, retained the county’s discretionary authority in 
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the future, and allowed a zoning freeze of limited duration only. The 
court found that the zoning freeze in the county’s development agree-
ment was not a surrender of police power but instead “advance[d] the 
public interest by preserving future options.”
 A second issue in the “vested rights” category is whether a city coun-
cil, in exercising its power to contract, can make a contract that binds its 
successors. One of the clearest rejections of the application of reserved 
power and bargaining away police power comes from the wide-ranging 
Nebraska Supreme Court opinion upholding development agreements 
in Giger v. City of Omaha.176 The objectors to the agreement claimed that 
development agreements were a form of contract zoning. However, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court preferred to characterize such agreements as 
a form of conditional zoning that actually increased the city’s police 
power, rather than lessened it, by permitting more restrictive zoning 
(attaching conditions through agreement) than a simple rezoning to a 
district in which a variety of uses would be permitted of right.177
A Statutory Checklist
The Hawai‘i statute contains minimum standards for describing the 
basic character of a proposed development subject to a development 
agreement.
1. Enabling Ordinance
A preliminary issue is whether an enabling statute is sufficient to grant 
local government the authority to enter into development agreements. 
There is some authority for requiring a local government to pass an 
enabling ordinance setting out the details of development agreement 
procedures and requirements. Thus, the Hawai‘i statute appears to 
require that local governments desiring to negotiate development 
agreements first pass a local resolution or ordinance to that effect.178 In 
Hawai‘i, the State Legislature has delegated the authority to the county 
to enter into development agreements—provided, however, that the 
county first passes an enabling ordinance establishing the procedures 
that the county executive branch must follow. All of Hawai‘i’s four coun-
ties have drafted them.
2. Approval and Adoption
Although one governmental body may enter into the negotiation stage 
of the development agreement, another may be authorized to approve 
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the final product. In Hawai‘i, for example, the mayor is the designated 
negotiator, with the final agreement presented to the county legislative 
body (county council) for approval. If approved, the council must then 
adopt the development agreement by resolution.179
3. Conformance to Plans and Other Reviews
Development agreements must often comply with local government 
plans as a condition of enforceability, either by statute or because of the 
rubric that the zoning bargained for must accord with comprehensive 
plans. The development agreement statute in Hawai‘i so requires.180 The 
importance of the plan is demonstrated by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey.181 There, the court 
upheld a rezoning over the objections of the developers of property sub-
ject to what the court called a “development agreement” (arguably an 
annexation agreement), on the ground that the applicable plan was suf-
ficiently broad in that it supported the contested downzoning.182 Largely 
to the same effect is a recent California court of appeals decision where 
the existence of and need to conform to applicable plans was critical in 
upholding a development agreement in the face of a broad and direct 
challenge to such agreements generally. 183
4. The Legislative/Administrative Issue
One of the thorniest problems in land use regulation is whether the 
amendment or changing of such a regulation is legislative or quasijudi-
cial/administrative.184 Legislative decisions such as zoning amendments 
are subject to initiative and referendum, whereas in most jurisdictions, 
quasijudicial decisions such as the granting of a special use permit are 
not. Legislative decisions such as rezonings are, when appealed, usually 
heard de novo, whereas quasijudicial decisions such as the granting of 
a special use permit are decided on the record made before the permit-
ting agency, usually under a state’s administrative procedure code.185 
How to characterize the development agreement is different in Califor-
nia and Hawai‘i: In the former, it is a legislative act,186 whereas it is an 
administrative act in the latter.187
5. Public Hearing
Another issue arising frequently is whether a public hearing is required 
before a development agreement can be executed, and if so, what pro-
ceedings are required. Hawai‘i explicitly requires that a public hearing 
be held prior to adoption of the development agreement.188
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6. Binding of State and Federal Agencies
Another issue arising frequently is the binding inclusion of state or fed-
eral agencies. Hawai‘i seeks to bind them and appears to authorize state 
and federal agencies to join in development agreements.189
7. Amendment or Cancellation of the Agreement
Generally, mutual consent of both parties is needed to amend or can-
cel the agreement.190 In Hawai‘i, if the proposed amendment would 
substantially alter the original agreement, a public hearing must be 
held.191
8. Breach
There are essentially two kinds of breaches that commonly occur dur-
ing the period of an agreement: change in land use rules by local gov-
ernment and failure to provide a bargained-for facility, dedication, or 
hookup by either party.
 a. When Local Government Changes the Land Development Rules
 Recall that the overriding concern of the landowner in negotiating 
a development agreement is the vesting of development rights or the 
freezing of land development regulations during the term of the agree-
ment. Whether these regulations are changed just prior to the execu-
tion of the agreement and whether the landowner may need further 
permits that are not subject to a particular agreement raise different but 
related questions. Here, we deal only with the effect on the landowner 
and the agreement should the local government change development 
regulations during the term of the agreement. Development agreement 
statutes usually contemplate such a freeze.192
 The Hawai‘i statute clearly and unequivocally provides that regula-
tions and ordinances passed or promulgated after the execution of a 
development agreement are “void” unless necessary to prevent a danger 
to the health and safety of residents.193 The California Supreme Court, 
in City of West Hollywood v. Beverly Towers,194 made it abundantly clear 
in a footnote that landowner protection from development regulation 
changes is a major factor in executing development agreements: “Devel-
opment agreements . . . between a developer and a government limit 
the power of that government to apply newly enacted ordinances to 
ongoing developments. Unless otherwise provided in the agreement, 
the rules, regulations, and official policies governing permitted uses, 
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density, design, improvement, and construction are those in effect when 
the agreement is executed.”195
 The purpose of a development agreement, said the court, was “to 
allow a developer who needs additional discretionary approvals to com-
plete a long-term development project as approved, regardless of any 
intervening changes in local regulations.”196
 The few courts that have dealt with local government changes in 
land use regulations have no difficulty in finding them inapplicable to 
the property subject to the agreement, provided the agreement itself is 
binding. Thus, in Meegan v. Village of Tinley Park,197 the Illinois Supreme 
Court held that the original zoning of the subject property was valid dur-
ing the term of the annexation agreement and any change by the village 
was void during that time. Indeed, since the village’s attempted zoning 
change was void, said the court, there was no breach by the village.198
 On the other hand, careful drafting is necessary to avoid the later 
application of land development regulations of a different sort than 
those contemplated in the agreement. Thus, in the California case of 
Pardee Construction Co. v. City of Camarillo,199 the court held applicable 
to the subject property a transportation impact fee on the ground that 
it was different from the land development regulations listed in the 
agreement as frozen. While this seems to require a certain amount of 
prescience from the landowner at first blush, a local government can 
hardly be estopped from exercising its police power in enforcing a new 
breed of land development regulations that were not contemplated 
years before by either party as being included under the authority of its 
police power. Country Meadows West Partnership v. Village of Germantown 
represents a different perspective, where the court struck down the vil-
lage’s imposition of a new impact fee against a subdivider, holding that 
because of a subdivision agreement between the village and the subdi-
vider, the latter was not obligated to pay the impact fee.200
 Most development agreement statutes either contain a limitation 
on the duration of such agreements,201 or they provide that the agree-
ment must recite one.202
 b. Nonperformance of a Bargained-for Act: Dedications, 
 Contributions, and Hookups
 Equally common is the failure of a landowner or local government 
to live up to the other terms of the agreement, generally by failing to pro-
vide a public facility or money therefor or by refusing to provide utility 
services to the subject property.203 Under such circumstances, the courts 
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have been strict in forcing the parties to live up to their bargains, even 
when unusual difficulties would appear to render such performance 
nearly impossible. Thus, in the California case of Morrison Homes Corp. v. 
City of Pleasanton, the court of appeals directed the local government to 
provide sewer connections to the landowner’s property, as agreed in an 
annexation agreement, even though a superior governmental entity—a 
state regional water quality control board—ordered the local govern-
ment not to do so.204 After deciding that the agreement did not amount 
to the city’s illegally contracting away its police power, the court stated, 
“The onset of materially changed conditions is not a ground for voiding 
a municipal contract which was valid when made, nor is the contracting 
city’s failure to have foreseen them.205
Limits on Local Government Conditions, Exactions, 
and Dedications Pursuant to Development Agreements
While every governmental action must be invested with a public pur-
pose, there are few conditions, exactions, or dedications that a local 
government may not legitimately bargain for in negotiating such 
agreements. Certainly, local governments may require landowners and 
developers to make reasonable contributions toward whatever services 
and other resources the government will need to provide as a result of 
an annexation or development.206 But this is so under existing law on 
development conditions and exactions entirely apart from such agree-
ments.207 The question is whether the local government may go further 
since the development agreement is in theory a voluntary agreement 
that neither government nor landowner is compelled to either negoti-
ate or execute. So long as the agreement is in fact voluntary, the answer 
is almost certainly yes.208
 The Hawai‘i development agreement statue provides that “Public 
benefits derived from development agreements may include, but are 
not limited to, affordable housing, design standards, and on- and off-
site infrastructure and other improvements. Such benefits may be nego-
tiated for in return for the vesting of development rights for a specific 
period.” 209 According to one commentator,
the government can require the developer to provide public 
benefits unrelated to the proposed project in exchange for the 
municipality granting her the right to develop. . . . [T]he stat-
ute leads municipalities to believe that the granting of develop-
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ment rights confers a governmental benefit on the developer. 
This is not the case. Nollan clearly holds that “the right to build 
on one’s own property—even though its exercise can be sub-
jected to legitimate permitting requirements—cannot remotely 
be described as a “governmental benefit.”210
 However, while it is true that the right to develop on one’s own land 
is not a governmental benefit, the right to develop is not the bargaining 
chip being tendered by the government in a development agreement. 
The authorities cited in support of the above-quoted argument concern 
exactions imposed as required conditions to development. In the case 
of a development agreement, the municipality is not granting the land-
owner the right to develop nor imposing conditions on such develop-
ment but instead is promising to protect the developer’s investment by 
not enforcing any subsequent land use regulation that may burden the 
project. The developer does not require any such guarantee to exercise 
his right or privilege to build and may certainly choose to avail himself 
of such a guarantee and to negotiate for it. It could be argued that the 
development agreement does indeed convey a “governmental benefit” 
upon the developer, since “[i]t is well established that there is no fed-
eral Constitutional right to be free from changes in land use laws.”211 
The municipality should therefore be free to negotiate its best terms in 
exchange for the benefit conferred, regardless of nexus. Because devel-
opment agreements are adopted as a result of negotiations between a 
local government and a developer, they are not subject to either nexus 
or proportionality requirements imposed either by the Dolan or Nollan 
decisions or by any state court decisions.212
IV. HAWAI‘I’S BUILDING CODE
Finally, a brief look at Hawai‘i’s Building Code and its provisions is help-
ful, as compliance with the code is a subsequent form of land use regula-
tion to be dealt with after a successful subdivision process.
 Building codes protect the health and safety of citizens by creating 
a uniform standard for construction at a state level, allowing building 
owners, designers, contractors, and code enforcers within the state to 
apply consistent standards.213 Thus a code functions to require adequate 
access to buildings, ensure structural integrity, and make sure structures 
have adequate electric, plumbing, sewage disposal, and protection, 
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particularly in case of severe weather or natural disaster.214 Tradition-
ally, Hawai‘i’s counties were allowed to promulgate their own building 
codes—which tracked various versions of the Uniform Building Code 
dating back to 1991215—independent of one another.216 This lack of uni-
formity had resulted in fragmented building requirements throughout 
the state, which in turn created public health and safety concerns while 
also posing a major problem to those “involved in building ownership, 
design, construction, and insurance.”217
 To remedy such inconsistencies, the State Building Code Council 
(administered under the Department of Accounting and General Ser-
vices) was created in 2007 to “establish and implement” a State Build-
ing Code.218 The council is comprised of a building official from each 
county, the comptroller of the Department of Accounting and General 
Services, and representatives from the State Fire Council, State Health 
Department, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, the Struc-
tural Engineers Association of Hawai‘i, and the American Institute of 
Architects.219 In addition to continuously working to keep the code 
updated, the council must also provide educational and technical train-
ing and assistance to affected agencies.220 This assistance may include 
“services or grants at the state and county levels relating to the imple-
mentation and enforcement of the state building code.”221
 The code regulates all substantial construction in Hawai‘i, includ-
ing the “construction, alteration, movement, enlargement, replacement, 
repair, equipment, use and occupancy, location, maintenance, removal 
and demolition of every building or structure or any appurtenances 
connected or attached to such buildings or structures.”222 Accessibility, 
structural integrity, hurricane and high-wind standards, fire safety, elec-
trical standards, and plumbing and sewage standards are also regulated. 
Finally, the code acknowledges and establishes procedures for designing 
and constructing indigenous Hawaiian architectural structures, authoriz-
ing both the use of certain building materials as well as allowable uses.223
 The content of the code is also specified by the act. The code must 
include the following: the latest edition of the fire code as adopted 
by the State Fire Council, the latest edition of the Uniform Plumbing 
Code, the latest edition of the International Building Code, Hawai‘i 
design standards for emergency shelters that are hurricane resistant 
and nationally recognized code provisions that include standards for 
residential and hurricane resistance, residential construction, fires, 
elevators, electrical, plumbing, mechanical, flood and tsunami, existing 
buildings, energy conservation, and on-site sewage disposal.224
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 It is worth noting that the State Building Code is a guideline for the 
counties, and the counties are allowed to amend the state model with-
out state approval.225 However, if a county does not amend the statewide 
model code within two years, the state code becomes the county’s code 
for the interim until the county adopts any amendments.226 The county 
also has the right to control and implement all administrative, permit-
ting and enforcement, and inspection procedures.227
 Hawai‘i Administrative Rules Title 3 Chapter 180 (Draft 2009) will 
adopt the State Building Code as required by Haw. Rev. Stat. § 107-25 
(2009) under the authority of Haw. Rev. Stat. § 107-29 (2009). The State 
Building Code is modeled after the International Building Code, 2006 
edition. “Detached one- and two-family dwellings and multiple single-
family dwellings (townhouses) not more than three stories above grade 
plane in height” may be exempt if the county adopts the international 
residential code that will then govern.228 “Existing state-owned buildings 
undergoing repair, alterations or additions and change of occupancy 
shall be permitted to comply with the existing Building Code, provided 
the extent of work does not exceed 50% of the appraised value of the 
building.”229 Existing buildings can continue the use or occupancy that 
existed at the time of the adoption of the Building Code as long as the 
use was legal at the time of adoption and the “use does not constitute 
a hazard to the general safety and welfare of the occupants and the 
public.”230
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2005).
 89. Dolan v. city of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395–396 (1994). 
 90. See, e.g., Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End Ltd., 433 So.2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1983); Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982); Home Builders Ass’n of 
Cent. Ariz., Inc. v. Riddel, 510 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1973). See generally Juergensmeyer, Fund-
ing Infrastructure, supra note 79; Robert Mason Blake and Julian Conrad Juergens-
meyer, “Impact fees: An answer to local governments’ capital funding dilemma,” 9 
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 415 (1981).
 91. 35 F.3d 1269 (8th Cir. 1994).
 92. Id. at 1274–1275.
 93. Id.
 94. Christopher Lake, 35 F.3d at 1275 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
374, 396 [1994]).
 95. Id. 
 96. 12 Cal. 14th 854 (1996). The Supreme Court of California recently reaf-
firmed the Ehrlich approach in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 41 P.3d 87, 104 (Cal. 2002). 
 97. 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998).
 98. Id. at 809-811.
 99. 904 P.2d 185 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
 100. Id. at 189.
 101. 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1997).
 102. Id. at 999–1000; cf. GST Tucson Lightwave, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 949 P.2d 971, 
978–979 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (deciding that Nollan/Dolan was inapplicable to a 
“franchise or license issued by a municipality to use public rights-of-way”). 
 103. 101 F.3d 1095, 1105 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 104. 515 U.S. 1116 (1995).
 105. Id. at 1117–1118.
 106. Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 389–390 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1995); Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821 (N.Y. 2003) (applying 
Nollan and Dolan to a fixed subdivision in lieu fee).
 107. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 46-141 et seq. 
 108. James C. Nicholas and Dan Davidson, Impact Fees in Hawaii: Implementing the 
State Law, Honolulu: Land Use Research Foundation, 1993, at 5. 
 109. Id.
 110. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 46-141. “Impact fees” means the charges imposed upon 
a developer by a county or board to fund all or a portion of the public facility capital 
improvement costs required by the development from which it is collected or to 
recoup the cost of existing public facility capital improvements made in anticipation 
of the needs of a development. 
 111. Nicholas and Davidson, Impact Fees in Hawaii, supra note 108 at 12. 
 112. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 46-143(a): “A county council or board considering 
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the enactment or adoption of impact fees shall first approve a needs assessment 
study that shall identify the kinds of public facilities for which the fees shall be 
imposed. The study shall be prepared by an engineer, architect, or other qualified 
professional and shall identify service standards levels, project public facility capital 
improvement needs, and differentiate between existing and future needs.”
 113. Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 46-143(a) and (b). Part (a) is set out supra note 112, and 
part (b) provides that “The data sources and methodology upon which needs assess-
ments and impact fees are based shall be set forth in the needs assessment study.”
 114. Nicholas and Davidson, Impact Fees in Hawaii, supra note 108 at 12. 
 115. Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 46-143(c): “The pro rata amount of each impact fee shall 
be based upon the development and actual capital cost of public facility expansion, 
or a reasonable estimate thereof, to be incurred.”
 116. Nicholas and Davidson, Impact Fees in Hawaii, supra note 108 at 12. 
 117. Id. at 12–13; see also Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 46-143(d).
 118. The Hawai‘i Code provides the following:
An impact fee shall be substantially related to the needs arising from 
the development and shall not exceed a proportionate share of the 
costs incurred or to be incurred in accommodating the development. 
The following seven factors shall be considered in determining a 
proportionate share of public facility capital improvement costs:
 (1) The level of public facility capital improvements required to 
appropriately serve a development, based on a needs assessment study 
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    (A) Deficiencies in public facilities;
    (B) The means, other than impact fees, by which existing 
   deficiencies will be eliminated within a reasonable period of 
   time; and 
    (C) Additional demands anticipated to be placed on speci-
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 (2) The availability of other funding for public facility capital 
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intergovernmental transfers, and special taxation or assessments;
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 (4) The means by which existing public facility capital improve-
ments were financed;
 (5) The extent to which a developer required to pay impact fees 
has contributed in the previous five years to the cost of existing public 
facility capital improvements and received no reasonable benefit 
therefrom, and any credits that may be due to a development because 
of such contributions;
 (6) The extent to which a developer required to pay impact fees 
over the next twenty years may reasonably be anticipated to contribute 
to the cost of existing public facility capital improvements through 
user fees, debt service payments, or other payments; and any credits 
that may accrue to a development because of future payments; and 
 (7) The extent to which a developer is required to pay impact fees 
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as a condition precedent to the non-site related public facility capital 
improvements, and any offsets payable to a developer because of this 
provision.
Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 46-143(d) (Westlaw 2007). 
 119. Nicholas and Davidson, Impact Fees in Hawaii, supra note 108 at 14 (“The 
impact fees charged to the new development must be based on the needs attribut-
able to the new development”). 
 120. Id.
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 125. Id. § 46-144(3). 
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 138. Id. at 34 (citing Kudo 1988 and Callies 1989).
 139. Id.
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Co., 2006 at § 2.27 (emphasis added).
 144. Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 46-141 to 148 (2006).
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sample development and annexation agreements, see Callies et al., Bargaining for 
Development, supra note 2. 
 173. See generally, Johnson and Ziegler, supra note 165; Porter and Marsh, supra 
note 165; Larsen, Development Agreements Manual, supra note 165. For commentary 
on the British experience with development agreements, see Callies and Grant, “Pay-
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the county, a development agreement must be approved by the county 
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the effective period of such agreement, or for 20 years from the date of execution 
thereof, whichever is shorter.” 
 202. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 65865.2 (West 1997): “A development agree-
 Subdivisions, Land Development Conditions, and Agreements 125
ment shall specify the duration of the agreement. . . .”; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 46-126 
(1993): “A development agreement shall . . . (4) Provide a termination date. . . .”
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Chapter 4
Public Lands in Hawai‘i
The Impact of State and Federal 
Ownership and Management
Federal and state governments and their agencies own a staggering 
48 percent of Hawai‘i’s land. The federal government owns or leases 
roughly 19 percent, or nearly 800,000 acres, and the Hawai‘i State gov-
ernment owns 28 percent, or nearly 1,116,000 acres.1 While much of 
this land is in undevelopable park and reserve, management policies in 
federal and state statutes—especially those pertaining to the state’s pub-
lic lands—permit a variety of private residential and commercial uses on 
these public lands. Moreover, federal land management and disposal 
policies affect the use of nearby private land in significant ways. Those 
aspects of public land policy that affect private uses on or near public 
lands are an indirect but potent tool for the management of private 
lands.
The State: Private Use on Public Lands
As noted, the State of Hawai‘i owns slightly more than a million acres of 
land, about one-third of the land area of Hawai‘i.2 While much of the 
land is virtually unusable in an economic sense—mountain, wetlands, 
and the like—a significant percentage is nevertheless both developed 
and developable. Aside from the development for residential purposes 
of Hawaiian Home Lands,3 the state has produced a detailed set of leg-
islative guidelines that govern what residential and commercial use and 
disposal can be made of Hawai‘i’s state-owned land.4 Most of these are 
enforced by the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) 
through its governing Board of Land and Natural Resources (hereinaf-
ter the Land Board).5
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 The Land Board has general power to deal with state public land, 
including leases and, under certain conditions, disposal for private use.6 
It places all public lands in one of thirteen classifications: intensive agri-
cultural; special livestock; pasture; commercial timber; quarry; mining; 
recreational; watershed; residential; commercial and industrial; hotel, 
apartment, and motel; resort; and unclassified.7 Aside from lands spe-
cifically set aside by the governor with the prior approval of the Land 
Board, all lands must be so classified prior to lease or sale.8 State policy 
expresses a clear preference for leases,9 which are restricted to a term 
not to exceed sixty-five years.10 Moreover, such leases are unavailable to 
persons with delinquent financial obligations to the state.11 They are 
not transferable or assignable, except by devise, bequest, or intestate 
succession, and even then only provided that the Land Board approves 
of the assignment or transfer and it is made in accordance with current 
industry standards.12
 The Land Board imposes additional conditions on commercial 
leases. A business lease requires a “development plan which provides for 
careful placement of complementary enterprises consistent with county 
zoning requirements,” and “wherever possible” the Land Board controls 
“the landscaping and architecture of the enterprises and protect[s] the 
public against the creation of nuisances of smoke, soot, irritating odors 
and gases and harmful wastes.”13 Leases for hotel and resort uses may 
be granted if the Department of Business, Economic Development, and 
Tourism finds that the land “possesses the amenities for a successful 
hotel and resort development and that the advantages of its placement 
for such use outweigh those inherent in free public use in its natural 
state.”14 Moreover, whenever the land being leased is “adjacent to any 
beach, waterway, or historic monument or landmark,” the lease is sub-
ject to public right-of-way or public access that must be available “at all 
times.”15
 Public land for commercial, industrial, and other business uses, as 
well as hotel and resort uses, may be sold to private parties with the 
prior approval of the governor and the State Legislature.16 When public 
land is sold for a hotel or resort, development plans must be submitted 
and the Land Board must make several findings: (1) the land is suit-
able for resort development; (2) its use will “promote the economic 
development of the State”; (3) the development is compatible with the 
developments in the area and is consistent with good, sound planning; 
and (4) the sale, as opposed to lease, is “absolutely necessary to give the 
purchaser self-sustaining economic operations.”17
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 The Land Board applies somewhat different regulations to residen-
tial development on public land. It acts very much like a combination 
developer and county planning agency. It determines the demand for 
house lots in an area, investigates costs, places the development adja-
cent to an existing urban center “wherever possible,” and subdivides 
and improves in conformity with local zoning and subdivision require-
ments.18 To avoid speculation, the Land Board requires the lessee or 
purchaser of a residential lot to build on it within three years.19 A pur-
chaser of such a lot may not sell it for ten years unless it has first been 
offered to the Land Board.20
 The Land Board may also make special provisions for persons who 
qualify for public housing or are unable to afford to buy or rent hous-
ing.21 Included are persons whose land has been recently condemned 
but whose compensation award is insufficient to purchase other hous-
ing and “low-rent housing” residents or prospective residents who 
might otherwise be discouraged from increasing their income for 
fear of becoming ineligible for subsidized housing.22 For this class of 
applicants, the Land Board may subdivide and lease lots of between 
five thousand and fifteen thousand square feet and lease them for an 
initial fifty-five-year term for the construction of a house.23 A prospective 
lessee under this program must have a gross annual family income of 
less than $20,000 and no other residential land holdings.24 The lessee is 
entitled to purchase the lot at its fair market value after ten years, pro-
vided a house is built.25 The Land Board may also lease public lands to 
an eleemosynary organization that has been certified to be tax exempt, 
for nominal consideration without recourse to public auction.26
 This scheme is subject to further Land Board regulation if any of 
the developed land is located in the State Conservation District as deter-
mined by the Land Use Commission. The Land Board must then regu-
late private development in accordance with statutory authority set out 
in the Land Use Law and its Regulation no. 4, as discussed in chapter 1.27 
Concessions may also be operated on public property. A “concession” is 
the grant of the privilege to “conduct operations involving the sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services to the general public including 
but not limited to food and beverage establishments, retail stores, motor 
vehicle rental operations under HRS section 437D, advertising, and 
communications and telecommunication services, in or on buildings or 
land under the jurisdiction of any government agency.”28 Concession-
aires may also operate a parking lot on property owned by the state and 
use, for compensation, space on public property to display advertising.
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The State Park System and Public Use
Hawai‘i’s State Park System consists of fifty-five state parks totaling 
nearly twenty-six thousand acres on the five major islands.29 The parks 
are managed by DLNR’s Division of State Parks, which is authorized by 
statute to make rules governing the use and protection of the system.30
Commercial use of state park land may be conducted only according 
to the provisions of a permit, contract, license, lease, concession, or 
other written agreement with the Land Board.31 Thus, for example, 
commercial filming, photography, and videotaping on state public land 
requires a written permit approved by the board.32 The Land Board 
issues permits governing the use of public facilities and areas within 
state parks for (1) camping, (2) lodging, (3) group use, and (4) special 
use.33 Group use permits are issued for any group larger than twenty-five 
members.34 Special use permits are issued for all types of uses other 
than camping, lodging, and group uses that are considered compatible 
with the functions and purposes of each individual area, facility, or unit 
of the premises.35 Examples include weddings, community events, and 
scientific research.36
 The Land Board may directly lease land to any eleemosynary or 
religious organization for campsites or sites for youth athletic or edu-
cational activities in a state park area without a public auction.37 It may 
also lease lands within a state park or forest reserve for recreation-res-
idence use for a period not to exceed twenty years.38 For example, the 
state leased land for private cabins in Koke‘e State Park on the island of 
Kaua‘i. Such leases are coveted because the cabins are located in remote 
forest areas, high in the mountains of the northwest corner of Kaua‘i.39 
Some of the leases have been held by Kaua‘i’s most powerful political 
and business leaders and wealthy kama‘āina families for many years.40 In 
the 1850s, Valdemar Knudsen, whose descendants would become major 
landowners in Kōloa, leased two parcels in Koke‘e from the Kingdom 
of Hawai‘i and built a home on one of them.41 That first house opened 
the way for campsites that eventually turned into sites for the 118 cabins 
that exist today.42
 However, animosity between DLNR and lessees began in 1985, 
when thirty-seven families lost their leases in an auction.43 Although 
the state had intended the auction to provide more opportunities for 
local families, it in fact allowed off-island and out-of-state residents to 
bid successfully for the lots.44 Some longtime leaseholders who lost 
their leases tore down their cabins or removed them from DLNR sites 
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before new lessees could move in,45 despite contrary provisions in some 
leases.46
 In January 2005, the staff of the State Parks Division of DLNR rec-
ommended that the Land Board consider a proposal to hire a vendor 
through a bid process to manage the recreational cabins.47 The units 
could be either rented or leased on a short-term basis.48 In 2006, cabin 
leaseholders sued the state when DLNR moved to auction the cabins, 
arguing that they owned the cabins and land outright.49 While a Kaua‘i 
circuit court ruled in favor of the state, the litigation stalled the auc-
tion.50 In 2008, the State Legislature passed a bill requiring DLNR to 
renegotiate market-rate leases directly with cabin occupants.51 DLNR 
has since entered into new twenty-year leases with cabin occupants.52 A 
provision in the new leases requires the tenants to acknowledge that the 
state owns the land under their structures. The new law also requires 
DLNR to auction vacant cabins first to neighbor island residents, then 
to other state residents, and only then to others.53
 In 2001, the Land Board drafted a master plan for the Koke‘e and 
Waimea Canyon State Park complex.54 Over the past twenty years, the 
state has collected between $4 and $5 million in lease revenue from 
cabin owners but has lost approximately $500,000 from defaulted 
leases.55 DLNR plans to turn the 6,200-acre park complex into a “rec-
reational facility of the 21st century.”56 The plan addresses preservation 
of natural, cultural, and recreational resources, other users and uses, 
maintenance of trails, and infrastructural needs.57 It also includes a 
review of leases for 118 private cabins in the park.58
Federal Lands: The Use and Disposal of a Scarce Commodity
The U.S. government once owned 80 percent of the land in the United 
States.59 It still owns a whopping 653 million acres, or approximately 
one-third of the total land area.60 Against this backdrop, it is not surpris-
ing that the federal government owns or leases nearly 20 percent of 
the land in Hawai‘i. The majority of federal land is either controlled 
by the military or is designated as relatively remote national parks or 
national wildlife refuges.61 Some of that land, however, is in prime sce-
nic or development locations, such as Pearl Harbor, Ka‘ena Point, Fort 
DeRussy, and Bellows Beach. The use and disposal of federal land and 
its effect on both public and private land use has been the subject of 
much comment.62 However, it is not the purpose of this chapter to deal 
extensively with the vast subject of federal public lands policy but with 
132 Regulating Paradise
selected effects of federal land use decisions on land development in 
Hawai‘i.63
 Much of the land that was eventually to become the vast major-
ity of federal land called “the public domain” was acquired through 
fortuitous purchases. Alaska, the Louisiana Purchase, and the Gadsden 
Purchase—totaling 54 percent of the land area of the United States—
come most readily to mind.64 The land was for the most part acquired 
during a decidedly expansionist period in U.S. history. The major 
thrust of legislation and other programs governing land use was to put 
as much public land as possible rapidly and expeditiously into private 
hands. The wholesale giveaways that characterized the first half of the 
eighteenth century and much of the nineteenth did not abate until the 
first part of the twentieth century with the creation of the U.S. National 
Park System, followed by national forests, reserves, and a host of other 
federal land classifications designed to hold and conserve, rather than 
dispose of, public land.
 A concomitant development was the reemergence of the public 
trust doctrine. Various state governments were directed by the courts to 
hold certain public lands in trust for “the people”—variously defined. 
The result was not only a slowdown but also a change in the manner of 
disposition. Leasing and other less-than-fee disposals took the place of 
the outright transfers of ownership that were so popular in the nation’s 
first 150 years.65
Ceded Lands in Hawai‘i
The federal government’s potential for affecting land use in Hawai‘i 
through disposal of land it now holds in the state is significant. Some of 
that land, much of it in critical locations, must be returned to the state 
at no cost if it is declared “surplus.”66 This is in part because federal 
public lands in Hawai‘i have never been part of the public domain from 
which so many grants to private interests elsewhere have come over the 
past two centuries. Congress administers public domain lands primar-
ily under the U.S. Constitution, Article IV, section 3, clause 2, which 
grants it power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regula-
tions respecting territory or property belonging to the United States.67 
Although Hawai‘i had achieved territorial status toward the end of the 
period when the federal government gave away land, it was still over 
half a century before Hawai‘i became a state.68 Partly as a consequence 
of an additional fifty-year period between U.S. settlement and annexa-
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tion and partly because of the ending of the public domain acquisi-
tion period in U.S. history, Hawai‘i’s land never did become part of the 
public domain. Thus, while the resolution of annexation declared the 
republic’s relinquishment of sovereignty and the cession and transfer to 
the United States “the absolute fee and ownership of all public, govern-
ment, or Crown lands, public holdings” and other public property “of 
every kind and description belonging to the government of the Hawai-
ian Islands,” it also expressly declared such land to be other than in 
the public domain.69 Finally, the resolution specified that all but armed 
forces uses must be for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian 
Islands:
[t]hat the existing land laws of the U.S. relative to public 
lands shall not apply to such land in the Hawaiian Islands, 
but the Congress of the U.S. shall enact special laws for their 
management and disposition: Provided, That all revenue from 
or proceeds of the same, except as regards such part thereof as 
may be used or occupied for the civil, military, or naval pur-
poses of the U.S., or may be assigned for the use of the local 
government shall be used solely for the benefit of the inhabit-
ants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public 
purposes.70
 It is clear from the legislative history of the Admission Act of 1959 
by which Hawai‘i became a state that Congress meant to perpetuate this 
exceptional status.71 First, Hawai‘i was to be the successor in title to the 
lands and properties held by the territory prior to admission. Second, 
the federal government turned over to the new state substantial land it 
owned—with the notable exception of the ceded lands.72 Third, the act 
set up a procedure by which these ceded lands would be returned to the 
state as well:
 (e) Within five years from the date Hawaii is admitted into 
the Union, each Federal agency having control over any land 
or property that is retained by the United States pursuant to 
subsections [ceded lands] shall report to the President the 
facts regarding its continued need for such land or property, 
and if the President determines that the land or property is no 
longer needed by the United States it shall be conveyed to the 
State of Hawaii.
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 (f) As used in the Act, the term “lands and other properties” 
includes public lands and other public property, and the term 
“public lands and other public property” means, and is limited 
to, the lands and properties that were ceded to the United 
States by the Republic of Hawaii under the joint resolution of 
annexation approved July 7, 1898 (30 Stat. 750), or that have 
been acquired in exchange for lands or properties so ceded.73
 For purposes of disposal, the critical section of the Admission Act is 
the above-quoted subsection 5(e). The necessity for an extension of the 
five-year deadline soon became obvious. Between 1960 and 1964, the fed-
eral government returned a measly six hundred acres.74 The slow pace of 
the return led directly to the enactment of the Ceded Lands Act of 1963, 
the history of which clearly declares the intent of Congress to promptly 
return all surplus ceded lands to the state as rapidly as possible.75
 After tracing the various laws by which ceded lands were acquired 
by the United States, the act states that whenever such lands are deter-
mined to be surplus property by the Administrator of General Services 
(Administrator) with the concurrence of the head of the department or 
agency exercising administration or control over such lands and prop-
erty, they “shall be conveyed to the State of Hawaii by the Administrator 
subject to the provisions of this Act.”76 The lands are conveyed to the 
state free of charge, unless improved with buildings or structures, in 
which case the improvements must be paid for or relocated: “If (1) the 
state refuses to pay for the improvements and (2) the administrator 
determines that relocation and removal are not feasible, then the obli-
gation to transfer the land to the state ceases, and the value of the land 
only must be turned over to the state upon subsequent disposal.”77
 Finally, the lands and proceeds therefrom are to be held in “public 
trust:” “Any lands, property, improvements, and proceeds conveyed or 
paid to the State of Hawaii under section 1 of this Act shall be consid-
ered a part of public trust . . . and shall be subject to the terms and 
conditions of the trust.”78
 The present state of ceded lands in Hawai‘i raises several critical 
questions:
 1. At what point are such lands “surplus” so that they must 
be transferred to the state?
 2. To whom or what should ceded lands be transferred (so 
far, they have been transferred to the state)?
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 3. Once such transfer takes place, what may be done with 
them?
Ceded Lands: At What Point Surplus?
Both the Admission Act and the 1963 Ceded Lands Act make clear that 
whoever (the president or the General Services administrator) even-
tually makes the transfer, the lands must first be declared “surplus.”79 
Moreover, whichever agency of the federal government administers or 
controls the land must concur with such declaration of surplus.80 Unfor-
tunately, there is no express requirement in either act that there be a 
regular review of agency needs leading to a declaration of “surplus.” 
Indeed, language requiring such a review every five years was apparently 
rejected by Congress during the course of hearings on the Ceded Lands 
Act.81
 Shortly after Hawai‘i achieved statehood, however, the Federal 
Office of Management and Budget—to whom the president delegated 
his authority to declare surplus ceded lands—did issue guidelines, which 
provide that a parcel of ceded land would not be retained when
 1. It is not being used by the controlling agency and there 
are no firm plans for future use;
 2. The costs of operation and maintenance are substantially 
higher than for other suitable properties of equal or less value 
which are, or can be made, available to the Federal Govern-
ment without direct cost;
 3. It is being leased to private individuals or enterprises and 
there are no firm plans for future Federal use; or
 4. It is being used by the Government to produce goods or 
services which are available from private enterprise, except 
when it is demonstrated clearly in each instance that it is not 
in the public interest to obtain such requirement from private 
enterprise.82
 These are, however, guidelines only, and there is apparently still 
some confusion over whether the federal government adheres to them, 
especially after the 1963 Ceded Lands Act amended the Admission 
Act.83 Hawai‘i was unsuccessful in its early attempt to obtain a favorable 
court decision setting out conditions under which the General Services 
administrator must declare ceded lands to be surplus. In 1963, the U.S. 
Supreme Court dismissed on procedural grounds the only suit that 
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has so far reached it on this issue: “We have concluded that this is a 
suit against the U.S. and, absent its consent, cannot be maintained by 
the State.”84 A later attempt to obtain that consent failed.85 However, 
pursuant to executive orders issued in the 1970s, the U.S. Department 
of Defense took great pains to inventory and analyze the ceded lands 
under its control.86 The result was a recommendation that nearly three 
thousand acres be released to the state.87
 A classic example of the reluctance of the federal government to 
release ceded lands to the state is Bellows Air Force Base, located on two 
and a half miles of sandy beach on the southeast coast of O‘ahu. Of the 
1,495 acres that comprise the base, 1,457 are ceded lands. Aside from 
certain military transmitter facilities—which may soon be consolidated 
with facilities off the base—the major if not sole use for Bellows appears 
to be a semiannual amphibious training exercise utilizing approximately 
six hundred acres.88 Other facilities include beach cottages, the use 
of which can hardly be described as “mission related”—the usual test 
for the need of facilities—an armory, and a nine-vehicle maintenance 
facility.89 In fairness to the U.S. Air Force, Bellows Beach is open to the 
general public on weekends and holidays, and seventy-seven acres of 
ceded land were released at the Waimanalo end of the base in 1974.90 
Nevertheless, the federal government has consistently turned aside state 
requests to either release or lease the rest.91
The Ceded Lands and Public Trust
The Admission Act broadened considerably the “public trust” purposes 
for which ceded lands, once acquired by the state, could be used:
The lands granted to the State of Hawaii . . . together with pro-
ceeds from the sale or other disposition of such lands and the 
income therefrom, shall be held by said State as public trust for 
the support of the public schools and other public educational 
institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of native 
Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission 
Act, 1920, as amended, for the development of farm and home 
ownership on as widespread a basis as possible for the making 
of public improvements, and for the provisions of lands for 
public use. Such lands, proceeds, and income shall be man-
aged and disposed of for one or more of the foregoing pur-
poses in such manner as the constitution and laws of said State 
may provide, and their use for any other object shall constitute 
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a breach of trust for which suit may be brought by the U.S. The 
schools and other educational institutions supported, in whole 
or in part, out of such public trust shall forever remain under 
the exclusive control of said State; and no part of the proceeds 
or income from the lands granted under this Act shall be used 
for the support of any sectarian or denominational school, 
college, or university.92
 While the state must therefore use the proceeds from the ceded 
lands for the five listed purposes in section 5(f)—(1) the support of 
public education; (2) the betterment of the conditions of Native Hawai-
ians; (3) the development of farm and home ownership; (4) the making 
of public improvements; and (5) the provision of lands for public use—
the language of section 5(f) allows the state to choose the manner in 
which the proceeds are allocated among the listed purposes.
 DLNR administers ceded lands that are eventually released to the 
state.93 DLNR has been criticized for its management of and accounting 
for land and resources under its control generally and for ceded lands 
in particular. Apparently, funds generated by use or sale of formerly 
ceded lands sometimes ended up in (or were transferred to) the state’s 
general fund rather than a special public trust fund.94
 The stakes in such funds are high. Native Hawaiian groups and sup-
porters successfully persuaded the 1978 Constitutional Convention to 
create the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), which is run by a generally 
elected board.95 In 1980, the State Legislature amended a 1979 statute 
implementing OHA’s constitutional creation by reserving “twenty per-
cent of all funds derived from the public land trust, described in section 
10-3” for OHA.96 Despite the specified percentage, this reservation was 
far from clear in ultimately resolving OHA’s pro rata share of the funds 
from ceded lands, resulting in more than two decades of controversy 
between OHA and the state. OHA’s claim to profit or revenues from 
potential projects on ceded lands—upon which, for example, Aloha 
Tower and its multimillion dollar redevelopment at Honolulu Harbor 
sits—may have far-reaching effects not only on Native Hawaiians but 
also on the success of such development projects.
 In 1995 OHA challenged the state’s transfer of ceded lands until its 
multiple claims were resolved.97 In a sharp reversal of an earlier memo-
randum opinion,98 the Hawai‘i Supreme Court enjoined the state from 
transferring any such lands until claims were resolved, citing a Clinton-
era “Apology Resolution” as the principle basis for its decision.99 The 
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state promptly sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court, joined by 
twenty-nine other states that filed friend-of-the-court briefs supporting 
review. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review in September of 2008 
and unanimously reversed the Hawai‘i Supreme Court, specifically hold-
ing that the Apology Resolution was just that—an apology that could 
form no basis for legal action.100
Federal Lands and State/Local Land Use Controls
Of potentially equal significance in Hawai‘i is the current federal policy 
of disposing of so-called surplus property aside from ceded lands. Within 
limits, the federal government may dispose of such property any way it 
chooses. It appears that disposal is part of an overall federal program 
to raise revenue. One such property is the Fort DeRussy site in Waikīkī. 
Surrounded on three sides by high-rise condominium and hotel devel-
opments, with unobstructed ocean view and access on the fourth side, 
the multiacre site is virtually free of development. It also has the last 
significant beachfront open space in Waikīkī. While the federal govern-
ment has in the past expressed interest in selling it for development, city 
and state administrators have consistently declared their intent to retain 
it as open space. Indeed, a mayor of Honolulu once threatened to zone 
it for low-density development in order to frustrate federal plans.101
 Recent federal court decisions, however, raise doubts about the 
power of Honolulu to regulate land use on federal land in the face of 
a contrary federal policy. In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court held a state 
statute providing for the rounding up of stray burros on federal land to 
be unenforceable in view of a federal statute managing them and pro-
hibiting such action, on the ground that when Congress passes legisla-
tion pertaining to federal property, state law “must recede.”102 Based on 
that decision, a federal appeals court in California—which has federal 
jurisdiction over Hawai‘i—decided in 1979 that Ventura County’s zon-
ing laws prohibiting oil exploration without a permit were inapplicable 
to private oil companies with federal permission to explore and drill on 
federal land: “the federal government has authorized a specific use of 
federal lands, and Ventura cannot prohibit that use, either temporar-
ily or permanently, in an attempt to substitute its judgment for that of 
Congress.”103
 However, in 1987’s California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock 
Company,104 in which a company mining on federal land in California 
similarly sued to prevent the Coastal Commission from imposing state 
permitting requirements on the project,105 the U.S. Supreme Court 
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distinguished between environmental and land use regulations such 
as zoning.106 The Court reasoned that “[l]and use planning in essence 
chooses particular uses for land; environmental regulation, at its core, 
does not mandate particular uses of land but requires only that, how-
ever the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within pre-
scribed limits.”107 The Court then held that reasonable state environmen-
tal regulation is not preempted on federal land.108 Thus, because the 
commission was not exercising “land use authority” by attempting to 
determine if federal land could be used for mining, but rather was using 
its “environmental authority” to regulate how mining was conducted, 
the Court held that the commission’s permitting requirements were not 
preempted.109 Therefore, even if the idea of city regulation resurfaces, 
Honolulu’s land use controls may be difficult to apply to properties such 
as Fort DeRussy so long as the federal government retains any rights in 
that land.
 In conclusion, public lands and their use and misuse will continue 
to affect land development in Hawai‘i for some years. The subject of 
ceded lands and their release and development was a major item on the 
agenda of the Native Hawaiian Study Commission, which was reconsti-
tuted in 1981, though its recommendations were advisory only.110 The 
importance of ceded lands continues unabated today. Measured against 
recent experience and current trends, the future does not bode particu-
larly well for immediate return to Hawai‘i of its remaining ceded lands. 
However current, the concern over ceded lands is but a part of the 
larger issue of use and management of public lands, which can proceed 
regardless of local land use controls, whether or not a particular federal 
or state administration chooses to subject itself to such local zoning. 
The agencies that oversee this use and development are largely their 
own masters, and the result for land use in Hawai‘i is not always predict-
able. It may be more prudent to raise the need for a determination 
of consistency of such development with Hawai‘i’s federally approved 
Coastal Zone Plan as required under both federal and State Coastal 
Zone Management Acts (see chapter 6).
Federal Land Policy and Management: Public Lands
Although the term “public lands” has various meanings under different 
statutes and circumstances, it generally refers to government lands that 
are open to public sale or other disposition under general laws and 
that are not held back or reserved for a governmental or public pur-
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pose.111 The phrase “public lands” is usually synonymous with “public 
domain.”112
 In public lands law, “disposal” commonly refers to the final, irrevo-
cable act by which the right of a person, purchaser, or grantee attaches, 
and an equitable right becomes complete to receive legal title by patent 
or some other appropriate mode of transfer.113 It is the policy of the 
United States that any disposal of public land take place according to 
uniform statutory procedures requiring consistency with the prescribed 
mission of the department or agency involved and reserving to Congress 
the power to review disposals in excess of a specified acreage.114 The 
Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act,115 enacted in 2000, provides 
both for the identification of and decision-making criteria regarding 
the disposal of public lands, as well as the identification and acquisition 
of inholdings and other land that would improve the resource manage-
ment ability of land management agencies and adjoining landowners, 
while allowing for the least disruption of existing land and resource 
management programs.
Transformation and Private Interests in Public Lands
For nearly a century, this country’s federally owned lands were valuable 
chiefly for their natural resources that could be removed by private com-
modity interests.116 Traditionally, federal land managers favored com-
modity uses such as timber, grazing, and mining operations.117 In recent 
years, however, public lands have undergone a fundamental change and 
are now dominated by recreational and preservation uses.118 Indeed, 
various parties have sought to acquire some inholdings not for devel-
opment purposes but for conservation.119 Thus in Hawai‘i, DLNR and 
the Trust for Public Land, a national nonprofit organization, purchased 
Moanalua Valley from a private party to “benefit the people . . . as an 
open space, a gathering place.”120 This shift is reflected in basic econom-
ics.121 The hundreds of billions of dollars spent each year on outdoor 
recreation have surpassed mining, timber harvesting, and grazing as 
an economic force on Western public lands.122 There has also been a 
marked increase in recreational visitors to public lands.123 In 1995, the 
U.S. Forest Service recorded 345 million visitor days on National Forest 
land, which represents a 1,161% increase since 1950.124 The Bureau of 
Land Management’s (BLM) adjusted visitor days rose 176% from 1982 
to 1996, and the National Park Service recorded a visitation level of 
nearly 270 million visits in 1995, a 711% increase since 1950.125
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 The increase in preservation use is in large part due to the conser-
vation movement. Since the conservation movement mobilized enough 
political strength to institutionalize the national park concept in the 
National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, a series of statutory mandates 
provides for the preservation of public lands.126 The Organic Act describes 
the Park Service’s dual and sometimes conflicting mandate to provide 
for recreational use, while at the same time preserving resources “unim-
paired for the enjoyment of future generations.”127 In 1940, an executive 
order created the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) by merging the Bureau 
of Fisheries of the Commerce Department with the Division of Biological 
Survey of the Department of Agriculture.128 Since then, FWS has become 
an increasingly important preservation and recreation resource on fed-
eral lands.129 The National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act 
of 1966 authorized FWS to administer the wildlife refuges.130 Then the 
Wilderness Act of 1964 signaled a heightened commitment to preserva-
tion, setting in motion a process that transferred millions of acres from 
extractive uses to recreation and the preservation of wildlife.131 Finally, 
in 1975 the Federal Land Policy and Management Act required BLM to 
adopt a multiple-use management policy with recreation, wildlife preser-
vation, and aesthetics as statutorily mandated uses.132
The National Park System
A major portion of federal lands in Hawai‘i is designated national parks. 
Both the expansion of uses associated with such parks and the attempts 
by the federal government to regulate private land adjacent to park 
boundaries in order to protect federal interests in the parks have major 
land use implications for private landowners.
 The National Park System of the United States comprises 391 areas 
covering more than 84 million acres in every state except Delaware; 
there are no national parks in the District of Columbia or in the territo-
ries of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.133 
The National Park Service (NPS) manages the parks. Created on August 
25, 1916, when President Woodrow Wilson signed the National Park 
Service Organic Act (Organic Act),134 NPS is a federal bureau within the 
Department of the Interior responsible for protecting national parks 
and monuments:135
The Service thus established shall promote and regulate the 
use of Federal areas known as national parks, monuments and 
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reservations . . . by such means and measures as conform to 
the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments and 
reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the 
natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to 
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by 
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment  
of future generations.136
 The act leaves two questions unanswered: (1) whether the author-
ity under the act extended to both public and private holdings within 
the park’s physical domain; and (2) whether the authority extended 
outside of park boundaries to include the right to regulate private and 
public lands.137 Judicial interpretation of the Property Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution has extended NPS’s regulatory authority to both pub-
lic and private holdings.138 However, this authority includes only that 
power necessary to enact regulations that govern private inholdings or 
public lands if those regulations are proper and realistically related to 
congressional intent.139 While it is fairly well settled that NPS can regu-
late activities within park boundaries regardless of whether the activities 
take place on public or private holdings, it is less clear whether NPS can 
regulate outside of park boundaries.140
 In its 1980 State of the Parks Report, NPS reported that “more than 50 
percent of the reported threats were attributed to sources or activities 
located external to the parks, particularly industrial and commercial 
development projects on adjacent lands; air pollutant emissions, often 
associated with facilities located considerable distances from the affected 
parks; urban encroachment; and roads and railroads.”141 Further studies 
have demonstrated that a multitude of development activities external 
to national parks are impacting and threatening to engulf them, caus-
ing severe damage to the values and resources within the parks that they 
were created to preserve.
 The secretary of the Interior is authorized to publish rules and 
regulations as deemed necessary or proper for the use and manage-
ment of the national parks.142 Federal regulations allow a park super-
intendent to issue permits “to authorize an otherwise prohibited or 
restricted activity or impose a public use limit.”143 Such special permits 
allow private use on official park lands. There are two instruments 
that may be used to authorize a special park use: (1) a special use 
permit or (2) a right-of-way permit.144 A special use permit is issued 
by a superintendent or individual or organization to allow the use of 
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NPS–administered resources and to authorize activities that require 
a permit.145 A right-of-way permit is issued by a regional director to 
authorize any new utilities, including water conduits, on NPS lands.146 
NPS also issues other permits and signed agreements including but 
not limited to research, collection, and use of natural and cultural 
resources.147
 Finally, the director may lease any property (except nonhistoric 
land) if the lessee meets the following restrictions:
 (a) The lease will not result in degradation of the purposes 
and values of the park area;
 (b) The lease will not deprive the park area of property nec-
essary for appropriate park protection, interpretation, visitor 
enjoyment, or administration of the park area;
 (c) The lease contains such terms and conditions as will 
assure the leased property will be used for activity and in a 
manner [. . .] consistent with the purposes established by law 
for the park area in which the property is located;
 (d) The lease is compatible with the programs of the 
National Park Service;
 (e) The lease is for rent at least equal to the fair market 
value rent of the leased property as described in § 18.5;
 (f) The proposed activities under the lease are not subject to 
authorization through a concession contract, commercial use 
authorization or similar instrument; and
 (g) If the lease is to include historic property, the lease will 
adequately insure the preservation of the historic property.148
All leases must have as short a term as possible and no lease may have a 
term of more than sixty years.149
Hawai‘i’s National Parks
Comprised of land on the islands of Hawai‘i and Maui, Hawai‘i National 
Park was created by Congress on August 1, 1916.150 In the early 1960s, 
the lands located on Maui were renamed Haleakalā National Park and 
the land located on the island of Hawai‘i was renamed Hawai‘i Volca-
noes National Park.151
 Volcanoes National Park (Volcanoes) is located on the southeastern 
portion of the island of Hawai‘i and encompasses 333,000 acres ranging 
from sea level to the summit of one of earth’s most massive volcanoes, 
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Mauna Loa, at 13,677 feet. The Park mission is to “protect, conserve 
and study volcanic landscapes and the associated natural and cultural 
resources and processes; facilitate public use and safe access to active 
volcanism, scenic vistas, diverse geographic settings and wilderness for 
recreation, education and public enjoyment.”152
 Volcanoes has been designated an International Biosphere Reserve 
(1980) and a World Heritage Site (1987).153 Within the park, Kīlauea, 
one of the world’s most active volcanoes, offers scientists insights on 
the birth of the Hawaiian Islands and gives visitors views of dramatic 
volcanic landscapes, including lava flows into the ocean. Over half of 
the park is designated wilderness, providing unique hiking and camp-
ing opportunities.154
 Like many other national parks, Volcanoes allows for private activi-
ties within the park lands through the granting of special use permits 
and concession contracts. Currently, the park issues permits for research, 
commercial filming, businesses, weddings, and the scattering of ashes. 
These permits require the permit holder to meet certain conditions 
and in some cases pay a nonrefundable application fee.155 Generally, 
the conditions restrict the permit holder from disturbing park features 
such as rocks, vegetation, or other natural resources and interfering 
with other visitors’ access, use, or enjoyment of an area.
 The purpose of concession contracts is to authorize concession-
ers to provide visitor services in park areas.156 The NPS director awards 
concession contracts through a public solicitation process.157 A conces-
sion contract is generally awarded for a term of ten years or less unless 
the director determines that the contract terms and conditions war-
rant a longer term.158 In no event, however, may the contract have a 
term of more than twenty years unless extended in accordance with 
regulations.159
 All concession contracts contain provisions for suspension and 
termination of the contract for (1) default, (2) unsatisfactory perfor-
mance, and (3) when necessary to protect, conserve, and preserve park 
area resources and providing necessary and appropriate visitor services 
in park areas.160 Concessioners may not assign, sell, convey, grant, con-
tract for, or otherwise transfer any concession contract, rights to operate 
under a contract as a subconcessioner, controlling interest in a con-
cessioner, leasehold surrender, or possessory interest without the prior 
written approval of the director.161 Additionally, a concessioner may not 
encumber, pledge, mortgage, or otherwise provide as a security interest 
any concession contract, rights to operate under a contract as a subcon-
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cessioner, controlling interest in a concessioner, leasehold surrender, or 
possessory interest for any purpose without prior written approval of the 
director.162
 NPS works with concessioners to provide visitor services throughout 
the park system. Volcano House, the only hotel within the park itself, is 
one such concessioner.163 Located on the edge of Kīlauea Crater,164 the 
old-style country lodge features shops and three dining areas and offers 
hiking and tours.
 Haleakalā National Park (Haleakalā) consists of 30,183 acres, 
24,719 acres of which are designated wilderness.165 The park ranges from 
sea level to the summit of Haleakalā, at ten thousand feet.166 The park 
also requires special use permits for a number of activities within park 
boundaries, including scattering ashes, wedding ceremonies, rallies, and 
other “first amendment activities.”167 In 2007, after several deaths and 
many injuries, the park banned the once-popular commercial downhill 
bicycle tours leading tourists at dawn from the summit to the sea.168 
Approximately ninety thousand people a year rode from the summit, 
bringing in approximately $10 million a year for tour operators.169
 There is a substantial basis of common law supporting NPS author-
ity to regulate private land adjacent to national parks in order to protect 
them.170 Thus for example, in Kleppe v. New Mexico,171 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the appropriate federal agencies may regulate private 
land and property in order to protect federal interest in federal land.
Fish and Wildlife Service Refuges in Hawai‘i
The National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS) is a collection of public 
federal lands managed by the Fish and Wildlife Service.172 The lands 
are set aside for the purpose of conserving the fish, wildlife, and plants 
within them.173 The federal government holds fee, leasehold, or ease-
ment interests in refuge land.174 There are over 540 refuges nationwide, 
at least one in each of the fifty states. The system provides habitat for 
“more than 700 species of birds, 220 species of mammals, 250 reptile 
and amphibian species, and more than 200 species of fish.”175 This 
includes habitat for more than 250 threatened or endangered plants 
and animals.176 Ninety-eight percent of refuges are open to the public; 
they host more than 40 million visitors each year.177
 Private uses on FWS land are governed by the National Wildlife 
Refuge Administration Act (also referred to as the National Wildlife 
Improvement Act) of 1997 (1997 Act)178 together with federal regula-
tions. Under the 1997 Act, the secretary of the Department of the Inte-
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rior (secretary) may permit the use of any area within NWRS for any 
purpose whenever it is determined that such uses are “compatible with 
the major purposes for which such areas were established.”179 Such uses 
may include but are not limited to hunting, fishing, public recreation 
and accommodation, and access.180 The secretary may also permit the 
use of or grant easements in, over, across, upon, through, or under any 
areas within the system whenever it is determined that such uses are 
compatible with the purposes for which these areas are established.181 
Such uses may include but are not limited to power lines, telephone 
lines, canals, ditches, pipelines, and roads, including the construction, 
operation, and maintenance thereof.182
 NWRS may open an area to public access and use by regulation, 
individual permit, or public notice.183 Compatibility determinations 
will include only evaluations of how the proposed use would affect the 
ability of the refuge to meet its mandated purposes.184 The manager of 
a refuge is authorized to issue permits unless the regulations require 
the applicant to obtain the applicable permit from the FWS director 
or the secretary.185 The refuge manager may terminate or revoke a 
permit at any time for noncompliance with the terms of the permit or 
federal regulations, for nonuse, for violation of any law, regulation, or 
order applicable to the refuge, or to protect public health, safety, or 
the resources of the refuge.186 Public use facilities may also be operated 
by concessioners or co-operators under contract or legal agreement on 
national wildlife refuges where there is a demonstrated justified need 
for services or facilities, such as boat rentals, swimming facilities, con-
ducted tours of special natural attractions, shelters, tables, trailer lots, 
food, lodging, and related services.187
 There are several natural refuges in Hawai‘i.188 Among the better 
known are those at Kīlauea and Hakalau. The Kaua‘i National Wild-
life Refuge Complex consists of Kīlauea Point, Hanalei, and Hulē‘ia 
National Wildlife Refuges. Kīlauea Point Refuge (Kīlauea) was estab-
lished in 1985 after its transfer from the U.S. Coast Guard and consists 
of 203 acres of protected land.189 It is located on the northernmost tip 
of the island and is one of the few Hawaiian refuges open daily to the 
public.190 One of the most popular spots for visitors and residents of 
Hawai‘i alike, it attracts an average of half a million visitors a year.191
 The refuge is home to both the endangered Hawaiian nēnē and a 
number of rare and endangered seabirds, including red-footed boobies, 
Laysan albatrosses, and wedge-tailed shearwaters.192 To protect the bird 
populations, the reserve traps predators within the refuge and maintains 
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a predator-proof fence around it.193 Native plant species are also planted 
and maintained within the refuge.194 The waters surrounding the refuge 
are home to a number of important species, including Hawaiian monk 
seals, green sea turtles, and humpback whales.195
 Current private uses that are permitted in the Hanalei area of the 
refuge are taro farming and kayak rentals. Taro farming is permitted on 
the refuge because it provides wetland habitat for birds.196 Because wild-
life management and bird use conflicts with taro water management 
and production, permit fees are set at an appropriate rate to compen-
sate farmers for losses incurred as a result of the requirement to favor 
the birds in bird-taro conflicts.197 The conditions attached to the special 
use permit (SUP) restrict the use of the land to taro farming.198 The 
permit also requires farmers to follow certain farming guidelines and 
report nests of waterbirds to the refuge manager.199 The current SUP for 
kayak rentals requires the permittee to remove all trash resulting from 
the company’s activities and forbids dumping trash in the waters.200 The 
permittee must also deliver a five- to ten-minute environmental educa-
tion talk to the general public on each of the kayak trips.201
 Hakalau Forest National Wildlife Reserve (Hakalau) was set aside 
in 1985 to protect and manage endangered forest birds and their rain 
forest habitat.202 Located on the windward slope of Mauna Kea on the 
island of Hawai‘i, the 32,733-acre refuge supports a diversity of native 
birds and plants.203 Currently, Hakalau issues SUPs for ecotours in the 
refuge; five permits were issued in 2004 and seven were issued in 2005.204 
The maximum number of individuals covered by a single permit is one 
hundred.205 Tour groups are limited to twenty-five or fewer people and 
may be conducted only in the vicinity of Pua Akala tract and the Pua 
Akala meadow.206 Permit conditions require a written report of the total 
number of visits and individuals for each month that visits occur207 and 
prohibit open fires on the refuge and the taking of any animal, vegeta-
ble, or mineral matter.208 The permittee is responsible and can be held 
liable for any damages or injuries resulting from the permitted activity.
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Marine  
National Monument
On June 15, 2006, President Bush announced plans to designate the 
island chain spanning nearly 1,400 miles of the Pacific northwest of 
Hawai‘i, from Nīhoa to Kure Atoll, as a national monument, creating the 
largest protected marine reserve in the world.209 Presidential Proclama-
tion 8031 reserved “all lands and interests in lands owned or controlled 
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by the Government of the U.S. in the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands, 
including emergent and submerged lands and waters.”210 The area of the 
monument is nearly 140,000 square miles, more than a hundred times 
larger than Yosemite National Park. Named the Northwestern Hawaiian 
Islands Marine National Monument (NWHI Monument), it “encom-
passes a string of uninhabited islands that support more than 7,000 
marine species, at least a fourth of which are [so far] found nowhere 
else on Earth.”211 The NWHI Monument contains almost 70 percent of 
the nation’s tropical, shallow-water coral reefs, a rookery for 14 million 
seabirds, and the last refuge for the endangered Hawaiian monk seal 
and the threatened green sea turtle, as well as many large predatory fish, 
90 percent of which have disappeared from the world’s oceans.212
 The federal regulations that govern the NWHI Monument do not 
explicitly refer to land use regulations. Nevertheless, the federal govern-
ment affects the use of land by strict regulation of access and activities 
in the area. The following is a description of the structure of the monu-
ment and the provisions that most relate to land use.
 Three separate agencies oversee the NWHI Monument: the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, through the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of the Interior, 
through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), and the State of 
Hawai‘i.213 NOAA has primary responsibility for managing the marine 
areas of the monument (in consultation with the secretary). USFWS has 
responsibility for managing the areas of the monument that cover the 
Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge, the Battle of Midway National 
Memorial, and the Hawaiian Islands National Wildlife Refuge (in 
consultation with the Secretary of Commerce). The state has primary 
responsibility for managing the state waters of the monument.214
 Entrance is strictly regulated. It is unlawful to enter the NWHI 
Monument unless (1) for emergency or military purposes; (2) after 
a permit has been issued to perform a specific activity; or (3) when 
conducting passage without interruption.215 Once in the monument, 
the federal government is explicit concerning the kinds of activities 
allowed. Prohibited and unlawful are the following:
 (a) Exploring for, developing, or producing oil, gas, or 
minerals;
 (b) Using or attempting to use poisons, electrical charges, 
or explosives in the collection or harvest of a Monument 
resource;
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 (c) Introducing or otherwise releasing an introduced spe-
cies from within or into the Monument; and
 (d) Anchoring on or having a vessel anchored on any living 
or dead coral with an anchor, anchor chain, or anchor rope.216
 The development of structures, such as offshore oil platforms, 
refineries, or other facilities used to produce energy, is prohibited. 
Not even the federal government may explore for, develop, or produce 
oil, gas, or minerals within the monument. Any regulated activity within 
the monument requires a valid permit that specifically authorizes that 
activity from NOAA and USFWS.217 A permit may be granted if the 
activity:
 (1) Is research designed to further understanding of Monu-
ment resources and qualities;
 (2) Will further the educational value of the Monument;
 (3) Will assist in the conservation and management of the 
Monument;
 (4) Will allow Native Hawaiian practices (discussed below);
 (5) Will allow a special ocean use (discussed below); or
 (6) Will allow recreational activities (discussed below).218
Moreover, regulations provide that a permit may not be issued unless 
the agencies find that:
 (1) The activity can be conducted with adequate safeguards 
for the resources and ecological integrity of the Monument;
 (2) The activity will be conducted in a manner compatible 
with the purposes of the Proclamation, considering the extent 
to which the conduct of the activity may diminish or enhance 
Monument resources, qualities, and ecological integrity, any 
indirect, secondary or cumulative effects of the activity, and the 
duration of such effects;
 (3) There is no practicable alternative to conducting the 
activity within the Monument;
 (4) The end value of the activity outweighs its adverse 
impacts on Monument resources, qualities, and ecological 
integrity;
 (5) The duration of the activity is no longer than necessary 
to achieve its stated purpose;
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 (6) The applicant is qualified to conduct and complete the 
activity and mitigate any potential impacts resulting from its 
conduct;
 (7) The applicant has adequate financial resources available 
to conduct and complete the activity and mitigate any potential 
impacts resulting from its conduct;
 (8) The methods and procedures proposed by the applicant 
are appropriate to achieve the proposed activity’s goals in 
relation to their impacts to Monument resources, qualities, and 
ecological integrity;
 (9) The applicant’s vessel has been outfitted with a mobile 
transceiver unit; and
 (10) There are no other factors that would make the issu-
ance of a permit for the activity inappropriate.219
 Monument regulations also take into account traditional and cus-
tomary Native Hawaiian practices. A permit to allow Native Hawaiian 
practices requires five specific findings: (1) the activity is noncommer-
cial and will not involve the sale of any organism or material collected; 
(2) the purpose and intent of the activity are appropriate and deemed 
necessary by traditional standards in the Native Hawaiian culture and 
demonstrate an understanding of and background in the traditional 
practice and its associated values and protocols; (3) the activity ben-
efits the resources of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands and the Native 
Hawaiian community; (4) the activity supports or advances the per-
petuation of traditional knowledge and ancestral connections of Native 
Hawaiians to the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands; and (5) any monu-
ment resource harvested from the monument will be consumed in the 
monument.220
 A special ocean use permit is also available to qualified applicants. 
According to the applicable regulation, a special ocean use means “an 
activity or use of the Monument that is engaged in to generate revenue 
or profits for one or more of the persons associated with the activity 
or use, and does not destroy, cause the loss of, or injure Monument 
resources. This includes ocean-based ecotourism and other activities 
such as educational and research activities that are engaged in to gen-
erate revenue, but does not include commercial fishing for bottom-
fish or pelagic species conducted pursuant to a valid permit issued by 
NOAA.”221
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 Whenever someone applies for a special ocean use permit, the 
agencies:
 (1) Shall authorize the conduct of an activity only if 
that activity is compatible with the purposes for which the 
Monument is designated and with protection of Monument 
resources;
 (2) Shall not authorize the conduct of any activity for a 
period of more than 5 years unless renewed;
 (3) Shall require that activities carried out under the permit 
be conducted in a manner that does not destroy, cause the loss 
of, or injure Monument resources; and
 (4) Shall require the permittee to purchase and maintain 
comprehensive general liability insurance, or post an equiva-
lent bond, against claims arising out of activities conducted 
under the permit and to agree to hold the United States harm-
less against such claims;
 (5) Each person issued a permit for a special ocean use 
under this section must submit an annual report to the Secre-
taries not later than December 31 of each year which describes 
activities conducted under that permit and revenues derived 
from such activities during the year.222
Categories of special ocean use permitted for the first time are restricted 
in duration and permitted only as a special ocean use pilot project. Sub-
sequent permits for any category of special ocean use may be issued 
only if a special ocean use pilot project for that category meets the 
requirements of this section and any terms and conditions placed on 
the permit for the pilot project.223 Public notice must be provided prior 
to requiring a special ocean use permit for any category of activity not 
previously identified as a special ocean use.224
 Finally, a recreation permit allows a recreational activity within 
the Midway Atoll Special Management Area. This area of the NWHI 
Monument surrounds Midway Atoll out to a distance of twelve nautical 
miles and was established for the enhanced management, protection, 
and preservation of monument wildlife and historical resources. Recre-
ational activity is defined as “an activity conducted for personal enjoy-
ment that does not result in the extraction of Monument resources or 
involve a fee-for-service transaction.” Such activities include wildlife 
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viewing, SCUBA diving, snorkeling, and boating.225 Application for a 
recreation permit must demonstrate that:
 (1) The activity is for the purpose of recreation as defined in 
the applicable statute;
 (2) The activity is not associated with any for-hire operation; 
and
 (3) The activity does not involve any extractive use.226
The Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Marine National Monument is still 
in its infancy. It is apparent, however, that the strict regulations basically 
prohibit most land use or development. What uses are allowable are 
tightly controlled and require a significant showing that the monument 
and its resources will be preserved and unharmed.
The Legacy Land Conservation Program
The first permanent funding source for land conservation in Hawai‘i 
was created in 2005 with the enactment of the Legacy Lands Act and the 
establishment of the Legacy Land Conservation Program.227 The pro-
gram provides grants to state agencies, counties, and nonprofit organi-
zations to facilitate the purchase and protection of lands with “cultural, 
natural, agricultural, historical [or] recreational resources.”228 Funds 
can also be used to acquire conservation or agricultural easements.229 
The broad goals of the program allow funding for projects outside the 
“traditional conservation paradigm,” including, for example, the con-
servation of land with cultural or agricultural value.230
 Grants may provide up to 75 percent of the purchase price; agen-
cies or nonprofit groups must supply at least 25 percent.231 The pro-
gram is funded through the conveyance tax on all property sales: 10 
percent of such collections are earmarked for the Legacy Land Conser-
vation Fund.232 The rationale is that the sale and development of prop-
erty increases the strain on “natural areas, coastal access, agricultural 
production, and Hawai‘i’s water resources and watershed recharge 
areas.”233
 The Legacy Lands Act also includes a graduated increase in the 
conveyance tax of 30 cents per $100 for sales from $1–2 million, 50 cents 
per $100 for sales from $2–4 million, 70 cents per $100 for sales from 
$4–6 million, 90 cents per $100 for sales in the $6–10 million range, 
and $1 per $100 for sales over $10 million.234 In 2008, total conveyance 
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tax collections were approximately $43 million,235 resulting in approxi-
mately $4.3 million deposited to the Legacy Land Fund.
 The application process for Legacy Land funds is competitive, 
requiring: (1) applicant submission of the grant application and pre-
liminary documentation by an annual deadline; (2) commission review 
of applications and the announcement of nominees, who may be asked 
to submit additional documents, including appraisals and title reports; 
and (3) commission recommendation of funding awards to the Board 
of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR), with final awards subject to 
a consultation process with members of the State Legislature and the 
approval of the BLNR, attorney general, and governor.236
 The Legacy Land Conservation Commission advises the DLNR, 
through the BLNR, on proposed land acquisitions and grant requests, 
and also makes recommendations for the acquisition of lands.237 The 
nine-member commission must include one member from each county 
in addition to four members with scientific qualifications evidenced by 
an academic degree, one member also belonging to an environmental 
organization, one member also belonging to a conservation organiza-
tion, one member in a statewide agricultural association, and one mem-
ber knowledgeable about Native Hawaiian culture.238
 Statutory guidelines instruct the commission on which lands must 
be given priority in acquisition recommendation: (1) lands with excep-
tional value due to unique aesthetic resources, cultural or archaeological 
resources, or threatened or endangered habitats; (2) lands in imminent 
danger of development; (3) lands in imminent danger of modification 
in such a way that would impair the land’s value; (4) lands providing 
critical habitats; (5) lands containing cultural or archaeological sites in 
danger of theft or destruction; and (6) unique and productive agricul-
tural lands.239
 The first grant was made in fiscal year 2006, awarding $1.1 million 
to the Maui Coastal Land Trust for a conservation easement over 168 
acres on the southeastern shore of Moloka‘i.240 Six awards totaling $4.7 
million were made in fiscal year 2007.241 Awards in the 2008 fiscal year 
totaled $4.7 million and included the following: $737,300 for the acqui-
sition of eleven acres in Waianae’s Lualualei Valley for agricultural pro-
tection; $1.5 million for approximately 551 acres in Kāwā on the island 
of Hawai‘i for watershed, coastal, habitat, cultural, recreational, and 
open space preservation; $700,000 for approximately twenty-one acres 
on the north shore of Kaua‘i for the protection of watershed, coastal, 
and habitat values; nearly $1 million for 128 acres in Nu‘u Makai, Maui, 
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for the protection of coastal, wetland, habitat, historical, and cultural 
values; and $767,976 for nearly 200 acres on Moloka‘i for the protection 
of watershed, cultural, and scenic values.242 The governor approved five 
fiscal year 2009 awards: nearly $1 million for 3,583 acres in Honouliuli 
Preserve in the Wai‘anae Range; $450,000 for approximately 66 acres in 
Hāmākua, Kailua; $7,000 for 7 acres in North Kohala, island of Hawai‘i; 
$1.25 million for 17.05 acres in Lapakahi, Kohala, island of Hawai‘i; and 
just over $600,000 for an agricultural conservation easement over 27.44 
acres in Pūpūkea, on the north shore of O‘ahu.243
Kapi‘olani Park
Kapi‘olani Park was originally conceived of as part of a planned commu-
nity for Hawai‘i’s elite in the late 1870s.244 The shareholder organization 
that established the park—the Kapi‘olani Park Association—had two 
goals: building residences for shareholders and constructing a horse-
racing track.245 The lands used by the project included three hundred 
acres of crown land leased from King Kalākaua (a shareholder in the 
association).246 By the 1890s, the park included a track, artificial ponds, 
and winding carriage roads surrounded by shareholder houses.247
 In 1896, the park was transferred by Act 53 of the Legislature of the 
Republic of Hawai‘i from the association to the Honolulu Park Commis-
sion, a public agency comprised of six trustees “charged by legislative 
mandate with operating the site as a public recreation ground for all 
citizens of Honolulu.”248 Importantly, the act provided that the park was 
to be “permanently set apart as a free public park and recreation ground 
forever,” while expressly withholding from the commission the ability to 
lease or sell any park land.249 The documents surrounding this transfer 
established the park as a public charitable trust.250 Following annexa-
tion in 1898, it was used by the U.S. Army as troop campgrounds.251 
It was during this period that concessions were first sold in the park; 
the trustees allowed refreshments to be sold in exchange for a monthly 
$25 fee.252
 In 1913, the Territory of Hawai‘i transferred park authority to the 
City and County of Honolulu, which continues to manage the park 
today.253 The nine members of the Honolulu City Council are the 
Kapi‘olani Park trustees.254 The Kapi‘olani Park Preservation Society 
(KPPS) was founded in 1986 by citizens concerned that the park was 
not being managed in compliance with the trust.255 In 1987, in one of 
the better-known controversies regarding the park, KPPS challenged 
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the city’s plan to lease a portion of the park adjacent to the Honolulu 
Zoo for construction of a seven-unit fast food complex that included 
a Burger King.256 The Supreme Court found the planned lease in 
breach of the trust,257 citing Act 53 and conveyance deeds to estab-
lish the trust’s lack of authority to enter into such leases.258 Beyond 
stopping the proposed construction, the ruling made clear the pub-
lic’s standing to challenge actions by the city as park trustee,259 and 
it has thus facilitated the KPPS taking on a “watchdog role over Park 
management.”260
 The park and its usage remains controversial; most recently the 
society has been involved in disputes regarding art sales in the park 
and proposed parking fee increases. In 2009, the trust—at the prod-
ding of the society—requested instructions on artwork sales and craft 
fairs held on and along the Honolulu Zoo fence.261 Although a hearing 
has not yet been scheduled, a court-appointed master found that the 
activities were explicitly allowed as “exhibitions,” finding any commer-
cial sales to be merely incidental.262 The report noted that no admission 
fees were being charged, no mass-produced items were being sold, and 
that permits and licenses granted for the activities were temporary and 
did “not unreasonably interfere with other park uses or users.”263 The 
society maintains that the art sales and craft fairs are not allowed under 
the trust and are examples of park commercialization, calling the sellers 
“special interest groups” using the park for “their own purposes.”264 The 
society has also been vocal in opposing a proposed increase in nearby 
metered parking fees from 25 cents to $1.50 per hour, arguing that the 
increases would deter park usage in a way contradictory to the “intent 
of the park trust.”265
The Army Compatible Use Buffer Program
Suburban and rural sprawl have brought civilian populations increas-
ingly close to military installations that were originally placed in isolated 
locations.266 This proximity often results in encroachment, broadly 
defined as “the cumulative result of any and all outside influence that 
inhibit normal military training, testing, and operations.”267 The main 
encroachment issues are noise pollution, endangered species and criti-
cal habitat, wetlands, water quality and supply, air pollution and quality, 
cultural resources, maritime competition, competition for airspace, com-
petition for radio frequency spectrum, urban growth around military 
installations, and unexploded ordnance and munitions constituents.268 
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The military thus has an interest in “buffering” military installations 
from civilian development through funding for cooperative conserva-
tion agreements, thereby cutting off future encroachment issues.
 In 2002, Congress amended the Department of Defense Authoriza-
tion Act to include explicit authorization for such partnership agree-
ments between the military and conservation initiatives of state and 
local governments and nonprofit groups.269 The amendment allows “[t]
he Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of a military department [to] 
enter into an agreement with an eligible entity . . . to address the use 
or development of real property in the vicinity of a military installation 
for purposes of (1) limiting any development or use of the property 
that would be incompatible with the mission of the installation; or (2) 
preserving habitat on the property.”270 In response, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) created what is now known as the Readi-
ness and Environmental Protection Initiative (REDI) in 2003 to provide 
an overarching framework and funding to the services in exercising the 
authority to form partnership agreements granted by Congress in 10 
U.S.C. § 2684a.271
 The military branches have developed distinct programs to exer-
cise the power granted under § 2684a. The army’s is called the Army 
Compatible Use Buffer (ACUB) program. The program allows the army 
to partner with conservation-minded groups to finance purchases, but 
the army itself does not hold a property interest,272 which goes instead 
to a partner with a land or natural resource conservation goal.273 The 
army benefits by limiting development on this land, thus cutting off the 
potential for encroachment issues to arise in the area. There have been 
three ACUB projects in Hawai‘i: Waimea Valley, Moanalua Valley, and 
Pūpūkea-Paumalū. A fourth partnership involving the purchase of 3,400 
acres at Honouliuli Preserve along the Wai‘anae Range is expected to 
be reached in 2009.274
 Waimea Valley was Hawai‘i’s inaugural project using ACUB funds, 
involving the $14 million sale of 1,875 acres near the army’s Kahuku 
Training Area in 2006.275 After the valley’s owner—a mainland inves-
tor—attempted to sell the valley as a private residence, the City and 
County of Honolulu filed a condemnation lawsuit to preserve the valley 
from development.276 Eventually, a settlement was reached involving 
the conservation purchase through funds contributed by the city and 
county ($5 million), ACUB ($3.5 million), OHA ($2.9 million), DLNR 
($1.6 million), and the National Audubon Society ($1 million).277 The 
valley is held and managed by Hi‘ilei Aloha, a limited liability company 
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created by OHA,278 and operated as a “historical, cultural, botanical and 
ecological” attraction for visitors and kama‘āina alike.279
 In 2007, 3,716 acres in Moanalua Valley—which, as one of the few 
remaining open spaces in the urban Honolulu area, had been both a 
potential location for the H-3 freeway and under longtime threat of resi-
dential development—were purchased by the Trust for Public Land for 
$5.5 million.280 The purchase was funded by state general funds, a grant 
from the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the ACUB program.281 The val-
ley, containing five distinct forest types, nine miles of streams, and the 
habitat of endangered plants and animals, is also home to culturally 
important sites and petroglyphs.282 Valley management was placed with 
the DLNR’s Division of Forestry and Wildlife, and the site was added 
to the State Forest Reserve and Ko‘olau Watershed Partnership.283 It 
is open to the public for hiking, hunting, cultural resource preserva-
tion, and education, with the back of the valley managed for wildlife 
preservation.284
 In 2007, another partnership to buffer the Kahuku Training Area 
purchased for $7.95 million the 1,129 acre Pūpūkea-Paumalū coastal 
bluff along the north shore.285 Partners included ACUB (approximately 
$3.3 million), NOAA (nearly $2 million), the City and County of Hono-
lulu ($1 million), the State of Hawai‘i ($1 million), and the North Shore 
Community Land Trust (approximately $600,000).286 Twenty-five acres 
were conveyed to the city as nature preserve, with the remaining land 
going to the state for addition to the Park Reserve System.287
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Chapter 5
Redevelopment and the 
Role of Public Corporations
The Hawai‘i State Legislature has created a number of special-purpose 
agencies with independent powers to develop or control the use of land 
within their geographic boundaries. In many instances, that power is 
exclusive and the county or counties in which such agencies are autho-
rized to act have little or no regulatory authority within such geographic 
limits. While some—such as the Hawai‘i Community Development 
Authority (HCDA)—are mature and have been more or less active for 
several decades, some are new, at least since the first edition of this 
book. To these we now turn.
The HCDA
In 1976, the legislature created the Hawai‘i Community Development 
Authority for the purpose, among other things, of meeting community 
development needs such as housing, rental, commercial, industrial 
facilities, parks, and open space.1 Aside from its extensive planning, land 
acquisition, and development powers,2 the HCDA may also establish 
development rules that supersede all inconsistent county use regula-
tions.3 This it has done, making it a potentially powerful land develop-
ment agency.
 The legislature established HCDA during an affordable housing 
crisis, with a particular redevelopment area in mind: the collection of 
mostly commercial and industrial buildings near downtown Honolulu 
known as Kaka‘ako.4 It was the intent of the legislature to create an 
agency to plan and guide the development of Kaka‘ako for a mixture 
of land uses.5 It was to proceed by means of a “joint development” 
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approach, combining the “strengths of private enterprise” with “public 
development and regulation.”6
 The reasons given for the creation of the district directly address 
community development needs:
 (1) The Kakaako district is centrally located in Honolulu 
proper, in close proximity to the central business district, the 
government center, commercial industrial and market facili-
ties, major existing and contemplated transportation routes 
and recreational and service areas;
 (2) Due to its present function as a service and light 
industrial area, the district is relatively underdeveloped and 
especially in view of its proximity to the urban core where 
the pressure for all land uses is strong, has the potential for 
increased growth and development that can alleviate commu-
nity needs such as low-income housing, parks and open space, 
and commercial and industrial facilities;
 (3) The district, if not redeveloped or renewed, has the 
potential to become a blighted and deteriorated area. Due to 
its present economic importance to the State in terms of indus-
try and subsequent employment, there is a need to preserve 
and enhance its value and potential;
 (4) Kakaako has a potential, if properly developed and 
improved, to become a planned new community in conso-
nance with surrounding urban areas.7
 The legislature also set out development guidance policies that gen-
erally govern the HCDA’s action in the Kaka‘ako community develop-
ment district.8 First, it directed that the Kaka‘ako district be developed 
for mixed land uses, provided its “function as a major economic center” 
was preserved.9 The legislature then listed a series of specific “develop-
ment guidance policies” to govern the authority’s Kaka‘ako activities:
 (1) Development shall result in a community which per-
mits an appropriate land mixture of residential, commercial, 
industrial, and other uses. In view of the innovative nature 
of the mixed use approach, urban design policies should be 
established to provide guidelines for the public and private 
sectors in the proper development of this district; while the 
authority’s development responsibilities apply only to the area 
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within the district, the authority may engage in any studies or 
coordinative activities permitted in this chapter which affect 
areas lying outside the district, where the authority in its discre-
tion decides that those activities are necessary to implement 
the intent of this chapter. The studies or coordinative activities 
shall be limited to facility systems, resident and industrial 
relocation, and other activities with the counties and appropri-
ate state agencies. The authority may engage in construction 
activities outside of the district; provided that such construc-
tion relates to infrastructure development or residential or 
business relocation activities; provided further, notwithstanding 
section 206E-7, that such construction shall comply with the 
general plan, development plan, ordinances, and rules of the 
county in which the district is located;
 (2) Existing and future industrial uses shall be permitted 
and encouraged in appropriate locations within the district. No 
plan or implementation strategy shall prevent continued activ-
ity or redevelopment of industrial and commercial uses which 
meet reasonable performance standards;
 (3) Activities shall be located so as to provide primary 
reliance on public transportation and pedestrian facilities for 
internal circulation within the district or designated subareas;
 (4) Major view planes, view corridors, and other environ-
mental elements such as natural light and prevailing winds, 
shall be preserved through necessary regulation and design 
review;
 (5) Redevelopment of the district shall be compatible with 
plans and special districts established for the Hawai‘i Capital 
District, and other areas surrounding the Kakaako district;
 (6) Historic sites and culturally significant facilities, settings, 
or locations shall be preserved;
 (7) Land use activities within the district, where compatible, 
shall to the greatest possible extent be mixed horizontally, that 
is, within blocks or other land areas, and vertically, as integral 
units of multi-purpose structures;
 (8) Residential development may require a mixture of 
densities, building types, and configurations in accordance 
with appropriate urban design guidelines; integration both 
vertically and horizontally of residents of varying incomes, 
ages, and family groups; and an increased supply of housing 
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for residents of low- or moderate-income may be required as 
a condition of redevelopment in residential use. Residential 
development shall provide necessary community facilities, such 
as open space, parks, community meeting places, child care 
centers, and other services, within and adjacent to residential 
development;
 (9) Public facilities within the district shall be planned, 
located, and developed so as to support the redevelopment 
policies for the district established by this chapter and plans 
and rules adopted pursuant to it.10
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 The HCDA developed a detailed Kaka‘ako Community Develop-
ment District Plan that, when stripped of its artists’ renderings and 
explanatory language, most resembles a zoning ordinance to be 
administered by HCDA.11 The present version of the plan envisions 
four land-use designations and seven neighborhoods.12 The districts 
are Mixed-Use Zone (MUZ), Mixed-Use Zone Residential (MUZ-R), 
Public, and Park.13 The neighborhoods are Sheridan, Thomas Square, 
Civic Center, Kapi‘olani, Central Kaka‘ako, Auahi, and Pauahi.14 While 
a neighborhood may be mostly residential or consist of public facilities, 
ultimately they are all mixed use.15 The result is that residential, com-
mercial, and industrial uses would be permitted nearly anywhere in 
Kaka‘ako—subject to the lengthy land use plan and urban design prin-
ciples contained in the plan.16 The HCDA has embarked on a major 
revision of the plan, which will be promulgated after public hearings 
in 2009 using “Smart Growth” principles to model the housing, trans-
portation, and aesthetic aspects.17 The entity has drafted another plan 
particularly directed at approximately thirty “prime” acres—the site of 
a very public project failure described below—to commence in late 
2009.18
 Apparently reacting to selective community opposition to a pro-
posal to develop high-density residential towers on land to be sold by 
the state to the developer, the legislature made an important statutory 
change in 2006: HCDA was prohibited “from approving any plan or pro-
posal for any residential development in that portion of the Kaka‘ako 
community development district makai of Ala Moana Boulevard and 
between Kewalo basin and the foreign trade zone.”19 HCDA also can-
not sell or otherwise assign the fee simple interest in any lands in the 
Kaka‘ako Community Development District to which the authority in its 
corporate capacity holds title, except for utility easements, remnants, 
grants to state or county departments or agencies or private entities of 
any easement, roadway, or infrastructure improvements.20 The amend-
ment stirred much controversy in the community. Although some criti-
cized it as the result of pressure from a small special interest group and 
not in the best interest of the environment, economy, or the public, 
others applauded it, claiming that it would not have added substantially 
to affordable housing inventories.21 Furthermore, it allegedly saved the 
area from being sold to Alexander and Baldwin below market value to 
be developed into a high-end project that would ultimately harm coastal 
view planes.22 In either event, the result is a legislative end run around 
the carefully drafted, painstakingly crafted plans for the development of 
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Kaka‘ako, effectively gutting the provisions for residential development 
in the Makai Area Plan.
The Aloha Tower Development Corporation
In 1981, the Hawai‘i State Legislature found that the area in downtown 
Honolulu on the water, known as the Aloha Tower complex, needed to 
be developed, renovated, and improved to “better serve the economic, 
maritime, and recreational needs of the people of Hawaii.”23 To do 
this, the legislature created the Aloha Tower Development Corpora-
tion (ATDC) “for the purpose of undertaking the redevelopment of the 
Aloha Tower complex, to strengthen the international economic base of 
the community in trade activities, to enhance the beautification of the 
waterfront, and in conjunction with the department of transportation, 
to better serve modern maritime uses, and to provide for public access 
and use of the waterfront property. Properly developed, the Aloha Tower 
complex will further serve as a stimulant to the commercial activities of 
the downtown business community and help transform the waterfront 
into a ‘people place.’”24
Powers of the ATDC: Statutes, Rules,  
and Redevelopment Plans
The ATDC is a “public body corporate and politic, public instrumental-
ity, and agency of the State” placed for administrative purposes within 
the Department of Business, Economic Development & Tourism.25 
ATDC is governed by a board of directors with seven voting members: 
the director of Business, Economic Development & Tourism, the direc-
tor of transportation, the chairperson of the Board of Land and Natural 
Resources, the mayor of the City and County of Honolulu (as ex officio 
voting members), and three remaining members appointed by the gov-
ernor from the public at large.26
 The general powers of the ATDC are extensive, particularly for 
land use and development:
(a) The development corporation shall have all the powers 
necessary to carry out its purposes, including the following:
 (7) To prepare or cause to be prepared a development plan 
for the Aloha Tower complex, incorporating the needs of the 
department of transportation and accommodating the plans, 
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specifications, designs, or estimates of any project acceptable to 
the development corporation;
 (8) To own, lease, hold, clear, improve, and rehabilitate 
real, personal, or mixed property and to assign, exchange, 
transfer, convey, lease, sublease, or encumber any project or 
improvement, including easements, constituting part of a 
project within the Aloha Tower complex, except that required 
for necessary maritime purposes, including leases or other 
agreements for the rehabilitation, repair, maintenance, and 
operation of the Aloha Tower;
 (9) By itself, or in conjunction with qualified persons, to 
develop, construct, reconstruct, rehabilitate, improve, alter, or 
repair or provide for the development, construction, recon-
struction, rehabilitation, improvement, alteration, or repair of 
any project, including projects or any portion thereof under 
the control or jurisdiction of qualified persons; to own, hold, 
assign, transfer, convey, exchange, lease, sublease, or encumber 
any project, including projects or any portion thereof under 
the control or jurisdiction of qualified persons;
 (10) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the con-
trary, to arrange or initiate appropriate action for the planning, 
replanning, opening, grading, relocating, or closing of streets, 
roads, roadways, alleys, easements, piers, or other places, the 
furnishing of facilities, the acquisition of property or property 
rights, or the furnishing of property, development rights, or 
services in connection with a project;
 (11) To grant options or renew any lease entered into by it 
in connection with any project, on terms and conditions as it 
deems advisable;
 (12) To prepare or cause to be prepared plans, specifi-
cations, designs, and estimates of project cost for the develop-
ment, construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation, improve-
ment, alteration, or repair of any project, and from time 
to time to modify such plans, specifications, designs, or 
estimates;
(b) The development corporation shall impose, prescribe, 
and collect rates, rentals, fees, or charges for the lease and use 
and services of its projects at least sufficient to pay the costs of 
operation, maintenance and repair, if any, of its projects and 
176 Regulating Paradise
the required payments of the principal of and interest on all 
bonds issued to finance its projects. Notwithstanding anything 
to the contrary contained in this section, the development 
corporation may take into account any project costs supplied 
by qualified persons in calculating such rates, rentals, fees, 
or charges, to the extent that if the qualified person selected 
by the development corporation is willing to underwrite the 
entire or substantially all of the costs of development and 
construction of that project, the development corporation is 
empowered to negotiate nominal rentals.27
 ATDC’s powers are not without limit, however. First, the legislature 
restricted ATDC from selling any submerged lands of the Aloha Tower 
complex.28 Second, ATDC must preserve Aloha Tower as a historical 
monument and may not sell, remove, demolish, deface, or alter the 
structure “in any reasonable degree to lessen its historical value to the 
community.”29 This does not apply to any “essential” reconstruction that 
is necessary for the preservation of Aloha Tower as a historical monu-
ment.30 Third, Irwin Memorial Park must be retained as a public park.31 
Lastly, ATDC or its lessees cannot exercise “any jurisdiction over the 
provided replacement facilities located within the Aloha Tower com-
plex required for necessary maritime purposes and activities.”32
 The relevant statutes provide that ATDC adopt administrative 
rules to be followed during the course of the development of the Aloha 
Tower complex that “are to be known as development rules in connec-
tion with health, safety, building, planning, zoning, and land use.”33 
ATDC has in fact adopted such rules, which supersede all other incon-
sistent ordinances and rules relating to the use, zoning, planning, and 
development of land and construction within the Aloha Tower com-
plex. However, the statute requires that “[r]ules adopted under this sec-
tion . . . shall follow existing law, rules, ordinances, and regulations as 
closely as is consistent with standards meeting minimum requirements 
of good design, pleasant amenities, health, safety, and coordinated 
development.”34
 While it is in the process of developing the Aloha Tower complex, 
if ATDC determines that leasing any portion of property constituting 
a project will still conform to the development plan, it may do so, as 
long as the lease does not exceed a term of sixty-five years.35 However, it 
must first agree upon the terms and conditions of that lease and what 
qualifications a person must have to apply for it.36
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Development Objectives: The Aloha  
Tower Project Area Plan
The ATDC has also completed and promulgated an Aloha Tower Proj-
ect Area Plan. The plan contains some of the following development 
objectives:
 (1) Ensure the project is capable of integration into any 
overall development plan, which may be adopted for the 
Honolulu waterfront.
 (4) Provide ease of pedestrian access to the project and 
waterfront, and generous open spaces for public enjoyment 
by eliminating visual and physical barriers between the water-
front and downtown, and by creating strong pedestrian links 
between downtown and Aloha Tower, particularly along Fort 
and Bishop streets.
 (5) Improve view corridors down Fort street, Bishop street 
and Alakea street.
 (8) Feature and enhance the physical, public use and visual 
characteristics of the historic Aloha Tower.
 (9) Minimize unattractive physical facilities (e.g. parking, 
utilities, service, and back-of-house operation).
 (10) Plan buildings and project features to attract people to 
the waterfront and create a major public gathering place at the 
Aloha Tower complex by enhancing public access to and along 
the water’s edge and by creating opportunities for a variety 
of water’s-edge experiences appropriate to the downtown 
waterfront.
 (11) Develop uses which would stimulate and be compatible 
with the commercial activities of the downtown business com-
munity, which may include, but need not be limited to, retail, 
restaurant, office, hotel, condominium, recreational, historical 
and cultural uses; and create new activities to assist in bringing 
people to the waterfront.
 (12) Provide accessible vehicular ingress and egress, and 
create a parking strategy which minimizes both the cost and 
impact of parking on the Aloha Tower complex.
 (13) Establish a construction phasing strategy which will mini-
mize disruption of maritime operations and achieve planned 
development of the Aloha Tower in the earliest practicable time.
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 (14) Create a financially feasible and aesthetically creative 
project which can be initiated at the earliest practicable 
time.
 (15) Encourage, to the extent possible, development of 
the Aloha Tower complex and adjoining areas by a qualified 
private sector developer who will provide all or substantially all 
of the costs of development.
 (16) Utilize the powers of the development corporation to 
transcend, as necessary, zoning, density, and height limitations 
in an aesthetically pleasing manner to accomplish the goals of 
the development corporation and to encourage private sector 
developers to undertake development plan solutions which will 
satisfy the foregoing development objectives.37
The ATDC’s development priority is thus the creation of an area that will 
become a “people place” by largely aesthetic and commercial endeav-
ors. It currently has the power to override all other applicable land use 
requirements, including county zoning.38
Hawai‘i Administrative Rules: Land Use Provisions
If the enabling legislation laid the foundation for the development 
power of the ATDC, the administrative rules define that power:
In harmony with the purpose and intent of chapter 206J, HRS, 
these rules are established by the ATDC for the project area 
controlling, regulating, and determining the height of build-
ings; minimum setbacks; required open spaces; the density 
of buildings; the location and amount of retail, office, hotel, 
residential, maritime, park, cultural, and other appropriate 
uses; the location of buildings and other structures; architec-
tural designs; urban design; historic and cultural sites; circula-
tion criteria; and other appropriate regulations relating to land 
use, zoning, and planning for buildings and structures for all 
properties within the Aloha Tower project area.39
Thus for example,
• A building permit cannot be issued for any development 
within the Aloha Tower complex until the developer has 
obtained a development permit from the ATDC, certifying 
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that the development complies with the ATDC rules and the 
development plan.40
• The ATDC also hears and determines the necessity for vari-
ances by developers, provided: (1) the applicant-developer 
would be deprived of the reasonable use of land or building 
if it were used only for the purpose allowed in that zone; 
(2) the request of the applicant-developer is due to unique 
circumstances and not the general conditions in the area, 
so that the reasonableness of the zoning is not drawn into 
question; and (3) the use sought to be authorized by the 
variance will not alter the essential character of the area nor 
be contrary to the intent and purpose of the ATDC develop-
ment plan or ATDC’s administrative rules.41
Land Use Zones
Within the project area, the ATDC has five different zones (a map of the 
land use zones can be found on the last page of the ATDC administra-
tive rules attachment):
• maritime (M) zone
• commercial (C) zone
• hotel/office/residential (H/O/R) zone
• park (P) zone
• residential/office (R/O) zone
 The rules outline the purpose and intent of each zone, specify per-
mitted uses, and list the development requirements within each zone. 
For example, the commercial zone (C) is designed to promote an envi-
ronment where retail commercial uses will coexist compatibly alongside 
maritime uses, as well as to create a vibrant, attractive, retail commercial 
“people place” that will attract downtown workers, local residents, and 
tourists.42 Some of the uses expressly permitted in the C zone are drug-
stores, theaters, banks, eating and drinking establishments, sales offices 
for commercial maritime operations, and plazas and other public open 
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spaces.43 The development requirements list maximum floor areas (for 
retail uses, 300,000 gross square feet for the first three floors; for office 
uses, a maximum of 160,000 gross square feet located on the third and 
fourth floors), minimum parking spaces (2,000), and maximum build-
ing height (ninety feet).44
 ATDC’s attempts to meet the development goals that the legislature 
created have been fraught with controversy, some of which has landed 
in the courts. In a long-running controversy over the rights conferred 
by a development agreement,45 the State Supreme Court, in a lengthy 
discussion of contractual rights and theory, found that a controversial 
letter agreement was the operative development agreement contem-
plated by the parties.46 However, due to indefiniteness, the contract was 
unenforceable. Because the letter development agreement was not spe-
cifically enforceable, the Court found that the plaintiff “ha[d] no rights 
to develop the Aloha Tower complex.”47
 Despite the development agreement’s unenforceability, however, 
the Court found that the developer might be entitled to damages: “Such 
damages arise from a number of possible grounds, including the appar-
ent repudiation of the letter development agreement calling for further 
negotiations. ATDC may have breached an obligation to negotiate in 
good faith” as well.48 ATDC was again embroiled in litigation over an 
alleged attempt to rewrite a development agreement months after its 
mutual execution. In 2009, an arbitrator found that ATDC had negoti-
ated in bad faith and awarded the plaintiff-developer in excess of $1.2 
million in damages.49 Twenty years after its creation, most of the land 
under its jurisdiction languishes underdeveloped.
Housing and Community Development: HCDCH, 
HPHA, and HHFDC
In 2004, the legislature passed a resolution requesting the Housing 
and Community Development Corporation of Hawai‘i (HCDCH) “to 
convene a task force to develop near-term solutions to Hawai‘i’s afford-
able housing shortage problem with respect to ownership and real mar-
kets.”50 During this time, the HCDCH provided some 200–250 afford-
able units per year. However, because of the housing development crisis, 
the legislature wanted to provide “incentives for private developers to 
build affordable housing projects,” as well as to raise more revenue for 
the rental housing trust fund (discussed below).51 It accomplished both 
tasks in 2005 by amending the conveyance tax provision52 and by passing 
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Act 196, A Bill for an Act Relating to Housing, which amended the old 
chapter 201G of the Hawaii Revised Statutes and implements many of 
the recommendations of the task force. One of the recommendations 
was to split the corporation “into two organizations to more effectively 
concentrate on the development of affordable housing.”53 The two 
roles of maintaining affordable housing have become (1) administering 
the state’s public housing programs and (2) financing and developing 
affordable housing.54 Act 196 creates two administrations to accomplish 
these tasks: the Hawai‘i Public Housing Administration (HPHA) and the 
Hawai‘i Housing Finance and Development Corporation (HHFDC).55
 The HHFDC officially assumed the HCDCH’s functions under sev-
eral former chapter 201G sections. The change became effective on July 
1, 2006.56 The HHFDC was established under the Department of Busi-
ness, Economic Development & Tourism (DBEDT)57 and is governed 
by a board of directors made up of six public members (at least four of 
whom must have knowledge and expertise of finance and development 
of affordable housing) appointed by the governor. The DBEDT direc-
tor, the director of finance, and a representative of the governor’s office 
make up the three ex officio voting members.58
Hawai‘i Public Housing Authority
Part I, Section 2 of Act 180 creates and defines HPHA, its staff,59 board,60 
and general powers.61
 HPHA has the power to acquire, own, hold,62 develop, clear, 
improve, and rehabilitate property, along with the power to plan, 
develop, construct, and finance public housing projects.63 HPHA may 
acquire property through a variety of methods, including exercising 
the power of eminent domain.64 It may also enter into contracts with 
the federal government and is authorized to do all things necessary to 
secure the financial aid and the cooperation of the federal government 
in the undertaking, construction, maintenance, and operation of any 
public housing project that HPHA is empowered to undertake.65
Hawai‘i Housing Finance and Development Corporation
Part II, Section 3, of Act 180, entitled “Housing Development Programs,” 
amends chapter 201H of the Hawaii Revised Statutes by adding a new 
part that creates and defines the HHFDC.66 The HHFDC is a corpo-
ration administered by DBEDT.67 This section is the most relevant to 
land use and development. The powers conferred upon HHFDC in this 
chapter are additional and supplemental to powers conferred upon it 
182 Regulating Paradise
by any other law.68 The overall focus and intent of this chapter relates to 
the supply of housing and the assistance in obtaining housing to those 
most in need of assistance.69
 HHFDC has the power to develop fee simple or leasehold property 
and to construct dwelling units on such property.70 It also has the power 
to sell, lease or rent, or cause to be leased or rented at the lowest possible 
price to qualified residents,71 nonprofit organizations, and government 
agencies.72 HHFDC established a system to determine preferences by 
lottery in the event it receives more qualified applicants than available 
dwelling units.73 It has specific authority to adopt rules on health, safety, 
building, planning, zoning, and land use that relate to the development, 
subdivision, and construction of dwelling units in housing projects in 
which the state participates. These rules supersede all other inconsistent 
laws relating to the use, zoning, planning, and development of the land 
and the construction of dwelling units thereon, presumably including 
county zoning, subdivision ordinances, use restrictions, and State Land 
Use Law classifications.74
 HHFDC may acquire by exchange, negotiation, or the exercise of 
the power of eminent domain land or property required in the fore-
seeable future for the purposes of this act.75 For example, Act 28876 
preserves Kukui Gardens (an affordable rental housing project built 
in part with federal funds whose affordability restrictions expire in the 
year 2011) as an affordable housing project. Since it is irreplaceable in 
the current housing market, the legislature sought to extend the afford-
able rent rates at least through 2016. If Kukui Gardens does not comply 
within a reasonable time, HHFDC may exercise its power of eminent 
domain to acquire the property. Furthermore, HHFDC is authorized to 
do “all other things necessary and convenient” to carry out the purposes 
of the act.77
 On behalf of the state or in partnership with an eligible devel-
oper, HHFDC may develop or assist under a governmental assistance 
program in the development of housing projects that are exempt 
from all statutes, ordinances, charter provisions, and rules of any gov-
ernment agency relating to planning, zoning, construction standards 
for subdivision, development and improvement of land, and the con-
struction of dwelling units thereon. However, these exemptions exist 
only if the development is consistent with the intent and purpose of 
the statute, meets minimum safety and health requirements, and does 
not contravene any safety standards, tariffs, or rates of public utilities. 
Furthermore, the legislative body of the relevant county must approve 
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the project and the Land Use Commission must approve a boundary 
change within forty-five days after HHFDC has submitted a petition to 
the commission.78 HHFDC may accept and approve housing projects 
independently initiated by private developers that, in its judgment, are 
primarily designed for low-income housing.79
 In connection with the development of any dwelling units under 
Hawaii Revised Statutes section 201H, HHFDC may also develop com-
mercial, industrial, and other properties if it determines that their uses 
can be an integral part of the overall project by preserving the lifestyles 
of the residents of the dwelling units. In doing so, HHFDC again has the 
power to bypass all statutes, ordinances, charter provisions, and rules of 
any government agency pursuant to § 201H-38,80 and it may utilize any 
of the funds authorized under the act.81 HHFDC must adopt rules that 
indicate the manner in which the uses of the properties are designated 
and provide that any commercial, industrial, or other property so devel-
oped is sold or leased at cost to owners of commercial, industrial, or 
other facilities that were displaced by HHFDC or at economic rents or 
sale prices regarding all other leases.82
 Transfer of property developed and sold under this statute is 
restricted for a period of ten years. During this period, if the purchaser 
wishes to transfer title, HHFDC has the first option to purchase the 
property.83 If HHFDC opts not to purchase the property, then the pur-
chaser may sell to a “qualified resident” as defined in section 201H,84 
but only upon terms that preserve the intent of the act.85 HHFDC may 
nevertheless waive or release the aforementioned restrictions under 
certain circumstances.86 After ten years, the purchaser may sell or assign 
the real property free from any restrictions, provided that the purchaser 
pays HHFDC all amounts owed, interest, and any subsidy or deferred 
sales price, together with HHFDC’s share of any appreciation.87
 Two chapters of administrative rules are particularly related to land 
development. Chapter 17488 is dedicated to the state-assisted land and 
housing development program and seems to correspond to the Housing 
Development Program of Part II, Section 3 of Act 180. The rules declare 
that HHFDC may develop land or housing projects in accordance with 
the provisions of section 201G89 on its own behalf or any government 
landowner or developer or with any eligible developer or contractor. 
HHFDC may develop housing projects for various groups, including 
employees, teachers, university students and faculty, and government 
agencies for special needs housing projects.90
 Subchapter 2 of chapter 174 governs the development of land and 
184 Regulating Paradise
the construction of units thereon.91 An individual, partnership, firm, 
or other type of organization that wants to be considered to develop a 
project, either with the HHFDC or independently, and which will need 
assistance, such as acquisition of land or developmental rights to land 
and aid with financial processing matters, submits a developer’s applica-
tion to HHFDC.92 This form usually will include evidence of the appli-
cant’s legal authority, financial status and ability to secure funds, ties 
to and support from the community, descriptions of existing projects 
owned by the applicant, a project proposal, and anything else HHFDC 
deems necessary to determine the qualifications of an applicant.93 If 
the HHFDC Board of Directors finds that the applicant has the neces-
sary experience, adequate financial resources or ability to secure such 
resources, and has demonstrated compliance with all legal and other 
requirements that HHFDC determines to be appropriate and reason-
able, it may certify the applicant as an eligible developer.94
 Whether the project proposal is submitted by an applicant, an eli-
gible developer, or initiated by HHFDC itself, it must contain certain 
minimum information to be considered for approval. Hawaii Adminis-
trative Rules section 15-174-24(a) presents this extensive list of require-
ments, which includes a comprehensive master plan of the proposed 
project, proposed financing of the project, descriptions of how the 
proposed project shall meet the needs of those targeted, how it will 
affect the area’s scenic and historical value, and applicable provisions of 
existing state and county general plans.95
 If a project proposal requires a land use district boundary amend-
ment by the State Land Use Commission (LUC) concurrently with its 
review of the project proposal, HHFDC may petition the state LUC for 
the boundary amendment as provided in section 205 of the Hawaii 
Revised Statutes.96 HHFDC may also designate portions of the land for 
commercial, industrial, or other uses, provided that the development 
is reasonably necessary and primarily for the benefit of the residents of 
the development.97
The Office of Hawaiian Affairs
The Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) has been operating as a public 
trust for over thirty years.98 Until 2005, its only land use impacts were the 
enforcement of the state’s obligation to protect Hawaiian rights.99 Thus, 
for example, OHA sued the state DLNR for failure to protect Native 
Hawaiian claims to ceded lands and its revenues. The court found no 
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such failure to protect traditional and cultural rights, culminating in 
a lengthy unpublished memorandum opinion by the State Supreme 
Court.100 The opinion appears to resolve many of the legal issues that 
the Court later addressed and upon which it appeared to reverse itself in 
OHA v. Housing & Community Development Corp., which the U.S. Supreme 
Court in turn unanimously overturned in early 2009.101
 OHA was created by the 1978 Hawaii Constitutional Convention 
and subsequent election.102 OHA’s primary mandate is “[t]he better-
ment of conditions” of Hawaiians and Native Hawaiians.103 Its other 
purposes include developing programs, procuring and distributing 
grants, and advocating for Hawaiians.104 OHA also advises other agen-
cies on the impact of their policies on Hawaiians.105 OHA is a public 
trust and a body corporate that is entirely independent of the Hawai‘i 
State Executive Branch.106 Its powers include acquiring and using both 
real and personal property “in such manner and to the extent necessary 
or appropriate to carry out its purpose,” controlling its own bylaws, gov-
erning its own finances, contracting, and generally taking “such actions 
as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the powers conferred 
upon it by law.”107 Thus, OHA is not quite a state agency.108
 An elected board of trustees governs OHA.109 The board man-
ages the office’s income and controls all real and personal property 
transferred to the office.110 It generally acts as a trustee, managing the 
office’s resources for the benefit of Hawaiians.111 OHA is funded in part 
by revenue from the state public land trust.112 Upon Hawai‘i’s admission 
to the United States as a state in 1959, the federal government returned 
land ceded to it when Hawai‘i was annexed in 1898.113 The state used 
that land to establish a public trust for five purposes, one of which was 
the betterment of Native Hawaiians.114 When the new constitution cre-
ated OHA in 1978, it crafted an entitlement by requiring that the state 
give a 20 percent prorated share of public trust land revenue to OHA.115 
OHA and the state have argued over the details of that payment since 
OHA’s inception, and OHA has repeatedly sued the state for its share 
of the proceeds.116 Nevertheless, OHA is hardly impecunious: the 2008 
OHA budget was $42 million.117
 From the outset, OHA has had the power to administer land set 
aside for the benefit of Hawaiians,118 but it has only recently come to 
directly control large amounts of land.119
 OHA presently holds title to two important tracts of land in Hawai‘i: 
Wao Kele O Puna on the Big Island and Waimea Valley on O‘ahu.120 In 
a recent State of OHA Address, OHA trustee and chairperson Haunani 
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Apoliona described how holding title to these lands set aside for conser-
vation coincides with OHA’s mission:121 “Mālama ‘āina goes to the core 
of who we are as a people. Our cultural practices and our values are all 
about caring for the ‘āina, loving our motherland, not just to use, but to 
conserve and replenish. These traditions and values coincide with the 
global desire to protect the environment to secure and sustain a certain 
quality of life for future generations.”122 Together, Wao Kele O Puna 
and Waimea Valley comprise almost 28,000 acres,123 title to which makes 
OHA the thirteenth largest landowner in the state.124
 Waimea Valley is an 1,875-acre parcel of land on the north shore 
of O‘ahu, 300 acres of which have been developed as a park.125 The 
valley shows signs of inhabitation dating back several centuries, and it 
was used extensively for agriculture and fishing during the nineteenth 
century.126 In 1929, Castle & Cooke purchased the valley from the ter-
ritorial government for use as a cattle ranch.127 In 1996, after a series 
of private owners, New York theme-park developer Christian Wolffer 
bought the state conservation-classified valley for $12 million.128 Wolffer 
attempted to sell the valley for private development in 2000.129 In 2001, 
he filed for bankruptcy protection, and in 2002 the City and County of 
Honolulu began the process of acquiring the property through emi-
nent domain.130 The city offered only $5.1 million in compensation for 
the valley, so Wolffer challenged the condemnation.131 In 2005, the city 
and Wolffer reached a tentative settlement to divide the valley.132 The 
300-acre park would go to the city for the $5.1 million, and Wolffer 
would keep the remaining 1,575, where he planned a luxury residential 
development.133 The settlement sparked substantial public opposition, 
and eventually the City Council rejected it.134
 In 2006, the Trust for Public Land, the U.S. Army, OHA, DLNR, the 
Audubon Society, the city, and the landowner reached an agreement to 
purchase the property for $14 million.135 Contributions to the purchase 
price were as follows: the U.S. Army $3.5 million, OHA $2.9 million, 
DLNR $1.6 million, the Audubon Society $1 million, and the City and 
County of Honolulu $5.1 million:136
  By agreement of the parties, and with the blessing of the 
interested contributors toward settlement, title to the property 
will lodge with OHA. This removes for the City the costs and 
expenses usually associated with fee ownership of real property, 
chief among which are the necessary and expensive ones of 
insuring and maintaining the property.
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  In exchange, the City, and all other entities involved in this 
process, will secure, for themselves and for the general public, 
a far more lavish real property interest. OHA, in exchange for 
title, will convey an expansive conservation and public access 
easement, such as would not only preserve the valley in its pres-
ent state, but would also permit reasonable access to all who 
desire to experience the splendor of it.
  The settlement agreement will also contain one or more 
negative covenants, which will run with the land, to insure that 
no future development of the valley will be permitted, and that 
it will remain as it is for all future generations, forever.137
 Indeed, OHA has granted the City and County of Honolulu and 
the State of Hawai‘i “a perpetual and irrevocable conservation easement 
in gross over the Property solely for the purpose of protecting and pre-
serving the Conservation Values of the Property.”138 The “Conservation 
Values” include “archaeological, historical, cultural, educational, natu-
ral, ecological, botanical, scenic, aesthetic, open-space and recreational 
values and values specific to Hawaiian culture and History, including, 
without limitation, the exercise of Hawaiian subsistence, cultural and 
religious practices.”139 The army was involved because it has a forty-foot-
wide road running through the valley, and development along it would 
make it difficult to continue use for training.140 Preserving the valley for 
conservation purposes provided the army with a buffer for its training 
activities on the road, which is currently being improved on neighbor-
ing parcels for use by a Stryker brigade.141
 Although the document granting the conservation easement is titled 
“Grant of Conservation and Access Easement,” and it acknowledges that 
the city conveyed the valley to OHA on the condition that OHA would 
convey to the city an “[e]asement for the benefit of the public,” no pub-
lic access easement is ever specifically conveyed in the document.142 The 
first sentence of the document refers to “THIS GRANT OF CONSERVA-
TION AND ACCESS EASEMENT,” but it appears to be referring to the 
title of the document rather than actually conveying an access easement 
to the public.143 OHA’s director of land management contends that the 
public was granted an access easement—but not for unfettered access.144 
He notes that under the document, OHA can never completely exclude 
the general public but that access must be limited in order to properly 
protect the valley.145
 The easement document states that OHA “will afford the general 
188 Regulating Paradise
public reasonable managed public access to the Property for passive, 
noncommercial, recreational purposes.”146 OHA intends to limit the 
general public’s access to the upper valley to guided excursions.147 The 
director cites unexploded ordnance as a possible concern.148 He notes 
that ordnance in the upper valley is not of particular concern to cultural 
practitioners because they tend not to go far up enough in the valley 
to encounter the area where the ordnance may be.149 OHA’s position 
is that the primary public benefits for which the city paid $5.1 million 
were preventing the development of the upper valley, inappropriate use 
of the lower valley, and the privatization of access.150 Nevertheless, OHA 
has also reserved the right to—and intends to—charge admission and 
establish the hours that the valley will be open to the public.151
 Indeed, under the agreement, OHA reserves full control over the 
day-to-day operations of the valley.152 Since granting the easement, OHA 
has established a limited liability corporation (LLC), Hi‘ilei Aloha, to 
govern operations at Waimea.153 It is that LLC that will develop the 
policies governing the valley.154 OHA’s status as a public trust and not a 
state agency with the power to write regulations that have the force and 
effect of law makes enforcement of rules in Waimea Valley an issue.155 
OHA claims that enforcement will be partially community based, with 
members of the community guiding one another on the proper way to 
use the valley and its resources.156
 Although Waimea Valley is of considerable cultural significance to 
Native Hawaiians, it is OHA’s acquisition of Wao Kele O Puna that has 
made it one of the largest landowners in the state. Wao Kele O Puna 
on the Big Island consists of 25,856 acres of rain forest, the last large 
intact lowland rain forest in the state.157 Hawaiians have long used it for 
traditional hunting, gathering, and religious practices.158 To preserve 
the rain forest, the Trust for Public Land worked with Senator Dan-
iel Inouye to fund the acquisition of the property from the Estate of 
James Campbell.159 Eventually, it was purchased for $3.4 million dollars 
from a federal Forest Legacy Grant and $250,000 from OHA.160 Again, 
OHA holds title.161 Land purchased by a state with a U.S. Department of 
Agriculture Forest Legacy Grant must be “managed and administered 
for goals consistent with Forest Legacy conservation purposes.”162 These 
include the “protection of important scenic, cultural, fish, wildlife and 
recreational resources,” and may include “traditional forest uses” such 
as hunting, fishing, and hiking.163
 Wao Kele is also the first non–DLNR forest reserve in the state.164 
DLNR and OHA entered into a memorandum of agreement for shar-
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ing Wao Kele management responsibilities.165 The purpose of the 
agreement is both to “provide proper management” of Wao Kele O 
Puna and “to develop OHA’s own capacity to manage lands indepen-
dently from DLNR.”166 Under the ten-year agreement, initial manage-
ment responsibility rests with DLNR and will be gradually turned over 
to OHA “as OHA acquires capacity, experience, and expertise in land 
management.”167 DLNR’s responsibility for managing Wao Kele O 
Puna expires after ten years—sooner if DLNR and OHA agree that 
OHA is capable of managing the reserve as required by a forthcom-
ing Comprehensive Management Plan.168 For every year that DLNR 
manages the property, OHA will transfer up to $228,000 to DLNR.169 
Although this amount may vary, “the amount of funds transferred 
will determine the level of management and protection that is imple-
mented” by DLNR.170
 The DLNR–OHA agreement for Wao Kele identifies public access, 
cultural, natural resources, open space and recreational use, preser-
vation of plant and wildlife habitat, traditional hunting and gather-
ing practices, and water extraction as allowable uses of the reserve.171 
Mineral extraction, grading and excavation, subdivision, commercial 
uses inconsistent with the Forest Legacy Program Guidelines, signage 
(except as needed for the management of the reserve), storage of waste, 
and the introduction of exotic plants or animals are prohibited.172 The 
agreement also specifically guarantees Hawaiian subsistence and cul-
tural practitioners and their companions access to both the developed 
and undeveloped portions of Wao Kele.173
 OHA has also used the courts to protect Hawaiian interests.174 In 
particular, the Hawai‘i State Constitution requires the state to protect 
Hawaiian rights “customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, 
cultural and religious purposes,”175 subject to reasonable regulation 
by the State Legislature. The Hawai‘i Supreme Court reinforced such 
rights in Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. City Planning Commission,176 when 
it held that “the State is obligated to protect the reasonable exercise of 
customarily and traditionally exercised rights of Hawaiians to the extent 
feasible.”177 In a later decision, the Court stressed that such rights could 
only be exercised upon proof that the particular activity was demonstra-
bly traditional and customary and that the land upon which the exercise 
was taking place was “undeveloped.”178 OHA has acted to enforce this 
obligation in the courts. For example, when the state Board of Land 
and Natural Resources (BLNR) issued a conservation district use area 
permit for the dredging of a marina entrance channel, OHA sued, argu-
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ing in part that BLNR failed to protect Native Hawaiian rights.179 The 
Hawai‘i Supreme Court agreed, holding that in issuing such a permit, 
BLNR must “make express findings as to the existence and extent of 
traditional and customary practices in the subject area. If the issuance 
of the permit will impair these rights, BLNR must determine whether 
this impairment is justified.”180 Because BLNR failed to do so, the Court 
vacated the permit and remanded to the board to determine whether 
Hawaiian rights were exercised in the area and, if so, the extent to 
which they would be affected by the project and any feasible action that 
could be taken to mitigate those effects.181 However, the Court explicitly 
rejected all of the remaining OHA claims, including those related to 
the use, sale, and use of sale proceeds of ceded lands, noting that the 
ceded lands trust expressly permitted their use for five purposes, only 
one of which was for the benefit of Native Hawaiians. Thus, for its first 
twenty-five years OHA “focused on monitoring federal and state use of 
lands and waters” and protecting Hawaiian interests therein.182 Only 
recently has the office come to directly control large amounts of land; 
it has developed a vision to be “the real estate partner of choice” in 
Hawai‘i.183
 OHA is becoming a major landowner in Hawai‘i. Whether this 
changes its largely supervisory role in land use in Hawai‘i or simply adds 
a new dimension to it remains uncertain. In either event, OHA’s partici-
pation in conservation and landownership will almost certainly grow in 
the years to come.
The Department of Hawaiian Home Lands
In 1920, Congress passed the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act 
(HHCA).184 The purpose of the act was to “enable native Hawaiians to 
return to their lands in order to fully support self-sufficiency for native 
Hawaiians and the self-determination of native Hawaiians in the admin-
istration of this Act, and the preservation of the values, traditions, and 
culture of native Hawaiians.”185 However, as discussed below, the state 
agency charged with the administration of the Act can and does lease 
“surplus” homelands for commercial purposes, and it is not at all clear 
that such leases are subject to otherwise applicable state and county 
plans and land use controls.
 There are five “principal purposes” enumerated in the HHCA, but 
the language of the act suggests that there may be others.186 The enu-
merated principal purposes are as follows:
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 (1) Establishing a permanent land base for the benefit and 
use of native Hawaiians, upon which they may live, farm, ranch, 
and otherwise engage in commercial or industrial or any other 
activities as authorized in this Act;
 (2) Placing native Hawaiians on the lands set aside under 
this Act in a prompt and efficient manner and assuring 
long-term tenancy to beneficiaries of this Act and their 
successors;
 (3) Preventing alienation of the fee title to the lands set 
aside under this Act so that these lands will always be held in 
trust for continued use by native Hawaiians in perpetuity;
 (4) Providing adequate amounts of water and supporting 
infrastructure, so that homestead lands will always be usable 
and accessible; and
 (5) Providing financial support and technical assistance to 
native Hawaiian beneficiaries of this Act so that by pursuing 
strategies to enhance economic self-sufficiency and promote 
community-based development, the traditions, culture, and 
quality of life of native Hawaiians shall be forever self-
sustaining.187
Central to the enforcement of these principal purposes is a “trust rela-
tionship” that is created between the federal government and the State 
of Hawai‘i as trustees and Native Hawaiians as the beneficiaries.188
The Hawaiian Homes Commission
While the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL) was created 
by statute in order to administer the land trust created by the HHCA,189 
the HHCA provides for a Hawaiian Homes Commission (HHC) to 
actually run the department.190 The HHC consists of nine members. As 
with most state commissions, the governor nominates and appoints the 
members, with the consent of the State Senate.191 The HHCA imposes 
further restrictions on the eligibility of prospective commissioners:
[T]hree shall be residents of the city and county of Honolulu; 
two shall be residents of the county of Hawaii one of whom 
shall be a resident of east Hawaii and the other a resident 
of west Hawaii; two shall be residents of the county of Maui 
one of whom shall be a resident from the island of Moloka‘i; 
one shall be a resident of the county of Kaua‘i; and the ninth 
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member shall be the chairman of the Hawaiian homes com-
mission. All members shall have been residents of the State at 
least three years prior to their appointment and at least four 
of the members shall be descendants of not less than one-
fourth part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian 
Islands previous to 1778. . . . The governor shall appoint 
the chairman of the commission from among the members 
thereof.192
 The chairman is required to serve in a full-time capacity and 
may be delegated by the other commissioners “such duties, powers, 
and authority or so much thereof, as may be lawful or proper for the 
performance of the functions vested in the commission.” The HHC 
has promulgated rules vesting the chairperson with the following 
powers:
 (1) To appoint special committees and prescribe their pow-
ers and duties;
 (2) To preside over all meetings of the commission;
 (3) To approve and sign all vouchers, and to approve the 
assignment of funds to be received;
 (4) To approve leaves of absence;
 (5) To approve plans for construction of homes and 
improvements;
 (6) To screen matters referred to the chairman by staff and 
to select those of sufficient importance to place on the agenda 
for consideration by the commission; and
 (7) To sign commission resolutions, licenses, leases, and 
contracts approved by the commission.193
The chairperson may also, subject to ratification by the commission,
 (1) Grant loans from any loan fund;
 (2) Approve the designation of successors;
 (3) Accept surrenders of homestead leases; and
 (4) Approve, with regard to general leases, plans, assign-
ments, subleases, and mortgages.194
These last powers grant the authority to effect the general purpose of 
the HHCA: returning Native Hawaiians to their lands.195
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Homesteading
The act authorizes DHHL to allocate its federally granted lands to 
Native Hawaiians (Homestead Lands). Housing constructed on these 
lands must be either single-family or multifamily dwellings, with the 
manner of allocation and the terms of the disposition of Homestead 
Lands determined by the rules promulgated by the commission.196 The 
HHCA does impose limitations on the disposition of Homestead Lands, 
requiring among other things that allotments not exceed one acre for 
residential lands, forty acres for agricultural lands, and one hundred 
acres for irrigated pastoral lands and that all Homestead Lands be lease-
hold tenures.197
 Apportionment of Homestead Lands is governed by administrative 
rules promulgated by the commission. Thus, for example, an applicant 
for Homestead Lands must be Native Hawaiian. Upon completion of an 
application for Homestead Lands, an applicant is placed on a waiting 
list. Waiting lists are divided by island and again by the type of land 
sought: Each island has lists for residential, agricultural, and pastoral 
lands, respectively.198 Generally, lands are allocated by date of applica-
tion, except that applicants who already have Homestead Land leases 
or who have spouses with such leases will have their subsequent awards 
deferred until applicants without Homestead Land leases are accom-
modated.199 These standards for the apportionment of Homestead 
Lands do not apply to all lands held by the DHHL. Where DHHL has 
determined that lands it controls are not needed for homesteading, the 
Homestead Land application rules do not apply.200
Commercial Licenses and Leases
There are two avenues for commercial activity on DHHL’s federally 
granted lands: by license and by lease. Commercial activity must take 
place by license when the desired location is situated within a district 
where Homestead Lands are leased to Native Hawaiians.201 Commer-
cial leases are made on Hawaiian Home Lands that are not needed or 
unsuitable for homestead purposes and which may be disposed of as the 
HHC sees fit in the course of “managing” such surplus lands.202 Such 
leases create millions of dollars of income for DHHL and fund a sub-
stantial portion of its annual operating budget.203 Those interested in 
leasing DHHL’s nonhomestead lands must file an application identify-
ing the land desired and a proposed use.204 Lease terms and rates are 
determined by DHHL and approved by the HHC.205
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 Under the HHCA, it is clear that “the department is expressly 
authorized to negotiate . . . the disposition of a lease of Hawaiian home 
lands . . . for commercial, industrial, or other business purposes”206 and 
with “the approval of the governor, undertake and carry out the devel-
opment of available lands for homestead, commercial, and multipur-
pose projects as provided in section 220.5 of this Act.”207 This Section 
confers upon HHL the ability to enter into contracts and project devel-
oper agreements to develop available lands for commercial projects.208 
The act further defines a “commercial project” as one “designed and 
intended to generate revenues.”209
 However, the authority for the proposition that development on 
homestead lands is not subject to local or state land use controls is less 
clear. According to Hawai‘i’s attorney general, “Where Hawaiian home 
lands are needed or required for the purposes of the Hawaiian Homes 
Commission Act, any zoning ordinance purporting to change the land 
use designation by the department of Hawaiian home lands or to impose 
restrictions on the use of such Hawaiian home lands would be outside 
the scope of any power granted to counties.”210 Based on this “Opinion 
of the Attorney General” and in conjunction with the above sections, 
the DHHL consensus is that lands on its property are exempt from city 
zoning laws.211
The Urban Redevelopment Act
In 1949, the Hawai‘i Territorial Legislature passed the Urban Redevel-
opment Act in order to establish a method to develop blighted areas in 
the Territory of Hawai‘i.212 The Territorial Legislature found that the 
conditions existing in the territory’s blighted areas:
impair property values and tax revenues in the same and 
surrounding areas, cause an increase in and spread of disease, 
infant mortality, juvenile delinquency and crime, and consti-
tute a menace to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the 
inhabitants of the communities in which they exist and of the 
inhabitants of the Territory generally, and necessitate excessive 
and disproportionate expenditures of public funds for crime 
prevention and punishment, public health and safety, fire and 
accident protection, and other public services and facilities, 
and encourage and hasten decentralization necessitating 
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additional large expenditures for public services and facilities 
in outlying areas.213
 The legislature concluded that it was too costly for individual own-
ers of property in blighted areas to redevelop themselves and that typi-
cal land use regulations were insufficient.214 An urban redevelopment 
act was thus necessary, and the Territorial Legislature sanctioned the 
acquisition and redevelopment of blighted areas “in accordance with 
sound redevelopment plans and principle.”215 Moreover, the Territo-
rial Legislature stated (in language similar to the future U.S. Supreme 
Court opinion in Berman v. Parker 216) that the acquisition and redevel-
opment of blighted areas was “necessary for the public health, safety, 
morals and welfare and are public uses and public purposes for which 
public moneys may be spent and private property acquired by purchase 
or by the exercise of eminent domain, and are governmental functions 
of grave concern to the Territory.”217 With that, it enacted the Urban 
Redevelopment Act (URA).
 The URA does not establish a state agency but instead enables the 
four counties to create their own redevelopment agencies. A county 
council may create a local redevelopment agency by passing a resolution. 
The agency must consist of five members, appointed by the mayor, with 
the approval of the council, who are “outstanding and public-spirited 
citizens” and have resided in the county for at least three years immedi-
ately preceding their appointment.218 Once established, the redevelop-
ment agency has certain powers and duties. The agency’s mission is to 
undertake and carry out urban renewal projects within the county.219 In 
doing so, the agency may “make and execute contracts and other instru-
ments necessary or convenient to exercise its powers.”220 The agency is 
also required to promulgate rules and regulations to carry into effect 
the powers and purposes of its agency.221
 The agency must make preliminary surveys, studies, and plans 
to identify redevelopment areas “provided that the studies and initial 
determination of what areas are blighted . . . are made exclusively by the 
planning commission.”222 In addition, the redevelopment agency must 
make redevelopment plans for the areas in conformity with the master 
plan for the development of the locality. Each plan must show the out-
line of the area, character of existing development, proposed use of 
land, general character of new buildings, and other general details of 
redevelopment, as well as the preliminary estimated cost of the develop-
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ment. “Further, the plans shall give due consideration to the provision 
of adequate park and recreational areas and facilities that may be desir-
able for neighborhood improvement, with special consideration for the 
health, safety and welfare of children residing in the general vicinity of 
the site covered by the plans.”223
 The agency is also obliged to “prepare a general neighborhood 
renewal plan for urban renewal areas which may be of such scope that 
urban renewal activities may have to be carried out in stages over an 
estimated period of up to ten years.”224 Under Hawaii Revised Statutes 
Section 53-5(7), the plan may include but is not limited to a prelimi-
nary plan that (1) outlines the urban renewal activities proposed for the 
area involved, (2) provides a framework for the preparation of urban 
renewal plans, and (3) indicates generally the land uses, population 
density, building coverage, prospective requirements for rehabilitation 
and improvement of property, and portions of the area contemplated 
for clearance and redevelopment. “A general neighborhood renewal 
plan shall, in the determination of the local governing body, conform 
to the general plan of the locality as a whole and the workable program 
of the county.”225
 A redevelopment agency also must accommodate the people it will 
displace by a redevelopment project. The agency must prepare plans 
for and assist in the relocation of persons (including individuals, fami-
lies, business concerns, nonprofit organizations, and others) displaced 
from an urban renewal area and make relocation payments from funds 
provided by the federal government.226 At the same time, the agency 
must establish and operate a central relocation office that will “perform 
such functions and activities as may be necessary and proper for the 
satisfactory relocation of families, individuals, businesses, and nonprofit 
organizations, incorporated and unincorporated, displaced by any gov-
ernmental action to decent, safe, and sanitary locations at rents and 
prices within the financial means of the displaced families, individuals, 
businesses, and nonprofit organizations.”227
 Once it has satisfied its relocation obligations, the agency then sub-
mits the redevelopment plan to the county planning commission for 
study and approval.228 Assuming the planning commission approves the 
redevelopment plan, the agency then submits the plan to the relevant 
county council. The council then holds a public hearing after affording 
its citizens published notice. The council may approve or amend and 
approve the proposal only if it finds that the redevelopment project is a 
blighted area within the jurisdiction of the county.229
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 The statute contemplates the use of private developers on urban 
redevelopment projects. If the agency finds that the owners or devel-
opers of project lands can “effectively, expeditiously, and economically” 
undertake the project as well or better than the agency could by itself, 
the agency must include a provision “for the execution of the project by 
an alternative method of private development thereof on the basis of an 
agreement between the agency and the owners or developers and impos-
ing such requirements, restrictions, and sanctions as the agency may deem 
necessary to effectuate the basic purposes of this chapter and to assure 
the successful completion of the project by private development.”230
 The agency is authorized to acquire said land “by condemnation or 
otherwise.”231 The property may be sold or leased to one or more indi-
viduals, corporations, or public bodies or to a redevelopment corpora-
tion “under such limitations, restrictions, requirements, or covenants 
as will insure its being developed and continued in use in accordance 
with the redevelopment plan, and in a manner that will best promote 
the interests and welfare of the urban area in which the project is situ-
ated.”232 If leased, the lessee must be given an option to purchase the 
leased property during the first twenty years of the lease. During the 
balance of the lease term, the lessee has the first right of refusal to pur-
chase the leased property, provided that the leased property may not 
be sold by the agency to any person or corporation except to the lessee 
during the first twenty years of the lease. In the event the lessee fails to 
exercise the first right of refusal, the agency may sell the leased property 
to any person or corporation at fair value, subject to the lease.
 Surprisingly, the agency may not actually build new structures 
on any of its property (except structures that will be held and used by 
the government for public purposes). However, if it will promote the 
realization of the redevelopment plan, it may grade, drain, construct 
streets, and install necessary utilities such as sewers, water, and lights.233 
In other words, the agency is limited to clearing out blighted areas and 
constructing the basic infrastructure needed to bring new development 
to the area.234
 Hawai‘i’s counties have used the URA many times since its incep-
tion. During the late 1950s the Honolulu Redevelopment Agency 
“determined that the area bounded by Liliha, Queen Emma, and 
Beretania streets and Vineyard (i.e., Chinatown)235 was filled with slums 
that needed to be bulldozed for the greater public good.”236 Buddhist 
temples, Shinto shrines, Chinese schools, a dozen Chinese societies, 
and other historic facilities were condemned. The agency apparently 
198 Regulating Paradise
planned to buy the entire tract, relocate the inhabitants, and sell the 
land to private developers.237 “Proposals included affordable housing, 
a cultural center, commercial areas, and a park. But for many years the 
land lay fallow because of delays and disagreements over development. 
Much of the area was used for parking.”238
 More recently, the Maui Redevelopment Authority is implementing 
the Department of Planning’s Wailuku Redevelopment Plan. According 
to the Maui Department of Planning, the Wailuku Redevelopment Plan 
“provides the vision, direction, and plan of action for the revitalization 
of the Wailuku Redevelopment Area. The Plan also establishes the policy 
framework and process within which the Maui Redevelopment Agency 
(MRA) will implement specific projects intended to foster economic 
revitalization. This plan is not intended to be a regional plan for Central 
Maui, an urban design plan for Wailuku Town or an economic feasibil-
ity study for a specific project. It is a strategic plan for the economic and 
physical revitalization of the Wailuku Redevelopment Area.”239
 Once the plan is fully implemented, the county will benefit in sev-
eral ways: (1) new amenities (theater, restaurants, festivals, commercial 
and residential opportunities); (2) more job opportunities (entrepre-
neurial start-up, construction, retail, service, office); (3) restoration of 
pride in Maui’s Civic Center; (4) increased tax base to provide greater 
public safety and services; and (5) rehabilitation and restoration of 
buildings and public spaces.240
 The plan provides specific actions to “foster an economic renais-
sance throughout the Wailuku Development Area.”241 Important objec-
tives for the MRA include streetscape beautification, streamlined regu-
lation, attracting more activities and people to the area, and targeted 
tax incentives.
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Chapter 6
Managing the Coastal Zone
Coastal zone management has been the subject of state and local regu-
lation through much of the last five decades in the United States. This 
is not particularly surprising since fully three-quarters of the popula-
tion of the United States lives in the coastal zone.1 However, it was not 
until the mid-1970s that a national program of coastal zone manage-
ment commenced under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act 
(CZMA).2 Designed largely to encourage states in coastal areas to plan, 
manage, and regulate the use of land therein, the CZMA provides funds 
for the creation and implementation of state coastal zone management 
plans, on the condition that they follow various coastal land regulatory 
and management guidelines. In 1975, the State of Hawai‘i responded 
to this federal coastal zone initiative, first with a Shoreland Protection 
Act, then with a Coastal Zone Management Act of its own. The Hawai‘i 
Coastal Zone Management Act (HCZMA) is applicable to Hawai‘i’s 
vast coastal areas, in which much intensive development has occurred 
in the past and which continue to be subject to intense development 
pressures.3
 What follows is a summary of the federal program of which Hawai‘i 
is a part, Hawai‘i’s state and local response to the federal coastal zone 
program, and a brief look at what judicial comment there is on both.
The Federal Framework and the Hawaiian Response
The CZMA of 1972 was passed during the heady days of national land 
use and environmental activism in response to competing develop-
ment and preservation demands on the nation’s coastal areas. Con-
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gress found that population growth and development in coastal areas 
resulted in the destruction of marine resources, wildlife, open space, 
and other important ecological, cultural, historic, and esthetic values.4 
In response, Congress created a management and regulatory frame-
work and appropriated money for the development and implementa-
tion of state-run coastal zone management programs. The framework 
is imposed if, but only if, a state chooses to accept the money. Most of 
the thirty-five eligible coastal states and territories have so chosen.5 The 
program consists of three parts: a management plan/program, imple-
mentation regulations, and consistency regulations.
The Plan/Program
The CZMA requires a state’s coastal zone management program to 
include nine planning elements, the most important plan themes of 
which are a definition of the boundaries of that part of a coastal zone 
that is subject to the program, objectives and policies for coastal area 
protection, a statement of permissible land and water uses, and the 
identification of special management areas.6
 The program’s coastal zone boundaries are defined as coastal 
waters and adjacent shorelands that are strongly influenced by each 
other.7 While it is not particularly difficult to define the seaward bound-
ary, the trick is to identify the vaguely defined inland boundary. The 
zone extends seaward to the outer limit of the U.S. territorial sea, but 
the inland boundary of the zone is based on the extent of area neces-
sary to control shorelands, the use of which has a direct and significant 
impact on coastal waters, and to control those geographical areas which 
are likely to be affected by or vulnerable to sea level rise.8 According 
to federal regulations, areas that might be included are “areas of par-
ticular concern” (discussed below), salt marshes and wetlands, beaches, 
state-determined floodplains, islands, and watersheds. However vague 
the regulations, a state must define its inland boundary with sufficient 
precision so that “interested parties” can determine whether the man-
agement program controls their activities.9 CZMA regulations also set 
out criteria for determining permissible uses subject to the manage-
ment program.10
 The process of defining the Hawai‘i coastal zone boundary in 
the late 1970s provoked one of the more spirited disputes in recent 
Hawai‘i state-county history. The seaward boundary was easy: the 
seaward limit of the state’s jurisdiction, except those areas owned, 
leased, held in trust, or otherwise subject to the power and authority 
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of the federal government.11 But except for some state forest preserve 
lands and federal lands, the inland boundary stretches across the 
entire land area of the state.12 This is not so extensive for regulatory 
purposes as it first appears. The whole of the coastal zone boundary 
area is subject to the HCZMA objectives and policies, but the control 
and management of areas requiring special management attention, 
where special permits from county agencies are required, cover a far 
smaller area.
 The objectives and policies mandated by the CZMA are set out 
in detail in HCZMA. Covering recreational, historic, scenic, and open 
space resources, coastal ecosystems and hazards, economic uses, and 
development management, they are enforced through a complicated 
networking process discussed later in this chapter. They apply to the 
entire coastal zone management area. For example, the objective of 
protecting scenic and open space resources reads, “protect, preserve, 
and where desirable, restore or improve the quality of coastal scenic 
and open space resources.”13 This leads to the following policies:
 (1) Identify valued scenic resources in the coastal zone 
management area;
 (2) Insure that new developments are compatible with their 
visual environment by designing and locating such develop-
ments to minimize the alteration of natural landforms and 
existing public views to and along the shoreline;
 (3) Preserve, maintain, and where desirable, improve and 
restore shoreline open space and scenic resources; and
 (4) Encourage those developments that are not coastal 
dependent to locate in inland areas.14
 Areas requiring special management attention because of unique 
coastal values or characteristics or because the area faces pressure that 
requires detailed attention beyond the general planning and regulatory 
systems of a typical management program must be designated by a man-
agement plan. These are called “areas of particular concern” (APCs) 
and “special management areas” (SMAs) and are the linchpin of the 
Hawaiian response to the CZMA’s requirements. Their boundaries are 
established in accordance with the following criteria:
 (1) Areas of unique, scarce, fragile or vulnerable natural 
habitat; unique or fragile, physical figuration (as, for example 
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Niagara Falls); historical significance, cultural value or scenic 
importance (including resources on or determined to be 
eligible for the National Register of Historic Places);
 (2) Areas of high natural productivity or essential habitat 
for living resources, including fish, wildlife, and endangered 
species and the various trophic levels in the food web critical to 
their well-being;
 (3) Areas of substantial recreational value and/or 
opportunity;
 (4) Areas where developments and facilities are dependent 
upon the utilization of, or access to, coastal waters;
 (5) Areas of unique hydrologic, geologic or topographic 
significance for industrial or commercial development or for 
dredge disposal;
 (6) Areas or urban concentration where shoreline utiliza-
tion and water uses are highly competitive;
 (7) Areas where, if development were permitted, it might 
be subject to significant hazard due to storms, slides, floods, 
erosion, settlement, salt water intrusion, and sea level rise;
 (8) Areas needed to protect, maintain or replenish coastal 
lands or resources including coastal flood plains, aquifers 
and their recharge areas, estuaries, sand dunes, coral and 
other reefs, beaches, offshore sand deposits and mangrove 
stands.15
 Special procedures for assessing public beach areas and other 
coastal areas (especially erosion) requiring access or protection are 
also required.16 The most critical special management area in Hawai‘i 
extends inland from the shoreline and is defined as “the upper reaches 
of the wash of the waves, other than storms and seismic waves, at high 
tide during the season of the year in which the highest wash of the 
waves occurs, usually evidenced by the edge of vegetation growth, or 
the upper limit of debris left by the wash of the waves.”17 The purposes 
of implementing controls in this special management area are to “avoid 
permanent losses of valuable resources” and to preserve public access to 
beaches and natural reserves.18 Maps showing the boundaries of the area 
are required by statute to be filed with the county permitting authority.19 
The mapping of areas of particular concern is primarily controlled by 
the state directly rather than by the counties, which have only adminis-
trative responsibilities for some.
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Implementation: What the Law Requires
The key to any land use planning system is implementation. Courts 
seem increasingly inclined to accept coastal zone management and 
preservation rationales as the bases for upholding coastal land use con-
trols.20 Participating states must have the authority to implement the 
management plan in order for it to be approved by the secretary of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce.21 There are three permissible options 
for implementation:
 (1) State establishment of criteria and standards for local 
implementation, subject to administrative review and enforce-
ment of compliance; or
 (2) Direct state land and water use planning and regulation; 
or
 (3) State administrative review for consistency with the 
management program of all development plans, projects, 
or land and water use regulations, including exceptions and 
variances thereto, proposed by any state or local authority or 
private developer, with power to approve or disapprove after 
public notice and an opportunity for hearings.22
 Option 2, direct state control, is the one that Hawai‘i chose. While 
seemingly the most onerous, it is not, primarily due to a concept called 
“networking.”23 For a state to utilize networking in meeting the state 
control implementation option, it must:
 (1) Demonstrate that, taken together, existing authorities 
can and will be used to implement the full range of policies 
and management techniques identified as necessary for coastal 
management purposes; and
 (2) Bind each party that exercises statutory authority which 
is part of the management program to conformance with 
relevant enforceable policies and management techniques. Par-
ties may be bound to conformance through an executive order, 
administrative directive or a memorandum of understanding 
provided that:
 (i) The management program authorities provide 
grounds for taking action to ensure compliance of net-
worked agencies with the program. It will be sufficient if 
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any of the following can act to ensure compliance: The 
State agency designated pursuant to subsection 306(d)
(6) of the Act, the State’s Attorney General, another 
State agency, a local government, or a citizen.
 (ii) The executive order, administrative directive or 
memorandum of understanding establishes confor-
mance requirements of other State agency activities or 
authorities to management program policies. A guber-
natorial executive order will be acceptable if networked 
State agency heads are directly responsible to the 
Governor.
 Where networked State agencies can enforce the manage-
ment program policies at the time of section 306 approval 
without first having to revise their operating rules and regula-
tions, then any proposed revisions to such rules and regula-
tions which would enhance or facilitate implementation need 
not be accomplished prior to program approval. Where State 
agencies cannot enforce coastal policies without first revis-
ing their rules and regulations, then these revisions must be 
made prior to approval of the State’s program by the Assistant 
Administrator.24
 Hawai‘i has managed to accomplish networking—and so obtain 
federal approval of the implementation section of its management 
plan—in several ways. First, the HCZMA itself states that its objectives 
and policies are binding on both state and county agencies. In the 
event that regulations of state and county agencies fail to so comply, the 
HCZMA requires that they be amended. Second, a governor’s directive 
requires all state departments and agencies to act—within the scope of 
their respective statutory authority—in accordance with the objectives 
and policies of the HCZMA.25 Finally, any person or agency may chal-
lenge any state or county agency’s lack of compliance with the approved 
management program’s objectives, policies, and guidelines within the 
waters of the coastal zone boundaries and the land within a special 
management area or its failure to perform an act or duty required by 
HCZMA. Courts may provide “any relief as may be appropriate, includ-
ing a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.”26
 The state and county laws thus networked number at least fifty-
eight. They are generally directed at fulfilling the recreational, historic, 
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scenic, and open space, as well as the coastal economic and develop-
ment management objectives of the program.27 The most noticeable 
and potentially effective element of the network is that which deals with 
the special management areas and areas of particular concern. While 
the state perforce retains overall power and responsibility for assuring 
that the regulations guiding management and development in these 
areas accord with the state programs, the counties define the special 
management areas and pass appropriate ordinances and regulations 
governing the use of land within their boundaries.28 After state designa-
tion, they also permit certain land uses by way of variances for areas of 
particular concern.29 These systems are partly responsible for the promi-
nent position Hawai‘i holds in those U.S. jurisdictions experiencing a 
“permit explosion.”30
 Special Management Areas
 In Hawai‘i, no development may proceed in an SMA unless an 
applicant obtains a permit from a county permit granting authority, 
which is either the county planning commission or, if it is only advisory, 
the council or its designated agency.31 Development is defined as any of 
the uses, activities, or operations on land in or underwater within the 
SMA that includes the following:
 (1) Placement or erection of any solid material or any 
gaseous, liquid, solid, or thermal waste;
 (2) Grading, removing, dredging, mining, or extraction of 
any materials;
 (3) Change in the density or intensity of use of land, includ-
ing but not limited to the division or subdivision of land;
 (4) Change in the intensity of use of water, ecology related 
thereto, or of access thereto; and
 (5) Construction, reconstruction, demolition, or alteration 
of the size of any structure.32
 The following uses, activities, or operations are not “development” 
(and therefore need no SMA permit) unless the county permit grant-
ing authority finds they are or may become part of a larger project, 
the cumulative impact of which may have a significant environmental 
or ecological effect on the SMA, in which case it slides back into the 
regulated “development” category:
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 (1) Construction of a single-family residence that is not part 
of a larger development;
 (2) Repair or maintenance of roads and highways within 
existing rights-of-way;
 (3) Routine maintenance dredging of existing streams, 
channels, and drainage ways;
 (4) Repair and maintenance of underground utility lines, 
including but not limited to water, sewer, power, and telephone 
and minor appurtenant structures such as pad mounted 
transformers and sewer pump stations;
 (5) Zoning variances, except for height, density, parking, 
and shoreline setback;
 (6) Repair, maintenance, or interior alterations to existing 
structures;
 (7) Demolition or removal of structures, except those 
structures located on any historic site as designated in national 
or state registers;
 (8) Use of any land for the purpose of cultivating, planting, 
growing, and harvesting plants, crops, trees, and other agricul-
tural, horticultural, or forestry products or animal husbandry, 
or aquaculture or mariculture of plants or animals, or other 
agricultural purposes;
 (9) Transfer of title to land;
 (10) Creation or termination of easements, covenants, or 
other rights in structures or land;
 (11) Subdivision of land into lots greater than twenty acres 
in size;
 (12) Subdivision of a parcel of land into four or fewer par-
cels when no associated construction activities are proposed; 
provided that any land which is so subdivided shall not there-
after qualify for this exception with respect to any subsequent 
subdivision of any of the resulting parcels;
 (13) Installation of underground utility lines and appurte-
nant aboveground fixtures less than four feet in height along 
existing corridors;
 (14) Structural and nonstructural improvements to existing 
single-family residences, where otherwise permissible;
 (15) Nonstructural improvements to existing commercial 
structures; and
 (16) Construction, installation, maintenance, repair, and 
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replacement of civil defense warning or signal devices and 
sirens; provided that whenever the authority finds that any 
excluded use, activity, or operation may have a cumulative 
impact, or a significant environmental or ecological effect on a 
special management area, that use, activity, or operation shall 
be defined as “development” for the purpose of this part.33
 County permitting authorities may issue three types of permits:
 (1) “Special management area emergency permit”—an 
action by the authority authorizing development in cases of 
emergency requiring immediate action to prevent substantial 
physical harm to persons or property or to allow the recon-
struction of structures damaged by natural hazards to their 
original form; provided that such structures were previously 
found to be in compliance with requirements of the Federal 
Flood Insurance Program.
 (2) “Special management area minor permit”—an action by 
the authority authorizing development the valuation of which 
is not in excess of $125,000 and which has no substantial adverse 
environmental or ecological effect, taking into account poten-
tial cumulative effects.
 (3) “Special management area use permit”—an action by 
the authority authorizing development the valuation of which 
exceeds $125,000 or which may have a substantial adverse envi-
ronmental or ecological effect, taking into account potential 
cumulative effects.34
 In issuing these permits, the county permitting authority also con-
siders whether the development complies with SMA guidelines designed 
to ensure access to public beaches and recreation areas, control sewage 
disposal, regulate site clearing for construction, and generally prohibit 
adverse environmental effects.35 Maui, Hawai‘i, and Kaua‘i Counties 
have designated their plan commissions as their permitting authority, 
while Honolulu has made it a council function.36
 In Honolulu the administration of the SMA permit system (filing 
for permits, hearings, and so on) is the responsibility of its director of 
the Department of Planning and Permitting (DPP).37 It is the Honolulu 
City Council, however, that decides whether the permit will be granted.38 
Honolulu also requires that the DPP conduct an environmental impact 
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assessment using the procedural guidelines in the Hawai‘i Environmen-
tal Impact Statement law (HEIS).39 However, if an environmental impact 
statement has been prepared under either the HEIS or the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), an applicant is excused from that 
requirement.40
 Maui’s SMA provisions are set out in the Rules and Regulations 
of the Planning Commission.41 As in Honolulu, a key part of the SMA 
permitting process is the making of an assessment, here by the planning 
director, of the “proposed action” to determine the extent and scope of 
the permit review process. In instances of clearly significant (fair market 
value over $125,000) or potentially environmentally adverse develop-
ments, the applicant may waive assessment and go directly to a hear-
ing and review. As the assessment process requires the filing of a fairly 
detailed application and review by the planning director, waiver could 
result in the saving of both time and expense. If he finds no significant 
effect or a less-than-$125,000 development, the planning director issues 
a “minor” SMA permit, with or without conditions. If the applicant 
has waived the assessment process or if the planning director finds a 
potentially significant adverse effect, then the applicant must submit 
to an extensive review process involving, among other things, a “Cen-
tral Coordinating Agency” of the Planning Commission and an “Urban 
Design Review Board.”42
 Where a county planning commission has delegated authority to its 
director, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has held that the director’s deci-
sion is considered a final administrative decision.43 The “final decision” 
designation is significant because it allows a permit applicant to appeal 
to the state’s courts, bypassing further administrative appeals. In Maui 
and Kaua‘i, this means that the Planning Commission has no direct 
authority over the processing of minor SMA permits.
 Ultimately, it is the Planning Commission that issues the permit, 
but only if it finds that “the development will not have any substantial 
adverse environmental or ecological effect, except as such adverse 
effect is minimized to the extent practicable and clearly outweighed by 
public health, safety, or compelling public interests” that “the develop-
ment is consistent with the objectives, policies, and special management 
area guidelines of [HRS chapter 205A] and any guidelines enacted by 
the [State] legislature” and that “the development is consistent with 
the [Maui] county general plan and zoning.”44 The wording of the 
final requirement is especially important, as it represents two tiers of 
analysis before SMA permits are issued on Maui or any other county 
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in Hawai‘i—one for general plan consistency and another for zoning 
consistency. In GATRI v. Blane, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court enforced 
this double consistency requirement.45 There, the Court rejected the 
developer’s argument that zoning consistency alone was sufficient. The 
Court further stated that, for the purposes of SMA permits, county gen-
eral plans have the force and effect of law. The rules also provide for 
the expansion of the SMA boundaries on Maui.46 This Maui has done, 
primarily for wetland (1,400 acres) and stream (7,600 acres) protection 
and development control (1,850 acres).47
 As with Maui, Kaua‘i has promulgated rules that give the Planning 
Commission the authority to grant or deny most SMA permits. Kaua‘i 
has also adopted an initial assessment process similar to the one used 
on O‘ahu and in Maui County, except that the standards for assessing 
the significance of potential environmental effects are more extensive. 
If the effects are found to be significantly adverse, a formal SMA permit 
application and hearing are required. The commission holds a pub-
lic hearing and makes a decision on the application, which is deemed 
approved if not decided within the time periods described in the rules.48 
The extent to which the Hawai‘i courts will strictly enforce the “find-
ings” requirements is clear from a 1982 decision of the Hawai‘i Supreme 
Court in Mahuiki v. Planning Comm’n of Kauai.49 There, the Court struck 
down an SMA permit granted by the Kaua‘i Planning Commission solely 
on the ground that the commission failed to make the required finding 
of no substantial adverse environmental or ecological effects.
 Kaua‘i also deals extensively with the amendment of SMA bound-
aries. A change in boundaries may be initiated only by the director 
of planning. Even a request addressed to the director may come only 
from a state or county department (or agency) head, the Kaua‘i County 
Council, or any owner or lessee (not merely an “interested person”) of 
the affected land.50
 As in Maui and Kaua‘i, Hawai‘i County vests its SMA authority in its 
Planning Commission by Planning Commission rules. As in the Kaua‘i 
rules, the objectives and policies of the HCZMA are recited word for 
word, followed by the usual list of SMA guidelines dealing with issues 
such as access, dredging, ocean views, and water quality. An assessment 
is required of most projects proposed in the SMA, unless the applicant 
determines “on his own” that his project will cost or be valued over 
$125,000 or will have a significant adverse effect, in which case he 
goes directly to the SMA permit process. The SMA permit is heard and 
decided by the Planning Commission much the way it is on Maui and 
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Kaua‘i. Unlike Kaua‘i, however, if a decision is not forthcoming within 
the time limits prescribed by the rules, it is deemed denied. Hawai‘i 
also authorizes the appointment of a hearing officer by the commission 
to conduct the hearings required by its SMA rules, although the com-
mission is, of course, free to decide the SMA permit application any 
way it chooses.51 SMA boundary applicants in Hawai‘i County may also 
petition the Planning Commission (through the director) for boundary 
amendments.52
 The Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals set out a textbook 
guide to precisely how counties may define the regulatory coastal zone 
in Topliss v. Planning Commission. In a well-structured two-part decision, 
the court first upheld Hawai‘i County’s inclusion of land hundreds of 
yards inland and steeply elevated from the beach because it was visible 
to anyone looking along the coast (but not away and upland from the 
coast). Second, the court held that the county improperly denied the 
permit because the adverse effects—traffic—of the development were 
not related to any effect on the coastal zone itself or any of its statutory 
values.
 Areas of Particular Concern
 APCs, like SMAs, are regulated by the networked laws controlling 
the broadly defined coastal zone subject to the State Management Plan’s 
general objectives and policies. An APC is created by means of a num-
ber of statutory schemes, some of which provide for state regulation, 
others of which provide for local (county) regulation. Most of these 
programs were both authorized and operating well before the federal 
CZMA made their networking a part of Hawai‘i’s Coastal Zone Man-
agement Program. Among them are the Natural Area Reserve System, 
the Marine Life Conservation District Program, the National Estuarine 
Research Reserve System, the Shoreline Setback Law, and the Hawai‘i 
Community Development Authority.
 The legislature established the Natural Area Reserve System to 
protect unique geological, volcanic, and other natural areas with dis-
tinctive marine, animal, and terrestrial features from loss due to human 
population and technology growth.53 The Natural Area Reserve System 
Commission recommends areas for inclusion. Rules specifying use, 
control, and protection of the areas recommended by the commission 
are promulgated by the Board of the State Department of Land and 
Natural Resources (BLNR), also referred to as the Land Board.54 For 
example, chapter 13 of the Hawai‘i Administrative Rules, promulgated 
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by BLNR, provides for a range of prohibited activities in all natural 
reserves, among them disruptive vehicle use, camping, construction of 
any kind, and the removal or injury of wildlife.55 The regulations make 
some allowances for hiking and hunting.56
 The Marine Life Conservation District (MLCD) was established to 
preserve unique areas of Hawai‘i’s marine environment, such as bays, 
shoals, and estuaries that are vulnerable to loss.57 These districts, desig-
nated by BLNR, are protected by regulations that prohibit certain activi-
ties, control allowable uses, and regulate scientifically related permits.58 
A separate regulation is issued for each district. Thus, for example, 
BLNR’s regulations governing the Waikīkī MLCD on O‘ahu prohibit 
fishing and possession, in the water, of any device that can be used to 
take marine or geological specimens.59 Additions to this variety of APC 
include the Wai‘ōpae Tidepools MLCD on Hawai‘i in June of 1983.
 The National Estuarine Research Reserve System was established 
by section 315 of the CZMA to provide long-term protection for natural 
areas so that they may be used for research, scientific, and educational 
purposes.60 The permitted uses of a sanctuary (which may include low-
intensity uses such as recreation, fishing, hunting, and wildlife observa-
tion) are determined on a case-by-case basis. Hawai‘i’s only reserve, the 
Waimanu Valley Estuarine Reserve, located in Waimanu Valley on the 
island of Hawai‘i, was withdrawn from the National Estuarine Research 
Reserve System in 1996.61
 The establishment of shoreline setback areas, also APCs, is left 
largely to the counties, in accordance with statutory guidelines. Thus, 
while the State Land Use Commission has the initial authority to estab-
lish a setback (of not less than twenty nor more than forty feet inland 
from the upper reaches of the wash of the waves), it is the counties that 
are specifically empowered to regulate, administer, and enlarge (by ordi-
nance) the land in such areas. This is subject to statutory prohibitions 
against permitting the construction of any structure, including seawalls 
unless they are necessary for the safety of a preexisting structure, or the 
removal of any sand, coral, rocks, or other beach material for commer-
cial purposes.62 Setbacks may also be established by private agreement. 
In Brescia v. North Shore Ohana, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court held that a 
developer’s more restrictive, self-imposed setbacks would be treated as 
the effective shoreline setback for that subdivision.63 Further, the Court 
held that setbacks imposed by restrictive covenant are not diminished 
by zoning ordinances or other statutory or administrative laws that are 
more permissive.64
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 Recall from Chapter 5 that the Hawai‘i Community Development 
Authority (HCDA) is responsible for developing and implementing 
community development plans and programs in underdeveloped or 
blighted areas designated by the legislature.65 This is significant for 
Hawai‘i’s CZ program because many urban developments are coastal 
related and because the authority has the power to override county con-
trols and regulations if necessary to better serve the public interest of the 
state. The program is treated as an area of particular concern because of 
its treatment of concentrated urban activities in areas where shoreline 
utilization and water uses are highly competitive. The Kaka‘ako area 
near downtown Honolulu was designated as the first area subject to the 
program because of its proximity to the coast and its potential impact in 
coastal development activities.
 Consideration, Consultation, Coordination, 
 and the Siting of Facilities
 Federal approval of any state coastal zone management program 
depends on a series of consultation, coordination, and participation 
efforts on the part of the state, not only with federal and local officials 
but with the general public as well. One element of management pro-
gram approval is the requirement that the state “adequately” consider 
the national interest when planning and siting facilities that “are of 
greater than local significance,” such as energy facilities.66 For energy 
facilities, the state must have considered any applicable national or 
interstate energy plan or program.67
 Of equal importance in the process of approval for state manage-
ment programs is the requirement that an environmental impact state-
ment be prepared under the National Environmental Policy Act, in 
which the state program must be explained in detail. Hawai‘i’s runs to 
several hundred pages.68
 Finally, the CZMA requires that states provide for participation by 
other state agencies, local governments, regional organizations, port 
authorities, and other “interested” public and private parties during the 
development of a management program. In addition, certain elements 
of the program must be coordinated with local, area-wide, and inter-
state plans applicable to the coastal zone. These include housing and 
land use plans, wastewater treatment facilities plans, highway plans, and 
flood insurance program plans.69 The process of coordination contin-
ues after program approval, especially where the state management pro-
gram decisions may conflict with a local zoning ordinance decision.70
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 In response to these requirements, the HCZMA declared the fol-
lowing matters to be in the national interest: (1) national defense, (2) 
mineral extraction, (3) energy facilities, energy research and energy 
reserves, and (4) resource conservation.71 However, as Hawai‘i has 
a local government structure consisting of but four counties, each of 
which has islandwide jurisdiction, the concept of “regional” benefit 
beyond local benefit is nearly impossible to apply, so the management 
program interprets the concept as applying to land and water uses of 
statewide benefit or of benefit to more than one county. The program 
declares the following uses to have regional benefit: (1) scientific field 
research, (2) marine-related research facilities, (3) energy research and 
development facilities, (4) mineral extraction, (5) intrastate or interna-
tional communication and transportation facilities, (6) mineral or fuel 
processing or transshipment facilities, and (7) national defense and 
coastal protection facilities.72
 Compliance
 The extent to which the CZMA as a voluntary program results in 
the achievement of federal statutory objectives depends on evaluation 
and compliance review. This the CZMA provides by requiring the Office 
of Coastal Zone Management (OCZM) to “conduct a continuing review 
of the performance of coastal states with respect to coastal manage-
ment.”73 Usually, evaluation takes place on an annual basis. The state 
prepares a response to an OCZM “information request,” OCZM repre-
sentatives visit the state, and the OCZM prepares “findings” based on 
both. If a state deviates without justification from its approved program, 
the OCZM has the authority to withdraw that program’s federal funds.
As experience with evaluations increases, the techniques for evaluation 
have become more sophisticated in theory, but they are frequently cha-
otic and highly subjective in practice. This may be due to the relatively 
broad goals to be accomplished by the review—program justification, 
information gathering, accountability—and the different perspectives 
state program managers and federal evaluators bring to the process.74 
Congress asks the OCZM, not the states, to account for money spent on 
coastal zone management programs. Nevertheless, it is at the state and 
local level that coastal zone management actually occurs.
Consistency
A major incentive (besides federal money) for states to participate 
in the coastal zone management program is the federal consistency 
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requirement in all states with approved coastal zone management pro-
grams. “Consistency” means that federal agencies must operate “to the 
maximum extent practicable”—that is, act, license, subsidize, and so 
forth—in a manner consistent with the objectives and policies of an 
approved state coastal zone management program.75 Because federal 
lands (which may, at the option of the federal government, be exempt 
from state and local zoning and subdivision laws) are excluded from the 
boundaries of state-defined coastal zone management areas, state and 
local coastal zone land use regulations do not apply to them.76 Thus, for 
any state with substantial federal coastal lands, like Hawai‘i, the consis-
tency provisions of the CZMA represent the principal method of review-
ing federal activities on these lands.
 The CZMA subjects five categories of federal actions to some con-
sistency with state management programs:
 (1) Federal activities (initial determination by federal 
agency).
 (2) Federal development projects (initial determination by 
federal agency).
 (3) Activities requiring a federal license or permit (initial 
determination by state agency).
 (4) Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) exploration, develop-
ment, and production activities (initial determination by U.S. 
Secretary of the Interior).
 (5) Federal assistance activities to state and local govern-
ments (initial determination made by the state).77
 In none of these categories is the federal government ultimately 
foreclosed from acting. Rather, the CZMA creates a hierarchy of 
reviews, findings, and high-level approvals before any action found to 
be inconsistent with an approved state coastal zone management plan 
may proceed.
 In Hawai‘i, DBEDT’s Office of Planning has primary respon-
sibility for reviewing federal programs, activities, permits, licenses, 
and development proposals for consistency with the state’s approved 
management program.78 The federal guidelines, discussed below, 
guide the Office of Planning in making consistency determinations 
on activities and development projects. All other federal actions in 
the coastal zone are reviewed by the appropriate federal agency for an 
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initial consistency decision before the Office of Planning’s consistency 
determination.79
 Federal Agency Activities and Development Projects
 Federal agency activities and development projects affecting the 
coastal zone must be consistent with state management plans to the 
maximum extent practicable. A “federal agency activity” is any function 
performed by or on behalf of a federal agency in the exercise of its 
statutory responsibilities.80 A “federal development project” is an activ-
ity involving the planning, construction, modification, or removal of 
public works, facilities, or other structures and the acquisition, utiliza-
tion, or disposal of land or water resources.81 The phrase “affecting the 
coastal zone” is defined as an activity that has “reasonably foreseeable 
direct [or] indirect effects on any coastal use or resource.”82 Federal 
development projects within the coastal zone are to be considered as 
affecting it, while all other types of federal activity either in or outside 
that zone may be “determined” to affect it after review by the acting 
federal agency.83 In borderline cases, “affecting the coastal zone” is sup-
posed to be “broadly construed.”
 The phrase “consistent to the maximum extent practicable” 
means that activities and development projects must be consistent with 
approved state management programs unless another law defining 
the acting federal agency’s activities prohibits such consistency. Then, 
the federal agency must point out to the state the law that prohib-
its consistency. However, consistency with an approved management 
plan is required of a federal agency only “to the maximum extent 
practicable.”84
 Finally, it is only the so-called enforceable policies of the state 
management program with which federal activities and projects must 
be consistent. Provisions that are in the nature of recommendations 
require mere “consideration.” What consistency requirements there are 
therefore depend to a large extent upon the level and sophistication of 
the approved state coastal zone management program.85
 Conflict over consistency does arise. An example is the disagree-
ment between DBEDT (then the Department of Planning and Economic 
Development) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) over 
proposed federal regulations (an “activity”) for the harvesting of pre-
cious coral. The state gave the Land Board jurisdiction over coral, and 
the board has issued regulations that heavily restricted where coral could 
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be harvested and by what means. The proposed federal regulations 
allowed harvesting in more areas and by nonselective (nets, dredges, 
and so on) means. DBEDT had notified NMFS that it disagreed with 
the NMFS determination that the proposed regulations were consistent 
with Hawai‘i’s Coastal Zone Management Program to the maximum 
extent practicable.86
 Activities Requiring a Federal License
 Any applicant for a federal license or permit to conduct an activ-
ity affecting the coastal zone must show that the activity complies with 
and will be conducted in a manner consistent with a state’s approved 
management program, without which the permit or license may not 
be issued.87 A federal license or permit is an authorization, certifica-
tion, approval, or other form of permission that any federal agency 
is authorized to issue to an applicant, except for projects that involve 
outer continental shelf exploration and development.88 An applicant is 
virtually anyone who files an application for a federal license or permit 
to conduct an activity in the coastal zone. This could be an individual, 
a public or private corporation, partnership, association, or any other 
entity organized or existing under state and local government.89
 The phrase “affecting the coastal zone,” like “directly affecting the 
coastal zone,” is not defined. Presumably the difference in language 
signals a difference in thresholds, with a federal license held to a higher 
standard in applying consistency regulations. In the same vein, “in a 
manner consistent” (also undefined) differs from the phrase “consis-
tent to the maximum extent practicable,” which is applied to federal 
activities and development projects.
 In contrast to federal activities and projects where the federal 
agency makes the initial determination, whether or not a federal license 
or permit activity affects the coastal zone is initially determined by the 
state, which lists the permits and licenses that will be subject to con-
sistency review in their management programs. Once it is determined 
that a permit or license activity is subject to consistency requirements, 
the applicant must prepare and furnish to the state and the issuing 
federal agency a certificate indicating that the proposed activity will be 
consistent with the state’s approved management program. If the state 
objects to the certification, the federal agency may not issue the license 
or permit until the applicant successfully appeals to the secretary of 
Commerce, who may permit the activity either because it is in the inter-
ests of national security or it is consistent with the CZMA. In so finding, 
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the secretary must determine that there is no reasonable alternative 
available.90
 OCS Exploration, Development, and Production
Leases for OCS projects require the approval of the secretary of the Inte-
rior.91 An applicant submits a plan for the required license or permit, 
describing federal license and permit activities in detail, which must be 
conducted in a manner consistent with an approved state management 
plan.92 The procedure for consistency determination is virtually identical 
to the aforementioned federal license and permit activities procedure. 
Any OCS activities for which the secretary failed to require a description 
in the OCS plan were theoretically caught up in the consistency require-
ments for federal permits and licenses generally,93 and the federal 
courts upheld stringent state and local permit programs based upon 
such consistency determinations, despite industrial complaints about 
both the programs and their enforcement to regulate OCS exploration 
and development.94 However, in Secretary of the Interior v. California,95 the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the lease and sale of OCS resources by 
the secretary of the Interior in 1982 did not directly affect California’s 
coastal zone under the California-approved coastal zone management 
plan. Therefore the secretary could ignore the federal CZMA by selling 
oil and gas leases without making a consistency determination under 
section 307(c)(1) of that act. Essentially, the Court held that the sale of 
OCS oil and gas leases is not an activity “directly affecting” the coastal 
zone, thus obviating the need for a consistency review. It based that 
decision on an interpretation of congressional intent not to subject 
such lease sales to consistency review. In response, Congress amended 
the federal CZMA to make clear that oil and gas leases constituted 
federal activities subject to consistency review.96 By doing so, Congress 
protected the only form of control coastal states may exert over federal 
activities affecting the coastal zone.
 Preemption
 Federal laws supersede state laws where Congress intends to be the 
sole authority on a particular issue or where state law directly conflicts 
with federal law. In states that participate in CZMA regulation, does the 
federal CZMA represent the extent to which the participating state may 
regulate its coastal lands? This question arose in California Coastal Com-
mission v. Granite Rock Co.97 In Granite Rock, a mining company objected 
to California’s imposition of permitting requirements on the mining 
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company’s operations on federal lands. The mining company raised 
three arguments: first, that the federal government’s environmental 
regulations over mining claims demonstrated an intent to preempt any 
state regulations; second, that as state land use regulations were pre-
empted by federal regulations, the same should follow for the state’s 
permit requirement; and finally, that because the CZMA had excluded 
federal lands from its definition of the “coastal zone,” it follows that 
there was a legislative intent to exclude all federal lands from state 
coastal zone regulation.98
 Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor held that Congress explic-
itly expressed its intent not to preempt state regulation through the 
CZMA and that, even if federal lands were excluded from the CZMA 
definition of “coastal zone,” the CZMA does not prevent a state from 
regulating activity on federal lands.99 First, examination of applicable 
federal laws revealed an intent to comply with, not preempt, state laws. 
For example, federal laws required that all operators comply with state 
air and waste disposal regulations and that all plans of operations must 
be approved by both federal and state laws.100 Second, while the Court 
appeared to concede that a state land use regulation would be preempted 
by a federal land use regulation, it held that the permit requirement 
in this case was merely an environmental regulation. The Court drew 
a sharp distinction between “land-use planning” and “environmental 
regulation.” While the former “in essence choose particular uses for 
the land,” the latter “does not mandate particular uses of the land but 
requires only that, however the land is used, damage to the environ-
ment is kept within prescribed limits.”101 Accordingly, the Court did not 
address whether state land use planning was preempted by the federal 
land use plan but held that the permit requirement was not preempted, 
as it did not seek to prohibit the mining company’s activities, just regu-
late it. Finally, the Court found that the statutory language of the CZMA 
itself expressly indicated that it was not intended to be “an independent 
cause of preemption except in cases of actual conflict.”102 The CZMA 
explicitly declared that it was not intended to diminish federal or state 
authority or “change interstate agreements”; accordingly, the Court 
found that the CZMA could not be used as a source to preempt all state 
regulation of activities on federal lands.103
 Federal Assistance to State and Local Government
 Federal funds for state and local activities affecting the coastal 
zone (highways, sewage treatment, urban renewal) may be granted 
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only when consistent with an approved state management program, as 
determined by review.104 Assistance is broadly defined as grants or con-
tractual arrangements, loans, subsidies, guarantees, insurance, or other 
forms of financial aid. There are two steps to state and local assistance 
consistency review. First, the state must decide on what assistance pro-
grams are subject to consistency review. Normally, the state will list these 
assistance programs in its management program. Should the affected 
federal agency disagree, either the state or the federal agency may seek 
a determination either by the Secretary of Commerce or by judicial 
review. Once the state and federal agency are agreed that the assistance 
program is subject to consistency review, local or state agencies applying 
for that assistance must notify the state reviewing agency. If that agency 
determines the assistance activity is inconsistent with the approved state 
coastal zone management plan, the federal agency is prohibited from 
making that assistance available unless the state or local applicant suc-
cessfully appeals to the Secretary of Commerce, who may override the 
state review agency in the interests of national security or consistency 
with the goals of the CZMA.105
 In sum, the coastal zone program in Hawai‘i consists primarily of a 
state-local regulatory partnership that owes much but not by any means 
all to the federal guidelines and standards framework that accompanied 
the federal funds used to develop the program. Key to its implementa-
tion are county SMA permit procedures and state APC management 
programs. A growing issue, if not a problem in Hawai‘i, is the way in 
which the CZMA program regulatory scheme—especially where net-
working is involved—intersects, overlaps, and conflicts with other fed-
eral or federally mandated programs, especially as those programs are 
carried out at the local level. In a way, some of these problems are at 
least examined under the so-called 312 Evaluation Process, under which 
state CZM programs are regularly reviewed and rated.106 Others have 
been the subject of report and concern at the federal level, especially 
the potential conflict between federally suggested rules and statutes for 
the location of transportation facilities and various flood hazard and 
coastal zone regulatory programs. It is at least probable since the Texas 
Landowners Rights Assoc. v. Harris case in 1978 that the federal govern-
ment will continue to duck behind the nonrequirement shield when 
such conflicts surface.107 Briefly, the argument is that since most federal 
programs are voluntary, and the regulatory programs that may come 
with the federal program (and federal money, the key inducement usu-
ally for state and local governments to “volunteer”) therefore avoidable, 
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the conflicts, if any, are state-local problems and represent no legal fed-
eral involvement. While this may be legally correct, it is hardly defen-
sible in terms of actual conflict resolution, programmatic coordination, 
and efficiency.
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Chapter 7
Floodplains and FEMA
Disaster protection as a policy goal sounds unassailable. In practice, 
it is a barely mitigated catastrophe. This is in part due to the tendency 
to build houses in floodplains and coastal hazard areas, despite the vir-
tually certain knowledge that a flood will one day destroy whatever is 
built there. Living in flood-prone areas, whether riverine or coastal, will 
eventually be costly, if not disastrous. In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina 
ravaged the Gulf Coast region of the United States, causing over $80 bil-
lion in damages and over 1,300 direct fatalities.1 Less cataclysmic but no 
less devastating, Tropical Storm Ike swept through southeastern Texas, 
causing severe damage, injuries, and deaths in Galveston and Houston.2 
After the storm, however, citizens and officials of the devastated areas 
commenced rebuilding on the same land.3
 In Hawai‘i, the flood hazard is both riverine and coastal. Heavy 
rainfall causes riverine flooding, resulting in the temporary rise of the 
water level of streams and other natural watercourses. When the car-
rying capacity of watercourses is exceeded, the adjacent lands, or the 
floodplain, are inundated. One example of riverine flooding is the Hal-
loween Eve 2004 flood in Mānoa Valley on the island of O‘ahu. On 
Saturday, October 30, nine inches of rain fell in Mānoa Valley within a 
six-hour period. The storm washed trees and debris into Mānoa Stream, 
forming a dam. A four-foot-high wall of water flowed down the valley, 
through the Institute for Astronomy, several schools, and eventually 
made its way to the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, “damaging 200 
homes and businesses and causing an estimated $80 million in damage 
to the University and to the Mānoa community.”4
 In contrast, coastal flooding occurs when unusual surf conditions 
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or tsunamis generate waves that inundate shoreline areas. Damage from 
tsunamis is due not only to flooding but also results from the velocity of 
onrushing water. Tsunamis also cause extensive beach and shoreline ero-
sion. There is no more graphic an example of the destructive power of 
a tsunami than the December 2004 tsunami that struck Southeast Asia. 
An earthquake with a magnitude of 9.15 on the Richter scale generated 
a wave that killed some 150,000 people5 and displaced at least another 
500,000.6 Hawai‘i experienced a major tsunami in 1960. That tsunami, 
which reached a height of thirty-five feet, killed sixty-one people and 
caused an estimated $155 million (in present value) of damage to the 
Hilo community.7
 The U.S. mainland shares many characteristics with coastal areas 
of Hawai‘i in terms of coastal flooding. Likewise, the disastrous 2004 
stream overflow floods on the island of O‘ahu near Mānoa were similar 
to riverine floods that occur on the mainland. Relatively speaking, how-
ever, coastal flooding has more potential for damage in Hawai‘i because 
of the intense development of Hawai‘i’s coastal zone.
 The floodplain is the land area on either side of a river that is likely 
to be inundated in the event of a hundred-year flood, so named because 
of the 1 percent statistical likelihood of its occurring in any one year 
or, conversely, the likelihood of its occurring but once every hundred 
years.8 However, such floods have occurred with alarming frequency on 
the U.S. mainland in the past two decades.9 The floodway is that portion 
of the floodplain adjacent to and including the river channel that is 
expected to carry the greatest volume and flow (velocity) of floodwaters, 
including those of lesser frequency than a hundred-year flood.10 Com-
mon sense dictates that no structures should be built in the latter and 
as few as possible in the former, not only to decrease the likelihood of 
personal and property injury, but also to preserve the capacity of the 
floodway to carry water and the floodplain to absorb it. Development in 
either simply causes more water to flow both laterally and downstream, 
thus enlarging the area of both floodplain and floodway and increasing 
the velocity of floodwaters and the likelihood of both downstream and 
upstream damage to any structures.11
 This brief sketch of the hazards of flooding may help to explain 
and justify, in legal terms, floodplain zoning: the exercise of police 
power to prevent damage to life and property from floodwaters. Indeed, 
many courts have precious little difficulty in sustaining local regulation 
of both coastal and riverine flood-prone lands in principle, although 
other courts have held that if the prohibition of use goes too far, a “tak-
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ing” of property results for which compensation is due.12 This is particu-
larly true when the protective rationale appears to be tainted by other 
public purposes such as the need for open space or the preservation of 
views.13
 Nevertheless, the theoretical public purpose behind the local regu-
lation of flood-prone lands—the protection of life and property—is 
well established. This is particularly critical because the Flood Disaster 
Protection Act (FDPA) and its predecessors require nothing unless 
and until a community chooses to become part of a federal program, 
which it does largely because of various financial inducements.14 Thus, 
the issue of federal power to enact floodplain/flood disaster protection 
laws never arises; it is always the local ordinance that does the regulat-
ing. One of the key issues in discussing the regulatory aspects of the 
federal flood laws is thus local court attitude toward floodplain zoning. 
In Hawai‘i, this issue has yet to be decided by the state’s highest court.
The Flood Disaster Protection Act
The federal government has been in the flood control business for over 
three-quarters of a century since the Mississippi River Valley flooded 
in 1927.15 Acknowledging “the considerable risk to life and property 
arising out of the continued development of the floodplain,” Congress 
enacted the Omnibus Flood Control Act of 1936.16 Essentially, federal 
flood control programs have approached flood hazard by (1) attempt-
ing to control floods by various preventive measures—dams, levees, 
reservoirs, as in New Orleans, with obviously limited results—and (2) 
regulating the use of land within the floodplain. It was the insurance 
aspect of flood hazard mitigation that involved the government in flood 
control through the promulgation of land use regulations. As a con-
dition of providing flood hazard insurance—in order to minimize the 
extent of claims thereon—early programs directed first that the state or 
local government with jurisdiction over an insurance applicant’s prop-
erty must first adopt floodplain zoning restrictions sufficient to reduce 
flood damages, and second that the property proposed to be insured 
had not been declared by an appropriate public body to be in violation 
of those floodplain zoning laws.
 For a variety of reasons—including lack of congressional funding—
the first attempt to promote floodplain regulation at the state and local 
level failed.17 Nevertheless, the insurance aspect of flood hazard mitiga-
tion became firmly engrafted onto the federal flood hazard program. 
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Hurricane Betsy gave it considerable impetus in 1965. Betsy, destroyed 
1,500 homes, damaged 150,000, damaged or destroyed 1,400 farms and 
small businesses, and adversely affected close to a million people in 
Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi.18 As a result, the federal government 
developed the first comprehensive disaster protection act: the National 
Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (FIA).19
 FIA set out clearly the dichotomy between individual and com-
munity participation in a federally sponsored flood hazard mitigation 
disaster relief program. Under the terms of the act, eligibility for feder-
ally backed private flood insurance for primarily residential properties 
depended upon state and local community participation in the pro-
gram. A condition for participation for the community was the formal 
adoption of a land management system based upon permanent land use 
controls, such as zoning, subdivision, a hazard mitigation plan, building 
requirements, flood control projects, floodproofing of buildings, flood 
warning systems, and emergency preparedness plans.20 A condition of 
eligibility for private individuals was compliance with these state or local 
controls. No federally subsidized insurance—and therefore usually no 
flood hazard insurance—was available in areas in which the state and 
local government chose not to participate. There was nothing the pri-
vate individual could do to become eligible. Nor was there any sanction 
against nonparticipation by state and local government beyond the pen-
alty that ultimately fell on the private landowner—no subsidized flood 
insurance. The number of policies in force in the United States has 
increased from about 95,000 before the Flood Disaster Protection Act 
of 1973 to 2.2 million in 1989 and to over 4.3 million in 2002.21
 When flood insurance first became available under the National 
Flood Insurance Act of 1968, the City and County of Honolulu and the 
Hilo area of the County of Hawai‘i were among the first communities 
in the nation to become eligible.22 Under the program, it is the local 
governmental units, not the states, that are the primary implementing 
agencies. The role of the states is limited to assisting and coordinating 
local government efforts.23 The State of Hawai‘i specifically authorized 
the mayor or executive officer and the councils of its four counties 
to participate in and to pass the flood zoning ordinances required by 
the program. The State Department of Land and Natural Resources 
(DLNR) was designated to coordinate the program.24
 A major defect of the FIA was its failure to “equate federal assistance 
with the purchase of flood insurance.”25 As a result, Congress enacted the 
FDPA of 1973 (as amended) with the purpose of discouraging the build-
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ing of structures on floodplains as well as providing relief to victims of 
floods.26 It is supposed to do this by making available federally subsidized 
insurance to those who have suffered flood damage on the condition 
that the local government in whose jurisdiction they reside passes certain 
restrictive land development and flood-proofing regulations. It increased 
considerably the penalty that flood-prone communities—and their resi-
dents—would suffer for choosing not to participate in the program and 
its accompanying land use and flood-proofing regulations. Collectively, 
the National Flood Insurance Act and the Flood Disaster Protection Act 
are known as the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).
 A principal sanction against communities that opt not to partici-
pate in NFIP is that no federal aid is available for the building of struc-
tures in flood hazard areas subject to the jurisdiction of nonparticipat-
ing local governments. This includes urban renewal aid, Clean Water 
Act assistance, wastewater treatment grants, and a host of other federal 
aid programs.27 Individuals in nonparticipating communities are not 
eligible for federal disaster assistance of any kind. Individuals living 
in flood-prone areas in participating communities that fail to obtain 
flood insurance are not only excluded from receiving federal disaster 
aid, but they are also ineligible for mortgage loans from any federally 
insured lending institution. The latter can be very effective, since feder-
ally insured lending institutions control more than 80 percent of the 
available funds for residential purchase-money mortgages.28
The Sequence of Federal Actions under the NFIP
The number of communities having flood-proofed and regulated flood 
hazard areas as a result of participation in NFIP was at first fairly small. 
This was so because of the relatively onerous and time-consuming tasks 
that NFIP imposes on the federal government before it can make flood-
proofing and development regulation demands of participating com-
munities. Basically, these tasks are to identify the flood-prone areas of a 
community and to determine flood elevations so as to ascertain the level 
at which habitable dwellings must be constructed in these areas. These 
tasks are carried out by the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Adminis-
tration (FIMA), which is a part of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA).
 First, FIMA prepares maps for the community showing the gen-
eral flood hazard areas, beginning with a Flood Hazard Boundary Map 
(FHBM), defined as “an official map of a community issued by the 
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Federal Insurance Administrator, where the boundaries of the flood, 
mudslide (i.e., mudflow) related erosion areas having special hazards 
have been designated as Zone A, M, and/or E.”29 Zone A is the area of 
special flood hazard in the community in which land in the floodplain 
is subject to a 1 percent or greater chance of flooding in any given year. 
Zone M is the area of special mudslide hazard in the community in 
which land is most likely to be subject to severe mudslides. Zone E is the 
area of special flood-related erosion hazard in the community in which 
land is most likely to be subject to severe flood-related erosion losses.
 After issuing the FHBM, the administrator must then notify the 
chief executive officer of the relevant community of any flood hazards 
identified by the FHBM.30 At this point, the community must either 
(1) promptly apply to participate in the program or (2) within twelve 
months submit technical data to show that the community is not flood 
prone.31 In order to qualify for federally subsidized flood insurance, a 
community must adopt and enforce floodplain management regula-
tions addressing the flood hazards within its jurisdiction.32
 In practice, when a disaster occurs, FEMA will “coordinate federal 
assistance efforts and designate specific areas eligible for such assis-
tance.”33 An example of FEMA in action occurred during the February 
and March 2006 flooding on O‘ahu and Kaua‘i. During this period, 
the state experienced heavy rainfall that resulted in severe flooding, 
landslides, mudslides, and the failure of the Kaloko Reservoir dam 
on Kaua‘i, resulting in the deaths of seven people. Damage from the 
flooding was estimated at $50 million. President Bush declared a major 
disaster, which qualified the Islands for federal disaster relief. The gov-
ernor’s office stated that the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Small 
Business Administration, and FEMA would make an announcement on 
how residents could apply for disaster assistance.34 Furthermore, a fed-
eral disaster assistance coordinating officer was appointed to meet with 
the state vice director of Civil Defense.35
 If the community fails to become a participant in the program 
within one year of notification and fails to show it is not flood prone, it 
is subject to the sanctions imposed on nonparticipating communities. 
FIMA can suspend communities from the program for failure to adopt 
(once the community is notified of being flood prone) or to maintain a 
floodplain management ordinance that meets or exceeds the minimum 
requirements of the NFIP.36 Since 1968, just over 2,300 communities 
have been suspended for failure to adopt a floodplain management 
ordinance.37
 Floodplains and FEMA 241
 If the community decides to participate in the program, it must 
satisfy certain eligibility requirements discussed later in this chapter. It 
will then be allowed to enter the “emergency” phase of the program. 
Under this phase, the community is eligible for lower level “first layer” 
insurance at subsidized rates,38 but it must utilize data from any federal, 
state, or other source to establish minimum land use and construc-
tion standards in flood-prone areas.39 At this stage of the program, the 
local government must require permits for all proposed development; 
it must review permits for a determination of reasonable safety from 
flooding and for compliance with federal and state laws; and it must 
enforce certain design, construction, and placement standards for all 
new construction and for substantial improvements.40
 Communities are not eligible to enter the regular phase of the pro-
gram until they adopt and approve strict floodplain regulation. Maxi-
mum insurance coverage is available to homeowners in communities 
participating under the regular phase of the program. The City and 
County of Honolulu and the County of Hawai‘i entered the emergency 
phase of the NFIP and became eligible to provide subsidized flood 
insurance on June 5, 1970, when preliminary FHBMs were issued. The 
Hilo area became eligible under the regular phase of the program on 
June 4, 1971. Other areas of the county have been participating in the 
emergency portion of the program since March 5, 1971. Maui County 
entered the emergency phase and became eligible to provide subsidized 
flood insurance on September 18, 1970. Its preliminary FHBM was not 
issued until December 6, 1977. The County of Kaua‘i entered the emer-
gency phase of the program and became eligible to provide subsidized 
flood insurance on April 2, 1971. Its FHBM was issued on December 20, 
1974.41
 After filing a detailed environmental impact statement, the admin-
istrator must next publish the more detailed Flood Insurance Rate Map 
(FIRM), which is established by a community’s Flood Insurance Study 
(FIS). The FIRM sets out for each area identified as flood prone (by the 
FHBM) a refined identification of special flood hazard and flood eleva-
tion areas.42 It is “an official map of a community, on which the Federal 
Insurance Administrator has delineated both the special hazard areas 
and the risk premium zones applicable to the community.”43 The FIRM 
is prepared after an FIS for the community has been completed and 
general risk insurance premium rates have been established.44 The risk 
premium zones are considerable both in number and detail.45
 FIMA determines the 1 percent annual-chance flood, shown on the 
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FIRMs as A Zones or V Zones, from information obtained through con-
sultation with the community, floodplain topographic surveys, detailed 
hydrologic and hydraulic analyses, and historic records. FIMA uses com-
monly accepted computer models and engineering methods that esti-
mate hydrologic and hydraulic conditions to determine the 1 percent 
annual-chance flood, to determine flood elevations, and to designate 
flood-risk zones.46 These flood elevations are shown on the FIRM and 
are the minimum building levels for new construction.47
 Concerned that FIMA was not adequately considering local com-
munity views, Congress added a consultation and appeal procedure for 
flood elevation determinations as part of the NFIP. Whenever FIMA 
determines or modifies flood elevations, it is required to inform the 
community of the nature and purposes of the study, the areas involved, 
the manner in which the study is to be undertaken, the general prin-
ciples and methods employed, and the use to be made of the data 
obtained.48
 There follows a host of publication, notice, and hearing require-
ments, the upshot of which is that until the process is completed and 
FIMA makes a proposed final determination of flood elevations and 
so notifies the community, the community remains eligible under the 
emergency phase for federally subsidized flood insurance (and, there-
fore, the land use impacts of the program may be minimal). Moreover, 
the determination of elevations also signals the earliest date from which 
a participating community can be required to adopt local land use con-
trol measures.
 Honolulu received its detailed FIRM from the FIMA on March 3, 
1980, and it took effect on September 3, 1980. There has been con-
siderable activity statewide under the NFIP because FIRMs have been 
approved in all areas of the state. This means that detailed flood hazard 
regulations must be enacted in all counties.49 Some already have been, 
as discussed below.
Land Use Controls
Assuming a local community desires to participate in the NFIP—in 
order for its citizens to permanently receive maximum subsidized flood 
insurance and for the community to become eligible for other federal 
programs—it must meet a number of eligibility requirements.50 Many of 
these are largely administrative, directing the community to outline the 
manner in which it is (or is proposed to be) complying with the land use 
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control and flood protection requirements described below. These are 
the heart of the land use control aspects of the NFIP, for they virtually 
dictate what kinds of regulatory programs must be locally enacted once 
FIMA has issued FHBMs and FIRMs as described above.
 The NFIP provides that flood insurance may not be sold or renewed 
under the program in a community unless the community has adopted 
adequate floodplain management regulations consistent with federal 
criteria.51 Such regulations must be enforceable, applied uniformly 
throughout the community to all privately and publicly owned land 
within flood-prone, mudslide, or flood-related erosion areas and must 
take precedence over any less restrictive conflicting local laws, ordi-
nances, or codes. The type of land use regulations required depends 
on the amount of the information that FIMA has provided to the com-
munity.52 A community is considered to be participating as soon as it has 
begun the emergency phase.
 A participating community’s land use regulation obligations start 
when the community has identified a floodway or coastal high-hazard 
area within its boundaries in an application to participate in NFIP, even 
though the FIMA has provided no information—certainly no FHBM—
whatsoever on flood data at that point. The community’s land use obli-
gations are thus negligible, amounting to little more than requiring per-
mits for developments and identifying those developments that will be 
newly constructed or substantially improved in flood-prone areas and 
seeing that they are constructed in a reasonable flood-proof manner.53
 Upon FIMA’s publication of a participating community’s FHBM 
but before identification of either water surface elevation or floodway/
coastal high-hazard area, the level of required regulation increases 
modestly. Large subdivisions must provide the community with flood 
elevation data, and the community must seek out and use whatever 
other flood elevation data is available. Utilizing that flood elevation 
data, the community must require all new residential constructions to 
have the lowest floor (including basement) elevated to or above the 
base flood level and all new nonresidential structures to be either so 
raised or flood-proofed. The community must also assure that the flood 
carrying capacity of any related or relocated portion of any watercourse 
is maintained.54
 When FIMA locates final base flood elevations in certain zones on 
a participating community’s FIRM, the land use requirements become 
more complicated, even though FIMA has not yet identified either a 
regulatory floodway or coastal high-hazard area. The zones in which 
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flood-proofing or construction above base flood levels must be required 
(unless exceptions or variances are granted) are expanded. Moreover, 
until the regulatory floodway is defined, no new construction, substan-
tial improvements, or other developments are to be permitted within 
certain zones unless it can be demonstrated that the cumulative effect 
thereof, when combined with all other existing and anticipated devel-
opment, will not increase the water surface elevation of the base flood 
more than one foot at any point within the community.55
 Once FIMA has provided additional flood elevation data on a par-
ticipating community’s FIRM, including data from which the community 
“shall” designate its regulatory floodway, the community must “select 
and adopt” such a floodway and prohibit encroachments (including fill) 
that would result in any increase in flood levels in the community during 
a flood.56 Finally, when FIMA has provided similar flood elevation data 
to coastal participating communities (such as Hawai‘i) and has identi-
fied in their FIRMs a coastal high-hazard area, the community must see 
that all new construction within that zone is located landward of the 
reach of the mean high tide and is elevated so the lowest floor is above 
the flood level and the lower levels of buildings have breakaway walls.57
 As NFIP reached its twenty-fifth anniversary, Congress realized that 
the program had failed to achieve its original goals of providing afford-
able flood insurance to property owners and encouraging state and 
local governments to make land use adjustments to minimize damage 
caused by flood losses.58 In response, Congress enacted reforms to NFIP 
that sought to increase compliance with insurance purchase require-
ments by lenders and secondary market purchasers, reduce the number 
of properties in the program that do not comply with flood protection 
standards, strengthen the Community Rating System (CRS) program 
that provides incentives in the form of reduced premiums to communi-
ties that voluntarily adopted and enforced stricter measures to reduce 
the risk of flood damage, and provide grants to states and communities 
that engage in activities mitigating the risk of flooding.59
 In response to long-standing criticism of NFIP,60 the legislation also 
authorized studies of possible future reforms.61 The most important of 
these are several related studies that respond to criticism that insurance 
rates for coastal properties are based solely on the risk posed by flood-
ing and do not reflect the significant risks represented by the effects of 
erosion. As a result, the argument is that owners of coastal properties 
pay flood insurance premiums that do not reflect the true scope of the 
risk of damage to their properties.62
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1994 Amendments
The 1994 amendments to NFIP provide for a voluntary community 
rating system program to provide incentives in the form of credits on 
premium rates for flood insurance for measures that reduce the risk of 
flood or erosion damage.63 Such credits are available for flood insur-
ance coverage in communities the director of FEMA determines have 
adopted and enforced measures that reduce the risk of flooding and 
erosion damage exceeding specified criteria.64 In addition, the 1994 
amendments to the NFIP created the Mitigation Assistance Program.65 
This program provides grants to states and communities for planning 
and carrying out activities designed to reduce the risk of flood damage 
to structures covered by flood insurance under the NFIP.66 To be eli-
gible for financial assistance under this program, a state or community 
must develop a flood risk mitigation plan to be approved by the director 
of FEMA.67
 The 1994 amendments also made several changes in the insurance 
purchase requirements in an effort to increase compliance by lenders 
and secondary market purchasers.68 The 1994 act requires federal agen-
cies regulating financial institutions69 to issue “any regulations neces-
sary” to direct lending institutions to meet the requirement that they 
not make, increase, extend, or renew any loan secured by improved 
real estate or a mobile home located in an identified flood hazard area 
in which flood insurance was available, unless the building or mobile 
home and any personal property securing the loan was covered for the 
term of the loan by flood insurance in an amount at least equal to the 
lesser of the outstanding principal balance of the loan or the maximum 
limit of coverage available under the act with respect to the particular 
type of property.70
 The act also addresses the problem caused by borrowers who, hav-
ing experienced an insured flood loss and not expecting another flood, 
cease payment of their insurance flood premiums during the term of 
their loan. The act now requires that financial institutions that put aside 
taxes, insurance premiums, or any other fees or charges for applicable 
noncommercial loans do the same for all premiums and fees for flood 
insurance.71
 Other provisions of the 1994 act imposing new obligations on lend-
ers include the following: (1) increasing the requirement that lenders 
and servicers that determine that a building or mobile home and any 
personal property securing an applicable loan is not covered by flood 
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insurance—or is covered in an inadequate amount—must purchase 
flood insurance on behalf of a borrower and may charge the borrower 
for the cost of premiums and fees incurred when a borrower fails to 
purchase such flood insurance within forty-five days of being notified 
of the lack or inadequacy of such flood insurance;72 (2) obligating fed-
eral agencies to publish regulations requiring financial institutions to 
notify FEMA of the servicer of any loan covered by flood insurance and 
also requiring them to notify FEMA of any change in the servicer of 
any loan covered by flood insurance no later than sixty days after the 
effective date of the change;73 and (3) subjecting financial institutions 
to civil penalties if found to have a pattern or practice of committing 
violations of the insurance requirements, escrow provisions, flood insur-
ance notice requirements, or the “forced placing” of flood insurance 
provisions.74 The penalties may increase to $350 for each violation, 
up to an aggregate of $100,000 in a single calendar year.75 Despite the 
importance of the 1994 amendments to NFIP, however, the core of the 
program itself has basically not changed since the 1970s.
Hawai‘i Participation in the Flood Insurance Program
Since Honolulu’s FIRM includes base flood elevations, floodways, and 
coastal high-hazard areas, the city was required to adopt the strictest 
federal land use requirements by the effective date of the FIRM in order 
to comply with the program. On August 20, 1980, the mayor approved 
amendments to the Comprehensive Zoning Code (CZC), Building 
Code, Electrical Code, and Plumbing Code to satisfy federal require-
ments.76 FIMA reviewed these amendments and stated that they meet 
the federal land use requirements of the program.77
 The former flood districts section of the CZC was amended in its 
entirety and replaced by a new ordinance in 1999, which takes prece-
dence over any less restrictive or conflicting law or regulation of the 
city.78 The flood hazard districts ordinance establishes four districts: 
floodway, flood fringe, coastal high hazard, and general floodplain. The 
flood hazard districts cover all areas so designated on the FHBMs and 
FIRMs prepared by FIMA.79 They are overlay districts, and all land uses 
within these districts must comply with their regulations as well as with 
the applicable restrictions of the underlying zoning district. The new 
ordinance then sets out permitted uses and provides general construc-
tion standards for each district. It also contains sections dealing with 
variances, exemptions, and nonconforming uses, all as required by the 
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federal program. The director of the Department of Planning and Per-
mitting (DPP), with the assistance of the chief engineer of the Depart-
ment of Public Works and the building superintendent, is responsible 
for the ordinance’s administration.
 The ordinance begins by setting forth a series of broad and gen-
eral construction, water, and drainage standards applicable to develop-
ments in all four districts. Individual standards for each district follow, 
with the degree of restriction dependent upon the likelihood of and 
proximity to a flooded area. Since it comprises the areas required to 
carry or discharge the flood without increasing the flood elevation of 
the floodplain more than one foot at any point, the floodway district 
is the most heavily restricted district. Only a few uses having low flood 
damage potential, such as agricultural uses and drainage improve-
ments, are permitted, and then only if they do not adversely affect 
the carrying capacity of the floodway.80 The flood fringe district, the 
portion of the floodplain outside the floodway, is considerably more 
permissive. Uses otherwise allowable in the underlying zoning district 
are permitted, provided that the lowest habitable floor is elevated to 
the regulatory flood level (the hundred-year flood) as shown on the 
FIRM.81 The restrictions in the coastal high hazard district, the area 
subject to high-velocity waters including tsunamis, are similar to those 
in the flood fringe district.82
 Finally, the regulations in the general floodplain district—con-
sisting of the approximate floodplain area as delineated on the flood 
maps where detailed engineering studies have not been conducted to 
designate flood fringe and floodway areas—subject all developments 
on a project-by-project basis to review/approval by the DPP director 
to determine if the proposed development is within a flood fringe or 
floodway.83 This is to accommodate those areas where base flood eleva-
tions have not yet been determined by the federal government, making 
further mapping impossible. Until a floodway or flood fringe district is 
designated, no development is allowed if it increases the water surface 
elevation more than one foot at any point. Nearly identical provisions 
apply to proposed developments adjacent to a stream, river, or drainage 
facility outside one of the four zones.84
 In the County of Hawai‘i, flood hazard regulations are contained in 
Chapter 27 of the Hawai‘i County Code. The Hawai‘i County Code pro-
vides for floodplain regulation in five distinct areas based on the FIRM 
of the island. The floodway area is watercourse reserved to discharge the 
base flood without cumulatively increasing the water surface elevation 
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more than one foot.85 Development in this area is prohibited unless a 
registered professional engineer can certify that the encroachment will 
not cause any increase in the base flood elevation.86 The flood fringe 
area is the area of a floodplain on either side of the designated floodway 
where encroachment may be permitted.87 The coastal high hazard area, 
also known as the tsunami inundation area, is the special flood haz-
ard area extending from offshore inland that is subject to high-velocity 
wave action from storms or seismic sources.88 Any new construction or 
substantial improvements are required to follow a number of provi-
sions, including using materials and utility equipment resistant to flood 
damage and using methods that minimize flood damage.89 The next 
area is known as the general floodplain. These areas of special flood 
hazards have not been studied to determine the base flood elevation 
or to identify floodways. Any construction or improvement is subject to 
an application and review process conducted by the director of Public 
Works.90 The final area is known as land adjacent to drainage facilities 
(in other words, a watercourse). Any new construction or substantial 
improvement is also subject to the review and approval of the director 
of Public Works.
 As a condition of obtaining a building permit and an eventual 
certificate of occupancy in any special flood hazard area, a developer 
must follow three guidelines: First, a number of documents (such as the 
building plans, elevation certification, and flood-proofing certification) 
must be submitted to the director of Public Works. This is known as pre-
construction certification.91 Second, a set of standards must be followed 
during the construction phase. Examples of these standards include 
anchoring improvements to resist flotation, preventing the collapse or 
lateral movement of the structure, and using materials and equipment 
resistant to flood damage.92 Finally, a postconstruction certification 
must be satisfied in order for the director to approve the certificate of 
occupancy.93
 Maui received final notice of proposed base flood elevations on 
July 9, 1980, and then entered the regular phase of the NFIP.94 The 
flood hazard regulation is found in Chapter 19.62 (Zoning) of the Maui 
County Code, which is entitled “Flood Hazard Areas.95 It provides for 
the establishment of special flood hazard areas, uses within those areas, 
standards for development, the granting of variances, and the appeals 
process. The practical effect is the establishment of overlay zones in 
which uses are regulated in addition to the regulations in the county’s 
comprehensive zoning ordinance. Any floodway district is adopted by 
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ordinance and designated on the official zoning maps of the county. 
Prior to the mapping, the ordinance is effective only for those areas 
found by the director of Public Works and the County Council to be 
subject to recurrent flooding or tsunami inundation.
 As might be anticipated, the floodway district is the most restric-
tive. No encroachment—including fill, new construction, substantial 
improvement, or other new development—is allowed within floodways 
without certification by a civil engineer and provided to the director 
of Public Works demonstrating that the encroachment will not result 
in any increases in base flood levels.96 Uses are less restrictive in the 
coastal high hazard area, where as long as a number of requirements 
are followed, any new construction or substantial improvement will 
be allowed.97 Some of these requirements include the prevention of 
flotation, collapse or lateral movement of the structure, locating the 
development on the “landward side of the reach of the mean high 
tide,” and certification by an engineer that the construction abides by 
these requirements.98 The final area, known as developments adjacent 
to drainage facilities, applies to developments encompassing or adjoin-
ing any stream, river, or drainage facilities and is subject to review by 
the director of Public Works. The director will grant such application 
only when the modification, construction, lining, or alteration does 
not reduce the capacity of the drainage facility, a river or stream, or 
adversely affect any downstream property.99
 Kaua‘i is also in the regular phase of the NFIP. As discussed in more 
detail in chapter 2, Kaua‘i has enacted development restriction zones 
called constraint districts, which operate as overlay zones, as part of its 
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance. The constraint districts are divided 
into six subdistricts: tsunami districts (S-TS), flood districts (S-FL), 
drainage districts (S-DR), soils districts (S-SO), slope districts (S-SL), 
and shore districts (S-SH). With the exception of the shore districts, 
all of the subdistricts regulate uses to prevent flood, tsunami, erosion, 
or mudslide damage and therefore are related to floodplain manage-
ment. Only the first three, however, are directed toward the mitigation 
of flood hazards.
 The purpose of the tsunami district is “to minimize the threat to 
the public health and safety, and damage to property due to extraordi-
nary ocean wave action.”100 No zoning, building, or use permit can be 
issued for development of any portion of the tsunami district unless the 
applicant establishes conformity with certain requirements, including a 
prohibition against constructing schools, hospitals, and nursing homes. 
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In addition, the applicant must delineate the boundaries of the tsunami 
district as shown on the flood maps, designate the base flood elevations 
for the site, and follow additional construction and development stan-
dards relating to floodplain management.101
 Flood districts are established in order “(1) to minimize the threat 
to public health and safety due to periodic inundation by storm water,” 
and “(2) to maintain the characteristics of floodplain areas which con-
tribute to ground water recharge, storm water storage, silt retention 
and marine water quality.”102 The flood district includes all lands subject 
to flooding and identified as flood fringe, floodway, and general flood 
plain areas by FIMA in its FIS engineering report.103 Uses requiring the 
development, grading, or alteration of any portion of the flood district 
are permitted if the applicant satisfies such requirements as the filing 
of detailed development plans, an environmental impact statement, 
hydrologic and geologic reports (when required by the Department of 
Public Works or the planning director), and a series of flood and struc-
tural showings.104
 Drainage districts are established for three purposes: “(1) to protect 
the function of natural and existing water courses as a part of the system 
for surface water collection and dispersal; (2) to maintain the quality 
of surface and marine water as a valuable public resource;” and “(3) to 
regulate the modification of water.”105 The drainage district includes all 
rivers, streams, storm water channels, and outfall areas indicated in the 
development restriction zones of the county general plan and in other 
areas of similar physical characteristics and conditions.106
Variances and Exemptions
As local zoning and subdivision controls are the primary method of 
enforcing NFIP land use requirements, the various techniques and tools 
of local zoning assume critical importance. Two of the mechanisms used 
to provide relief from general ordinance provisions in unusual cases 
are treated in the NFIP: variances and exceptions. Theoretically, the 
variance is granted in cases of unusual individual hardship and should 
represent the least tinkering as possible with the ordinance as applied, 
consonant with affording the applicant some relief.107 An example is the 
varying of an eight-foot side yard requirement by a few inches to permit 
the construction of a house addition in a residential zone. In practice, 
however, local zoning boards have often converted the variance process 
into a mini-rezoning process, granting so-called use variances by which 
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uses inconsistent with a zone classification are often permitted after an 
applicant has unsuccessfully sought to have the subject property reclas-
sified from a zone prohibiting such use to one permitting it. In other 
words, the variance process became a zoning appeals process. Permitting 
such variances to flood hazard regulations would result in the under-
mining of the NFIP. Therefore, NFIP regulations permit the granting 
of variances only upon the showing of good and sufficient cause, a 
determination of exceptional hardship, and a finding that granting the 
variance “will not result in increased flood heights, additional threats 
to public safety, extraordinary public expense, create nuisances, cause 
fraud on or victimization of the public, or conflict with existing local 
laws or ordinances.”108
 In Honolulu, subject to the review and approval of the DPP direc-
tor, the following may be permitted as a flood hazard variance: “new 
structures except in the Floodway District which are to be erected on 
a lot of one-half acre or less in area, contiguous to and surrounded by 
lots with existing structures below the regulatory flood elevation” and 
“uses, structures and standards in the Floodway District as permitted 
under the underlying zoning district, which do not result in any adverse 
increase in the regulatory flood elevation.”109
 The director must consider a series of factors in the grant or denial 
of the variance:
 (a) The danger to life and property including surround-
ing properties due to increased flood elevations or velocities 
caused by the variance.
 (b) The danger that materials may be swept on to other 
lands or downstream to the injury of others.
 (c) The proposed water supply and sanitation systems and 
the ability of these systems to prevent disease, contamination, 
and unsanitary conditions.
 (d) The susceptibility of the proposed facility and its con-
tents to flood damage and the effect of such damage on the 
individual owners.
 (e) The importance of the services provided by the pro-
posed facility to the community.
 (f) The availability of alternative locations not subject to 
flooding for the proposed use.
 (g) The compatibility of the proposed use with existing 
development anticipated in the foreseeable future.
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 (h) The relationship of the proposed use to the floodplain 
management program for the area.
 (i) The safety of access to the property in times of flood for 
ordinary and emergency vehicles.
 (j) The expected elevations and velocity of the regulatory 
flood expected at the site due to the variance.
 (k) The failure to grant the variance would result in excep-
tional hardship to the applicant.
 (l) The variance will not result in adverse increase to the 
regulatory flood elevations, additional threat to surrounding 
properties and to public safety, extraordinary public expenses 
or conflict with other laws or regulations.110
 The director may also attach conditions to the variance, should he 
choose to grant it. If a variance is granted, the applicant must agree 
to insert a covenant in deeds and other conveyancing documents filed 
with the Bureau of Conveyances, stating that the property is located in 
a flood area, is subject to flooding and flood damage, that increased 
flood insurance premiums will result from the variance, and that he 
will not sue the city for loss or damage as a result of being permitted to 
build.111
 The granting of variances is reviewable by FIMA. If a pattern incon-
sistent with the objectives of sound floodplain management emerges, 
FIMA may suspend a community from the flood insurance program. 
However, applicable regulations specifically permit the reconstruc-
tion, rehabilitation, or restoration of structures listed on either the 
National Register of Historic Places or the Hawai‘i Register of Historic 
Places.112
 While a variance represents personal relief for an individual from 
a zoning regulation, an exception is a waiver from federal land use 
standards directed to a community that relieves it from the require-
ments of a rule, regulation, order, or other determination. FIMA 
permits certain exceptions from federal land use standards because 
of extraordinary circumstances and local conditions that make their 
application the cause of severe hardship and gross inequity for a par-
ticular community. A community seeking an exception must justify 
the request by showing supporting economic, environmental, topo-
graphic, hydrologic, and other scientific and technical data.113 None of 
Hawai‘i’s four county ordinances allow for exceptions to flood hazard 
regulations.114
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The Takings Clause and the National 
Flood Insurance Program
Local floodplain regulations can severely restrict the use of private 
property.115 Despite these limitations, flood hazard regulations are often 
upheld because courts recognize the need to protect the health and 
safety of the public,116 and they realize that they serve a legitimate state 
interest in reducing flood hazards.117 This suggests that a developer chal-
lenging a local floodplain regulation scheme would most likely fail.118
Most courts have taken a favorable view of floodplain regulation under 
the takings clause. Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham is a typical case.119 
The court upheld a floodplain ordinance that allowed only passive uses 
and prohibited any building or structure, even though these restrictions 
allegedly reduced the value of the subject property from $431,000 to 
$53,000. The court noted that floodplain regulation protects individu-
als who might choose to build there despite the flood danger, protects 
other landowners from floodplain development, and protects the 
“entire community from individual choices of land use which require 
subsequent public expenditures for public works and disaster relief.” 
It held that these regulatory purposes satisfy the usual substantive due 
process tests. The court also held that the ordinance did not deprive the 
landowner of all of the use of its land because it allowed a number of 
passive uses. The court balanced the restrictions the ordinance imposed 
on the property “against the potential harm to the community from 
overdevelopment of a flood plain area.” It applied standard regulatory 
taking law to hold that a taking had not occurred even though the ordi-
nance substantially diminished the value of the property.120
A number of cases that have rejected regulatory taking objections to 
floodplain regulations emphasized the dangers that flooding creates.121 
In Krahl v. Nine Mile Creek Watershed District,122 a landowner who was 
denied a permit to construct a building in a floodplain challenged the 
floodplain regulation as a regulatory taking.123 The court observed and 
agreed with the watershed district that the proposed development would 
increase the likelihood of flooding downstream.124 Moreover, the court 
stated that a number of nonstructural uses of the land were allowed.125 
In addition, restrictions on the land were not permanent and would be 
modified once permanent flood control facilities were constructed. The 
court cited Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York126 for the 
proposition that “this is not a case where a property owner is burdened 
with a restriction without receiving a reciprocal benefit in his favor.”127
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 Lower courts have also upheld the NFIP. In Texas Landowners Rights 
Ass’n. v Harris,128 the district court held that the National Flood Insur-
ance Program did not constitute a taking of land without payment of 
just compensation as required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. The court utilized a balancing test of social policy and public 
interest versus the rights of a landowner to be unencumbered in the use 
of his property.129 The scale tipped in favor of the public interest since 
the public safety, health, and general welfare favor the program.130
 In Adolph v. Federal Emergency Management Agency,131 the court held 
that when NFIP was operating precisely as intended by Congress, it 
resulted in no unconstitutional taking of property, regardless of state 
law, even if elevation requirements actually deprived the landowner 
of all use without compensation.132 In any event, FEMA could not be 
charged with the unconstitutional taking of property, since it did not 
compel the state to participate in NFIP. The regulations were local, even 
if federal in nature.
Coordination with other Federal Programs
Pursuant to Executive Order 11988, all federal agencies are required 
to conduct their activities in a manner consistent with the objectives of 
NFIP.133 The problem of coordination has been particularly acute with 
respect to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway 
Administration, whose design standards and approved routes for feder-
ally funded highways often traverse or follow floodplains—which are 
flat and even-graded—for considerable distances. Indeed, some federal 
officials have wondered aloud whether they may not be promoting (if 
not requiring) some contradictory local activities. It would not be the 
first time.134
Conclusion
Hawai‘i’s four counties are full participants in the National Flood Insur-
ance Program. The extent to which the various ordinance amendments, 
passed pursuant to federal guidelines and standards, will begin to affect 
development is therefore unclear—for the moment. Unfortunately—
and obviously—the subsidizing of structures in a flood hazard zone by 
means of insuring against losses tends to encourage building in that 
zone, despite the onerous land use regulations the FDPA requires of 
local governments as a condition for insurance. Moreover, it has taken so 
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long for the various government agencies to produce the maps and data 
and issue the regulations that are necessary before the flood-proofing 
and development regulations can be required that little has happened 
in the decade since FDPA was passed.
 The extent to which the granting of exceptions and variances may 
tend to soften the effect of these ordinances also remains to be seen. 
Given Hawai‘i’s substantial coastal areas and the tendency so far to 
develop such areas, the coastal hazard program responses of the coun-
ties and their implementation will bear watching. Enforce they must, 
however. The federal government has taken an increasingly hard line 
with communities that have failed to enforce their floodplain regula-
tions; it has sued several local governments in Louisiana to recover 
nearly $100 million in national flood insurance claims paid by the U.S. 
government for flood damage to structures either built in areas that 
should have been development free or built improperly in flood-prone 
areas, contrary to local regulations that the local governments allegedly 
failed to enforce.135 If the United States is successful in persuading the 
federal court that the fault—and the liability—lies with local govern-
ment for the flood damage because they failed to enforce their own 
ordinances, this will be a powerful incentive for stringent enforcement 
nationally.
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Zones B, C, and X
Areas with less than a 1% chance of flooding each year; areas that 
have less than a 1% chance of sheet flow flooding with an average 
depth of less than 1 foot; areas that have less than a 1% chance of 
stream flooding where the contributing drainage area is less than 1 
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square mile; or areas protected from floods by levees. No base flood 
elevations or depths are shown within these zones.
Zone A
Areas with a 1% annual chance of flooding and a 26% chance of 
flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. Because detailed analyses 
are not performed for such areas, no depths or base flood elevations 
are shown within these zones.
Zone AE and A1–A30
Areas with a 1% annual chance of flooding and a 26% chance of 
flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. In most instances, base 
flood elevations derived from detailed analyses are shown at selected 
intervals within these zones.
Zone AH
Areas with a 1% annual chance of shallow flooding, usually in the 
form of a pond, with an average depth ranging from 1 to 3 feet. These 
areas have a 26% chance of flooding over the life of a 30-year mort-
gage. Base flood elevations derived from detailed analyses are shown 
at selected intervals within these zones.
Zone AO
River or stream flood hazard areas, and areas with a 1% or greater 
chance of shallow flooding each year, usually in the form of sheet flow, 
with an average depth ranging from 1 to 3 feet. These areas have a 
26% chance of flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. Average 
flood depths derived from detailed analyses are shown within these 
zones.
Zone AR
Areas with a temporarily increased flood risk due to the building or 
restoration of a flood control system (such as a levee or a dam). Man-
datory flood insurance purchase requirements will apply, but rates 
will not exceed the rates for unnumbered A zones if the structure is 
built or restored in compliance with Zone AR floodplain management 
regulations.
Zone A99
Areas with a 1% annual chance of flooding that will be protected by a 
Federal flood control system where construction has reached specified 
legal requirements. No depths or base flood elevations are shown 
within these zones.
Zone V
Coastal areas with a 1% or greater chance of flooding and an addi-
tional hazard associated with storm waves. These areas have a 26% 
chance of flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. No base flood 
elevations are shown within these zones.
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Coastal areas with a 1% or greater chance of flooding and an addi-
tional hazard associated with storm waves. These areas have a 26% 
chance of flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. Base flood 
elevations derived from detailed analyses are shown at selected 
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Areas with possible but undetermined flood hazards. No flood hazard 
analysis has been conducted. Flood insurance rates are commensurate 
with the uncertainty of the flood risk.
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Chapter 8
Historic Preservation
Recapturing the Past
The preservation of historic buildings and archaeological sites has 
been something of a national crusade, especially since the mid-1960s. 
In 1966, Congress passed the National Historic Preservation Act 
(NHPA), which accomplished four major things: “First, it created the 
National Register of Historic Places [National Register], the federal 
government’s official list of properties worthy of preservation. Second, 
it led to the appointment, in every state and territory, of a State Historic 
Preservation Officer (SHPO) with responsibility for encouraging and 
assisting preservation efforts at the state level.”1 Third, the legislation 
established the Historic Preservation Fund, which helps “the states 
carry out the preservation responsibilities mandated to them.”2 Finally, 
the NHPA created the President’s Advisory Council on Historic Pres-
ervation (Advisory Council), an independent federal agency given the 
authority to review and comment on any proposed project involving 
the use of federal resources and affecting sites listed on the National 
Register.
 The reasons for promoting preservation range from the desire to 
preserve links with the past to the retention of tourist attractions. There 
are essentially three major elements in modern historic preservation 
programs: (1) regulation to prevent damage or destruction of private 
sites, (2) rehabilitation to encourage reuse of private sites, and (3) 
the protection of sites from federally funded redevelopment or public 
works projects through “listing” and the associated mandatory consult-
ing process. While some sites are also saved through outright public 
acquisition, historic properties are expensive to purchase and maintain. 
Therefore, in times of tight budgets and increasing demand upon gov-
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ernment at all levels, reliance on such acquisitions to save a substantial 
share of historic sites is misplaced.
The Basic Program: What is Possible
The essential issue in any regulatory program is the extent to which the 
regulation may permissibly restrict private action. So it is with historic 
preservation. The issue of private restriction is particularly acute because 
health and safety, traditional bases for regulation, are not affected by 
the damage or destruction of a historic site. This leaves public welfare, 
a vaguely defined concept that is often used to justify regulatory sys-
tems when all else fails. It is the basis for most historic preservation laws, 
which prevent the alteration (and sometimes require the maintenance) 
of a historic structure or site whether in public or private hands.
 Courts have been and continue to be sympathetic in supporting 
the designation and regulation of historic sites by qualified public bod-
ies.3 But the full extent to which the police power could be invoked 
to prevent an owner from altering or demolishing such sites was vastly 
enlarged in 1978 by the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co. v. City of N.Y. case.4 There, the Court upheld a New 
York City ordinance that heavily restricted the development potential 
of Grand Central Station solely because of its historic significance. The 
Court recounted those aspects of the regulatory scheme that made it 
defensible: expertise and due process in both the selection of historic 
sites and the granting (or refusal) of a “certificate of appropriateness” 
for exterior modifications or demolition; economic viability of the site 
in its present condition; availability of tax relief for designated proper-
ties; and ability of the private owner to transfer air development rights 
to nearby properties.5 State courts were quick to seize upon Penn Central 
as a precedent for other similar historic preservation schemes, with the 
result that most programs that (1) use defensible criteria (or experts) in 
identifying historic sites, (2) provide fair procedures for landowners to 
seek permits for alteration, and (3) leave some economic use of the site 
have been upheld.6
 Regardless of the regulatory framework, a usable building is more 
likely to be preserved than one that depends solely on the force of the 
law for its maintenance. Thus, the historic preservation movement 
increasingly shifted to incentives for commercial rehabilitation and 
reuse of old buildings, relying primarily on tax incentives, especially 
with the passage of the Economic Recovery Act of 1981. The incentive 
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programs provided financial benefits to owners otherwise burdened by 
preservation laws and countered private and public land use policies 
favoring demolition and new construction.7 For a time, the programs—
jointly administered by the National Park Service (NPS), SHPOs, and 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)—proved successful, revitalizing 
communities and preserving the special character of rural areas and 
towns.
 However, significant changes in the law have limited the act’s appli-
cability and utility. Gone are the days when accelerated depreciation 
and five-year amortization periods were allowed.8 What remains are 
straight-line depreciation methods over 27.5 or 39 years, depending 
upon whether the property is residential.9 The two main tax incentive 
programs presently are the tax credits of 10 or 20 percent for qualified 
rehabilitation expenditures, based on whether the building is a “certi-
fied historic structure,” and income tax deductions for charitable con-
tributions of interests in historic property.10 A certified historic structure 
is one listed on the National Register or one located in a registered 
historic district and certified as such by the NPS or the secretary of the 
Interior.11
 To qualify for a 20 percent credit, the structure not only has to be a 
building (as opposed to a bridge, dam, or railroad car), but also it must 
be depreciable: It can be an office or any commercial enterprise used for 
the production of income as long as it does not serve as the taxpayer’s 
personal residence.12 In addition, the rehabilitation of the building must 
be substantial. The “expenditures must exceed the greater of $5,000 or 
the adjusted basis of the building and its structural components” dur-
ing a twenty-four-month period selected by the taxpayer.13 Finally, the 
building must have been “a certified historic structure when it is placed 
in service.”14 Otherwise, “the owner must have requested on or before 
the date that the building was placed in service a determination from 
the NPS that the building is a certified historic structure, and have a 
reasonable expectation that the determination will be granted.”15
 The qualifications for a 10 percent tax credit are similar to those 
of the 20 percent, with certain exceptions. For example, the buildings 
must be nonhistoric, nonresidential, and placed into service before 
1936. So while a building can be old, it need not be historic to be eligi-
ble for a credit. There are other specific requirements mandated in the 
rehabilitation process, including making sure that “75 percent or more 
of the existing external walls of such building are retained in place as 
internal or external walls.”16 Determining which tax incentive applies is 
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a function of the building, not owner preference. Furthermore, the two 
credits are mutually exclusive; one or the other applies. Even compli-
ance with all these provisions may be for naught if one disposes of the 
building within five years. The full tax credit is recaptured if the build-
ing “ceases to be investment credit property” during the first year, and 
that amount is reduced by 20 percent a year.17
 Finally, for the qualified conservation contributions, an individual 
may take income tax deductions on any donated structure (not just a 
building), including land, whether or not depreciable.18 For example, 
easements on private residences qualify. The structures, however, must 
still conform to the IRS’ definition of a “historically important land 
area.”19 With all these different criteria, standards, and definitions, not 
to mention the reduced tax benefits compared to the mid-1970s and 
early 1980s legislation, it is no surprise that many “states have created 
their own historic rehabilitation tax credit programs, to fill the incen-
tive gap created by the downsizing of the federal program.”20
 The aforementioned NHPA, coupled with the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) passed in 1969, provide some measure 
of temporary protection for historic sites.21 NHPA is the latest in a 
series of federal laws directed toward the survey and preservation of 
historic sites.22 One of its more salient features, under Section 106, is 
the requirement that federal agencies “take into account the effects 
of their undertakings, on historic properties and afford the Council a 
reasonable opportunity to comment on such undertakings.”23 Indeed, 
the Advisory Council must be permitted to comment on the proposed 
action.24 Native Hawaiian organizations are explicitly listed as consult-
ing parties regarding any historic properties for which they attach any 
cultural or religious importance.25
 Though Section 106 review does not mandate preservation or pre-
vent construction, it does “ensure that preservation values are factored 
into [f]ederal agency planning and decisions” and that “[f]ederal agen-
cies must assume responsibility for the consequences of their actions on 
historic properties.”26 Thus, Section 106 applies only to those historic 
sites listed or eligible to be listed on the National Register and where 
the proposed project or development utilizes federal funds or otherwise 
“involves” a federal agency, including the issuance of federal permits, 
licenses, or approvals.27 Thanks to the pervasiveness of the federal gov-
ernment in much of Hawai‘i’s development activity, this temporary pro-
tection is likely to be invoked often.28 Even a less obvious action, such 
as a Federal Communications Commission license for construction of a 
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cellular tower, may compromise view planes, landscapes, or properties 
valued for traditional, cultural, or religious practices.
 A listing on the National Register could be just as broad and com-
prehensive. The register includes those historic resources, districts, 
sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in American history, 
architecture, archaeology, engineering, and culture. National Register 
listings thus are those:
[t]hat possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, 
workmanship, feeling and association, and: (a) that are associ-
ated with events that have made a significant contribution to 
the broad patterns of our history; or (b) that are associated 
with the lives of persons significant in our past; or (c) that 
embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or 
method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, 
or that possess high artistic values, or that represent a signifi-
cant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack 
individual distinction, or (d) that have yielded, or may be likely 
to yield, information important in prehistory or history.29
 The secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior maintains 
the database from sites nominated by anyone, but this is usually in 
conjunction with review by SHPO. The benefits of a National Register 
listing are fourfold: (1) It is an honorific designation; (2) it meets the 
basic eligibility criteria for any available preservation funding; (3) it 
qualifies for the higher (i.e., 20 percent) property rehabilitation tax 
credit; and (4) it enjoys some protection through the mandatory Sec-
tion 106 review process. If the property owner objects to the nomina-
tion, however, then the site is simply not listed. Reasons for declining 
a nomination include concerns that listing will severely restrict private 
property rights. However, “[l]isting in the National Register imposes no 
restrictions on an owner’s right to do anything to his or her property 
that local law allows.”30 Hence, state or county laws regarding nationally 
registered properties, if any, will more likely affect the use of the listed 
property.
 Because there is no legal requirement that a project must be aban-
doned, even if the Advisory Council strenuously objects, what the NHPA 
does is buy time. For example, a Department of Transportation policy 
forbids the use of either public or private land from a historic site for a 
transportation program or project unless (1) there is no “prudent and 
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feasible” alternative and (2) all “possible” planning to minimize harm 
to the site is undertaken.31
 Such consideration of historic sites is not confined to the NHPA. 
Before undertaking a federal action that significantly affects the human 
environment, NEPA requires an environmental impact statement (EIS) 
of the proposed action to be prepared.32 An environmental assessment 
must be made for virtually every federal action to determine its signifi-
cance and the probable effect on the environment; it is then used to 
determine whether a full EIS is warranted.33 NEPA is of considerable 
help in buttressing the protection of historic sites because it states that 
one of the environmental policies to be effectuated is to “preserve 
important historic . . . aspects of our national heritage.”34
 Indeed, a federal court held in 1979 that the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development had to prepare an EIS on proposed 
destruction of register-eligible properties in an urban renewal project 
so long as it has any discretion over it.35 The Stop H-3 Association v. Dole 
case in Hawai‘i is another example of the interplay between NHPA and 
NEPA.36 At issue was the legality of a federally funded highway route 
passing within a few feet of a petroglyph in Moanalua Valley on O‘ahu. 
In holding that both NHPA and NEPA were triggered, the court held 
that before the transportation secretary may authorize the construction 
of a highway through a site eligible for listing on the National Register, 
he must first find that there is no prudent and feasible alternative. The 
state and federal governments then switched the route to the nearby 
Hālawa Valley, only to find that the original injunction banning con-
struction in Moanalua Valley was also applicable there.37
 More complicated was the status of the island of Kaho‘olawe in 
Maui County. Literally awash in heiaus (places of worship), adze quar-
ries, and petroglyphs, the small island had been a U.S. Navy bombing 
target since World War II.38 After protracted litigation concerning the 
need for a federal EIS to continue bombing the island, the navy con-
ducted a four-year, $600,000 survey, nominated 171 sites to the National 
Register, and restricted bombing to those parts of Kaho‘olawe that were 
free of such sites.39 This failed to satisfy the Protect Kaho‘olawe Ohana 
(PKO), an organization seeking to end the bombing, which observed 
that the number of sites so chosen was far fewer than those that had 
been uncovered and that minimally every site should be listed. In fact, 
the keeper of the National Register listed the entire island as an archae-
ological district in early 1981.40 As a result of PKO actions and litigation, 
President George Bush Sr. ordered a halt to the bombing of Kaho‘olawe 
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in 1990.41 The navy transferred ownership of the island back to Hawai‘i 
in 1994.42
Historic Preservation in Hawai‘i
That Hawai‘i has many historic sites worth preserving is beyond ques-
tion. Approximately 713 sites are currently listed on local and national 
registers of historic places.43 But while procedural irregularities have 
resulted in some delisting of these sites, such listing has only marginal 
protective significance. Listing requires virtually no state or local regula-
tion of a site. At best, private owners of a listed site must merely pro-
vide the state with notice of an intended alteration or demolition and 
under certain circumstances file an EIS. Either or both merely delay the 
action. Only when such sites also fall within the boundaries of either 
county-enacted special zoning districts or state conservation districts is 
there any regulatory protection.
 Hawai‘i’s Constitution specifically links the police power with his-
toric site preservation under the public health and welfare rubric: “The 
State shall have the power to conserve and develop objects and places 
of historic or cultural interest and provide for public sightliness and 
physical good order. For these purposes private property shall be sub-
ject to reasonable regulation.”44 Pursuant to this broad constitutional 
mandate, the State of Hawai‘i enacted a historic preservation program 
dealing with historic sites that are (1) publicly owned and (2) privately 
owned. While it is the latter in which issues of public control and the 
limits of police power arise, the number of sites on public lands makes 
the first category an important element in surveying the manner and 
effectiveness of historic preservation in Hawai‘i.
On Public Lands
Hawai‘i has always recognized “the value of conserving and developing 
historic and cultural property within the State for the public good.”45 
Consequently, several state statutes deal with the classification and regu-
lation of historic sites on state lands, much of which falls under the aus-
pices of the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR). The 
department is responsible for administering a “historic preservation 
program” designed to protect and preserve Hawai‘i’s historical, archi-
tectural, archaeological, and cultural resources.46 DLNR must approve 
any proposed project or transfer of historic property, whether on land 
or underwater.47 Indeed, the statute defines “project” to encompass 
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almost any real property-related activity undertaken or even partially 
supported by the state, including contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, 
leases, permits, and licenses.48
 While a historic preservation officer appointed by the governor is 
responsible for the program and serves as a liaison with the public and 
other government agencies, much authority also rests with the Historic 
Places Review Board, statutorily created to administer the Hawai‘i Reg-
ister as well as to recommend sites for inclusion on the National Regis-
ter.49 The board is comprised of ten members, appointed and removed 
by the governor, who must have professional qualifications in fields such 
as archaeology, architecture, history, sociology, and knowledge of tradi-
tional Hawaiian society and culture among its membership.50
 One method of regulating or restricting development of historic 
sites is to simply acquire the lands. DLNR has authority to preserve 
lands with “historic value.”51 It may also promulgate and administer 
rules concerning permissible uses based upon recommendations of 
the Natural Reserve System Commission, composed of thirteen mem-
bers who possess scientific qualifications in forestry or wildlife biol-
ogy and memberships in hiking and hunting organizations.52 With 
the DLNR’s recommendation, the governor is empowered to classify 
landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of 
historic interest on state land to be state monuments.53 Similar to the 
“project” definition, almost anything may be deemed “historic” as long 
as it is at least fifty years old. Thus, “aviation artifacts,” burial sites, 
and heiaus are all within DLNR’s jurisdiction.54 Any entity may appeal 
the department’s determination, however.55 Even after a “historic site” 
designation, the preservation of these locations remains paramount. 
As a result, the state cannot dispose of the properties without DLNR’s 
approval.56 Further, any disposition is subject to the restrictions and 
covenants intended to protect the sites, including rights of access and 
public visits.57
On Private Lands
The Historic Places Review Board also exercises limited authority 
over privately held lands by ordering “and enter[ing] historic proper-
ties into the Hawai‘i Register on the basis of their value to Hawai‘i’s 
heritage.”58 Nominating considerations include the quality of the site’s 
significance to Hawaiian history and culture, taking into account the 
“location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and associa-
tion . . . with events that have made a significant contribution to the 
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broad patterns” of the state’s history.59 The Review Board also evaluates 
the environmental impact and takes into account other “social, cultural, 
educational, and recreational” values of the potentially listed structures 
or sites.60 Though nominations for listing are customarily made by the 
SHPO, anyone may nominate a site.61
 While hardly a paragon of strength, a Hawai‘i Register listing does 
provide for a measure of temporary site protection. An owner of a listed 
site must notify and secure the concurrence of DLNR for any proposed 
construction, alteration, transfer, or improvement that will affect a his-
toric property.62 In the event DLNR approval is not secured, however, 
the owner need only wait ninety days before altering or demolishing a 
site.63 During that time, DLNR may commence condemnation proceed-
ings or undertake investigation, recordation, preservation, and salvage 
of “any historical information deemed necessary to preserve Hawaiian 
history.”64 Violation of these regulations results in a fine of up to $1,000 
per offense, and “each day of continued violation shall constitute a dis-
tinct and separate offense.”65
 Though infrequent, properties listed on either register of historic 
places can be removed. But they are usually not delisted unless there 
was an error in judgment, the qualities for which they were listed in the 
first place are no longer present, or statutory procedures were not cor-
rectly followed.66 For example, a cause célèbre in both local and national 
historic preservation circles had been the listing of the Royal Hawaiian 
Hotel on the Hawai‘i Register in 1980. Though itself subject to criti-
cal historic preservation comment during construction because several 
structures deemed to be historic were demolished to make way for it, 
the Royal Hawaiian was also nominated to the National Register. How-
ever, the owner of the property, Kyo-Ya Co., Ltd., was able to remove this 
“Pink Palace of the Pacific” from the Hawai‘i Register because of alleged 
noncompliance with the notice provisions under the statutes. Presently, 
the hotel is now on neither the Hawai‘i nor the National Registers of 
Historic Places.
 The opposite is also possible. A building that no longer exists could 
remain on the National Register. Not so famous outside of Hawai‘i, 
the Alexander Young Building in Honolulu was also something of a 
cause in the historic preservation community before its demolition. 
Once a luxurious downtown hotel with architecture borrowed from 
both the Renaissance and classical Rome, the structure even had a 
roof garden for dancing. Although listed on both the Hawai‘i and the 
National Registers of Historic Places, there was considerable division 
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in the community over its historic value. It was described both as a 
“nostalgic grey giant” and as a “renaissance monstrosity.” DLNR opted 
not to purchase the building, and its owner demolished it to make 
way for the currently existing twenty-nine-story Pauahi Tower of the 
Pacific Trade Center office building and the three-quarter-acre Tama-
rind Park. However, because there is no regular review or update of 
a site’s status, a listing remains on the database unless the National 
Park Service, the official keeper of the register, is notified. Thus, a 
thirty-year-old vestige of the Alexander Young building still exists on 
the National Register.
 One statute does provide incentives to private owners of sites to 
help preserve them. While not particularly generous, it will probably 
account for as much state-fostered historic preservation as the process 
of listing described above. Under a section of the state’s tax code, own-
ers of listed sites are exempt from real property taxes, except for a $100 
minimum tax, for that part of the site dedicated to public use.67 The 
state director of Taxation must additionally find that the benefit to the 
public from said dedication is equal to the foregone property taxes. 
The initial period of dedication is ten years, renewable indefinitely but 
“subject to cancellation by either the owner or the director upon five 
years’ notice at any time after the end of the fifth year.”68 Furthermore, 
if the owner fails to maintain the dedicated land, then the special tax 
exemption is lost and all prior foregone real property taxes must be 
repaid, with interest.69 Given the narrowness of the exemption, it is not 
surprising that little use has so far been made of it.
 The state also affects the use that the owner of a listed site can 
make of his land by virtue of certain classification criteria under Act 
187, Hawai‘i’s landmark statewide “zoning” act, described in detail in 
chapter 2. The land in one of the four classifications into which all state 
land is classified, the conservation district, is regulated by DLNR’s Land 
Board. The uses listed for this district are restrictive. Among the lands 
that are required to be classified into this conservation district by the 
State Land Use Commission are “[l]ands and waters necessary for the 
preservation and enhancement of designated historic or archaeological 
sites.”70
 Under certain circumstances or conditions, a historic site may also 
be subject to review under Hawai‘i’s environmental impact statement 
law.71 The environmentally significant actions that can trigger an impact 
assessment requirement include proposing “any use within any historic 
site as designated in the National Register or Hawai‘i Register.”72 In the 
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assessment, the “historic perspective” must be addressed as part of the 
project description.73 The environment in the vicinity of the proposed 
action must also be described, including “natural or human-made 
resources of historical, archaeological, or aesthetic significance.”74 
Once such an assessment is made and there is no significant environ-
mental impact, then the project may proceed. However, if the proposed 
action “may have a significant impact, a more detailed environmental 
impact statement (EIS) [must] be prepared.”75 The EIS is subject to 
various reviews and legal challenges by both the public and government 
agencies. Only the governor, mayor, or relevant agency may determine 
the acceptability of the final EIS, upon which an appeal may be taken 
directly to the Environmental Council. “A final EIS must be accepted by 
a government entity before a[ny] project can proceed.”76
 The State’s Coastal Zone Management Act (described in detail in 
chapter 6)—surprisingly—also deals with the preservation of historic 
sites.77 Each county administers extensive coastal zone special man-
agement areas (SMA)s under state statutory standards through the 
requirement of an SMA permit for most developments. One of those 
standards requires a proposed development to be consistent with the 
state’s statutory objectives, policies, and SMA guidelines.78 One of the 
county objectives is to “protect, preserve, and, where desirable, restore 
those natural and manmade historic and prehistoric resources in the 
coastal zone management area that are significant in Hawaiian and 
American history and culture.”79 This gives counties the right to deny 
a permit for any development that threatens a significant resource as 
defined in the act. Presumably, listing on either the Hawai‘i or National 
Register raises a presumption in favor of “significance” sufficient to 
trigger this part of the CZM program’s regulatory regime. On the other 
hand, lack of such listing may raise a contrary presumption against 
significance.
 Yet one more state statute affects the preservation of historic sites: 
the Hawai‘i State Planning Act (HSPA), enacted in 1978 and since 
amended.80 This act contains a number of broad policies, objectives, 
and goals, such as the following that address historic preservation:
Objectives:
  1. Planning for the state’s physical environment shall be 
directed towards achievement of the objective of enhancement 
of Hawaii’s . . . historical resources.
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Policies:
 1. Promote the preservation and restoration of significant 
natural and historic resources.
 2. Provide incentives to maintain and enhance historic, 
cultural, and scenic amenities.
 3. Protect those special areas, structures, and elements that 
are an integral and functional part of Hawaii’s ethnic and 
cultural heritage.81
 These criteria are binding on both state agencies and on the 
counties’ development planning and implementation processes, all as 
explained in chapter 2. As there described, all state government agen-
cies are bound by HSPA in making land use decisions, and counties must 
take its provisions into account. Certain words and phrases are therefore 
critical: What does “promote” preservation of historic resources mean? 
What are “historic resources”? Is there any significance to the absence 
of the word “historic” from the third policy quoted above, the only one 
that appears to guarantee protection, or are historic sites included in 
the phrase “special areas, structures, and elements that are an integral 
function of Hawaii’s ethnic and cultural heritage”?
 Answers to these and other questions should have been answered 
by the implementation of the State Functional Plan on Historic Pres-
ervation, which the legislature approved in 1984. The plan, however, 
added little regulatory muscle with respect to historic sites on either 
public or private land. “[B]oth the State Plans and the Functional Plans 
fell into disuse” in the early 1990s due to fiscal constraints.82 Moreover, 
according to our State Supreme Court, “the state functional plans are 
broad policy guidelines providing a framework for state and county 
planning and do not constitute legal mandates, nor legal standards of 
performance.”83 The most recent iteration of the State Historic Pres-
ervation Plan addresses historic preservation at a broad level “and as 
such does not become immersed in place-specific or decision-making 
specific levels of activity.”84 It “has been developed to provide a vision 
for historic preservation, . . . to serve as a guide for effective decision 
making on a general level, . . . and for communicating statewide his-
toric preservation goals, policies and objectives.”85 Ultimately, lack of 
the prior definitions may be moot because other explicit but broadly 
defined synonyms (e.g., “historic property”) have been employed in 
the name of “historic preservation,” to which an entire statutory chap-
ter is dedicated.86
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The Legislative Options
While not specific in its statutory language, the state has given its coun-
ties discretion to preserve historic sites through their zoning power.87 
Thus, while “historic sites” are not specifically mentioned, ordinances 
“establishing historical, cultural, and scenic districts” are.88 Each of 
Hawai‘i’s four counties has passed historic preservation zoning schemes 
offering various degrees of protection to historic sites within a historic 
or scenic district. What follows is a summary of the pertinent local regu-
lations in each county.
Honolulu
The City and County of Honolulu essentially has a three-tier system of 
“objectives, policies, planning principles, guidelines and regulations” 
with regard to land use and growth.89 The General Plan forms the 
first tier of the system and provides six policy statements in support of 
“Objective B”: “To protect O‘ahu’s cultural, historical, architectural, 
and archaeological resources.”90 Development and sustainable com-
munity plans form the second tier and elaborate further on the island’s 
significant cultural and natural resources but do not add any specific 
regulatory material. For example, the north shore plan stresses the 
importance of its historical and cultural sites as representative of the 
area’s precontact and plantation eras and includes an inventory of 
those sites listed on the National and State Registers of Historic Places, 
but it implements nothing further.91 Honolulu’s zoning for historic 
preservation lies in the third tier, in the City and County’s Land Use 
Ordinance (LUO), and more specifically in the special design district 
(SDD).
 In addition to creating an O‘ahu Historic Preservation Commission, 
the County Code also allowed for an SDD in its LUO, whose purpose 
is to conserve “the city’s natural, historic and scenic resources.”92 SDD 
would “provide a means by which certain areas in the community in 
need of restoration, preservation, redevelopment or rejuvenation may 
be designated . . . to guide development to protect and/or enhance the 
physical and visual aspects of an area for the benefit of the community 
as a whole.”93 SDD is a zoning district that is approved and mapped by 
the City Council.94 Once mapped, it takes precedence over any previous 
zone district regulations and classifications.95 Procedurally initiated by 
the City Council, the Department of Permit and Planning (DPP), or 
the landowner, the proposal to establish an SDD is first reviewed infor-
276 Regulating Paradise
mally by DPP in conjunction with the applicant. After consultation with 
affected and interested citizens and organizations such as the relevant 
neighborhood board, the DPP director sends the SDD application to a 
design advisory committee for comment and review.96 The design com-
mittee consists of DLNR’s SHPO as well as architects and urban plan-
ners.97 After the committee makes its comments and recommendations, 
the director then prepares a report and the proposed ordinance for 
the Planning Commission, which holds a hearing and submits its find-
ings and recommendations to the council.98 The council then conducts 
another public hearing and may approve the ordinance as submitted, 
with modifications, or deny it.99
 A good example of the detailed regulations placed on both exist-
ing and potential structures is the Chinatown Special District because 
of “a concern that architectural and historic elements of the district 
may . . . be lost.”100 The LUO sets the objectives and the boundaries of the 
special district and then provides an inventory of significant structures, 
both listed and unlisted on the dual registers.101 It then promulgates 
design controls and development standards within the precinct, includ-
ing landscaping and use regulations, density, architectural review, and 
sign size limitations.102 New structures, for example, “shall not exceed 
40 feet.”103 Street furnishings, such as benches, lampposts, and plant-
ers, are not to be of a style and “detailing inappropriate to Chinatown’s 
period of significance, which is from the 1880s to the 1940s.”104 These 
types of controls exist for the other six special districts within the county: 
Diamond Head, Punchbowl, Waikīkī, Hale‘iwa, Thomas Square/Hono-
lulu Academy of Arts, and the Hawai‘i Capital.
Kaua‘i
Historic preservation in Kaua‘i County consists of a robust General Plan 
augmented by a blend of zoning ordinance and development plans. 
Almost every single one of the plan’s nine chapters mentions historic 
preservation.105 Indeed, the very first policy item sets the theme. “The 
General Plan establishes . . . the . . . preservation of natural, cultural 
and scenic resources.”106 The plan then depicts the locations of these 
important resources on Heritage Resource Maps, including both regis-
tered historic buildings and unregistered but otherwise important struc-
tures.107 The pertinent provisions of Kaua‘i’s zoning ordinance, which 
set out special districts created in part to preserve historic places, may 
be supplemented by area-specific development plans, the provisions of 
which supersede any conflicting provision of that zoning ordinance.108 
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The county zoning ordinance deals with historic preservation in two 
special zoning districts: special treatment districts and special planning 
areas. The former is explicitly considered an overlay district, whereas 
the latter is implied.109
 Special treatment districts, drafted to designate and guide develop-
ment in areas with “unique or critical cultural, physical or locational 
characteristics,” are specifically authorized for those areas with “signifi-
cant historic background, structures, or land forms.”110 The district is 
created by the County Council and recorded on the county’s zoning 
map.111 All “uses, structures, or development” require a use permit, 
“except repairs or modifications of land and existing structures that do 
not substantially change exterior form or appearance.”112
 In contrast, the special planning area is a creation of the Planning 
Commission, which “may” formulate development plans for it.113 Such 
development plans “shall include, wherever appropriate and practical,” 
among other things, “a review of the . . . historic characteristics of the 
area.”114 The critical tool is the Development Plan, which, by incorpora-
tion into the county zoning ordinance, nominally supersedes any con-
flicting district regulations: “After the Council adopts a Development 
Plan for a Special Planning Area, no development, use or activity may 
be undertaken in the area that is contrary to the Development Plan.”115 
Through a series of Development Plans passed by the County Council, 
Kaua‘i has designated a number of historic sites and districts, including 
locations in Hanalei, Wailua, Līhu‘e, Waimea, and Kōloa.116
 Other ordinances support historic preservation through both 
regulatory and incentive provisions. These include relief from building 
code compliance, broader permitted use of a historic structure, and 
tax exemptions for commercial historic properties.117 One of the more 
important enactments is the creation of the Kaua‘i Historic Preserva-
tion Review Commission, whose purpose is to protect, preserve, per-
petuate, promote, enhance, and develop “the historic resources of the 
County of Kaua‘i.”118 The commission’s establishment, plus a require-
ment for “adequate public participation,” permits Kaua‘i County to take 
advantage of a sometimes overlooked proviso in the National Historic 
Preservation Act.119 That is, the “certified local government” designa-
tion provides Kaua‘i with federal funds equal to a “minimum of 10 
per centum of the annual apportionment distributed by the Secretary 
[of the Department of the Interior] to each State for the purposes of” 
historic preservation.120 It is the state—and in particular, the SHPO—
along with the secretary that certify such a designation, providing an 
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example of how all three levels of government legislation—national, 
state, and local—can work together to promote the preservation of 
historic sites.121
Hawai‘i
Historic preservation in Hawai‘i County, as in Kaua‘i and Maui, depends 
on what the county’s General Plan contains. The county-adopted (by 
ordinance) General Plan is comprehensive with respect to historic pres-
ervation, devoting an entire chapter to historic sites.122 Fourteen pages 
delineate the goals, policies, and standards for evaluating a particular 
site and include a listing of historical sites and districts placed on the 
Hawai‘i or National Registers, along with an islandwide map depicting 
these locations.123 Indeed, the plan mandates that any new listing on 
the registers must be included in future general plans.124 The Hawai‘i 
Heritage Corridor Program, currently unique to the Big Island, seeks 
“to preserve historic sites by enabling non-profit organizations in the 
various County districts [to] preserve historic sites and buildings along 
a transportation corridor.”125 The county charter also makes it clear 
that “[n]o public improvement or project, or subdivision or zoning 
ordinance, shall be initiated or adopted unless the same conforms to 
and implements the general plan.”126 Such plan provisions as applied 
to historic preservation therefore have the force of law not only in addi-
tion to, but also in case of conflict, superior to any land development 
ordinance to the contrary.
 The Hawai‘i General Plan has much to say about historic preserva-
tion, most of which—as indicated by the aforementioned charter lan-
guage—is binding upon the council, Planning Commission, and other 
land use decision makers. Probably the most significant provisions are 
the goal to “[p]rotect, restore, and enhance the sites, buildings, and 
objects of significant historical and cultural importance to Hawai‘i” and 
the policies that specifically address historic preservation:
Amend appropriate ordinances to incorporate the stewardship 
and protection of historic sites, buildings and objects.
Require both public and private developers of land to provide 
historical and archaeological surveys and cultural assessments, 
where appropriate, prior to the clearing or development of 
land when there are indications that the land under construc-
tion has historical significance.
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Public access to significant historic sites and objects shall be 
acquired.
Embark on a program of restoring significant historic sites on 
County lands. Assure the protection and restoration of sites on 
other public lands through a joint effort with the State.127
These goals and policies of the General Plan are buttressed by action 
plans specific to the historic site or district. For example, a “course of 
action” for the North Kona District is to “[e]stablish suitable visual 
buffers for the Keakealaniwahine and Keolanahihi complexes as a con-
dition of rezoning or Special Management Area permits, for nearby 
properties.”128
 Recognizing that the plan is intended only to generally set forth 
objectives, goals, and policies, Hawai‘i County has left it to the com-
munity development plans to “translate the broad General Plan state-
ments to specific actions as they apply to specific geographical areas.”129 
The development plans, in conjunction with the county code and ordi-
nances, provide for various regulatory schemes and incentives related 
to the preservation of historic sites. Thus, the Zoning Code creates a 
Design Commission for the Kailua Village Special District to review any 
proposed architectural and design changes that will affect the physi-
cal appearance of the village.130 Other “carrots and sticks” include the 
creation of a fund and commission for the “[p]reservation of historic or 
culturally important land areas and sites,” subdivision restrictions (e.g., 
“historical sites and structures shall be preserved”), real property tax 
exemption for dedications of historic residential real property, except 
for a minimum tax, and exemptions of historic sites from compliance 
with the applicable building code.131
Maui
The Maui County Charter provides for a General Plan, a “cultural 
resource management program,” and a fund to preserve “historic or 
culturally important land areas.”132 One of the General Plan’s policies 
is to “[i]dentify and preserve significant historic and cultural sites,” and 
this policy is bolstered by some of the strongest ordinance language 
relating to historic preservation.133 Indeed, besides Kaua‘i, Maui is cur-
rently the only other county in the state to receive a “certified local 
government” designation.
 Maui has adopted a full-blown historic district ordinance complete 
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with a historic district commission, historic districts (three), and detailed 
design and use standards. The ordinance creates the nine-member Maui 
County Cultural Resources Commission, whose members are appointed 
by the mayor and approved by the City Council.134 The commission must 
also include at least one representative from each island in Maui County 
(i.e., Lāna‘i and Moloka‘i).135 One of the commission’s duties is to 
review all plans for the construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, 
moving, or demolition of structures in the historic districts.136 Unless 
the commission issues a “certificate of approval,” the county superin-
tendent of building inspection cannot issue a building permit for the 
requested change to the structure.137 The ordinance also creates three 
historic districts: two in Lahaina and one in Wailuku.138 The boundaries 
of each district are extensively and explicitly described. While Historic 
District no. 2 differs from no. 1 because there are no historic structures 
or sites within the district to be preserved or restored, it is intended “to 
preserve the charm of Lahaina by preserving the architectural styles” 
unique to it.139
 Finally, there are regulations for the architectural styles and uses 
for the commission to use as standards for granting certificates of 
approval. They require the exterior of all new buildings to keep with the 
architectural style of the district so as not to impair the value of other 
buildings in the immediate vicinity.140 For Historic District no. 1 and 
Historic District no. 2, the preferred styles of architecture are “Native 
Hawaiian,” nineteenth-century New England, “Monterey” or Western; 
and for single-family dwellings, “any architectural style prevalent during 
the nineteenth century in Lahaina or which evolved from 1900 to the 
present in Lahaina, being unpretentious in style and painted in muted 
tones.”141 For Historic District no. 3, the restrictions are largely stated in 
the negative. European, Asian, excessively decorated, flat-roofed, mod-
ernistic, and gaudy styles are prohibited.142 The regulations list specific 
criteria for use, such as height (two stories, thirty-five feet for Lahaina) 
and off-street parking (“one canopy tree shall be planted for every eight 
parking stalls”).143
Burials
A study of historical and cultural land use and regulation in Hawai‘i can-
not be complete without a review of those governing Native Hawaiian 
iwi (bones) and burials that are found throughout the Islands. Indeed, 
between 1991 and 2000, nearly three thousand sets of Native Hawaiian 
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remains have been discovered and reinterred.144 Any land development 
must stop when such sites are discovered.145 Failure to comply with the 
relevant statutory provisions may result in civil, administrative, and 
criminal penalties.146 Furthermore, if such finds occur on federal or 
tribal lands, then the 1990 federal Native American Graves Protection 
and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) also applies.147
 According to Native Hawaiian tradition, the bones of family mem-
bers possess “mana,” or spiritual power.148 Unlike human flesh, which 
decays, the bones of the dead allegedly contain the spirit of the deceased 
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and transfer their power to their living Hawaiian descendants.149 This 
belief is reflected in Hawaiian proverbs:
‘A‘ohe e nalo ka iwi o ke ali‘i ‘ino, o ko ke ali‘i maika‘i ke nalo.
The bones of an evil chief will not be concealed, but the bones of a good 
chief will.
When an evil chief died, the people did not take the trouble to 
conceal his bones.150
 While Native Hawaiians once buried their dead in graveyards, 
“wicked, traitorous, and desecrating chiefs” regularly exhumed fresh 
corpses to use the flesh as food and shark bait and to fashion the bones 
into arrows and fishhooks.151 Thereafter, Hawaiians concealed their 
dead without identifying the sites.
 Sand was the preferred location for burials because it better pre-
served remains than higher, wetter elevations.152 Therefore, coastal areas 
with subsurface beach sand are likely to contain iwi.153 “[T]he confiden-
tiality of description and location information, especially for burial and 
other cultural sites, is a highly sensitive issue [in] the Hawaiian com-
munity. The final resting place of the ancestors of Native Hawaiians has 
always been sacred and consequently, hidden to protect its sanctity.”154
 Hence, burial secrecy lies at the heart of the state’s burial statutes. 
The watershed event that resulted in legislative language to protect 
ancestral bones occurred in 1988, during the construction of the Ritz-
Carlton at Honokōhau in Kapalua, Maui. The unearthing of approxi-
mately one thousand sets of remains caused an uproar in the Native 
Hawaiian community. Activists immediately protested the development, 
and—after a $6 million settlement that included the relocation of the 
hotel to another parcel—the State Legislature amended Chapter 6E of 
the Hawai‘i Revised Statutes to include burial sites as part of its histori-
cal and cultural preservation provisions.155
 Central to the enforcement of burial site regulation is the DLNR’s 
State Historic Preservation Division (SHPD). One may not so much 
as photograph remains without SHPD’s approval.156 Indeed, SHPD is 
involved even if the private owner or developer is not, at least directly. 
“Before any agency or officer of the State or its political subdivisions 
approves any project involving a permit, license, certificate, land use 
change, subdivision, or other entitlement for use, which may affect . . . 
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a burial site, the agency or office shall advise the department and prior 
to any approval allow the department an opportunity for review and 
comment on the effect of the proposed project.”157
 SHPD responds primarily to “inadvertently discovered” burial 
remains, defined as “the unanticipated finding of human skeletal 
remains and any burial goods resulting from unintentional distur-
bance, erosion, or other ground disturbing activity.”158 Upon discovery 
of a potentially historic burial site, SHPD requires that it, the medi-
cal examiner, and the appropriate police department be notified as 
soon as possible.159 A qualified archaeologist and a medical examiner 
must examine the remains to determine whether the remains are over 
fifty years old.160 Once SHPD is contacted, administrative procedures 
require a response time of twenty-four hours on O‘ahu, forty-eight 
hours on other islands, and an additional twenty-four hours if multiple 
sets of remains are reported to determine if the burial is historic.161 
If the bones are of animal origin, then no statutory obligations are 
incurred. However, if the remains are over fifty years old and of Native 
Hawaiian ancestry, then SHPD must begin gathering information 
about the history of the burial and determine whether the remains 
will be preserved in place or relocated.162 If the remains were discov-
ered with no relation to a planned development project, SHPD must 
prepare a mitigation plan requiring “appropriate treatment . . . of 
burial sites or human skeletal remains.”163 However, if the discovery of 
remains was related to a planned development project, the landowner 
must prepare the mitigation plan with the concurrence of SHPD.164 
The process often raises concerns in the Hawaiian community because 
“developers may conduct cursory archaeological inventory surveys, 
claim that burials are ‘inadvertently discovered,’ and then attempt 
to force SHPD to agree to removal/relocation.”165 When it comes to 
land development in Hawai‘i, inadvertent discoveries of Native Hawai-
ian burial sites usually lead to controversy and consequent delays in a 
project.166
 The determination to preserve a burial site in place or relocate 
remains may be based upon the advice of an Island Burial Council 
(IBC), which DLNR establishes to advise both the department and 
SHPD regarding burial matters.167 IBCs exist for the following five dis-
tricts: Hawai‘i, O‘ahu, Kaua‘i/Ni‘ihau, Moloka‘i, and Maui/Lāna‘i.168 
Comprised of between nine and fifteen members appointed by the 
governor, each council is charged with making an inventory of burial 
sites in Hawai‘i.169 The councils have jurisdiction over all requests to 
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preserve or relocate “previously identified” Native Hawaiian burial sites, 
while SPHD has jurisdiction over those burial sites that are determined 
to hold remains of non-Native Hawaiian origin.170 “Previously identi-
fied” burial sites are those “containing human skeletal remains and any 
burial goods identified during archaeological inventory survey and data 
recovery of possible burial sites, or known through oral or written testi-
mony.”171 IBCs often hold regular public meetings where they may col-
lect information from Hawaiians; this information serves to “previously 
identify” burial sites.172 The archaeological inventory survey identifies 
and documents the historic sites in the project area, including subsur-
face excavations, to determine the location of buried sites.173 Because 
of the nature and sensitivity, IBCs often keep locations confidential, 
unrecorded in the public records of DLNR.174
 If Native Hawaiian remains are discovered in an area where buri-
als have been previously identified, whoever finds the remains may not 
move them without SHPD’s approval.175 SHPD refers the matter to the 
appropriate IBC, which will determine whether the remains will be 
either undisturbed or reinterred at a different location.176 The councils 
are more likely to recommend preservation in place for the following 
burials: “areas with a concentration of skeletal remains, or prehistoric 
or historic burials associated with important individuals and events, or 
areas that are within a context of historic properties, or have known lin-
eal descendants.”177 The relevant IBC has forty-five days, commencing 
with the date that SHPD makes a referral to it, to render a determina-
tion about the disposition of the remains.178 It must also make a good-
faith effort to give notice to possible lineal or cultural descendants of 
any proposed burial treatment plan.179
 If the IBC determines that the burial site should be preserved in 
place, the applicant must then develop a preservation plan providing 
for both short- and long-term preservation of the burial site.180 When 
the IBC determines to relocate the burial site, the landowner must com-
plete an archaeological data recovery plan outlining the reasons for 
relocation, the methods for disinterment, and the location and man-
ner of reinterment.181 SHPD must approve within ninety days; however, 
before approving the plans, SHPD must first consult with the applicant, 
any known lineal descendants, the IBC, and any appropriate Hawaiian 
organizations.182 Even after approval of the final plans to preserve or 
reinter, the SHPD must record the determination of the IBC with the 
Bureau of Conveyances to ensure that the burial sites are protected in 
perpetuity.183
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 There are several locations in Hawai‘i in which the state’s burial 
laws have delayed development projects, including the site of a Wal-
Mart and a Whole Foods Market on O‘ahu, a luxury golf-residential 
development on the Big Island of Hawai‘i, and private residences on 
Maui. Most recently, sixty-nine Hawaiian remains discovered during 
earthmoving for the construction of a $17.5-million multipurpose 
center on the grounds of Honolulu’s famous and largely Native 
Hawaiian–attended Kawaiaha‘o Church has resulted in a temporary 
halt in construction due to “one of the largest graveyard intrusions on 
O‘ahu.”184 An archaeologist hired by an interested third party found 
that the excavation is also encroaching on the burial plot of one of 
Hawai‘i’s prominent figures, Queen Kapi‘olani.185 The project halted 
while the church supplied the state with “documentation on past 
burials, conduct[ed] hand excavations of newly discovered remains 
and develop[ed] a detailed reburial plan for bodies that [have been] 
unearthed.”186 The church was also required to use ground-penetrating 
radar to examine the property for additional burials that might not yet 
have been disturbed.187
 Earlier, a huge controversy erupted on Kaua‘i over remains on a 
single residential lot. On December 11, 2007, the Kaua‘i County Plan-
ning Commission approved the construction of a single-family home 
on a lot in Ha‘ena, conditioned on an archaeological survey of the land 
and a subsequent approval by the SHPD.188 The archaeological survey 
uncovered thirty sets of Native Hawaiian remains on the half-acre lot. 
SHPD then required the landowner to draw up a burial treatment plan 
for protecting the remains.189 The plan proposed preservation in place 
of twenty-four sets of remains that would not be impacted by the con-
struction and on-site relocation of the six others that would be under 
the footprint of the proposed house.190
 Upon receiving the burial treatment plan, however, the Kaua‘i/
Ni‘ihau IBC recommended that all thirty sets of remains, together 
with those that may be found on the property in the future, should 
be preserved in place.191 The landowner then revised the burial treat-
ment plan to preserve all thirty remains in place, by capping the graves 
with cement blocks and adding vertical buffers to protect the human 
remains.192 After consulting with Native Hawaiian organizations and 
the Kaua‘i/Ni‘ihau IBC, SHPD approved the plan,193 though it appar-
ently approved the vertical buffers and concrete cappings as a means of 
preservation of the remains without the approval of the Kaua‘i/Ni‘ihau 
IBC.194 As the burial statute presently provides, although the IBCs have 
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the authority to determine the preservation or relocation of previously 
identified Native Hawaiian burials, the councils may only make recom-
mendations regarding the appropriate management treatment and 
protection of the Native Hawaiian burial sites after making their initial 
determination.195
 For burials “excavated intentionally or discovered inadvertently” 
on federal lands in Hawai‘i and Hawaiian Home Lands, NAGPRA 
applies. NAGPRA mainly deals with three issues: (1) the custodial prior-
ity of the cultural items excavated or discovered to the organizations or 
descendants who lay claim to them; (2) the process by which intentional 
removal of cultural items are allowed; and (3) “inadvertent discover-
ies” of native remains and objects.196 Regulations promulgated by the 
Department of the Interior then govern the process by which “human 
remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, or objects of cultural patri-
mony are excavated or removed.”197 For the latter two, and for any event 
in which a Native Hawaiian organization is likely a consulting party, the 
rules require that “the responsible Federal agency official must” notify 
said organizations in writing in addition to any other communication 
that may have occurred.198
 In general, the federal mandates are similar to those of the state, 
requiring the immediate cessation of activity in the case of inadver-
tent discoveries and the consent of Native Hawaiian organizations in 
the case of intentional excavations.199 There is at least one difference, 
however. Whereas an IBC can require the preservation of bones as-is 
and where-is on state and private lands, site activity may resume within 
thirty days on federal lands “after certification by the notified Fed-
eral agency of receipt of the written confirmation of notification of 
inadvertent discovery if the resumption of the activity is otherwise law-
ful.”200 The presumption is that state burial regulations do not apply 
to federal lands. Instances of removals or excavations are not an issue 
because these are explicitly covered in the NAGPRA regulations.201 
Federal agencies are encouraged to come to an agreement with 
local organizations with respect to human remains and other sacred 
objects.202
Sacred Sites
Sacred sites, or wahi pana, are also important to the Native Hawaiian 
community. According to Native Hawaiian belief, sacred places, like 
human remains, possess mana or spiritual power in connection with 
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the gods or important chiefs that may have resided there, the events or 
natural phenomena that occurred there, or the usefulness or aesthetic 
value of the location.203 “[Hawaiian sacred places] are more than rem-
nants of a distant past; they are enduring reminders of Hawaiian iden-
tity, a rich heritage left by kapuna.”204 Native Hawaiians are spiritually 
connected to these sacred places, linking them to their past, present, 
and future.205
 Native Hawaiians believe that such sites can be irreparably harmed 
physically as well as spiritually; the mere visitation of certain locations or 
touching of certain objects could cause the sacred spirits to be destroyed 
or to leave the site.206 The destruction or departure of spirits from wahi 
pana is said to be detrimental to the Native Hawaiian culture. There are 
many examples in Hawai‘i where the Native Hawaiian community has 
tried to protect their sacred sites. In 2007, challenges by environmental 
and Hawaiian groups temporarily halted plans for the Outriggers Proj-
ect, a $50 million addition to the W. M. Keck Observatory on Mauna 
Kea’s summit.207 Mauna Kea is allegedly sacred to the Hawaiian people 
not only as a place of worship and prayer, but also because Hawaiian leg-
end suggests it was here that the first ancestors of the Hawaiian people, 
Papa and Wakea, met.208
 A court reversed a decision by DLNR that granted a conservation 
district permit allowing the University of Hawai‘i Institute for Astron-
omy to proceed with the Outriggers Project.209 It ordered the comple-
tion of a comprehensive management plan before any project could 
proceed, stating “the resource that needs to be conserved, protected 
and preserved is the summit area of Mauna Kea, not just the area of the 
Project.”210
 While not perfect, historic preservation is alive and well in Hawai‘i. 
The state’s legislative protection has been strengthened over the years, 
and there are some linkages to other laws that are variously triggered 
when a historic site is listed and that provide a measure of protection 
to certain sites. But the state could do more, especially given the consti-
tutional mandate that other states with stronger preservation laws lack. 
Indeed, Hawai‘i is in the minority of states that fail to provide rehabili-
tation tax credits for historic buildings.211 It is the counties that play a 
major role in enacting ordinances with the most promise for preserving 
Hawai‘i’s historic heritage. Witness two of the four counties’ “certified 
local government” status and the Big Island’s Hawai‘i Heritage Corridor 
program. Given the strong language of the Penn Central decision from 
our nation’s highest court upholding historic preservation restrictions 
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prohibiting demolition altogether, it is clear that there would be no legal 
barriers to more forceful implementation of our state constitutional 
mandate that “private property shall be subject to reasonable regula-
tion” in order to “conserve and develop objects and places of historic or 
cultural interest.”212
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Chapter 9
Federalization of Land Use 
Control in Hawai‘i
Clean Air, Clean Water, Species Protection, 
and Environmental Impacts
The federal government injected itself into environmental law in a 
series of statutes passed in the 1970s. The late Don Hagman called the 
new environmental laws with their significant land use implications 
“The Federalization of land use controls.”1 The complex array of federal 
environmental statutes spawned a cottage industry of lawyers devoted to 
keeping businesses in compliance with the laws. From a land use per-
spective, the most important of these laws are the Clean Air Act, the 
Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act.2 In some instances, 
Hawai‘i’s state environmental laws go even further. For example, as 
interpreted in a series of Hawai‘i Supreme Court decisions, the Hawai‘i 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) law has been so broadly con-
strued that any land use project that so much as touches state land, 
however minimal the effect, triggers a time-consuming, expensive EIS 
review.
Clean Air
What began as a set of guidelines for the states in the Air Quality Act 
of 1967 became a comprehensive, multilevel regulatory scheme to 
control air pollution through amendments in 1972, 1977, and 1990. 
Designed by the federal government and implemented largely by the 
states to protect and maintain healthy air, the act has achieved many of 
its goals. The amount of pollution released into the environment in the 
United States has declined since 1970, even as the size of the economy 
doubled.3 The Clean Air Act is a command-and-control environmental 
scheme. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states 
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set emission limits for specific pollutants, issue permits, and punish the 
noncompliant.4
 In spite of its success, the Clean Air Act faces criticism for its empha-
sis on legal compliance, which deters businesses from misbehavior but 
offers no incentive to exceed minimum standards.5 The costs of compli-
ance can be high. Nevertheless, Hawai‘i has a relatively easy time of 
it. The geography and composition of the Hawai‘i economy together 
bless Hawai‘i with some of the best air quality in the country. There 
are few major stationary sources of pollution, and trade winds normally 
disperse pollutants from automobiles.
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 The purpose of the Clean Air Act is “to protect and enhance 
the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public 
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”6 It 
achieves this by directing the EPA to develop National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for certain named pollutants that are 
deemed hazardous to public health and welfare.7 Primary ambient air 
standards are those designed to protect public health (plus an extra 
margin). Secondary ambient air standards safeguard “public welfare,”8 
which includes ecological concerns such as healthy vegetation, wild-
life, damage to property, and general prevention of environmental 
degradation.9
 NAAQS are enforced through state-created State Implementation 
Plans (SIPs) that provide for the implementation, maintenance, and 
enforcement of standards in an air quality control region.10 SIPs are 
mandatory, on pain of revocation of highway funds, and the EPA will 
draw up a Federal Implementation Plan. The EPA must approve an SIP 
to ensure that it conforms to the requirements of the Clean Air Act 
before the SIP becomes enforceable. Nevertheless, SIPs are a source 
of some autonomy for the states in implementing the Clean Air Act. 
Through the development of SIPs, state officials are responsible for the 
localization of the Clean Air Act to suit the particular needs of their 
state. Though the act is a federal mandate imposed on the states, in 
practice it relies on the states’ cooperation; approximately 80 percent 
of enforcement actions for federal environmental laws are brought by 
state authorities.11
 A state implementation program must follow a number of statutory 
requirements to be approved by the EPA.12 The requirements with the 
most significance for land use are the following:
 (1) enforceable emission limitations and other techniques 
permitted by the state (including economic incentives such as 
fees, marketable permits, and auctions of emissions rights), as 
well as schedules and timetables for compliance;
 (2) a program to enforce those emission limitations and 
regulate the modification and construction of any stationary 
source within the areas covered by the plan, including a permit 
program in which applicants pay the cost;
 (3) prohibitions of stationary sources or other emissions 
that would interfere with the prevention of significant deterio-
ration of air quality or to protect visibility.13
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 The impact of these requirements on land use can be significant. 
Development opportunities are limited in areas at or near emission 
limits of the SIP due to the prohibition of new sources of pollution 
that might push pollutants over the limit, while areas that are under 
the limit are more attractive.14 In practice, this is not a huge concern in 
Hawai‘i. Emissions are about half the federal limits.15 Even in areas with 
good air, compliance with the prevention of significant deterioration 
requirement can distort urban growth patterns. Land use controls as a 
requirement for SIPs were removed from the 1972 Clean Air Amend-
ment, but the legislative history indicates that land use controls are not 
out of bounds.16
 Hawai‘i has not revised its SIP since 1994. With some of the best 
air in the country, it is not surprising that the EPA has paid relatively 
little attention to the state’s delay, but the Hawai‘i State Department 
of Health’s Clean Air Branch is planning to update the SIP in the near 
future.
Preconstruction Review
Amendments to the Clean Air Act require preconstruction review of 
every new17 major stationary source or modification of an existing 
stationary source of air pollution in order to assure the attainment or 
maintenance of national primary and secondary ambient air quality.18 
Consequently, major new developments often must undergo a federally 
mandated review. Negative reviews can delay a project even further—a 
potentially ruinous delay amid other local permitting requirements. If 
state and local officials are not up to the task of performing the review, 
the EPA has the power to perform the review for them.
 The act established review of proposed sites of stationary sources 
of pollution as a natural counterpart to the stationary source emission 
limitations (new-source performance standards). The performance 
standards place a ceiling on maximum emissions; however, to rely on 
that measure alone would be to ignore the effects of geography in chan-
neling and concentrating emissions. A factory located in a valley is a 
recipe for bad air quality no matter how seriously emissions limits are 
taken and enforced, because dispersion cannot have its usual benefi-
cial effect of improving air quality.19 The preconstruction review is an 
opportunity to confront rank unsuitability of a particular project to a 
particular area. Unhappily for those projects that would benefit from 
easier compliance with the Clean Air Act, a facility located on the coast 
encounters two more federal programs, the Coastal Hazards Protection 
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and the Coastal Zone Management Acts, which present their own chal-
lenges.20 As a result of the preconstruction review amendments, the SIP 
contains enforceable measures to review whether the proposed entity 
would complicate the maintenance or attainment of ambient air quality 
standards, either through direct emissions or the likely result of a new 
building: increased traffic. The amendments set out further submis-
sions state agencies may require from developers to fully inform their 
decisions.21
 Hawai‘i requires both a permit and registration for the precon-
struction review process.22 Construction of major new stationary sources 
of air pollution triggers tougher levels of control. The involvement 
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of regulatory agencies in the permitting process before construction 
begins gives the agencies a degree of control over where new sources 
are located and how they are designed in order to minimize harmful 
effects on air quality. The New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) 
program compiles a list of non–NAAQS pollutants designated by the 
EPA through regulations. The EPA requires that emissions standards 
be the lowest achievable emission, through the best technology avail-
able, given the “non-air-quality health and environmental impacts and 
energy requirements.” Standards may be based on design, equipment, 
work practice, or operational standards where it is not feasible to require 
adherence to a specific emissions limit.23
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
In attainment areas like Hawai‘i, PSD permits are required before 
construction begins on any new stationary source of pollution or any 
major modification to an existing source in order to prevent air qual-
ity deterioration and maintain air quality above the federally mandated 
minimum.24 PSD areas cover all of Hawai‘i. There are three classes of 
PSD areas.25 Class I areas are national parks, national memorials, and 
national wilderness areas of greater than five thousand acres in size that 
are deemed to deserve special protection. Class II areas are attainment 
areas not otherwise classified where some deterioration in air quality 
accompanying growth is permissible. Class III areas are those in which 
air quality is allowed to degrade to reach national secondary ambient 
air qualities. So far, no area in Hawai‘i has been designated a growth-
friendly Class III. Except for the two national parks that are required to 
be Class I, every area in Hawai‘i is Class II. The EPA faults the Hawai‘i 
SIP for not including “approvable procedures for preventing the signifi-
cant deterioration of air quality.”26 Nevertheless, the implications of the 
Clean Air Act for land use in Hawai‘i are likely to remain minimal.
Clean Water
The Clean Water Act (CWA) is the philosophical and regulatory frater-
nal twin of the Clean Air Act. The CWA is a federal statutory scheme 
that mixes ambient water standards and technology-based controls to 
regulate pollution. The two schemes are not identical, however; the 
outlook on the CWA is less rosy for all concerned, whether concerned 
about regulatory burdens on property or polluted water. While the 
characteristics of geography and economy in Hawai‘i combine to ease 
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the impact of the Clean Air Act and enable the state to easily achieve 
attainment, the Clean Water Act grapples less successfully to balance 
the regulatory burden placed on land use with the need to obtain high 
water quality standards.27
 The objective of the Clean Water Act is to “restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”28 
Under the CWA, the EPA must develop programs aimed at “prevent-
ing, reducing, or eliminating the pollution of the navigable waters and 
ground waters and improving the sanitary condition of surface and 
underground waters.”29 The CWA was born from the frustration of 
federal legislators with the ineffectiveness of state water quality control 
measures. The federal government stepped forcefully into the water 
pollution control business with the 1972 amendments to the CWA. The 
state programs that preceded the CWA focused on ambient water qual-
ity. Congress was well aware of the problems with state-led ambient water 
quality programs and focused their efforts instead on controlling pollut-
ing industrial and sewage treatment facilities through technology-based 
controls.30 Federal regulations mandate that every discharger adopt the 
best practicable technology to minimize the pollution of the waters of 
the United States. Overall, the CWA has been successful. Waters that 
were once so polluted they were not safe to swim in are on their way to 
recovery.31 But the CWA’s success in regulating the traditional factory 
pipe may just have been picking the low-hanging fruit. Probably most of 
the remaining pollutants in the water are due to nonpoint sources such 
as agricultural runoff. Nonpoint sources are estimated to be respon-
sible for 99 percent of suspended solids and 50–90 percent of other 
pollutants.32 Revisions to the CWA since the mid-1980s are designed to 
give federal and state regulators more muscle and more options in han-
dling other significant sources of pollution, most notably storm water 
discharges and the polluted runoff from dirty city streets; the 1987 CWA 
amendments and subsequent rules have increased regulatory hurdles 
for most land use and development. Overall, the impact of attempts to 
control runoff has been anemic.
 Clean water is particularly important to Hawai‘i. Tourists are the 
consumers of the major state industry, and they flock to Hawai‘i for the 
beaches, the waterfalls, the marine wildlife, and the diving and snorkel-
ing. Hawai‘i regulators are aware of the importance of maintaining that 
experience for visitors.33
 The relative lack of heavy industry makes regulating point sources 
unproblematic. Of more concern are the nonpoint sources—pollutants 
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that cannot be defined as emanating from a discrete source like a pipe 
but which are responsible for most of the pollution in Hawai‘i’s streams 
and nearshore marine areas. Nonpoint pollution comes from herbi-
cides, fertilizers, insecticides, and soil from eroded cliffs being washed 
by storms into bodies of water. Hawai‘i’s geography offers unusual chal-
lenges to controlling nonpoint source pollution. Streams flow short and 
steep down the mountain, and most are intermittent. Moreover, as in 
other states, Hawai‘i’s enthusiasm for regulatory controls falls short of 
meaningful (i.e., mandatory) runoff control of agricultural interests. 
As regulators struggle with plans for dealing with the water runoff, the 
state may contemplate greater restrictions imposed on land use.
NPDES Permits and Point Sources
Anyone who discharges pollutants into “waters of the United States” 
from a “point source” must get a permit to do so.34 Section 402 National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits,35 along with 
Section 404 “dredge and fill permits,”36 are the centerpiece of regu-
lated water pollution under the CWA.37 The “discharge of a pollutant” 
is defined as the “addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from 
any point source.”38 What constitutes an “addition” can sometimes be 
a subtle thing. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, of which Hawai‘i 
is a part, has tended to interpret “addition” more broadly than some 
other circuits, including soil, sand, and rocks taken from a streambed, 
sifted for gold, and returned to the water.39 The Ninth Circuit similarly 
decided that spraying aquatic herbicide into canals to destroy vegetative 
growth in the water was a discharge.40 What constitutes a “point source” 
requiring a permit is also the subject of litigation. A point source is 
“any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not 
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, con-
tainer, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation,” and so 
on.41 “Point sources” include “surface runoff which is collected or chan-
neled by man.”42 Courts have taken the definition even further.43 Navy 
planes and cattle feedlots during a storm have both been held to be 
point sources.44 A dairy farm, in aggregate, has been found to be a point 
source, or—as the court found in the alternative—so are the manure-
spreading vehicles that spread manure onto fields. The manure subse-
quently flows to streams.45 The CWA is lenient toward farmers, however, 
leaving them largely unregulated: Agricultural storm water discharges 
and flows from irrigated agriculture are not “point sources.”46
 The definition of “waters of the United States” has also undergone 
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some revision by the courts since the first expansive constructions by the 
Army Corps of Engineers. Regulations promulgated by the agency cast 
a very broad net to bring virtually all surface waters (and many surfaces 
without waters) into the ambit of federal regulation. These regulations 
were narrowed by the Supreme Court in Rapanos v. United States.47 The 
Court determined that although a body of water need not be constantly 
flowing to be regulated under the Clean Water Act, there must be at 
least a “significant nexus” to waters that were actually navigable.48 Due 
to the interconnectedness of the waters and terrain in Hawai‘i, the 
impact of this ruling is likely to be slight for the state’s land use. NPDES 
permits are not required for nonpoint agricultural or silvicultural (tree 
farming) projects.49 Dredged or fill materials are regulated with the 
separate 404 permit elsewhere in the CWA. NPDES permits are also 
not required for sewage from vessels and the discharge of pollutants 
to a treatment works.50 The CWA does not normally require NPDES 
permits for discharges to groundwater or wells either,51 although some 
courts have found them to be necessary when discharges into ground-
water resulted in contamination of connected surface waters.52 The EPA 
is less demanding in protecting groundwater and usually allows state 
programs to take the lead in such programs; action under the CWA is 
limited to a reporting requirement.53 Hawai‘i has been active in promot-
ing voluntary guidelines to limit the harm caused to groundwater from 
golf courses.54
 The federal government delegates the NPDES permitting system 
to the states in accordance with federal statutes and regulations, but 
state NPDES permits must still comply with applicable federal require-
ments.55 The most significant of these are technology-based limitations. 
Technology-based limits do not mandate the use of a particular technol-
ogy or design; instead, they hold permittees to an achievable level of 
pollution control based on technology available in the industry.
 The CWA has inconsistent standards for facilities of different ages 
and for those discharging different types of pollution.56 Discharges of 
conventional pollutants by existing sources to surface waters require 
the “best practicable control technology currently available” (BPT) 
or the “best conventional pollutant control technology” (BCT).57 BPT 
standards are created by surveying what the best in the industry achieve 
with a model technology and holding dirtier dischargers to that stan-
dard, though “the best” is no specific percentage and in one case was 
based on a model technology used by over 70 percent of the industry.58 
Congress enacted BCT as a fuzzy intermediate stage between the “best 
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available technology economically achievable” (BAT), which could be 
unreasonably costly, and BPT. BCT is applied if it is deemed to be cost 
effective based on two arbitrary benchmarks created by the EPA.59
 New sources are subject to still higher technological standards: new 
source performance standards (NSPS). A “new source” is a “building, 
structure or facility” that was built after the promulgation of an applica-
ble NSPS,60 which was constructed at a site without a preexisting source, 
totally replaces the process or production equipment, or is separate and 
independent of sources already in place at the same site.61 In Hawai‘i, 
new sources or increased sources of pollution must “provide the highest 
and best degree of waste treatment practicable under existing technol-
ogy.”62 Under federal regulations, NSPS standards are at least as tough 
as BAT; the theory is that it is most practical to require new facilities 
to design their facilities with the best technology from the start rather 
than require existing facilities designed with old technology in mind to 
undergo costly renovations and thereby phase in higher water quality 
technologies over time as old facilities are replaced.
 NPDES permits come in two forms: a general permit or an indi-
vidual permit. An individual permit is a site-specific permit for one facil-
ity. A general permit is for a group of similar facilities not expected to 
greatly impact waters, but it is desirable that they adhere to BPT stan-
dards. General permits are usually instigated by the permitting organi-
zation, and the organization cannot rely on site-specific information.63 
They are used for sources of pollutants that are conveniently managed 
together, such as storm water associated with industrial activity, storm 
water associated with construction activities, and treated effluents leak-
ing from underground storage tanks. An application for a permit (or 
notice of intent to be covered by a general permit) must be filed at least 
180 days prior to the first discharge,64 with the exception of storm water 
construction discharge permits, which may be applied for at least ninety 
days before the beginning of construction.65 An NPDES permit applica-
tion must contain substantive information on the proposed activity.66
 The Hawai‘i Department of Health (DOH) may require additional 
information from the applicant. If the NPDES application is deficient 
in some fashion, it will not be processed until the deficiency is cured.67 
The applicant is also required to send a copy of the permit application 
to the State Historic Preservation Division when review is required.68
 Before the public has a chance to comment on the application and 
tentative issuance or denial, the DOH must make tentative determina-
tions as to the ground rules of the permit, including proposed effluent 
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limitations, a proposed schedule of compliance with dates and require-
ments, monitoring requirements, and any other proposed special 
conditions to granting the permit.69 The DOH must then give notice 
“designed to inform interested and potentially interested persons of the 
proposed discharge.”70 Notice must be circulated within the geographi-
cal area—potentially including post offices near the entrance of the 
premises of the proposed discharge and to newspapers—paid for by the 
applicant.71 A public hearing will be held if a request is submitted within 
thirty days and there is “significant public interest,” with instances of 
doubt resolved in favor of holding a hearing.72 Once a final determina-
tion is made, the DOH must send a final decision to the applicant and 
those who submitted written comments.73
 An NPDES permit may not be granted for a duration longer than 
five years. It may be terminated by natural expiration, noncompliance 
with any condition of the permit, failure by the permittee to “disclose 
fully all relevant facts” or “misrepresentation of any relevant facts at any 
time,” a determination that the permitted activity endangers human 
health, or a change in conditions requiring a temporary or permanent 
reduction or elimination of a discharge.74 Once an NPDES is acquired, 
compliance with the effluent limitations listed in the NPDES permit 
satisfies the CWA. The permittee is shielded from new regulations and 
requirements promulgated by the EPA for the duration of the permit.75 
During the duration of the permit, permittees are subject to monitor-
ing to ensure compliance. All records and samples taken of water qual-
ity must be retained and included in the mean tests reported to the 
DOH.76
 In addition to an NPDES permit, a water quality certification is 
required stating that a proposed activity will not violate water quality 
standards for any application for a federal license or permit that may 
cause a discharge into navigable waters.77 Navigable waters are defined 
by Hawai‘i regulations to include all waters that could be used by for-
eign or interstate travelers for recreation, from which fish could be 
taken and sold in interstate commerce, or that could be used by indus-
tries engaged in interstate commerce. As a practical matter, navigable 
waters encompass most surface waters in Hawai‘i.78 The application for 
a water quality certification must make a “reasonable assurance” that 
the proposed activity will not violate water quality standards. The water 
quality certification should include any conditions that DOH deems 
necessary or desirable to meet water quality assurances. DOH will issue 
the certification if there is “reasonable assurance” water quality stan-
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dards will be maintained and “best practicable methods of control” will 
be applied to a discharge. Permits and water quality certifications relat-
ing to the construction or rehabilitation of Hawaiian fishponds have 
priority.79 If for some reason a project or activity requiring a federal 
permit or license neglects to acquire a water quality certification and 
the project is begun, an “After the Fact” water quality certification may 
be obtained, but this certification does not retroactively cover the previ-
ous violation.
Controlling Storm Water Pollution
Storm water discharges fall somewhere between point and nonpoint 
sources. Unlike other runoff, storm water discharges are legally classi-
fied as “point” sources because they are often collected and discharged 
through drains, culverts, and other conveyances and thus meet the 
definition of a “point source.”80 NPDES permits are required for storm 
water discharges already permitted, discharges associated with indus-
trial activity, discharges from municipal storm sewer systems serving 
more than one hundred thousand people, and discharges determined 
to contribute to “a violation of a water quality standard or is a significant 
contributor of pollutants.”81 Storm water is “storm water runoff, snow 
melt runoff, and surface runoff and drainage.”82 Agricultural runoff is 
pointedly excluded.83
 In 1999, storm water regulations were extended to cover small 
construction sites and small, separate municipal storm sewer systems. 
Permits are now required for construction sites that would disturb one 
acre or more.84 Most such sites should fall within general permits and 
are required to submit a notice of intent for coverage.85
Water Quality Standards
Hawai‘i water quality regulations remain substantially as they were since 
they were established in 1979, in spite of the more accurate science that 
has emerged since then.86 Hawai‘i State water quality standards seek to 
maintain current water quality and existing uses.87 Water degradation 
may sometimes be allowed when water quality is higher than necessary 
to support swimming and wildlife, if “allowing lower water quality is 
necessary to accommodate important economic or social development 
in the area in which the waters are located,” provided that existing uses 
remain protected and other statutory and regulatory requirements are 
met for point sources, and all “cost effective and reasonable best man-
agement practices” for nonpoint sources are met.88
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 Hawai‘i’s numeric water quality standards are based on the national 
effluent limits. National standards were not designed for a tropical 
environment, however, and some commentators have suggested that as 
applied to Hawai‘i (and areas such as Florida), such standards might be 
unduly strict, and lack of attainment may not accurately reflect attain-
ment of high-quality water. For instance, the standards issued for certain 
bacteria that are used as indicators for fecal matter do not recognize 
that the bacteria flourishes in Hawai‘i’s soil, while it does not in more 
temperate areas of the United States, leading to misleadingly high levels 
not necessarily indicative of sewage problems.89
 Basic water quality standards set a water quality floor below which 
water is not allowed to degrade.90 Standards are both numeric and nar-
rative. All state waters are monitored for toxic or harmful pollutants. 
Water is to be free of material that settles to become sludge, floating 
debris, or substances that discolor or “produce taste” in the water or alter 
the flavor of fish. Water is also to be free of substances in concentrations 
that would “produce undesirable aquatic life” and toxic or otherwise 
harmful substances in concentrations that are harmful to humans or 
wildlife or that “interfere with any beneficial use of the water.”91 State 
waters must be free at all times from pollutants that would rapidly harm 
fish life. Standards are somewhat looser for levels of discharges that are 
harmful only over the long term.92
 The requirement that water be free of soil from agriculture and 
erosion is deemed to have been met if the land on which the erosion 
occurred is managed according to “the best degree of management or 
control” or a soil conservation program is “actively pursued” and the 
impact on the waters is “acceptable.”93 Unsurprisingly, the waters of 
national and state parks and wildlife refuges and waters of “exceptional 
recreational or ecological significance” enjoy higher levels of protec-
tion. Water quality in such areas may not be degraded.94
 Hawai‘i divides its waters into a series of classes of higher and lower 
degrees of protection. “Inland” waters include wetlands, reservoirs, 
ditches and flumes that discharge into other waters, lakes, and streams 
(intermittent and perennial).95 “Intermittent” streams include gulches in 
which a sudden rainstorm sometimes creates flowing waters.96 “Marine” 
waters are embayments (an indentation of a coastline), open coastal 
waters, and oceanic waters. Coastal waters and embayments are further 
subdivided into things such as sand beaches and reef flats.97 Both types 
of waters contain a hierarchy of protection under Hawai‘i water quality 
standards.
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 The most protected inland waters are “class 1” waters to be pre-
served “in their natural state as nearly as possible with an absolute mini-
mum of pollution.” Waste discharge is prohibited, and “any conduct 
which results in a demonstrable increase in levels of point or nonpoint 
source contamination in class 1 waters is prohibited.” There are sepa-
rate subclasses for waters that warrant this level of protection because 
of their importance to an ecosystem, and sources for drinking water are 
separated out in a special subclass to which the public may be prevented 
access.98 Waters that are a “unique or critical habitat” for listed threat-
ened or endangered species are class 1, as are waters within conserva-
tion areas and refuges and national and state parks.99
 Class 2 designates less protected waters that protect uses for recre-
ational purposes, aquatic life, shipping, and agricultural and industrial 
water supplies. Discharges into class 2 waters must receive “the best 
degree of treatment or control.” These are the default waters not listed 
as class 1. The “basic” water quality standards apply to class 2 waters such 
as springs and seeps, ditches, and flumes.
 Discharges into estuaries and embayments are particularly limited. 
New treated sewage discharges are prohibited from estuaries and embay-
ments. Industrial discharges are likewise prohibited, with the exception 
of storm water discharges associated with industrial activity, discharges 
allowed by a general NPDES permit, and a few specific harbors.100
 Marine waters likewise have highly protected class AA waters to be 
preserved in a “natural pristine state.”101 No zones of mixing—where 
discharges that otherwise would violate water quality standards may 
be dispersed into the waters to achieve attainment—are permitted in 
shallow, defined reef areas or within a thousand feet of shore. Class 
AA waters are to be protected for research, marine life, recreation, and 
conservation. Hōnaunau, Waialua Bay, Hanauma Bay, and some open 
coastal waters are all class AA.102 The primary uses of the less-protected 
class A waters are recreational and aesthetic. Other uses are permitted if 
compatible with this objective and the existence of marine life.103 Class 
A waters are predominately harbors.104
 In class I marine bottom ecosystems, only “passive human uses 
without intervention or alteration” are permitted. In class II marine 
bottom ecosystems, wildlife and recreational purposes are protected, 
but actions altering or modifying the seafloor, including the construc-
tion of harbors, dams, seawalls, wastewater effluent outfall structures, 
and landfills are allowed with regulatory approval after weighing the 
environmental impact against the public interest.
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TMDLs: The Seeds of Mandatory Nonpoint 
Source Regulation?
Generally, the CWA does not directly prohibit nonpoint source dis-
charges,105 even though nonpoint pollution contributes more to water 
pollution in the United States than point sources.106 However, the 
administrator of the EPA approves the management plans developed 
by the state and certified by the governor.107 As part of their plans, the 
states must develop Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) to allocate 
allowable pollutant levels to different sources and implement abate-
ment measures. For many years, the mandate was entirely ignored 
by the EPA and all but a handful of states, as they devoted energy 
and resources to implementing the technology-based controls of the 
recent CWA amendments. Inattention continued until a series of 
citizen lawsuits in the 1980s forced implementation. The EPA finally 
began to promulgate guidelines and requirements in the early 1990s.108 
As the pace of listing impaired waters increased, TMDLs became an 
irresistibly potent mechanism for nonpoint source regulation. Recall 
that nonpoint sources now account for the majority of impairment 
in polluted waters. Indeed, according to at least one TMDL devel-
oped for Hawai‘i, nonpoint sources account for the entirety of the 
impairment.109
 Here is how it works. Section 303(d) requires that states identify 
receiving waters that have failed to meet water quality standards for their 
designated uses after the implementation of technology-based pollution 
controls. Waters that fail to meet state standards are “impaired”; failure 
to meet a single water quality criterion, numeric or narrative, results 
in the designation. States are required to establish a priority ranking 
of these impaired water bodies and create TMDLs for the waters based 
on identification of the numeric targets to reach designated beneficial 
uses of the water and a source analysis to locate the sources contributing 
to pollution. The TMDL establishes a numerical limit to the pollutant 
load and allocates those limits to point and nonpoint sources. States 
are required to have continuing planning processes and mechanisms to 
implement TMDLs, though in practice they have wide latitude in how 
they choose to go about it; the EPA is disinclined to pick quarrels in the 
face of passive defiance or outright resistance.110 Point source pollution 
must be consistent with the TMDL, and new discharges are permitted 
only if there remains capacity in current loads that would not exceed 
the TMDL allocated to point sources.111
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 Hawai‘i has listed 93 stream segments and 209 marine segments 
as impaired.112 It has also begun the arduous and expensive process of 
developing TMDLs for impaired waters according to a priority list. There 
is a wide variety of potential TMDLs. For example, broad, dry gulches 
that flow with water in heavy rain are listed as “impaired waters,” as they 
carry pollutants into coastal waters.113 Several have been approved by 
the EPA. The most common source of impairment is turbidity resulting 
from polluted runoff. Excessive amounts of nitrite/nitrates, total nitro-
gen, and total phosphorous are also common.114 Some streams are listed 
as impaired for “turbidity” on the strength of a visual assessment alone 
(i.e., they looked muddy).115 The DOH lacks the resources for exten-
sive testing and argues that in cases where it established water impair-
ment visually, later scientific sampling confirmed the visual assessment. 
Problematically for landowners, it is easier to get on the list of impaired 
waters than off it: While visual data suffices for a listing, waters may be 
removed from the “impaired” list only by a showing of “good cause”—
and “good cause” requires sampling.
 Now that TMDLs have been established for some waters, the big 
question is what they may mean for previously unregulated nonpoint 
sources—particularly agricultural runoff. The CWA is ambiguous about 
whether the TMDL–mandating section of the Clean Water Act, 303(d), 
reaches nonpoint sources at all. Nevertheless, the EPA has interpreted 
Section 303(d) to include nonpoint sources since the 1970s, and states 
have complied by listing nonpoint source allocations in their TMDLs.116 
Because EPA lacks specific authority to regulate nonpoint sources 
directly, implementation of the nonpoint source TMDL load allocations 
was left in the hands of the states.117 However, in Prosolino v. American For-
est & Paper Association,118 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 
the EPA must step in and set TMDLs for waterways that are polluted by 
nonpoint sources if a state fails to do so.119 It reasoned that this did not 
interfere with the state’s traditional control over land use because the 
TMDLs do “not specify the load of pollutants that may be received from 
particular parcels of land or describe what measures the state should 
take to implement the TMDL.”120 Indeed, both the court and the TMDL 
emphasized that “implementation and monitoring are state responsi-
bilities.”121 Hawai‘i has its water quality standards and its TMDLs; now, 
can it enforce them?
 While Hawai‘i has adequate authority to regulate nonpoint pollu-
tion through TMDLs, it lacks effective enforcement mechanisms.122 In 
the words of one TMDL, “Participation in the Polluted Runoff Con-
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trol program is voluntary, and there are no DOH-imposed regulatory 
consequences of non-participation.”123 The Polluted Runoff Control 
Program, the state agency created to apply for and distribute grants 
for (voluntary) runoff pollution control from Section 319 of the Clean 
Water Act, is hampered by lack of funding and lack of personnel. In the 
year 2007, there were two vacancies in a very small department.124 In 
one TMDL, the DOH claimed it had authority under Section 342D-11 
of the Hawaii Revised Statutes to enforce nonpoint sources violating 
water quality standards, even absent permitting authority, by filing civil 
lawsuits. According to the statute, “The [DOH] may institute a civil 
action in any court of competent jurisdiction for injunctive and other 
relief to prevent any violation of [the water pollution chapter], any rule 
adopted pursuant to this chapter . . . to impose and collect civil penal-
ties, to collect administrative penalties, or to obtain other relief.”125 It is 
unclear whether this vague directive would be sufficient to compel non-
point source polluters to adopt best management practices or otherwise 
be liable for the runoff that contributed (but probably did not solely 
cause) violations of state water quality standards. Such a litigation would 
no doubt consume legal resources better used elsewhere; no attempts 
to use 342D-11 in such a manner have yet been attempted on the basis 
of a TMDL.
 What can be expected of TMDLs in Hawai‘i? According to one 
gloomy commentator, “The largest loss leaders of the federal air and 
water quality acts are the science-based total maximum daily load 
(TMDL) and state implementation plan (SIP) programs, which absorb 
large amounts of money, remain information-starved, feature shame-
less manipulation of the data, face crippling political pressure, and 
produce little abatement.”126 Another commentator, equally pessimis-
tic, questioned the applicability of the TMDL regulatory scheme to 
Hawai‘i: “The TMDL program was not designed to accomplish water 
quality improvement in streams in small Hawaiian watersheds impaired 
mainly by nonpoint source pollutants, habitat destruction, dewatering 
of streams, and growth of dense stands of introduced vegetation in 
stream channels. Without changes at the federal level, monies spent 
on TMDL preparation in Hawai‘i will accomplish little beyond satisfy-
ing federal paperwork requirements.”127 Regulating nonpoint sources 
of pollution is not impossible. Relatively simple best management 
practices are capable of reducing pollutants, at a cost that is relatively 
cheap compared to requiring BPT or BAT from point sources.128 The 
state of Florida decreased nutrient loading into the Everglades from 
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sugar crops by 40 percent.129 Thus far, however, Hawai‘i has not shown 
much inclination to push for more regulation of the most responsible 
industries.
Dredge and Fill
Historically, the conversion of wetlands into usable land was regarded 
as a valuable and desirable improvement. It is only in the past few 
decades that the importance of wetlands to preserving ecosystems and 
the maintenance of clean water has been recognized and embraced. 
Section 404 of the CWA is designed to protect wetlands by requiring 
permits for the discharge of “dredged or fill material” into “waters of 
the United States.”130 The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for 
issuing permits “for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the 
navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”131 The Corps exercises wide 
discretion in implementing Section 404, which does not have the same 
scientific benchmarks as the NPDES program.132 Though the statute 
authorizes delegation of the implementation plans, Hawai‘i has not 
adopted one. This section therefore deals entirely with federal statutes 
and regulations.
 “Dredged material” and “fill material” represent different concepts. 
“Fill material” is “material placed in waters of the United States where 
the material has the effect of . . . [r]eplacing any portion of a water of 
the United States with dry land; or [c]hanging the bottom elevation of 
any portion of a water of the United States.”133 Fill material is brought in 
from outside the wetland: Excavation debris, sand, rocks, and soil are all 
fill material. Garbage is not fill material. Fill material might be added to 
the waters of the United States for the purpose of constructing structures 
or infrastructure in a waterway, to create causeways or road fills, seawalls, 
breakwaters, levees, intake and outfall pipes associated with power plants, 
utility lines placed beneath the water, and artificial reefs.134
 “Dredged material” is “material that is excavated or dredged from 
waters of the United States.”135 This refers to substances that come from 
the wetland itself. “Discharge of dredged material” is “any addition of 
dredged material into, including redeposit of dredged material other 
than incidental fallback within, waters of the United States.” A 404 per-
mit is not required for “incidental addition” of dredged material if it is 
not associated with an activity that would degrade or destroy waters of 
the United States, unless it involves mechanized land-clearing and exca-
vation activity, absent a showing that such activities would not degrade 
the waters of the United States.136 The distinction matters because de 
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minimis discharges of dredged material are permitted without a permit 
as “incidental fallback”: “Incidental fall back is the redeposit of small 
volumes of dredged material that is incidental to excavation activity 
. . . [s]oil that is disturbed when dirt is shoveled . . . when such small 
volume of soil . . . falls into substantially the same place from which it 
was initially removed.”137
 The regulatory burden on the 404 permitting process is huge. The 
average decision time following an application for a 404 permit is 405 
days. However, including the time spent in “preapplication consulta-
tion” and the application itself, it takes an average of 788 days to obtain 
an individual permit. Even very small impacts involving less than one-
tenth of an acre take 270 days to go through the permitting process. It 
costs the Corps about $5,000 to review a permit requesting dredging 
or filling of one acre of wetland.138 Predictably, more applications are 
withdrawn than actually decided by the Corps.
 Happily for farmers and road builders, a number of exceptions to 
the requirement for a 404 permit exist. Exemptions for agriculture are 
generous. “Normal farming” and ranching, “plowing, seeding, cultivat-
ing, minor drainage, and harvesting . . . or upland soil and water conser-
vation practices” are exempt. The farming must already be “established” 
to fall under this exemption. Other activities associated with agricul-
ture, such as the construction or maintenance of ponds or irrigation 
ditches and the maintenance of drainage ditches, are likewise exempt. 
So also are roads “sufficiently far” from water bodies, farm roads, forest 
roads, and temporary mining, if in accordance with “best management 
practices.” The “[c]onstruction of temporary sedimentation basins on 
a construction site” not filling in wetlands is also exempt. But if these 
exempted activities are part of a larger project to “convert an area of the 
waters of the United States” to a new use that would reduce or impair 
the circulation of waters, a 404 permit is still required.139
 There are several types of permits available under Section 404. 
Nationwide permits (or “general permits”) are available for discharges 
that would “cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when 
performed separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse 
effect on the environment.”140 Like NPDES general permits, nationwide 
permits are issued to cover routine activities in order to reduce the delay 
and expense of the individual permitting process. Examples of activities 
covered under general permits are agricultural activities, environmen-
tal protection actions such as oil spill cleanup and emergency watershed 
protection, boat ramps, and discharges in ditches.141 If the conditions 
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attached to the nationwide permit are satisfied, the permittee usually 
does not need to notify the Corps before proceeding with the activity.142 
Regional permits are similar to nationwide permits but are issued on a 
case-by-case basis.
 The other major permit from the Corps is an “individual permit,” 
which, like the NPDES individual permit, is for a specific proposal at a 
specific site. The Corps typically requires individual permits for uses that 
may cause a severe impact on the environment.143 It will issue a permit 
if there is no practicable alternative, there will be no significant adverse 
impacts on aquatic resources, the applicant takes all reasonable mitiga-
tion efforts, and the project otherwise complies with applicable law.144 
Applications filed with the Corps district engineer are on a standard 
form, accompanied by drawings and sketches sufficient to give notice 
to the proposed project. The engineer must issue a public notice that 
must provide sufficient information about the scope of the project.145 
The public has thirty days to make comments for the district engineer to 
consider.146 For the Corps to reach a decision on a Section 404 permit, 
the applicant may need to demonstrate compliance with other laws: 
(1) Unless the proposed activity is exempted, a decision requires com-
pliance and approval pursuant to the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, which may require an environmental impact statement or 
environmental assessment; (2) a certification of compliance with state 
implementation of Coastal Zone Management Act; (3) compliance with 
applicable regulations of the National Historic Preservation Act; (4) 
review of the impact on threatened or endangered species under the 
Endangered Species Act; (5) and compliance with Section 401(a) of the 
Clean Water Act, which requires a water quality certification.147
 Ultimately, the Corps decides whether to issue a dredge and fill per-
mit by evaluating the potential benefits and harm of the project and, gen-
erally, “the needs and welfare of the people.” Federal regulations contain 
an exhaustive list of specific factors that the Corps considers. There is, 
for example, a general presumption that the alteration or destruction of 
wetlands is against the public interest.148 If conditions necessary to make 
the proposed activity accord with the public interest are not “reasonably 
implementable or enforceable,” the permit must be denied.149
The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act of 1973150 (ESA) restricts land use activi-
ties on federal, state, and private land by prohibiting activities that may 
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affect endangered or threatened species. In the early 1970s, Congress 
found that “various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the U.S. have 
been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and devel-
opment untempered by adequate concern and conservation[.]”151 The 
ESA was passed in order to (1) “provide a means whereby the ecosys-
tems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend 
may be conserved,” (2) “to provide a program for the conservation of 
such endangered species and threatened species,” and (3) “to take such 
steps as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and 
conventions set forth in [the act].”152 Under certain conditions, the ESA 
has the potential to halt land development, and it has thus drawn criti-
cism and a reputation as one of the most powerful environmental laws 
in the world.153
 There are approximately 1,880 species listed under the ESA.154 Of 
these species, approximately 1,310 are found in part or entirely in the 
United States and its waters; the remainder are foreign species.155 The 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
share responsibility for implementing the ESA.156 Generally, FWS man-
ages land and freshwater species, while NMFS manages marine and 
“anadromous” species.157 NMFS has jurisdiction over approximately 
sixty listed species.158
 The ESA directs the secretary of the Interior to list species as threat-
ened or endangered.159 An “endangered species” is “any species which 
is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its 
range other than a species of the Class Insecta determined by the Sec-
retary to constitute a pest whose protection under the provisions of this 
Act would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man.”160 A 
“threatened species” is “any species which is likely to become an endan-
gered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a signifi-
cant portion of its range.”161
 The secretary may designate any species as endangered or threat-
ened because of any of the following factors: (1) “the present or 
threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or 
range”; (2) “overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or 
educational purposes”; (3) “disease or predation”; (4) “the inadequacy 
of existing regulatory mechanisms; or” (5) “other natural or manmade 
factors affecting its continued existence.”162 When determining the sta-
tus of any species, however, the secretary must base a decision “solely on 
the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available[.]”163
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 Pursuant to Section 4 of the ESA, the secretary must also designate 
“critical habitat” for threatened and endangered species.164 The term 
“critical habitat” is defined as “(i) the specific areas within the geographi-
cal area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed . . . , on which are 
found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conserva-
tion of the species and (II) which may require special management con-
siderations or protection; and (ii) specific areas outside the geographical 
area occupied by the species at the time it is listed . . . , upon a determina-
tion by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation of 
the species.”165 The secretary must designate critical habitat on the basis 
of “the best scientific data available and after taking into consideration the 
economic impact, the impact on national security, and any other relevant 
impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat.”166
 The critical habitat designation (CHD) of the ESA has the most 
potential for affecting the private use of land, and what is meant by “eco-
nomic impact” is crucial in determining the area of a CHD. Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided this issue, lower federal courts 
have made it clear that economic impacts of a CHD include those 
impacts that are attributable coextensively to other causes. In New Mexico 
Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,167 the court concluded 
that “Congress intended that the FWS conduct a full analysis of all of the 
economic impacts of a critical habitat designation, regardless of whether 
those impacts are attributable co-extensively to other causes.”168
 Section 7 of the act directs federal agencies to consider the impact 
proposed actions may have on protected species.169 Once critical habitat 
is designated, federal agencies must consult with the Fish and Wildlife 
Service to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by 
such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of 
any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruc-
tion or adverse modification of [the designated critical] habitat of such 
species[.]”170 With respect to any agency action, each federal agency 
must request from the secretary information on whether any species 
that is listed or proposed to be listed may be present in the area of such 
proposed action.171 “If the Secretary advises, based on the best scientific 
and commercial data available, that such species may be present, such 
agency shall conduct a biological assessment for the purpose of identify-
ing any endangered species or threatened species which is likely to be 
affected by such action.”172
 Section 9 affects private individuals by its prohibition against the 
“taking” of endangered species.173 To “take” means to “harass, harm, 
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pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt 
to engage in any such conduct.”174 Among these proscribed actions, the 
most significant is “harm,” which is defined not in the ESA but in the 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) as “an act which actually kills or 
injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification 
or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly 
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or 
sheltering.”175 The CFR also defines “harass” as “an intentional or negli-
gent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by 
annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behav-
ioral patterns which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, 
or sheltering.”176
 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Department of Interior’s 
definition of “harm” against a facial challenge to its validity in Babbit 
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon.177 There, small 
landowners, logging companies, families dependent on the forest prod-
ucts industries, and organizations that represent their interests brought 
a declaratory judgment action challenging the statutory validity of the 
definition of “harm.”178 They alleged that the application of the “harm” 
regulation to the red-cockaded woodpecker, an endangered species, 
and the northern spotted owl, a threatened species, had injured them 
economically.179
 The Court upheld the definition of “harm,” reasoning that the text 
of the ESA provided three reasons for concluding that their definition 
of “harm” is reasonable.180 “First, an ordinary understanding of the 
word ‘harm’ supports it. The dictionary definition of the verb form of 
‘harm’ is ‘to cause hurt or damage to: injure.’ In the context of the ESA, 
that definition naturally encompasses habitat modification that results 
in actual injury or death to members of an endangered or threatened 
species.”181 “Second, the broad purpose of the ESA supports the Sec-
retary’s decision to extend protection against activities that cause the 
precise harms Congress enacted the statute to avoid.”182 “Third, the 
fact that Congress in 1982 authorized the Secretary to issue permits for 
[incidental takings], strongly suggests that Congress understood [Sec-
tion 9] to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings. . . . Congress’ 
addition of the [Section 10] permit provision supports the Secretary’s 
conclusion that activities not intended to harm an endangered species, 
such as habitat modification, may constitute unlawful takings under the 
ESA unless the Secretary permits them.”183
 Courts have also considered what constitutes a “taking.” In Palila 
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v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources,184 a lower court held 
that habitat destruction constituted a taking in violation of the ESA. 
The court found that the state’s action in maintaining feral sheep and 
goats in a critical habitat was a violation of the ESA since it was shown 
that a listed bird was endangered by the activity.185 It explained that its 
conclusion was “consistent with the Act’s legislative history showing that 
Congress was informed that the greatest threat to endangered species is 
the destruction of their natural habitat.”186
 More than a decade later, another court held that limited devel-
opment within critical habitat is not necessarily a taking. In Defenders 
of Wildlife v. Bernal,187 citizen groups sought an injunction to prevent 
the Amphitheater School District in Tucson, Arizona, from building a 
“critically-needed” high school, claiming that the proposed construc-
tion would result in a “take” of the endangered pygmy-owl.188 The court 
held that the citizen groups had not shown that the “proposed construc-
tion would harm a pygmy-owl by killing or injuring it, or would more 
likely than not harass a pygmy-owl by annoying it to such an extent as 
to disrupt its normal behavioral patterns.”189 The court considered the 
trial judge’s factual findings that (1) “no pygmy-owl had been detected 
anywhere within the school site itself”190 and (2) “pygmy-owls can toler-
ate a fairly high degree of human presence.”191
 Although Section 9 creates a strict ban on actions that affect pro-
tected species, the ESA provides some flexibility through its allowance 
of “Section 10 incidental takings.” “Incidental taking” means “any tak-
ing otherwise prohibited, if such taking is incidental to, and not the pur-
pose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”192 Section 10 
allows for the secretary to permit, under such terms and conditions as 
he shall prescribe, “any act otherwise prohibited by section 9 for scien-
tific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected 
species, including, but not limited to, acts necessary for the establish-
ment and maintenance of experimental populations[.]”193 Section 10 
incidental taking permits also issue for the taking of any endangered 
species within the United States or its territorial sea “if such taking is 
incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise 
lawful activity.”194 No permit can be issued for the latter reason unless 
the applicant submits to the secretary a conservation plan that specifies 
“(1) the impact which will likely result from such taking; (2) what steps 
the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts, and the 
funding that will be available to implement such steps; (3) what alterna-
tive actions to such taking the applicant considered and the reasons why 
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such alternatives are not being utilized; and (4) such other measures 
that the Secretary may require as being necessary or appropriate for 
purposes of the plan.”195
 After opportunity for public comment, with respect to a permit 
application and the related conservation plan, the secretary must issue 
the permit if he finds that: “(1) the taking will be incidental; (2) the appli-
cant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate 
the impacts of such taking; (3) the applicant will ensure that adequate 
funding for the plan will be provided; (4) the taking will not appreciably 
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the 
wild; and (5) the measures, if any, required under [the act] will be met; 
and he has received such other assurances as he may require that the 
plan will be implemented[.]”196 The permit will contain such terms and 
conditions as the secretary deems necessary or appropriate, including 
but not limited to reporting requirements for determining whether the 
permittee is complying with such terms and conditions.197 If not, the 
secretary can revoke a Section 10 permit.198
Interplay between the ESA and Hawai‘i  
Land Use Law199
Pursuant to this statutory authority and mandate, in early 2003 the FWS 
proposed to designate several thousand acres in the County of Kaua‘i, 
including thousands of acres of private land, in order to protect two 
listed species: the cave wolf spider and the cave amphipod. While the 
FWS has repeatedly claimed that such designation only affects federal 
activities on federal lands in areas so designated as critical area, such 
designation will almost certainly trigger further designation and regula-
tion under certain Hawai‘i statutes, resulting in severe restrictions on 
the use of private land with dire economic consequences for affected 
landowners.
 Recall that Hawai‘i’s State Land Use Law, essentially embodied in 
Act 187 and Act 100, creates a dual zoning system whereby land is zoned 
by both the state and county (see chapter 1).200 Pursuant to the ESA, the 
FWS is required to designate critical habitat for all listed endangered 
species, whether on private or public land. The purpose of the designa-
tion is to designate specific areas within the geographical area occupied 
by such listed species essential to its conservation.201 Conservation is 
further defined to include not only survival but recovery, if necessary, of 
the listed endangered species.202
 The State Land Use Law defines uses in each district, requiring 
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for the conservation district that “[c]onservation districts shall include 
areas necessary for . . . conserving indigenous or endemic plants, fish, 
and wildlife, including those which are threatened or endangered.”203 
Given further language in the State Plan,204 which requires that the 
state’s physical environment planning “[e]ncourage the protection of 
rare or endangered plant and animal species and habitats native to Hawai‘i,” 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the State Land Use Commis-
sion will be required to reclassify into the State Conservation District 
all endangered species habitat land that is not already so classified.205 
Further increasing the likelihood of such redistricting, the State Depart-
ment of Land and Natural Resources is required by statute to “initiate 
amendments to the conservation district boundaries consistent with sec-
tion 205-4 in order to include high quality native forests and the habitat 
of rare native species of flora and fauna within the Conservation District.”206 
It is difficult to see how the commission can thus avoid classifying land 
that the FWS designates as critical habitat for listed endangered species 
immediately into the State Conservation District.
 Moreover, it will be extremely difficult to persuade the commis-
sion to reclassify designated endangered species habitat lands from the 
conservation district to any of the other three state land use districts (all 
of which permit economically beneficial land use, from agriculture to 
urban development) and equally difficult to persuade the commission 
to reclassify any such lands in any of the other districts (say, agriculture 
to rural or urban) to any district but conservation. This is so because the 
Land Use Law further provides that “[i]n its review of any petition for 
reclassification of district boundaries pursuant to this chapter, the com-
mission shall specifically consider . . . the impact of the proposed reclas-
sification on . . . areas of state concern [such as the] [p]reservation or 
maintenance of important natural systems or habitats.”207 The Land Use 
Law also requires that any such boundary amendments (reclassifica-
tions) conform to the State Plan, which encourages the protection of 
endangered plant and animal habitats.208
 Once the commission classifies lands—private and public alike—
in the State Conservation District, control of such lands for regulatory 
purposes passes to the DLNR, which has exclusive jurisdiction over their 
use.209 The DLNR is further required by statute to establish subzones 
within the conservation district.210 Finally, except for uses established 
in 1964 and the rare variance, only those uses permitted in these sub-
zones are permitted uses in the conservation district.211 The DLNR has 
by regulation established five such subzones. Very little is permitted in 
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any of them. The most restrictive of these is the protective subzone. 
The protective subzone “shall encompass . . . [a]reas necessary for pre-
serving natural ecosystems of native plants, fish, and wildlife, particularly 
those which are endangered.”212 The only uses permitted are “[b]asic data 
collection, research, education and resource evaluation.”213
 It is thus nearly certain that the DLNR will reclassify any conserva-
tion district lands under its jurisdiction that the FWS designates as criti-
cal endangered species habitat into the most restrictive—protective—
subzone, which permits virtually no economic use of such land. Its value 
would accordingly plummet. Indeed, should either the commission or 
DLNR fail to so classify FWS–designated endangered species critical 
habitat lands, they may well be forced to do so under the rules of Log-
gerhead Turtle v. Volusia County,214 holding that a county may be charged 
with violation of the ESA for harmfully inadequate regulation of activity 
that endangers a listed species.
 Hawai‘i’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Law, which applies 
to a broader range of activities than the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA), would almost certainly be triggered by the ESA.215 This is 
because any proposed use would now be in a State Conservation Dis-
trict; even in the unlikely event that land in which a use is contemplated 
is not in a State Conservation District this would be true, because the 
use would “[s]ubstantially [affect] a rare, threatened, or endangered 
species, or its habitat.”216 Any use of commission-classified conservation 
lands (or for that matter any state or county lands, even if that use con-
sists only of intersecting such lands through an underground pipe or 
overhead wire) triggers at least an environmental assessment, if not a 
full-blown EIS, as described elsewhere in this chapter.217
 Recall (from chapter 6) that Hawai‘i’s CZMA218 requires a Special 
Management Area permit (SMAP) from the appropriate county for 
any development in the designated coastal zone special management 
area, which extends around each of the state’s islands and inland for 
a mile or more in some instances. The statute provides that the coun-
ties must minimize any development that would “adversely affect . . . 
wildlife habitats,”219 and it requires that the counties may not approve 
any development unless they find that it is “consistent with the objec-
tives, policies and . . . guidelines” of the CZMA.220 The list of CZMA 
policies in the statute includes ensuring “that the use and development 
of marine and coastal resources are ecologically and environmentally 
sound.”221 It will be difficult to obtain an SMAP in ESA–designated 
critical habitats because it is more than arguable that after designa-
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tion, development will adversely affect the habitat of an endangered 
species.
Hawai‘i’s Endangered Species Act
Hawai‘i has the highest number of listed threatened and endangered 
species in the nation, with 385 threatened and endangered plant and 
animal species listed under the ESA.222 Of these 385 species, 285 are 
plants and 100 are animals.223 Given the state’s abundance of endan-
gered species, Hawai‘i has adopted its own version of the ESA to further 
protect its unique wildlife.224
 The Hawai‘i State Legislature has declared that “[a]ll indigenous 
species of aquatic life, wildlife, and land plants are integral parts of 
Hawai‘i’s native ecosystems and comprise the living heritage of Hawai‘i, 
for they represent a natural resource of scientific, cultural, educational, 
environmental, and economic value to future generations of Hawai‘i’s 
people.”225 Therefore, “[t]o insure the continued perpetuation of indig-
enous aquatic life, wildlife, and land plants, and their habitats for human 
enjoyment, for scientific purposes, and as members of ecosystems, it is 
necessary that the State take positive actions to enhance their prospects 
for survival.”226 Chapter 195D of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (herein-
after “Hawai‘i’s Conservation Law”) authorizes the DLNR “to conduct 
investigations on any species of aquatic life, wildlife, and land plants in 
order to develop information relating to their biology, ecology, popula-
tion, status, distribution, habitat needs, and other limiting factors to 
determine conservation measures necessary for their continued ability 
to sustain themselves successfully.”227 The Hawai‘i law is more restric-
tive than the ESA because it protects both threatened and endangered 
species and provides for the protection of species that are not listed as 
endangered or threatened pursuant to the ESA.
 Under Hawai‘i’s statute, “endangered species” means “any species 
whose continued existence as a viable component of Hawaii’s indig-
enous fauna or flora is determined to be in jeopardy[.]”228 “Threat-
ened species” means “any species of aquatic life, wildlife, or land plant 
which appears likely, within the foreseeable future, to become endan-
gered[.]”229 Although any species that is deemed endangered pursuant 
to the ESA is deemed to be an endangered species under Hawai‘i’s stat-
ute, the DLNR may determine that any threatened species is an endan-
gered species within the State of Hawai‘i. The factors used to determine 
whether a species is endangered or threatened under the state law are 
similar to those used in the ESA.
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 Hawai‘i’s statute makes it “unlawful for any person to take, possess, 
transport, transplant, export, process, sell, offer for sale, or ship any spe-
cies of aquatic life, wildlife, or land plants deemed by the department to 
be in need of conservation[.]”230 It is unlawful for any person to “take” 
any threatened or endangered species within the State of Hawai‘i.231 
“Person” means “an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, associa-
tion, or any other private entity, or any officer, employee, agent, depart-
ment, or instrumentality of the federal government, of any state or 
political subdivision thereof, or of any foreign government[.]”232 The 
definition of “take” under the state law is similar to, although slightly 
more expansive than, the definition under the ESA.233 The Hawai‘i stat-
ute also provides exceptions similar to the Section 10 incidental taking 
provisions of the ESA.234
 Given the interplay between the ESA and Hawai‘i’s Land Use Law, 
the designation of a species as endangered under Hawai‘i’s statute 
may also trigger a boundary amendment for the lands upon which the 
endangered species is found.
Hawai‘i Environmental Impact and Assessment Law
The Hawai‘i Environmental Impact Statements (HEIS) law requires an 
environmental assessment for actions (projects or proposals) in order 
that “environmental policies of the legislature are given appropriate 
consideration in decision-making along with economic and technologi-
cal considerations.”235 The agency from which approval is sought for a 
project or proposal must prepare an environmental assessment (EA). If 
a finding of “no significant impact” is anticipated, a draft environmental 
assessment is made available for public comment for thirty days. The 
agency is required to respond to comments in writing and may then 
prepare a final environmental assessment to determine whether an 
EIS is required. An EIS is required when the environmental assessment 
determines that a proposed action will “likely” have a significant effect 
on the environment.236 A draft EIS is made available for public review 
for forty-five days. The applicant or agency must respond in writing to 
comments received during the review period and prepare a final state-
ment to submit for acceptance.
 Acceptance is a formal determination that the EIS adequately 
describes identifiable environmental impacts and satisfactorily responds 
to comments received during the review of the statement.237 It requires 
no action to mitigate, only to note and record alternatives. Acceptance of 
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a final statement is a condition precedent for approval of the requested 
action.238 Chapter 343 requires disclosure of the environmental effects 
of the proposed action as well as the effects on the economic welfare, 
social welfare, and cultural practices of the community, measures pro-
posed to minimize adverse effects, and alternatives to the action and 
their environmental effects.
 The Hawai‘i Supreme Court has consistently read chapter 343 to 
maximize opportunities for public comment and participation in accor-
dance with its reading of the intent of the legislature and consequently 
has required environmental assessments in close cases. In Kahana Sunset 
Owners Ass’n v. County of Maui,239 the Court held that a new thirty-six-
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inch drainage line beneath a public roadway connecting to an existing 
twenty-four-inch culvert below a state highway was a use of state lands 
and triggered an environmental assessment.240 The Court determined 
the drainage line did not qualify for an exemption for “installation of 
drains within streets and highways” because it was not in the category 
of “minor structures accessory to existing facilities.” Most importantly, 
the Court determined that the requirement for an environmental 
assessment was not confined to the drainage line on state land, but 
that it must address the environmental effects of the entire proposed 
development—a 312-unit multifamily residential development that the 
HEIS process would not otherwise reach. The drainage pipe was a “nec-
essary precedent” for the development and had no independent utility. 
Thus, “[i]solating only that particular component of the development 
for environmental assessment would be improper segmentation of the 
project.”241
 A decision two years later reached a similar result. The developer 
of a resort with a hotel and golf course was required to file an EIS for 
the entire resort early in the planning phase because it proposed to 
construct two underpasses under a state highway so that golf carts and 
maintenance vehicles could access three golf holes and the golf course 
maintenance facility.242
 Finally, a proposed reclassification of property from agricultural 
district to urban district constituted an “action” proposing the use 
of state lands, because the proposed development would eventually 
require sewage and water transmission lines under state highways.243 
Reclassification of land requiring an EA was considered and rejected 
by the legislature in 1974.244 Nevertheless, the Court held that although 
not every reclassification triggered an EA, if the reclassification was the 
initial step of a project that proposed the use of state lands, an EA was 
required.245
 The result is a judicial backdoor into the EIS process at a very early 
stage for private landowners. Though HEIS does not require any action 
to be taken as a result of the findings of an EIS, it is a potent tool for 
those seeking to delay or derail a project. The legislature rejected a 
proposal in 1974 to apply the HEIS law to all major developments that 
would likely have significant environmental affects, choosing instead to 
limit the application of the law to actions proposing the use of state 
lands and state funds and certain “areas of critical concern,” such as the 
Waikīkī–Diamond Head area, lands classified in the State Conservation 
District, and the shoreline.246 But under the Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s 
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interpretation of the law, every large project that in some minor way 
touches upon state lands (as a practical matter, almost every such proj-
ect) is required to undergo the expense, delay, and possible litigation 
of the EIS process in order to obtain the necessary state and county 
permits. The Court confirmed its apparent policy of subjecting all prop-
erty development to the state HEIS process by unanimously deciding in 
April 2010 that an EIS completed too long ago must be supplemented or 
redone to take into consideration potential impacts arising outside the 
boundaries of the subject project, despite the lack of statutory authority 
for such a requirement.247
 Environmental regulation in Hawai‘i presents significant challenges 
to land developers, and compliance with various regulatory schemes and 
inevitable litigation are major costs of financing development. The future 
may hold even more aggressive land use regulation, since the state-spon-
sored Hawai‘i 2050 Sustainability Plan calls for increased enforcement of 
habitat management, more “compact patterns of urban development,” 
and generally recommends “building up, rather than out.”248
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2030. Kevin Dayton, “How much is too much?” Honolulu Advertiser, June 23, 
2006, at 1A. Even with that increase, because of the growing population, the current 
shortage of affordable housing will almost certainly continue. “Housing: Develop-
ment cap, ‘enough’ affordable homes look unlikely,” Honolulu Advertiser, June 
23, 2006, at 12A. The 2050 Sustainability Plan was created in part to ensure that 
quality of life does not decline as population increases. Dayton, supra.
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